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No. 2—January 1988

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# ABSTRACTS

## Changing Aspirations, Limited Attention, and War
By P. ANDERSON and T. J. McKEOWN

The authors present a theory of the general enabling conditions for war which predicts that war is possible, though not inevitable, when the conditions of the theory are satisfied. Whether a war will actually occur depends upon the idiosyncratic situational factors that are outside the scope of the theory. Three conditions make war possible: (1) Aspirations do not match achievements: governments only initiate wars when their achieved share of global capabilities differs from their aspired share of capabilities. (2) Salience: governments only initiate wars against other governments when there is a history of substantial interaction. (3) Power: governments never initiate wars against other governments that have a substantially greater military capacity. These conditions may be viewed as a series of three filters that identify pairs of countries between which war is possible. The theory predicts that wars will not occur in any dyad that does not pass through all the filters. In testing this theory for all nations between 1816 and 1980, the authors allowed for the fact that governments may preemptively initiate wars against other governments that meet these conditions.

## Democracy from Above: The Political Origins of Military Dictatorship in Brazil
By Y. COHEN

The argument of this paper is that the emergence of military dictatorships, such as the Brazilian regime of 1964, is not caused by an economic crisis of dependent capitalist development. Rather, *it results from a polarization and radicalization of the democratic regime by which it* is preceded. Democracies handed down from above, like that in Brazil and other South American democracies, lend themselves to polarization and radicalization. They therefore favor the emergence of modern forms of autocracy.

## The Party, the Military, and Decision Authority in the Soviet Union
By C. RICE

Soviet military decision making is characterized by a division of labor between the party, which issues broad policy guidance, and the professional military, which oversees the development of the armed forces based on that guidance. There is to date no civilian institution whose functions parallel those of the General Staff. The party is now, and has historically been, dependent on the professional military for the formation of options on strategy, organization, and force composition. The Soviets have never equated civilian control and authority with civilian management. Absolute party authority over defense policy has been maintained through control of personnel and resource allocation.

## Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War
By J. S. LEVY

The preventive motivation for war arises from political leaders' perceptions that their states' military power and potential are declining relative to those of a rising adversary, and from their fear of the consequences of that decline. It is conceptualized as an intervening variable between changing power differentials and the outbreak of war, and is distinguished from preemption and other sources of better-now-than-later logic. The strength of the preventive motivation is hypothesized to be a function of a state's expectations regarding its rate of military decline, the margin of its inferiority in the future, the probability of a future war, and the probability of a victorious war now with acceptable costs. It is also affected by the risk orientation of decision makers; the influence of the military in the political process; and domestic political factors that undermine the political security of decision makers as well as the military power and potential of the state.

## The Steps to War:

### TOWARD A SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION OF CORRELATES OF WAR FINDINGS

By J. A. VASQUEZ

Since its inception, the Correlates of War project has been in the forefront of the quantitative analysis of war. This review seeks to integrate some of the major findings of the project into an explanation that identifies the steps that regularly occur before war. The explanation must be seen as an artificial construct, based on inductive generalizations from existing evidence and clues, whose primary utility at this stage of inquiry is to see what patterns precede wars, what conditions are associated with peace, and what factors may be of causal significance. The findings and the explanation derived from them are relevant to assessing some common realist practices and policies of states such as alliance making, military build-ups, hard-line bargaining, balancing of power, peace-through-strength, and deterrence. It is argued that among equals, power-politics behavior does not avoid war, but leads political actors to take steps that bring them closer to war.

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PATRICK M. BOYLE, S.J., is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Politics at Princeton University. He is currently conducting thesis research on the politics of education in contemporary Zaire.

# ABSTRACTS

## Social Revolutions and Mass Military Mobilization

By T. SKOCPOL

Despite their limited accomplishments in promoting economic development, the authoritarian regimes brought to power through social-revolutionary transformations—from the French Revolution of the 18th century to the Iranian Revolution of the present—have excelled at conducting humanly costly wars with a special fusion of popular zeal, meritocratic professionalism, and central coordination. Revolutionary elites, whether communist or not, have been able to build the strongest states in those countries whose geopolitical circumstances allowed the emerging new regimes to become engaged in protracted and labor-intensive international warfare.

## Science and Sovietology:

### BRIDGING THE METHODS GAP IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY STUDIES

By J. SNYDER

Specialists in the study of Soviet foreign policy increasingly feel torn between the positivist culture of political science departments and the holistic traditions of the Soviet area-studies programs. In fact, these approaches are largely complementary. Examples taken from literature on Soviet security policy and on the domestic sources of Soviet expansionism show how positivist theories and methods can be used to clarify holist (or traditionalist) arguments, to sharpen debates, to suggest more telling tests, and to invigorate the field's research agenda.

## Left-Libertarian Parties:

### EXPLAINING INNOVATION IN COMPETITIVE PARTY SYSTEMS

By H. P. KITSCHELT

Since the 1960s, new left-socialist or ecology parties have appeared in approximately half of the advanced Western democracies. These parties have a common set of egalitarian and libertarian tenets and appeal to younger, educated voters. The author uses macropolitical and economic data to explain the electoral success of these left-libertarian parties. While high levels of economic development are favorable preconditions for their emergence, they are best explained in terms of domestic political opportunity structures. There is little evidence that these parties are a reaction to economic and social crises in advanced democracies. The findings suggest that the rise of left-libertarian parties is the result of a new cleavage mobilized in democratic party systems rather than of transient protest.

## Neorealism and Neoliberalism

By J. S. NYE, JR.

The classic dialectic between Realist and Liberal theories of international politics, as expressed by Robert O. Keohane, ed., in *Neorealism and Its Critics* and Richard Rosecrance in *The Rise of the Trading State*, can be transcended. Neither paradigm singularly explains international behavior: Realism is the dominant approach, but liberal theories of transnationalism and interdependence help to illuminate how national interests are learned and changed. Keohane and fellow critics argue that Neorealism—articulated definitively in Kenneth Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* (1979)—elegantly systematizes Realism, but concentrates on international system structure at the expense of system process. Focused tightly on the concept of bipolarity, Waltz's theory tends toward stasis; the unit (state) level unproductively becomes an analytical "dumping ground." As a Neoliberal counterpoint, Rosecrance's argument does not go far enough. In the tradition of commercial liberalism, he argues that an open trading system offers states maneuverability through economic growth rather than through military conquest. He tempers his argument with Realist considerations of prudence, but fails to clarify Realist-Liberal links in his theory, or to explore fully the connections between power and non-power incentives influencing states' behavior. A synthesis of Neorealism and Neoliberalism is warranted: a systemic theory using the former to analyze at the level of structure, the latter more often at the level of process.

## State, Social Elites, and Government Capacity in Southeast Asia

By D. K. CRONE

The signal performances of Southeast Asian countries in attaining economic growth and political stability are frequently explained by cultural and policy factors. Recent research suggests, however, that the role of the state is extensive and central to economic and political goals. The present approach to the comparative evaluation of state capacities attempts to account for the variations and nuances of the performance of Southeast Asian states. The structure of political support and available means of social control provide relatively greater capacity to state elites in Singapore and Malaysia, and less capacity to state elites in the Philippines and Indonesia; Thailand is an intermediate case.

## A View from Zaire

By P. BOYLE

This review of recent books on Zaire examines how the changing salience of the issues of ethnicity, class, and the state exhibit shifts in academic perspectives and especially in perceptions of how best to account for and articulate the characteristics of political life in contemporary Zaire. The authors' views on the dynamics of class formation within a situation of increasing socioeconomic inequality and state decline raise questions about how or to what degree the Mobutu regime has managed to institutionalize a kind of "authority" and "political order" over the past twenty years. The case of Zaire challenges the meaning of "institutionalization" because the most clearly identifiable practices in Zaire have centered on finding efficient means for appropriating whatever political and economic resources are at hand.

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# ABSTRACTS

## New Perspectives on Appeasement:
### SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
By J. L. RICHARDSON

Historical research since the opening of the British archives in the late 1960s has brought about a substantial revision of the image of appeasement that had generally been accepted after World War II. Yet the traditional image has scarcely been questioned in contemporary writing on international relations. This article examines some of the central themes in recent studies relating to appeasement: the "structural" approach, which offers a new overall interpretation; the economic, military, and intelligence "dimensions" of British foreign policy in the 1930s; and the breaking down of traditional stereotypes of the roles of Chamberlain and Churchill. This reappraisal has important implications for the discipline of international relations, its view of the origins of World War II, and theories of international structural change.

## Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation
By R. JERVIS

Recent work has focused on the problem of how states cooperate in the environment of anarchy. Linked to the ideas of the Prisoners' Dilemma and public goods, that work has provided important insights and lines of research. But it also has problems and limitations, which are explored in the paper. The anarchy approach stresses individual actors' choices and slights questions of how issues are posed and constrained. It takes preferences as given without exploring either the frequency of PD situations or the ways in which preferences are formed and can change. Many of the concepts the framework uses—e.g., cooperation and defection, the distinction between offense and defense, and the nature of power—are problematical. Issues of beliefs, perceptions, norms, and values also lead to a different perspective on cooperation.

## Trading Places:
### INDUSTRIES FOR FREE TRADE
By H. MILNER

Many scholars expected U.S. trade policy in the 1970s and beyond to look like that of the 1920s and 1930s—i.e., to be marked by widespread and high levels of protectionism. The American market, however, remained relatively open. One central reason was the growth of antiprotectionist sentiment among American firms. Firms now opposed protection because they had developed extensive ties to the international economy through exports, multinational production, and global intrafirm trade. The development of these international ties by the 1970s reduced protectionist pressure by American firms even when they were faced with serious import competition: protection had become too costly. The preferences of these firms also seemed to affect trade policy outcomes, turning them away from protection.

## Paradigm Lost:
### DEPENDENCE TO DEMOCRACY
By D. H. LEVINE

Analysis of transitions to democracy is marked empirically by democracy's own resurgent vigor, and theoretically by shifts away from focus on global political economy to concern with such political variables as organization or leadership, and study of their expression within national arenas. Contributors to *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy* (edited by Guillermo O'Donnell, Phillippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead) explore these issues with special emphasis on how regime transitions begin and on possibilities for

social, cultural, and economic democratization. The collection focuses more on the transitior than on democracy itself, and fails to place transitions in the context of democracy's social an cultural bases. Insufficient attention is given to civil society and to its organized links wit politics. This theoretical and empirical position obscures the appeal of liberal democracy t elites and masses, and hinders understanding of why popular groups accept pacts and bac the leaders who make them.

## A Search for Identity: the "German Question" in Atlantic Alliance Relations

By J. M. MUSHABEN

Major changes in the postwar global environment have transformed "the" German ques tion into many German questions that continue to complicate the foreign and domestic pol icy-making processes in the Federal Republic. Inconsistencies between official policy pro nouncements and the accepted political modus operandi are explainable in terms of fou "paradoxes": (1) the nation/state identity paradox; (2) the reunification/integration paradox (3) the stability/security paradox; and (4) the lessons-of-history/normalcy paradox. West Ger man commitment to the Atlantic Alliance remains unshaken, but the FRG should not be forced to choose between the U.S. and Europe, between integration with the West and furthe improvement in relations with the GDR. Normalization of those relations will be best servec by a mutual adherence to the principles of balance, territorial integrity, confidence building and greater transparency in matters of inter-German decision making.

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# ABSTRACTS

## External Ambition and Economic Performance

By M. KAHLER

Realist approaches to international politics raise the possibility that external policies based on expanding military power may undermine the economic bases of that power. The links between external strategy and economic performance can be classified as fiscal (macroeconomic effects), structural (microeconomic and structural effects), and protectionist (effects on foreign economic policy). The case of prewar Japan suggests that, for countries at an intermediate position in the international power hierarchy and in the international division of labor, the positive effects of external ambition on economic performance may dominate. Other cases—National Socialist Germany, contemporary developing countries, and the postwar superpowers—seem to confirm that international position is a principal determinant of these effects.

## The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Politics of Opposites

By M. NINCIC

The notion that the attitudes of the American public vis-à-vis the Soviet Union are driven essentially by emotion, and that they are more extreme and volatile than those of the government itself, is widely believed but may not be valid. While the public typically desires a combination of tough and conciliatory policies, it also tends to express, at any given moment, particular concern about whichever of the two it feels is most slighted in U.S. policy. Thus, the public will tend to seek conciliatory behavior from hawkish administrations while preferring a tough stance from administrations it deems dovish. By so doing, the public is likely to have a moderating effect on official behavior toward Moscow. The proposition is tested with reference to shifts in public approval of presidential Soviet policy, and certain implications are suggested for the manner in which political leadership perceives of its mandate.

## Economic and Political Explanations of Human Rights Violations

By N. J. MITCHELL AND J. M. McCORMICK

This research note aims to measure human rights conditions crossnationally and to account for variations in these conditions. The measure conceptualizes human rights along two dimensions: the imprisonment of political dissidents, and the killing and torture of prisoners. The authors apply these measures to 122 countries and attempt to account for variations in terms of several well-known economic and political hypotheses.

## Lessons from History, or the Perfidy of English Exceptionalism and the Significance of Historical France

By R. H. BATES

Theories of development are derived from readings of history. Modern historical research challenges many of the basic beliefs about how economies develop. More specifically, recent research suggests that the lessons drawn from the history of industrialization in England are highly misleading. The article thus challenges the empirical foundations for much of classical and Marxian development theory.

## Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation:

### EXPLAINING THE REACTIVE STATE

By K. E. CALDER

The concept of the "reactive state" is useful in understanding the foreign economic policy behavior of Japan and certain other middle-range powers deeply integrated in the global political economy, particularly during periods of economic turbulence when international regimes do not fully safeguard their economic interests. The essential characteristics of the reactive state are two-fold: (1) it fails to undertake major independent foreign-policy initiatives although it has the power and national incentives to do so; (2) it responds to outside pressure for change, albeit erratically, unsystematically, and often incompletely.

In the Japanese case, reactive state behavior flows from domestic institutional characteristics as well as from the structure of the international system. Domestic features such as bureaucratic fragmentation, political factionalism, powerful mass media, and the lack of a strong central executive have played an especially important part in Japanese financial, energy, trade, and technology policy formation since 1971.

## Implementing the Final Solution:

### THE ORDINARY REGULATING OF THE EXTRAORDINARY

By H. L. MASON

The implementation of the Final Solution is discussed in terms of the divergent interpretations characteristic of the "functionalists" and the "intentionalists." The routines of two sets of implementors are described: the mass liquidations perpetrated by the *Einsatzgruppen* and the "barbaric-civil orderliness" of the bureaucrats carrying out the deportation of the German Jews. In the final section, Lifton's concept of the medicalization of the killings is introduced, with attention also to his thoughts on "doubling" and the extension of his concerns "beyond Auschwitz" to the sphere of nuclear catastrophe.

# CHANGING ASPIRATIONS, LIMITED ATTENTION, AND WAR

By PAUL A. ANDERSON and TIMOTHY J. McKEOWN*

## INTRODUCTION

OUR objective is to contribute toward theoretical progress in understanding the outbreak of interstate war by achieving what Lakatos terms a "progressive problemshift."[1] In taking the theory of the outbreak of interstate war proposed by Bueno de Mesquita as a point of departure, we present an alternative theory that performs at least as well empirically and uses a more plausible theoretical structure.[2]

Bueno de Mesquita's theory accounts for decisions to initiate war using a rational choice, expected-utility framework. His theory starts with the presumption that decisions to initiate war are made by unitary, expected utility-maximizing actors who wage war against any target at any time when the expected utility of fighting is greater than the expected utility of not fighting. This basic core is fleshed out by auxiliary assumptions and operationalizations. The utility one nation has for another is based upon policy agreement as measured by similarity in alliance commitments. The probability that a nation will win a war against another nation is a function of the relative capabilities of the two nations and their respective allies, weighted by geographical distance. Within this theoretical structure Bueno de Mesquita embeds additional assumptions that deal with the potential contributions of third parties to conflicts, the risk proneness of the hypothetical decision maker, and the degree of structural uncertainty in the international system.

* This paper describes research supported by National Science Foundation Grant No. SES-8319532. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, the Correlates of War Project, and the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research provided most of the data utilized in this research. We thank them for making the information available to us and absolve them of responsibility for whatever interpretations we have made of it. We also thank Alexander George, Joshua Goldstein, Robert Jervis, and Michael Loriaux for their helpful comments on various versions of this paper.

[1] Imre Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes," in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds., *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 91-196.

[2] Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, *The War Trap* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981). Bueno de Mesquita's theory has undergone two revisions since 1981: Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "The War Trap Revisited: A Revised Expected Utility Model," *American Political Science Review* 79 (March 1985), 156-77, and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, "Reason and War," *American Political Science Review* 80 (December 1986), 1113-29. Because the original 1981 version has the broadest empirical test, we use it as our point of comparison.

In support of his theory of interstate war as the product of expecte utility-maximizing decision makers, Bueno de Mesquita offers contii gency tables and measures of association which, on their face, show a vei strong relationship between expected utility and decisions to initiate war. Bueno de Mesquita asks us to judge his theory on the basis of en pirical results and not on the basis of the truthfulness of his assumption On that basis there is, indeed, a prima facie case for acceptance.

Although theories cannot be rejected because their assumptions ai unrealistic, they can be rejected in favor of others that explain the sarr empirical domain and use more realistic assumptions. Thus, we leave to others to assess in detail the internal consistency and conceptual ad( quacy of Bueno de Mesquita's theory, and accept his implicit challenge t explain the empirical domain by using a more plausible theoretical stru( ture.[3]

Our analysis departs from two central features of Bueno de Mesquita theory. First, we omit his assumption that war decisions can be ad( quately explained as the product of unitary, expected utility-maximizin decision making. Expected-utility theories of the sort advanced by Buen de Mesquita assume that goals are comprehensive and consistent, th: search is exhaustive, and that attention to the environment is continuou Many studies of the decision-making process in governments and oth( large organizations suggest, however, that goals are not comprehensiv and are frequently inconsistent, that search is biased and incomplete, an that attention is sporadic.[4] Our second departure is a response to the di: embodied nature of the decision to initiate a war in his theory. Oper: tionalizations of utility, probability of winning, and uncertainty are th only components of his argument that connect Bueno de Mesquita's th( ory to the phenomenon of war. Although operationalizations are no le: theoretical than are the equations used to express the basic relationshi in the model, Bueno de Mesquita chooses to stress the expected-utilit framework used in the equations as his key theoretical contribution. E› pected-utility theory, however, is little more than a plastic shell, capabl

[3] Steven J. Majeski and David J. Sylvan, "Simple Choices and Complex Calculations: Critique of the War Trap," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 28 (June 1984), 316-40; Zeev Mao "The Expected Utility of International Conflict: Some Theoretical Problems and Empiric Surprises in 'The War Trap,'" mimeo (Pittsburgh: Carnegie-Mellon University, 198: R. Harrison Wagner, "War and Expected-Utility Theory," *World Politics* 36 (April 198‹ 407-23.

[4] Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Littl Brown, 1971); Paul A. Anderson, "Decision Making by Objection and the Cuban Missile Cı sis," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 28 (June 1983), 201-22; Richard Cyert and James ( March, *A Behavioral Theory of the Firm* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1963); Jam G. March and Johan P. Olsen, *Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations* (Bergen, Norway: Un versitetsforlaget, 1976); Herbert A. Simon, *Administrative Behavior*, 3rd ed. (New York: Fr( Press, 1976).

of modeling almost any human choice by virtue of its extreme flexibility. Our preference is for a theory that is grounded in a central feature of international politics—the competitive national accumulation of capabilities—and is consistent with what we know about governmental decision making as an organizational process.

## Theory Development

Our approach to a theory of interstate war has four central characteristics. First, our theory is decision-oriented. Wars are assumed to occur, not because governments are compelled by circumstances or efficient causes, but because the leaders of a government choose to initiate them. Second, we attempt to identify only necessary conditions, and not necessary and sufficient conditions. Although a theory of necessary conditions is weaker than one that posits both necessary and sufficient conditions, we are persuaded that the former theory will be more productive: following Bueno de Mesquita,[5] it seems quite likely that there is no universal sufficient condition for the outbreak of war; any empirically adequate sufficient condition undoubtedly will be a string of particular circumstances. Third, our theory does not assume that war decisions are the product of expected-utility calculations. Instead, we assume that the decisions are the product of a boundedly rational process characterized by aspiration levels, limited and problem-motivated search, a failure to make tradeoffs, and a reliance on rules of thumb. Fourth, our approach is to see interstate war as growing out of the routine, day-to-day interactions of nations: without such prior interactions, war is unlikely.

The causes of war have long been separated into underlying and immediate causes; underlying causes are the fundamental sources of conflict and tension between states, and immediate causes are the stimuli for a particular conflict.[6] Our theory also separates the causes of war into two classes: universal necessary conditions, which we attempt to describe, and situation-specific factors, which lead to war when the enabling conditions are present. The situation-specific factors fall outside the domain of our theory.

The theory embodies a simple perspective on international politics:

*Nations interact with each other. These interactions, which include diplomacy, international trade and commerce, and unofficial nongovernmental exchanges, provide the opportunity for misunderstandings and conflicts between*

[5] Bueno de Mesquita (fn. 2, 1981), 5.
[6] Richard Ned Lebow, *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981).

*governments. By themselves, these conflicts are a routine part of international interaction and are of no particular significance. Under appropriate circumstances, however, they can serve as a* casus belli.

From this perspective, what needs to be explained is *not* the existence of conflicts between states. Disagreements of various sorts are always present in the international system. The central analytic problem is to determine the conditions under which disagreements will lead to war.

We start with an assumption central to behavioral theories of organizational and governmental decision making: organizational attention is a scarce resource.[7] Organizations do not continuously scan their environment searching for opportunities, but attend to the environment in an episodic, fragmented manner. The first problem, therefore, is to understand the conditions under which governmental attention will be directed to the external environment in ways likely to result in inter-state conflict.

The available empirical evidence suggests that governments are boundedly rational decision-making systems. Their goal-seeking behavior can better be described by a "satisficing" or adaptive-expectations model than by an expected-utility one. When aspirations match actual or expected achievements, their behavior is qualitatively different than when they do not match. In particular, their attention to the external environment (in this case, potential adversaries in war) is not constant and unflagging; rather, it is stimulated by disparities between aspirations and performance. We maintain that governments will attend to the external environment, and provide a necessary condition of war, when there is a disparity between national aspirations and national achievements. Such an argument is similar to Organski and Kugler's power transition model, and is also similar in spirit to the argument of status-inconsistency models.[8] Lenin's contention that the "law of uneven development" accounts for inter-imperialist wars can also be subsumed under our more general argument.[9] Further parallels to our approach can be found in economists' treatments of adaptive rationality, the mathematical learning theory, and the "J-curve" theory of domestic political violence.[10]

[7] Allison (fn. 4); Cyert and March (fn. 4); James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, *Organizations* (New York: Wiley, 1958).

[8] A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, *The War Ledger* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).

[9] V. I. Lenin, *Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1969).

[10] Richard H. Day and Theodore Groves, eds., *Adaptive Economic Models* (New York: Academic Press, 1975); James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," *American Sociological Review* 27 (February 1962), 5-19; William K. Estes, "Individual Behavior in Uncertain Situations: An Interpretation in Terms of Statistical Association Theory," in Robert M. Thrall, Clyde H. Coombs, and Robert L. Davis, eds., *Decision Processes* (New York: Wiley, 1954), 127-38.

Once governmental attention has been focused on the external environment, the second problem is to determine where it will be directed. If our theory posited comprehensive rational decision-making processes, this step would be trivial. We would simply assume, as does Bueno de Mesquita, that each government considers every other government as a possible target. But, consistent with our initial assumption of bounded rationality, we propose that governmental attention is focused by prior interaction: *casus belli* do not exist for governments that have not had prior substantial interaction.

The final consideration, once attention is focused externally on salient actors, is whether governmental leaders will choose to invoke an available *casus belli*. Following our bounded-rationality approach, we assume that governments do not perform complex calculations of the expected utility of various courses of action, but rather assess alternatives by applying relatively simple rules of thumb and by avoiding explicit comparison of trade-offs. Their understanding of the world is simple-minded compared to comprehensive rationalistic representations of the process, and "problems" or threats are identified with their most obvious and immediate manifestations. Governments are capable of strategic calculations, but only relatively simple ones, and they assess their chances of winning wars in a relatively crude fashion.

For a war to occur between two nations, this conception implies the following necessary conditions:

1. At least one of the nations is experiencing a disparity between achievements and aspirations.
2. There is a history of previous interaction that leads this nation to focus attention on the other as a possible target for military action.
3. Rule-of-thumb calculations convince at least one set of leaders that going to war has a reasonable chance of producing an acceptable outcome.

These propositions are the core of our theory. They can be viewed as a series of three filters or as a set of imbedded conditions that identify pairs of countries between which war is possible. The theory predicts that wars will not occur in any dyad that does not pass through all the filters. The task, of course, is to specify the procedures for determining whether the three conditions are satisfied.

### Modeling Preemption

The possibility of strategic interaction between states implies that a state that is not itself disposed to attack may observe another's preparations for war and conclude that a preemptive attack is the least unpleasant option.

There are essentially three approaches to the problems raised b preemption. One approach is simply to ignore it, on the assumption tha it occurs so seldom as to be empirically insignificant. Another is to at tempt to state a separate theory of preemption by positing some explici process whereby a preemptive attack is triggered. A third approach which is the one adopted here, is to make pairs of governments rathe than single governments the domain of the theory, thereby foldin preemption into it. This modification presents three possible types o pairs: neither nation is a potential initiator; one is a potential initiato while the other is not; or both are potential initiators. We assume tha preemption will occur if our theory predicts that the preempting natio is a candidate for attack. For pairs that contain no potential initiator, n war is expected. War (and hence, the possibility of preemption) can occu only in the remaining two cases. In the second case, the nation that is no classed as a potential initiator may launch a preemptive attack. In th third case, either nation may preempt. We can compare empirical result that treat preemption in this fashion with those obtained by deliberatel ignoring the possibility of preemption in order to gain an idea of the his torical significance of the phenomenon.

The theoretical structure we have described stands in sharp contrast t the basic assumptions of Bueno de Mesquita's expected-utility theory. Al though both view the outbreak of inter-state war from a broadly ration alistic decision-making perspective, our theory emphasizes the diver gence between aspirations and achievements as a fundamental factor, i contrast to Bueno de Mesquita's static cross-sectional view of nationa utilities. Our theory assumes that governmental attention toward the in ternational environment is sporadic and focused, in contrast to the con tinuous and comprehensive scanning in the expected-utility theory. Fi nally, cross-sectional comparisons of relative capability play a role in ou formulation only after the activation and attention conditions have bee satisfied.

## Research Design

Rather than treat decision making as a process modeled by a singl global calculation of expected utilities, our model embodies a commo behavioral perspective that conceives of decision making as a three-ste process involving activation, attention, and choice. We model each step i the process separately, evaluating it in terms of the gross error rate an the "prediction logic" approach outlined below. Finally, we also evaluat the cumulative performance of the assembled stages.

## Evaluating Models of Necessary Conditions

Our research effort is intended to identify a set of necessary conditions for the onset of war. This objective has some important consequences for evaluating the empirical adequacy of the result. Even though they do not count as prediction failures, we cannot be indifferent to the number of cases where the theory predicts war is possible and no war occurs. A high proportion of cases of this type would imply that the theory, though making few wrong predictions, is quite weak: situational factors not captured by the theory would be more important than the general factors within the theory. One could achieve high prediction accuracy for this type of model simply by postulating weak necessary conditions: if the theory classed every case as meeting the necessary conditions, then it would yield no incorrect predictions. The result, however, would be a vacuous theory. In order to evaluate the extent to which our theory is making vacuous predictions, we must examine all nations for all years for the period under study rather than focus exclusively on the instances of war.[11]

We use the prediction analysis approach of Hildebrand, Laing, and Rosenthal to evaluate our models of necessary conditions.[12] We use their $\nabla$, a proportional reduction in error measure, to evaluate the accuracy of the prediction, and their "scope" to measure the vacuousness of the prediction.[13]

$\nabla$ is defined as follows:

$$\nabla = 1 - \frac{\text{probability of making an error predicting wars, given the condition}}{\text{probability of making an error predicting wars, without the condition}}$$

[11] Benjamin A. Most and Harvey Starr, "Case Selection, Conceptualizations and Basic Logic in the Study of War," *American Journal of Political Science* 26 (November 1982), 834-56.

[12] David K. Hildebrand, James D. Laing, and Howard Rosenthal, "Prediction Analysis in Political Research," *American Political Science Review* 60 (June 1976), 509-35.

[13] Bueno de Mesquita (fn. 2, 1981) uses Yule's $Q$. We believe that this is not a particularly helpful statistic for our purposes because, unlike Bueno de Mesquita, we examine all nation-years for the period. Although it is certainly true that $Q = 1.0$ when only one of the off-diagonal cells equals 0, this is not by itself a sufficiently attractive property to overcome what we view as its most important weakness. $Q$ is maximized by minimizing the product of the off-diagonal elements, $bc$. But a crucial question in a model of necessary conditions is how each of the variables $b$ and $c$ contributes to that minimization. If $b$ represents cases where war has occurred when it was predicted not to, then those cases are clear prediction failures, as we have noted above. However, $c$ must then represent cases where war was predicted but none has occurred. A low value for $c$ means that the model is rather stringent in its conditions; in fact, a value of 0 for $c$ would suggest that one has an excellent model of *sufficient* conditions. But if one is serious about claiming to have a model of necessary conditions, minimizing the value of $b$ must take precedence over minimizing $c$. We contend that, since stringency is logically independent of prediction accuracy, two measures of performance are really needed.

The probability of making a prediction error with knowledge of the condition is equal to the proportion of cases where war occurred when the condition was not satisfied. The probability of making an error without knowledge of the condition is defined as the product of the proportion of all cases not meeting the condition and the proportion of all cases resulting in wars, or the marginal probability of making an error.

$\nabla$ thus is a measure of the extent to which knowing whether the necessary condition is satisfied improves the ability to predict whether a war will occur over chance. $\nabla$ varies between 1.0 and minus infinity. When $\nabla$ is positive, it has a straightforward proportional reduction in error interpretation. When $\nabla$ is negative, it reflects the proportionate *increase* in prediction errors resulting from using the condition to predict wars. For example, a $\nabla$ of 0.5 indicates that knowledge of the condition results in a 50 percent improvement in predicting the outbreak of war.

Because the accuracy of predictions based on necessary conditions can be trivially inflated by making the necessary conditions weak, we also want to measure the extent to which our conditions are at risk of making a prediction error. Hildebrand and his associates define the precision of a proposition as the denominator of the $\nabla$ statistic. Because we are dealing with predictions of rare events (there were only 77 wars in over 200,000 nation-years), the skewed nature of this distribution makes their measure of precision problematic. We use a component of their precision measure—the proportion of all cases not meeting the condition—to evaluate the degree to which our condition is at risk of making an error. Hildebrand et al. define this as the "scope" of a proposition. Errors can only be produced by instances that fail to meet the condition—that is, it is not met, but war occurs anyhow. Thus, the proportion of all cases failing to meet the condition is a simple measure of the extent to which a proposition is at risk of making an error. When the scope is low, the condition is satisfied in most instances, and the risk of error is low.

Because $\nabla$ and scope are independent, we must use both criteria in evaluating our filters. An ideal filter would have a high scope (meaning that the filter had a high risk of making an error) and a high $\nabla$ (meaning that knowledge of the filter condition substantially reduced the probability of making an error). To determine the best-fitting model, we computed both $\nabla$ and scope, plotted the distribution of points, and selected a point on the frontier of the distribution. While most of the parameter settings were dominated, a handful of undominated points remained and we were faced with making a tradeoff between scope and $\nabla$. In selecting from among the undominated points, we gave more emphasis to $\nabla$ than to scope.

THE ACTIVATION FILTER (Filter 1)

Our theory views war as the product of a process involving activation, attention, and choice. The activation filter is designed to identify those governments that will be activated to attend to the external environment.

In our model, nations are postulated to aspire to achieving a certain *relative* share of world capabilities. When aspirations diverge from actual or expected achievements, nations are said to be activated. This treatment of goal seeking differs from standard expected utility formulations in that degrees of goal attainment are not measured; instead, the theory simply partitions outcomes into those that match aspirations and those that do not. In general, we expect behavior in the former situations to be qualitatively different from behavior in the latter ones. In particular, we argue that, when expectations and aspirations do not match, attention will be directed toward the external environment.

There are two reasons for adopting this particular treatment of goal seeking. First, the assumptions required to justify an aspiration-level model seem far less heroic than the sorts of assumptions required to make the expected-utility model plausible. Bueno de Mesquita, for example, assumes that war decisions are made by an expected utility-maximizing strongman who makes all war and peace decisions as a dictator.[14] Such assumptions are unnecessary because aspiration-level formulations do not require a single consistent utility function. Second, the aspiration formulation in conjunction with a satisficing search rule (stop searching when what has been found is "good enough") makes plausible assumptions about the information-processing and decision-making capacity of governments. There is considerable empirical evidence from studies of business and governments that activity is stimulated by failures to meet aspired levels of performance.[15]

We use relative capabilities as the criterion of performance for two reasons. The first is strategic. Because we are interested in developing an alternative to Bueno de Mesquita's theory, we need a measure of performance that spans the time frame against which his theory has been tested. The Correlates of War project's measurement of national capabilities is the best comprehensive source of such data. The second reason is substantive. Advantages in national capabilities (which include military, economic, industrial, and demographic factors) provide a basis for power and influence in the international system.[16] Even if power is highly situ-

[14] Bueno de Mesquita (fn. 2, 1981), 27-28.

[15] Cyert and March (fn. 4); Morton H. Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1974); Simon (fn. 4).

[16] Stuart A. Bremer, "National Capabilities and War Proneness," in J. David Singer, ed.,

ation-specific, however, it seems likely that national leaders will monit performance on only a few, highly general capability indicators rath than attempt the much more complicated task of assessing their capaciti on a case-by-case basis.[17]

We examine three variants of the basic aspiration model in construc ing this first filter. They all have the common property that aspiratio are influenced by experience: if the relative share of capabilities is increa ing, the aspired level of performance rises; if the relative share is decrea ing, the aspired level of performance falls. Each variant, however, adop a slightly different method for incorporating experience into aspiration

The first model is the simplest. It shows current aspirations as a fun tion of previous aspirations and previous performance. A government activated when

$$\text{SHARE}_t < \text{ASPIRED}_t$$
$$\text{ASPIRED}_t = \alpha(\text{SHARE}_{t-1} - \text{ASPIRED}_{t-1}) + \text{ASPIRED}_{t-1}$$
$$0.0 < \alpha \leq 1.0.$$

Note that if $\alpha = 1.0$, the model reduces to

$$\text{SHARE}_t < \text{SHARE}_{t-1}$$

This version assumes that the aspired share is whatever was achieve during the previous period.

The second variant posits that a projected capability share is used in stead of the actual share in judging satisfaction; a government is activate when

$$\text{PROJECTED}_t < \text{ASPIRED}_t$$
$$\text{ASPIRED}_t = \alpha(\text{SHARE}_{t-1} - \text{ASPIRED}_{t-1}) + \text{ASPIRED}_{t-1}$$
$$\text{PROJECTED}_t = \beta(\text{SHARE}_{t-1} - \text{SHARE}_{t-2}) + \text{SHARE}_{t-1}$$
$$0.0 < \alpha < \beta \leq 1.0$$

A third version of the aspiration model builds on an argument b James March that the relationship between achievement of aspiration and the triggering of search behavior is more complicated than the simp step-function relationship depicted in the first two models.[18] March su

*The Correlates of War II: Testing some Realpolitik Models* (New York: Free Press, 1980), 59-6 Organski and Kugler (fn. 8); J. David Singer, Stuart A. Bremer, and John Stuckey, "Cap bility Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1816-1965," in Bruce M. Russett, e *Peace, War, and Numbers* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1972), 19-48.

[17] David A. Baldwin, "Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Te dencies," *World Politics* 31 (January 1979), 161-94.

[18] James G. March, "Decision Making Perspective: Decisions in Organizations and The ries of Choice," in Andrew H. Van de Ven and William F. Joyce, eds., *Perspectives on Orga izational Design and Behavior* (New York: Wiley, 1981), 214-15.

gests that, when achievements consistently exceed aspirations, the presence of high levels of organizational slack can also stimulate search even though firms are meeting their goals.

Search under these circumstances is just another use for slack resources. When slack resources are abundant, search can be triggered when

$$\text{ASPIRED}_t > \text{PROJECTED}_t \text{ OR } \text{PROJECTED}_t > \delta\text{ASPIRED}_t$$
$$\text{ASPIRED}_t = \alpha(\text{SHARE}_{t-1} - \text{ASPIRED}_{t-1}) + \text{ASPIRED}_{t-1}$$
$$\text{PROJECTED}_t = \beta(\text{SHARE}_{t-1} - \text{SHARE}_{t-2}) + \text{SHARE}_{t-1}$$
$$0.0 < \alpha < \beta \leqslant 1.0 < \delta$$

That is, when projections exceed aspirations by $\delta$, governments may be "supersatisfied," and be stimulated to attend to the external environment.

All three versions of the aspiration model contain parameters that must be estimated from the data. We estimate these parameters through an iterative search, with the goal of minimizing the number of prediction errors. This amounts to minimizing the number of nonactivated nations (i.e., nations not passing the filter) that are engaged in war, provided the resulting model has a positive $\nabla$ statistic. For any given set of parameter values and the historical capability data, one can generate a list of activated governments for any given year. Once governments are classed as activated or nonactivated, then one simply notes whether the observed war-fighting states are distributed among the activated and nonactivated nations in the manner predicted by the theory.

It is, of course, necessary to search through a variety of parameter values to ensure that one has identified the value that yields the strongest model. We place bounds on the range of these parameters. With respect to the parameter $\alpha$, we have restricted the values to $(0, 1]$ because it seems unlikely that aspirations will increase more quickly than actual gains. We then examine all values of $\alpha$ within the interval $(0.0, 1.0]$ using an increment of .02; i.e., $\{.02, .04, .06, \ldots, .96, .98, 1.00\}$.[19] The number of nations that do not pass the filter (are not activated) but that are involved in interstate wars is computed for each value of $\alpha$. For the second model with its two parameters $\alpha$ and $\beta$, the search for values of $\alpha$ and $\beta$ will be constrained by the assumption that $\alpha < \beta$. (The initial increment for $\beta$ is set at .05.) This constraint follows from the assumption that the projected share is more likely to be sensitive to actual experience than the aspired share; on this view, desires change more slowly than perceptions. This is not to argue that perceptions are always accurate, or even mostly accurate.

[19] In early runs we also tried using a finer increment—.005—at times. This resulted in only modest improvements in number of cases filtered out, and generally no improvement in the error count.

It is simply a claim based on the observation that demands for economi growth or for governmental programs such as military spending tend t acquire entrenched organized constituencies, and that this factor impart a substantial degree of inertia to the demands made on governments. Th third model, with the parameter 1, is handled in a similar fashion, wit the addition of a search for 1 within the range of [1.1, 1.5], with an incre ment of .1.

Both preemptive and non-preemptive assumptions are tested. The var iant of the basic model that recognizes preemption uses pairs of nation (dyads) as the basic unit of analysis; it counts an occurrence of war withi the dyad as a prediction success without inquiring into the precise cir cumstances of initiation. The version that ignores the possibility o preemption counts as a prediction success only those instances where th activated nations are the initiators.

The database for determining activation is the annual national capability data collected by the Correlates of War (COW) project.[20] This database currently contains annual data on military expenditures, military personnel, iron and steel production, energy consumption, total population, and size of urban population for all members of the international system for each year from 1816 to 1980.[21] We have revised some values in the COW capability dataset where alternative estimates seemed to be well documented.[22] We follow the Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey procedure of constructing an index of relative shares for each nation for each year. The annual data are converted to a proportion of the total for the entire international system for that category. We did this in three ways:

1. Following Singer, Bremer and Stuckey as well as Bueno de Mesquita, we took the arithmetic mean of capability shares across all six capability measures.[23]
2. We analyzed just the two military capability measures alone, taking their arithmetic mean shares for each nation for each year.
3. We analyzed the four non-military measures alone, taking their arithmetic mean shares for each nation for each year.

The various ways of computing capability shares allow us to examine whether narrowly military factors are dominant in governments' assessments of relative position, or whether a broader notion of capability seems to capture competitive dynamics more faithfully.

Finally, we tested an alternative to the simple annual updating of the

[20] Singer et al. (fn. 16).

[21] The war years 1914-1918 and 1939-1945 were largely devoid of data in the original dataset. We have remedied this to a small extent.

[22] Details on dataset revisions are available from the authors.

[23] Singer et al. (fn. 16); Bueno de Mesquita (fn. 2, 1981), 103.

previous year's aspirations by the previous year's performance. This alternative consisted of measuring performance in terms of a five-year weighted moving average rather than only in terms of the previous year.[24] We decided to examine this partly because we uncovered enough omissions and suspected or confirmed errors in the data to look for some sort of smoothing procedure.

THE ATTENTION FILTER (Filter 2)

Once we have established that governments are activated by a gap between expectations and aspirations, our next task is to determine where attention will be focused. In the absence of other information, any nation in the international system is a possible target, but not all nations are equally likely targets. Our theory is based on the presumption that attention is a scarce resource, and that governments allocate attention primarily to nations with which they have had substantial amounts of previous interaction. The second filter is thus designed to exclude those dyads within which there is little previous interaction (such as, for instance, Fiji and Albania).

This approach to identifying the available targets is consistent with three different perspectives on the national decision-making process. First, it is consistent with arguments concerning both the cognitive and affective component of human decision making. Searching for a target among those nations with which the government is familiar is consistent with arguments about the importance of an "availability heuristic" in decision making under uncertainty.[25] Considering as possible targets those nations that are currently the source of conflict and friction is also consistent with an argument that frictional conflict has vividness effects; negative affect among decision makers can readily be focused on the "source" of the friction.[26]

Second, our postulated search process is consistent with studies of organizational decision making in firms and governments.[27] The organizational search process operates with a simple-minded view of causal-

[24] The weights decline in linear fashion. We also developed a method for handling missing data within the five-year period by using only those data that were present, and automatically making the appropriate adjustment in weights to reflect the missing year.

[25] Richard E. Nisbett and Lee Ross, *Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings in Social Judgment* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1980), 18-23.

[26] *Ibid.*, 51-52; Dina A. Zinnes, "The Expression and Perception of Hostility in Prewar Crisis: 1914," in J. David Singer, ed., *Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence* (New York: Free Press, 1968), 85-122.

[27] Cyert and March (fn. 4); Paul A. Anderson, "Justifications and Precedents as Constraints in Foreign Policy Decision Making," *American Journal of Political Science* 25 (November 1981), 738-61.

ity—with which one would be inclined to see attack on the immediate sources of friction as a solution to the "problem" of lagging capabilities. Moreover, the existence of frictions creates a legitimate organizational pretext for the discussion and justification of overt military action.[28]

Third, the postulated process is consistent with a traditional balance-of-power or microeconomic view of interstate disputes as being driven by conflicts of interest.[29] In this perspective, local frictions are no longer merely attention-getters, pretexts, or triggering events—they are manifestations of the underlying conflicts.

There are several ways in which the salience of one nation for another can be measured; most of them have received some attention in the theoretical literature on interstate conflict. Measures of salience can be divided into two groups: conflict-based measures and interaction-based measures. Conflict-based measures assume that governmental attention is focused on past or existing conflicts of interest. Interaction-based measures assume that attention is conditioned on interaction regardless of any conflicts of interest. We examine both types.

Since the publication of Richardson's work, students of international politics have been systematically studying the effect of geography on the outbreak of war.[30] Because geography has a strong influence on interaction, geographical propinquity measured by physical distance can be used to identify those dyads that engage in frequent exchanges.[31] Similarly, data on diplomatic exchanges[32] or joint membership in intergovernmental organizations[33] can indicate interaction and hence the possibility for conflict. The three measures are all alike in that they treat interaction as a necessary condition for the appearance of conflict, thus suggesting that an absence of interaction implies that there are no possibilities for conflict. These approaches are consistent with an image of international politics in which states are quasi-rationalistic, only imperfectly in control of their own actions (let alone the actions of others), and not necessarily capable of distinguishing fundamental conflicts from frictional ones.

A fourth indicator of attention is grounded in a Realist approach; conflict is presumed to emerge from a structure of alliances. This approach stands in sharp contrast to the interaction-based approaches because it

[28] *Ibid.*

[29] Bueno de Mesquita (fn. 2, 1981); Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 5th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1978).

[30] Lewis F. Richardson, *Statistics of Deadly Quarrels* (Pittsburgh: Boxwood Press, 1960).

[31] Bueno de Mesquita (fn. 2, 1981).

[32] Melvin Small and J. David Singer, "The Diplomatic Importance of States, 1816-1970: An Extension and Refinement of the Indicator," *World Politics* 25 (July 1973), 577-99.

[33] Michael Wallace and J. David Singer, "Intergovernmental Organization in the Global System, 1815-1964: A Quantitative Description," *International Organization* 24 (No. 2, 1970), 239-87.

presupposes a single source of conflict (the international alliance structure) and is generally consistent with an image of international politics that treats states as capable of making finer distinctions between intense and less intense conflicts of interest and as having more control over their own behavior. For this indicator, we use Bueno de Mesquita's ingenious measure of conflict of interest derived from data on international alliances.[34]

(A fifth measure of salience, akin to the interaction-based ones noted above, can be defined using Bueno de Mesquita's measures of divergence and similarity in alliance patterns.[35] By taking the absolute values of Bueno de Mesquita's conflict-of-interest measures, the latter can be transformed into measures of simple salience. Under this procedure, nations having strongly similar or dissimilar alliance commitments will be more salient than those having statistically independent alliance commitments.)

A sixth possibility is theoretically intermediate between the Realist and interaction-based approaches. Previous incidents and disputes as measured by the Correlates of War project may provide a good indicator of attention.[36] Unlike the Realist approach, the focus on incidents and disputes presupposes that not all of the important conflicts in the international system are internalized through a set of alliances; unlike the interaction-based approaches, this focus presupposes that prior violent or near-violent behavior has a special significance. Like the information on alliances, the information on incidents and disputes can be used to develop a pure interaction filter in which joint participation in a dispute—even as allies—provides a subsequent focus for attention.

In the version of the theory that ignores the possibility of preemption, the second filter will produce a list of potential targets for each activated government, representing those nations against which war is possible. In the dyadic version of the theory that allows for preemption, it will produce the set of dyads for which at least one member is activated. The dyads that pass through the filter will be those in which at least one member is activated and which engage in routine day-to-day interactions.

THE CHOICE FILTER (Filter 3)

The third filter reflects the proposition that governments generally do not initiate wars with the intention of losing. Underlying this filter are three questions that every potential aggressor must answer: (1) Against

[34] Bueno de Mesquita (fn. 2, 1981), 115-18.

[35] For work on another part of the model we updated the alliance dataset to reflect alliances formed up to 1980, but ran this part of the model using data supplied by Bueno de Mesquita on Europe and the Middle East only.

[36] Charles S. Gochman and Zeev Maoz, "Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1976: Procedures, Patterns, and Insights," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 28 (December 1984), 585-616.

whom will I be fighting? (2) Who will be fighting on my side? (3) Do I have an acceptable chance of winning? If all wars were between two states only, the first two questions would never arise (except in a trivial way); alliances, then, represent complications that the theory must address.

Our approach to modeling the actual decision to initiate a war is to begin with the simplest, most general theoretical structure that offers some hope of producing meaningful results. We argue that the decision to initiate war is a product of the application of a simple rule of thumb rather than a complex calculation of expected utility. The basic version of this filter is that activated nations compare the capabilities of their side to those of the other side, and attack when the capability ratio is sufficiently in their favor. The filter thus is an exercise in glorified "bean counting," in which decision makers compare two stocks of capabilities. In this way, it is broadly similar to a wide variety of Realist approaches. It is not, however, an expected-utility model because it makes no use of a probability term, and it posits a single threshold capability ratio that is "good enough" for going to war—thus creating a step-function relationship (rather than a continuous function) between the capability ratio and war initiation.

In preemption versions of this filter, we postulate that the target of the activated state "knows" that the capability ratios are such as to make an attack by the other state a real possibility; under those circumstances, preemption also becomes a real possibility. As before, the performance of this version of the filter is assessed by analyzing dyads rather than individual nations. The war-prediction logic distinguishes between two types of dyads: those in which both members meet the activation and attention conditions, and those in which only one member meets the activation condition. When both members of the dyad meet the prior conditions, either is a candidate for preemption. When aspirations and performance diverge for only one member of the dyad, however, the other is a candidate for preemption only if the diverging nation meets the conditions of Filter 3. Thus, a nonactivated government initiating a war against a weaker activated target is considered an error in prediction, but a nonactivated government initiating a war against a stronger activated target is classified as a preemptive attack.

If the threshold were set at 0.5 or lower, every dyad passing the attention filter and containing two activated states would be a potential candidate for war. When both nations are activated, a postulated capability threshold that is significantly greater than 0.5 is required before many such dyads will be classed as "war not possible."

Alliances—particularly when the allies are strong and the primary belligerents are weak—can alter the balance of capabilities considerably. One could, if one wished, simply ignore alliances and model initiation as if they did not matter. Alternately, one could develop simple procedures for including the capabilities of allies in the capability calculations of the respective parties. Our procedure for including allies is straightforward. We presume that only nations which have defense pacts or ententes with a given nation can be counted as allies. (If a nation is allied with both sides, it is postulated to remain neutral.) This way of conceiving of formal alliances deliberately ignores the legal properties of the alliance in assuming that ostensibly defensive alliances are likely to come into play in offensive situations as well. We have not yet tested an alternative assumption.

We postulate that, among the nations that meet these requirements, the largest allies will be most likely to intervene, while the smallest will be least likely. We justify this by means of Siverson and King's empirical results on alliance members' actual compliance with the terms of alliance treaties;[37] we can also justify it theoretically by arguing that the smallest nations will have the least effect on the outcome, and that they can wait to join the conflict until they can be reasonably certain that they will end up on the winning side—thus taking a free ride.

The choice (or relative capability) filter is run with a varying threshold for the number of allies postulated to join in the conflict, ranked in order of capability weight. We use different capability measures: "military only" and "combined." As in the Activation Filter, our "military only" index relies solely on number of people under arms; at this point, we lack confidence in the accuracy of the military budget figures, but have not had time to revise them. For all versions of the filter, gross capability weights are adjusted for the distance between the contending parties, following the procedure outlined in Bueno de Mesquita.[38]

## Results

### The Activation Filter (Filter 1)

The results from the activation filter are encouraging. The best performer, which generates only 5 errors in a total of 77 wars, is a variant of the "supersatisfied" model which allows for preemption, considers only

[37] Randolph M. Siverson and Joel King, "Attributes of National Alliance Membership and War Participation, 1815-1965," *American Journal of Political Science* 24 (February 1980), 1-15.
[38] Bueno de Mesquita (fn. 2, 1981), 105-8.

military capabilities, and smooths capabilities over five years. At the parameter settings where this error rate is obtained, about 44 percent of the nations are classed as "satisfied," and 20 percent of the cases are classed as "no war predicted." Since 80 percent of the cases are thus candidates for war, the scope is modest, but only 6.5 percent of the historically observed wars were incorrectly classed as "no war predicted"; so there is a substantial gain over the background error rate. This is accomplished with an absolute number of errors that is reasonably small.

In general, the preemption variation of a model outperformed the no-preemption variation of the same model. The use of five-year smoothing generally produced little or no gain in predictive accuracy or scope over the equivalent model based just on the previous year's performance. Controlling for the use of preemption, the method of measuring capabilities, and the use of a five-year moving average, a supersatisfaction specification generally was more accurate than its competitors.

TABLE 1
PERFORMANCE OF THE ACTIVATION FILTER

| PARAMETER VALUES | ww | $w\bar{w}$ | $\bar{w}w$ | $\bar{w}\bar{w}$ | ERR | $\nabla$ | SCOPE |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| $\alpha$ = .1<br>$\beta$ = .2<br>$\delta$ = 1.5 | 72 | 169,237 | 5 | 42,549 | .065 | .677 | .20 |

ww: Classed as "war possible," and war occurs.
$w\bar{w}$: Classed as "war possible," but no war occurs.
$\bar{w}w$: Classed as "war not possible," but war occurs.
$\bar{w}\bar{w}$: Classed as "war not possible," and no war occurs.
ERR: Model error rate—$\bar{w}w/(\bar{w}w + ww)$
$\nabla$: Proportional reduction in prediction error
SCOPE: Proportion of cases classified as "war not possible"

For the modeling of Filter 1 as a whole, those versions that assessed relative capabilities in purely military terms generally performed better than those that assessed relative capabilities more broadly. This suggests that, that least in one sense, a Realist perspective on war is justified: changes in the military balance among states seem more closely related to war initiation than changes in broader performance categories. Moreover, states that accumulate narrowly *economic* capabilities more slowly than they aspire were found to become involved in war less often than one would predict on the basis of a random draw. Such a finding is consistent with an argument advanced by Eckert Kehr in the 1920s to the

effect that poor business conditions have an inhibiting effect on warfighting by eliminating any slack in government budgets that might otherwise have been used to finance a war.[39] The fact that the supersatisfied model performed better than the others suggests that there is some empirical support for Lebow's contention that perceptions of "falling behind" and of possessing large advantages can *both* lead to aggression.[40] It is important to note, however, that the less complicated projection model performed only slightly less well than the supersatisfied model, suggesting that the more prevalent dynamic is that of aggression being triggered by perceptions of falling behind. A similar finding at the individual level was reported by Grofman and Muller in their test of Davies's J-curve hypothesis.[41]

THE ATTENTION FILTER (Filter 2)

The second filter is intended to depict the process whereby activated states focus attention on possible targets for aggressive actions or demands. The various possible models are summarized in Table 2; results are presented in Table 3.

The purely interaction-based incidents-and-disputes model generates fewer errors than does the conflict-based model, but its scope is slightly less than that of the conflict-based one. The performance of the interaction-based incidents-and-disputes model is clearly superior to the other interaction-based models in both prediction accuracy and scope. Both the interaction-based and the conflict-based incidents-and-disputes models outperform the model based on conflict of interest calculated from alliance memberships; they are also superior to the other interaction-based models. The negative scores for $\nabla$ for the intergovernmental-organizations models and the conflict-of-interest models suggest that when these are used as predictors, more errors in prediction result than there would be in simple random guessing.

The performance of the incidents-and-disputes model is striking, not only because of the overall results, but also because of the fact that the interaction history of the previous 50 years is so potent a predictor. The result can be interpreted as an indication of the length of institutional memory; of the slowness with which disputes are resolved; or of the per-

[39] Eckert Kehr, *Economic Interest, Militarism, and Foreign Policy*, Gordon A. Craig, ed., Grete Heinz, trans. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 62-63.

[40] Richard Ned Lebow, "The Paranoia of the Powerful: Thucydides on World War III," *PS* 17 (Winter 1984), 10-17.

[41] Bernard N. Grofman and Edward N. Muller, "The Strange Case of Relative Gratification and Potential for Political Violence: The V-Curve Hypothesis," *American Political Science Review* 67 (June 1973), 514-39.

TABLE 2
ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF ATTENTION

| | |
|---|---|
| INTERACTION-BASED MODELS | |
| Model I: | Distance |
| Model II: | Diplomatic Exchanges (symmetric) |
| Model III: | IGO Memberships |
| Model IV: | Incidents and Disputes (adversaries and partners) |
| Model V: | Conflict of Interest (high agreement or high disagreement) |
| CONFLICT-BASED MODELS | |
| Model VI: | Incidents and Disputes (adversaries only) |
| *Model VII:* | *Conflict of interest (high disagreement only)* |

TABLE 3
PERFORMANCE OF VARIOUS ATTENTION MODELS

| | CUTOFF | WW | $W\overline{W}$ | $\overline{W}W$ | $\overline{W}\overline{W}$ | ERR | $\nabla$ | SCOPI |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| INTERACTION-BASED MODELS | | | | | | | | |
| I | 2,000 mi. | 59 | 40,339 | 12 | 38,251 | .169 | .652 | .486 |
| II | none | 51 | 50,577 | 13 | 64,946 | .203 | .639 | .562 |
| III | none | 40 | 62,305 | 19 | 25,232 | .322 | −.122 | .288 |
| IV | 50 yrs. | 70 | 21,804 | 2 | 147,443 | .028 | .968 | .871 |
| V | 1.051 | 35 | 23,360 | 5 | 3,967 | .125 | .139 | .145 |
| CONFLICT-BASED MODELS | | | | | | | | |
| VI | 50 yrs. | 61 | 14,204 | 11 | 155,033 | .153 | .833 | .916 |
| VII | .55 | 29 | 23,320 | 11 | 4,007 | .275 | −.873 | .145 |

For key, see Table 1.

sistence of long-lived "structural" conflicts for which disputes serve a
visible manifestations. The fact that the pure interaction version perform
better than the conflict version suggests that simple participation in inte
national incidents and disputes is more important than directed confli
in identifying salient targets. These results are consistent with Midla
sky's finding that the pattern of international disputes is closely related t
the pattern of subsequent wars; they are also consistent with the finding
of a more limited study by Houweling and Siccama that the probabilit
of serious disputes' escalating to war is only slightly less than the proba
bility of war emerging from a situation characterized by both a seriou
dispute and an arms race.[42]

[42] Manus I. Midlarsky, "Preventing Systemic War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 28 (De

Interaction-based models that employ a more generalized notion of salience (distance, diplomatic representation, common IGO membership, participation in a set of alliances) clearly do not perform as well as those that treat previous acts of low-level violence as uniquely salient to decision makers.[43] The relatively large number of prediction errors made by the conflict-of-interest model suggests that a given set of alliances does not succeed in "internalizing" all of the potential conflicts in the system; the low scope occurs because most states are not in formal alliances most of the time, and hence can not be assigned a high conflict-of-interest score.

THE CHOICE FILTER (Filter 3)

The third filter is designed to capture the actual decision to initiate.

TABLE 4
RESULTS FOR RELATIVE CAPABILITIES FILTER

| PARAMETER VALUES | WW | $W\bar{W}$ | $\bar{W}W$ | $\bar{W}\bar{W}$ | ERR | $\nabla$ | SCOPE |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| $p$ = .35 ıllies = 1 | 59 | 17,974 | 11 | 3,830 | .157 | .105 | .178 |

or key, see Table 1.

The performance of Filter 3 is clearly not as impressive as the performnce of Filters 1 and 2. The absolute number of errors generally is high; lthough many models have a positive $\nabla$, it is clear that the performance f this filter leaves much to be desired. The best performer is a singlehreshold model, relying only on military personnel as a capability indiator, and counting defense pacts and ententes. This version performed est when the largest ally on either side was counted as a potential enrant.

Although Bueno de Mesquita labels his model as an expected-utility nodel, we can also categorize it as one that is dominated by consideration f alliances. The structure of alliances determines the conflicts of interests nd partly also the relative capabilities of any two sets of potential adveraries. In our filter, alliances play a more modest role: they are incorpo-

:mber 1984), 563-84; Henk W. Houweling and Jan G. Siccama, "The Arms Race—War Retionship: Why Serious Disputes Matter," *Arms Control* 2 (September 1981), 157-97.

[43] If we set the cutpoint at the "region" as defined by Bueno de Mesquita (an ad hoc modication of geographic regions) we obtain the following results: WW = 71; $W\bar{W}$ = 78,590; $\bar{W}W$ = 1; $\bar{W}\bar{W}$ = 90,647; ERR = .014; $\nabla$ = .974; SCOPE = .535.

rated into the assessment of relative capabilities. We have observed, however, that it generally makes little difference exactly how we count allies; the results of our treatment of alliances in Filter 3 indicate that the location of the cutpoint demarcating allies postulated to join a conflict versus those postulated to stay out did not have much effect on the results. The relatively stronger performance when capabilities are defined in narrow military terms is generally consistent with Realist thinking; it suggests that decision makers assign more weight to those capabilities that have an immediate effect on military success. Industrial productive capacity and demographic advantages take time to mobilize; existing military forces do not take nearly as much.

The prediction errors of Filter 3 (listed in Appendix 1) have two striking characteristics. The wars tend to be regional conflicts, and a substantial number of the errors are generated when a nonactivated government initiates a war against a weaker activated opponent. This combination of factors among the errors suggests that the next stage of the research should use a regional frame of reference for measuring aspirations and performance.

## Overall Results and Discussion

The three filters and the overall results are summarized in Table 5. Although we argue that the order in which the filters are executed bears a loose resemblance to actual organizational decision-making processes, these results do not provide any support for such an assertion. When we ran the model with the different possible permutations of the filters, the results obtained were almost identical to the original model.[44]

The overall results of our model are partially supportive of Realist thinking. In both the activation and the choice filters, narrower definitions of capabilities proved more fruitful for predictive purposes than broader definitions, suggesting that deliberations about the use of force are to some degree detached from considerations of the wider capabilities of the respective potential adversaries. The finding (from the analysis of the various attention filters) that the history of incidents and disputes is a relatively potent predictor for the outbreak of war suggests that it is not interaction in general, but rather those interactions in which the conflict levels have previously risen to a point where some disruption of routine interactions has occurred, that are the most likely sources of new wars.

[44] In no permuted version did the accuracy of the war predictions change; the largest shift in scope occurred when we ran the sequence 2-1-3. This increased the final scope by 18 cases, an improvement of approximately 0.1%.

There is thus some support for the notion that the outbreak of war can
)e analyzed in isolation from broader economic and demographic factors.
Finally, an analysis of the temporal distribution of our prediction errors
eveals that prediction accuracy for the post-1945 period seems to be
ibout the same as for the pre-1945 period, with 22 of 77 wars and 7 of 18
)rediction errors occurring in the post-1945 period. This suggests that the
ffects of the introduction of nuclear weapons and of increasing economic
nterdependence are not detectable by a relatively crude model such as
)urs.

There are, however, several areas where our work does not lend sup-
)ort to a Realist perspective. The findings from the activation filter dem-
)nstrate that changes in relative capabilities have a relationship to out-
)reaks of war: nations which accumulate military capabilities at a rate
hat differs from their aspired level of accumulation are likely to find
hemselves in wars more often than nations which accumulate capabili-
ies at a rate close to their aspiration level. On the other hand, nations which
ccumulate *economic* capabilities more slowly than they aspire will be-
ome involved in war less often than one would predict on the basis of a
andom draw. The standard Realist fixation on cross-sectional analysis
nisses these dynamics. In addition, the results from the attention filter
uggest that not all the potential axes of conflict find expression within a
,iven alliance system. There are a significant number of prediction errors
rising from cases in which states with low conflict-of-interest scores go
o war with one another.

## Comparison to Bueno de Mesquita's Model

Our approach and that of Bueno de Mesquita differ in a number of
espects. His model postulates conflicts arising out of a conscious effort by
tates to seek gains by going to war; our model treats war as arising out
f disparities between aspirations and achievements. By implication, his
nodel postulates continuous scanning of the international environment
y each would-be initiator of a conflict, whereas our model treats atten-
on as episodic and narrowly focused. His model filters out cases of po-
:ntial war by imposing an ad hoc regionalization on the international
ystem so that only a subset of all logically possible wars is considered.
)ur model endogenizes an analogous process via an attention filter. His
nodel invests heavily in elaborate assumptions about variation in risk-
iking propensities and the structure of the international system (ex-
ressed in terms of alliance patterns). Our model makes no assumptions
bout risk-taking propensities, and considers alliances only in the context

TABLE 5
SUMMARY OF OVERALL MODEL AND ITS PERFORMANCE

FILTER 1:

State is activated if:

$$\text{ASPIRED}_t > \text{PROJECTED}_t \text{ or } \text{PROJECTED}_t > 1.5\,(\text{ASPIRED}_t), \text{ where}$$
$$\text{ASPIRED}_t = 0.1\,(\text{SHARE}_{t-1} - \text{ASPIRED}_{t-1}) + \text{ASPIRED}_{t-1}$$
$$\text{PROJECTED}_t = 0.2\,(\text{SHARE}_{t-1} - \text{SHARE}_{t-2}) + \text{SHARE}_{t-1}$$

When both states in dyad are not activated, consider the dyad as one in which war is not possible. Otherwise, consider it as a possible-war case.

FILTER 2

If the two nations in question have been involved as allies or adversaries in any dispute in the last 50 years (excepting any dispute leading directly to an ongoing war), consider it as a possible-war case. Otherwise, consider it as a case in which war is not possible.

FILTER 3

$$\text{AdjCAP} = \text{CAPABILITIES}^{\log[(\text{miles/miles per day}) + (10 - e)]}$$
$$p = \text{AdjCAP}_i/(\text{AdjCAP}_i + \text{AdjCAP}_j)$$
$$\text{AdjCAP}_i = \text{AdjCAP}_{\text{activated state}} + \text{AdjCAP}_{\text{largest ally}}$$

If $p \geq .35$, count as a possible-war case. Otherwise, count as a case in which war is not possible.

OVERALL RESULTS

| | |
|---|---|
| War considered possible and occurs | 59 |
| War considered possible and does not occur | 17,974 |
| War considered not possible and occurs | 18 |
| War considered not possible and does not occur | 193,812 |

of the final stage of the decision process—the calculation of relative capabilities. As a consequence of his treatment of international system structure and conflict of interest in terms of alliance patterns, Bueno de Mesquita's fullfledged model is applicable only in situations where alliances exist, since the pattern of alliances determines the conflict-of-interest scores for each dyad. Our model does not rely on a conflict-of-interest measurement; thus it avoids this particular limitation on its applicability.

Maoz has analyzed the empirical performance of Bueno de Mesquita's

nodel in such a way as to make it roughly comparable to the performance ıf ours.[45] Bueno de Mesquita imposed a regionalization on his data that s not an explicit part of his theory and that has the effect of substantially educing the number of nation-years under consideration.[46] The time peiod for his study extends only to 1974, whereas our study extends to 1980. He also attempts to predict the specific national initiator, whereas we atempt to do this only in selected versions of our models.

Bueno de Mesquita correctly predicts war initiation in 65 of 76 cases.[47] Given 90,158 total possible war initiations,[48] with 14 percent of them as ituations where expected utility was positive,[49] we have

| $WW$ | $W\overline{W}$ | $\overline{W}W$ | $\overline{W}\overline{W}$ | ERR | $\nabla$ | SCOPE |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 65 | 12,557 | 11 | 77,525 | .145 | .831 | .860 |

Following Maoz,[50]

$$p(\text{Initiation} | E(U) \geqslant 0) = 65/12{,}622 = .0051497$$
$$p(\text{Initiation} | E(U) < 0) = 11/77{,}296 = .0001423$$

With Bueno de Mesquita's model, a nation classed as a potential initiator is 36.19 times as likely to go war as a nation not so classed.

Consideration of just the first two filters of our model yields the following results:

| $WW$ | $W\overline{W}$ | $\overline{W}W$ | $\overline{W}\,\overline{W}$ | ERR | $\nabla$ | SCOPE |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 70 | 21,804 | 7 | 189,982 | .090 | .899 | .897 |

$$p(\text{War} | \text{classed as possible}) = 70/21{,}874 = .0032001$$
$$p(\text{War} | \text{classed as not possible}) = 7/189{,}989 = .0000368$$

A nation classed as a possible war participant is 86.95 times more likely o go to war than one that is not. In other words, if we know how rapidly, elative to others, a nation is accumulating military capabilities and if we now that nation's history of incidents and disputes, we can predict the kelihood of its being involved in a war in any given year against any iven adversary. Our prediction will have more than twice the accuracy f Bueno de Mesquita's model—without engaging in any cross-sectional omparisons of capabilities, and without any information on the alliance ystem in operation at the time.

Adding the third filter to our model results in additional scope (reducon in the size of the pool of cases where war is deemed possible), but at

[45] Maoz (fn. 3).
[46] Bueno de Mesquita (fn. 2, 1981), 94-96.
[47] *Ibid.*, 129.
[48] Maoz (fn. 3), 27.
[49] Bueno de Mesquita (fn. 2, 1981), 129.
[50] Maoz (fn. 3), Table 2.

the cost of a significant increase in errors. The third filter shrinks the size of the "war is possible" pool, but it does so at a rate that is not much better than the rate at which it generates errors. In adding Filter 3, we produce the following overall results:

| $WW$ | $W\overline{W}$ | $\overline{W}W$ | $\overline{WW}$ | ERR | $\nabla$ | SCOPE |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 59 | 17,974 | 18 | 193,812 | .234 | .744 | .915 |

Shrinking the potential-war pool from 21,804 to 17,974 almost triples the overall error rate. Even though Filter 3 has a positive $\nabla$ statistic, the overall effect of adding it to Filters 1 and 2 is to degrade performance:

$$p(\text{War} \mid \text{classed as possible}) = 59/18{,}033 = .0032717$$
$$p(\text{War} \mid \text{classed as not possible}) = 18/193{,}830 = .0000928$$

Now, a nation in the "war is possible" category is only 35.26 times as likely as a nation in the "war is not possible" category to be involved in a given war.

In one sense, this is not too disappointing: since the first two filters have cleared away about 90 percent of the possible cases, all the "easy" work has been done. Disposing of the remaining non-war cases will prove to be more of a challenge.

## Comparison to Doran and Parsons' Model

The model constructed by Doran and Parsons predicts great-power war occurrences as a function of such a power's movement through a "cycle of relative power" (a regularized pattern of changes in its share of system capabilities). They are interested in the effects of "long-term nonlinear changes in a state's relative power on its propensity for extensive war."[51]

Doran and Parsons measure relative capability shares within a major power system rather than a global system. They postulate an ideal-typical sine curve for a great power's share of capabilities over the long term, and they argue that this curve's inflection and turning points mark occasions where national leaders undergo the "trauma of role change." At such times, they argue, a simple linear projection of capabilities from the near past is most likely to be inaccurate; hence, the expectations of central decision makers are most likely to be violated. That is when such nations are apt to become involved in wars.

[51] Charles F. Doran and W[illegible] Parsons, "War and the Cycle of Relative Power," *American Political Science Review* 74 (December 1980), 947.

According to Doran and Parsons, wars tend to cluster around the two flection and the two turning points.[52] More specifically, the first inflec-on point (where the first derivative—the rate of change in capabilities er unit of time—takes on a local maximum value and the second deriv-ive is zero) is in the region where the number of wars and their mag-tude is greatest; the second inflection point (where the first derivative kes on a local minimum and the second derivative is zero) is in the re-on where the severity and duration of wars is greatest. These findings articularly the one regarding the number of wars) are consistent with ır results. The reason for the consistency is not difficult to see: at the flections, the rate of change in capability is greatest. Because our aspi-tion models are based on linear extrapolations, if there ever is a dispar-y between aspirations and achievements, or between aspirations and ojections, it is most likely to occur just after large changes of relative pability have taken place within a short time. Such changes could pro-ıce dissatisfaction if they are decreases, and supersatisfaction if they are creases.

## Extensions of the Model and Further Research

There are several reasons why a model such as ours is likely to have me erroneous predictions. When nations assess their standing on rela-ve capabilities, they may weight the capabilities of neighbors or rivals ore heavily than those of others. A modification of our model that in-rporates this feature may eliminate some of the errors we generate (see ppendix 1); we plan to investigate this possibility in the next phase of ır research. In addition, we know that "bean counting" as an approach capability assessment possesses serious limitations: it obviously does not pture qualitative differences between military forces, nor does it cap-ıre differences in cost tolerance that could have a substantial effect on e expected outcome of war.[53] In view of the great amounts of situation-ecific data that would be required, however, it is a fairly unmanageable sk to incorporate these latter considerations into a general model.

## Conclusion

A general theory of war initiation based on necessary conditions can ıd does yield nontrivial results. Using very little information, we can

[52] *Ibid.*, 962.
[53] Steven Rosen, "War Power and the Willingness to Suffer," in Russett (fn. 16), 167-84.

eliminate about 90 percent of all dyads from consideration as candidates for war at an error rate (7 of 77) that is quite tolerable.

A general theory need not rely on analysis of alliances. Indeed, it cannot rely solely on such an analysis for many cases: in only 37 of 77 wars analyzed by Bueno de Mesquita did his measure of "conflict of interest" (based on alliance configurations) differ from zero.[54] Refining the analysis of alliances will not help to predict all of the wars in which allies are not a factor. However, further work on modeling the behavior of allies is still valuable, partly in order to increase the predictive accuracy of decisions to initiate, but more importantly because it is central to analyzing the decision of allies to intervene in an ongoing conflict.

Our theory of the outbreak of war yields empirical results that are comparable or superior to those of an expected-utility theory, and does so while using fewer heroic assumptions about governments. Although it would be presumptuous of us to argue that we have successfully refuted Bueno de Mesquita's theory, we are confident that we have proposed a reasonable competing alternative theory of the outbreak of war which presents a different view of the conditions for war than does his:

1. Our theory emphasizes capability shifts and divergences between aspirations and achievements over cross-sectional comparisons of power or conflicts of interest.
2. Our theory considers governmental attention to the external environment to be sporadic and drawn toward participants active in the international system rather than continuous and focused on conflicts of interest.
3. A substantial amount of the uncertainty in predicting the outbreak of war can be reduced with the activation and attention filters. Alliances and cross-sectional comparisons of military capabilities provide relatively little additional explanatory leverage.

Although the empirical results cannot prove that our theory is correct, they do remind us that there are alternative ways of conceptualizing human goal-seeking behavior, and that the alternative to expected utility maximization is not necessarily an assumption of irrational or random behavior.

[54] Bueno de Mesquita (fn. 2, 1981), 143.

## Appendix
## Wars Not Predicted by the Model

| | |
|---|---|
| | **Filter 1 Errors*** |
| 1827 | France — Ottoman Empire |
| 1860 | Sardinia — Two Sicilies |
| 1937 | China — Japan |
| 1971 | India — Pakistan |
| 1979 | China — Vietnam |
| | **Filter 2 Errors** |
| 1866 | Prussia — Baden |
| 1979 | U.S.S.R. — Afghanistan |
| | **Filter 3 Errors** |
| 1823 | France — Spain |
| 1849 | France — Papal States |
| 1860 | Sardinia — Papal States |
| 1897 | Ottoman Empire — Greece |
| 1906 | Guatemala — El Salvador |
| 1906 | Guatemala — Honduras |
| 1907 | Honduras — Nicaragua |
| 1956 | U.S.S.R. — Hungary |
| 1967 | Syria — Israel |
| 1973 | Egypt — Israel |
| 1975 | Kampuchea — Vietnam |

* Because of missing data, Filter 1 did not make predictions on 15 wars: 1851, Brazil – Arentina; 1856, U.K. – Iran; 1863, Columbia – Ecuador; 1866, Prussia – Bavaria; 1919, Ruıania – Hungary; 1919, Greece – Turkey; 1920, U.S.S.R. – Poland; 1940, Thailand – France; 948, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan – Israel; 1950, North Korea – South Korea; 1962, .gypt – South Yemen.

# DEMOCRACY FROM ABOVE: The Political Origins of Military Dictatorship in Brazil

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THE argument of this paper is that the emergence of military dictatorships such as the Brazilian regime of 1964 is not caused by an economic crisis of dependent capitalist development. It results, rather, from the political polarization and radicalization of the democratic regime by which it is preceded. The origins of such a polarization may be found in the process by which Latin American democracies such as that of Brazil (1946-1964) are created. Because they are handed down from above, such democracies are prone to polarization and radicalization. The particular tensions of these democracies work against their transformation into stable democratic regimes. Instead, democracies from above favor the emergence of modern forms of autocracy.

These conclusions were reached by studying the emergence of the Brazilian military regime of 1964; the present paper will therefore be concerned only with that case. It will demonstrate the weakness of economic explanations and propose a political one for the case of Brazil. Since this case is paradigmatic of economic explanations of military autocracy, however, the argument is sure to apply more widely. Even if it does not, this preliminary exercise should stimulate more research on the political roots of contemporary military autocracies.

## ECONOMIC EXPLANATIONS

Economic explanations present the emergence of military autocracy as the result of two contradictory aspects of dependent capitalist, or import-substituting, industrialization. On one hand, the exuberant growth of such industrialization in its early phase both encourages and absorbs the increasing demands of the lower classes. On the other hand, the inherent

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limits of such industrialization eventually lead to a drastic decline in the rate of economic growth. To survive, dependent capitalism must therefore generate a military autocracy to contain the rising demands of the lower classes. According to economic explanations, that is what happened in Brazil in 1964. The economic recession Brazil experienced in the early sixties is attributed to a crisis of import-substituting industrialization, and it is seen as the cause of the military coup. There are three basic versions of this argument.

One group of authors saw the source of the problems in the difficulties of industrializing by substituting for imports of consumer durables and luxury goods.[1] These analysts argued that the slowdown of the economy was caused by the limits imposed on the size of the market for such goods by the prevailing distribution of income. Since none but the middle and upper classes could acquire goods such as automobiles, growth could proceed only if the increase in income was channeled to those classes at the expense of workers. The solution to the crisis was therefore a further concentration of income in the hands of the upper classes. Because the exuberant growth of the easy phase of import substitution had fostered an increase in the power of workers to make demands as well as in the volume of demands itself, the solution to the crisis required the coercive hand of a military regime.

A second conjecture is the one proposed by O'Donnell.[2] For him, the decline in growth was caused by the difficulty of "deepening" the economy—that is, of substituting for imports of capital goods and achieving a vertical integration of the economic structure. The early, easier phase of substituting for consumer goods had been exhausted, and the resumption of growth through a deepening of the economy required new investments of a size and a period of maturation, as well as a level of technological sophistication, that were far beyond the capacity of the national

[1] The best-known proponents of this argument are Celso Furtado, *Análise do Modelo Brasileiro* [Analysis of the Brazilian Model] (Rio: Civilização Brasileira, 1972), and Rui M. Marini, *Subdesarollo y revolución* [Underdevelopment and revolution] (Mexico City: Siglo Vientiuno, 1969); *Dialéctica de la dependencia* [Dialectics of dependency] (Mexico City: Nueva Era, 1973). Also see Kenneth P. Erickson and Patrick V. Peppe, "Dependent Capitalist Development, U.S. Foreign Policy, and Repression of the Working Class in Chile and Brazil," *Latin American Perspectives* 3 (No. 3, 1976), 19-44.

[2] Guillermo A. O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973); O'Donnell, "Corporatism and the Question of the State," in James M. Malloy, ed., *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), 47-87; O'Donnell, "Reflections on the Patterns of Change in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State," *Latin American Research Review* 13 (No. 1, 1978), 3-38; O'Donnell, "Tensions in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State and the Question of Democracy," in David Collier, ed., *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 285-318.

firms of dependent countries. This meant that the deepening of the economy had to be carried out mainly by the state and multinational corporations. In order to muster the enormous resources needed for such a long-term project and to attract foreign capital, however, the level of consumption and the political activity of the working class had to be contained. Since the working class had been permitted to organize during the previous period of economic growth and democracy, its demands were on the rise, and the military regime was necessary to secure the compliance of workers.

The problems with both of these arguments are widely known; a brief recapitulation of the major criticisms is therefore sufficient. As to the first, it is doubtful that the recession of the early sixties was caused by an insufficient concentration of income. Morley and Smith have shown that the effect of income concentration on economic growth was negligible in Brazil.[3] Moreover, to stimulate the consumption of consumer durables it was not even necessary to concentrate income; Brazilian workers spend more than one-third of their income on such goods.[4] Even if it had been necessary, however, it is not clear why a military regime was needed. As Hirschman notes, much growth in consumer-durables industries has occurred in the total absence of authoritarianism.[5] O'Donnell's argument is not supported by the evidence either. The substitution for imported capital goods, or "deepening," decreased rather than increased during the years of recovery that followed the coup.[6] If deepening had anything to do with the recession, it was its cause rather than its cure.

It should also be noted that the coup makers themselves thought that growth depended neither on an increased degree of income concentration nor on a deepening of the economy. They did not pursue a growth strategy based on concentration, and they sought to *un*deepen rather than to deepen the economy because they believed that deepening had already been carried too far.[7] The concentration of income that did in fact occur after the military coup was more an unintended consequence than a

[3] Samuel A. Morley and Gordon W. Smith, "The Effects of Changes in the Distribution of Income on Labor, Foreign Investment and Growth in Brazil," in Alfred Stepan, ed., *Authoritarian Brazil* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), 119-41.

[4] For data on the expenditures of workers on consumer durables, see José Serra, "Three Mistaken Theses Regarding the Connection between Industrialization and Authoritarian Regimes," in Collier (fn. 2), 108.

[5] See Albert O. Hirschman, "The Turn to Authoritarianism in Latin America and the Search for Its Economic Determinants," *ibid.*, 81.

[6] For ample evidence supporting this point, see Serra (fn. 4), 117-27. For an extensive and helpful critique and elaboration of O'Donnell's argument, see Robert Kaufman, "Industrial Change and Authoritarian Rule in Latin America: A Concrete Review of the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Model," in Collier (fn. 2), 165-254.

[7] See Serra (fn. 4), 127-28; Hirschman (fn. 5), 76.

planned result of the actions of the policy makers of the military regime.[8]

We are thus left with the third argument concerning the relation between the economic crisis and the military regime; at the heart of it are runaway inflation and a balance-of-payments crisis.[9] It attributes the recession to a decline in the effectiveness of the unorthodox policies pursued at the beginning of import-substituting industrialization—a decline that exacerbated inflation and the shortage of foreign exchange. This unorthodox policy package consisted of using an overvalued exchange rate, in combination with import controls, in order to favor domestic industry at the expense of the export sector. Obviously, this combination cheapened imports of machinery and other materials essential to industry which were given preferential status by the government. The overvalued rate thus favored new industries while decreasing the real income of traditional exporters. In the end, this unorthodox policy package was in fact a shrewd mechanism by which income could be transferred from the traditional export sector to the new industries, albeit at the cost of some inflation.[10]

Eventually, however, unorthodox policies became dysfunctional. As traditional exports lost ground, the overvalued exchange rate aggravated the recurrent disequilibrium of the balance of payments. In turn, the import constraints imposed by the shortage in foreign exchange inhibited further growth because import-substituting industrialization is an import-intensive process. Moreover, inflation ran wildly out of control, mainly because of the abuse of unorthodox measures by policy makers and the profligacy of politicians. Consequently, foreign capital became much scarcer. Thus, unorthodox policies had a negative impact on growth by aggravating inflation and the shortage of foreign exchange.[11] The resumption of growth therefore required an improvement in the balance of payments. Since imports could not be reduced without jeop-

[8] *Ibid.*, 80-81; Serra (fn. 4), 110-11.

[9] For different (though related) variations of this argument, see Thomas E. Skidmore, "Politics and Economic Policy Making in Authoritarian Brazil, 1937-71," in Stepan (fn. 3), 3-6; Skidmore, "The Politics of Economic Stabilization in Postwar Latin America," in Malloy (fn. 2), 149-90; Hirschman (fn. 5); Kaufman (fn. 6); Michael Wallerstein, "The Collapse of Democracy in Brazil," *Latin American Research Review* 15 (No. 1, 1980), 3-40; John Sheahan, "Market-Oriented Economic Policies and Political Repression in Latin America," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 28 (No. 2, 1980), 264-89. For recent empirical studies of the links between authoritarianism, repression, stabilization, and economic growth, see David Pion-Berlin, "Political Repression and Economic Doctrines," *Comparative Political Studies* 16 (April 1983), 37-66, and Youssef Cohen, "The Impact of Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Rule on Economic Growth," *Comparative Political Studies* 18 (April 1985), 123-36.

[10] For greater detail on the functioning of this mechanism, see Albert O. Hirschman, "The Political Economy of Import-Substituting Industrialization in Latin America," in Hirschman, *A Bias for Hope* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 85-123, at 117.

[11] Hirschman (fn. 5), 73-74.

ardizing growth, it was necessary to promote exports and encourage the inflow of foreign capital. Both of these strategies required a devaluation of the currency, the dismantling of exchange controls, and stabilization policies to check the disrupting effects of inflation.[12] Such a transition to orthodoxy obviously would hurt many interests—most of all those of the workers by creating unemployment and keeping wages low.[13] Hence the need for a military regime.

Of the three arguments explaining the recession, this last one is the most plausible. The policy makers of the military regime felt that recovery depended on controlling inflation, eliminating price distortions, devaluating the currency, modernizing capital markets, broadening income taxation, fostering and diversifying exports, and attracting foreign capital. They implemented a variety of policies to achieve a transition to orthodoxy; the latter seems to have been, at least in part, responsible for the recovery of the economy.[14] It would seem, then, that the recession of the early sixties was largely caused by the decline in the effectiveness of unorthodox policies, and that the military regime emerged because of the need for stabilization and other more orthodox market-oriented policies.

Although this argument is the most plausible, its validity is doubtful. In the first place, there is some evidence that the decline in growth generated or greatly accentuated the disequilibrium in the balance of payments and the severe inflation of the early sixties, rather than the reverse. It is also possible that the decline in the rate of growth was largely due to a reduction of the rate of investment caused by the political turmoil following Goulart's accession to power in 1961. To the extent that this is the case, one would have to argue that, rather than being the result of the difficulties of import substitution or dependent capitalism, the slowdown of the economy was largely the result of a strictly political crisis. Second,

[12] See Wallerstein (fn. 9), 29.

[13] This argument is slightly different from the others in that the authoritarian regime is thought to be needed to repress not only the lower classes, but also a variety of other social groups, including the bourgeoisie. In assuming a greater autonomy of the military, it fits quite well the broader conjecture that military regimes emerged in the third world in order to increase the autonomy of their respective states, an autonomy that would be necessary to their development. For this argument, see Irving L. Horowitz and Ellen K. Trimberger, "State Power and Military Nationalism in Latin America," *Comparative Politics* 8 (No. 2, 1976), 223-44; Ellen K. Trimberger, *Revolution from Above* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1978).

[14] For the policies adopted by the military regime, and the behavior of the economy after 1964, see Skidmore (fn. 9, Stepan); Albert Fishlow, "Some Reflections on Post-1964 Brazilian Economic Policy," in Stepan (fn. 3), 69-118; Edmar Bacha, "Issues and Evidence on Recent Brazilian Economic Growth," *World Development* 5 (No. 1, 1977), 47-68; Sheahan (fn. 9); Serra (fn. 4); Werner Baer, "The Brazilian Boom of 1968-72: An Explanation and Interpretation," *World Development* 1 (August, 1973), 1-15; Baer, "Brazil: Political Determinants of Development," in Robert Wesson, ed., *Politics, Policies and Economic Development in Latin America* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1984), 53-73.

is doubtful that a military regime was necessary to effect a transition to conomic orthodoxy. And, even if it had been, it is not at all clear whether e need for such a transition was sufficient to cause the military coup.

The discussion of these problems will reveal the inherent weakness of conomic explanations and provide the basis for the formulation of an alrnative, political explanation of the emergence of the military regime.

## Toward a Political Explanation

### n Economic or a Political Crisis?

It seems that unorthodox policies did not contribute much to the deline in the rate of economic growth in the early sixties; at least, they did ot do so by exacerbating inflation and the disequilibrium in the balance f payments. As Baer and Kerstenetzky have noted, the decline of the rowth rate cannot be linked to import constraints caused by a disequibrium in the balance of payments.[15] It was the decline of growth that led the fall in imports, rather than the reverse.

Wallerstein, too, has pointed out that, rather than causing the receson, the severe inflation of the early sixties was itself largely caused by e slowdown of the economy.[16] If that is the case, and the main effects of decline in the effectiveness of the unorthodox policies are more of a conquence than a cause of the economic slowdown, what then explains the ecline in the rate of growth?

According to Werner Baer, a "definitive explanation for the decline in e growth rate is still wanting." Baer maintains that the most reasonable xplanation is "to link the growth decline to the political turmoil of the arly 1960s," which "resulted in uncertainties about changes in the social ructure and economy (especially about the role allowed to the private omestic and foreign sectors) and caused a drastic decline in investment ctivities."[17] The turmoil to which Baer refers was the result of President

[15] Werner Baer and Isaac Kerstenetzky, "The Brazilian Economy in the Sixties," in Rioran Roett, ed., *Brazil in the Sixties* (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 1972), Table

[16] Wallerstein draws on Fishlow (fn. 14), as well as on Hirschman's conjectures on inflation, argue that perhaps the slowdown of growth triggered high levels of inflation as a way to pease the severe social conflict that it generated. For Hirschman's recent version of his earr sociological theory of inflation, see his "The Social and Political Matrix of Inflation: Elabrations on the Latin American Experience," in Hirschman, *Essays in Trespassing: Economics Politics and Beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980). For Wallerstein's arment, see Wallerstein (fn. 9), 25-28.

[17] Baer, "Comment," *Latin American Research Review* 15 (No. 1, 1980), 42; Baer, *A Industrialização e o Desenvolvimento Econômico do Brasil* [Industrialization and Economic Development in Brazil] (Rio: FGV, 1983), chap. 9. Baer does not elaborate much on the political rmoil. The elaboration that follows is based on Thomas E. Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil* (Ox-

Quadros's resignation in 1961, which triggered one of the most severe political crises in Brazilian history because Vice-President Goulart, his legal successor, was unacceptable to many high-ranking officers as well as to powerful civilians. They considered Goulart, the most prominent national leader of the Labor Party, dangerous not only because he was the heir of Vargas's labor populism, but also because he had strong political ties with the left. The military had forced his resignation when he was Vargas's minister of labor in 1954;[18] now the anti-Vargas, right-wing military ministers were trying to block his accession to the presidency. They failed because of a split in their ranks, but they were strong enough to curtail Goulart's powers by having the Congress vote for a parliamentary system. This, in turn, set in motion a process of polarization; in order to regain full presidential powers, Goulart had to cultivate the support of the left even more, which obviously intensified opposition from the right. As Goulart's actions became increasingly associated with the radical left, he also lost the confidence of domestic and foreign investors, as well as that of international financial organizations and of the United States.[19]

The ensuing decline in the rate of growth greatly accelerated the inflationary trend by decreasing governmental revenues at a time when Goulart had to increase expenditures in order to generate popular support. The resulting rapid rise of the budget deficit played a major role in accelerating inflation. From 1959 to 1963, expenditures rose by about 3 percent as a proportion of GDP, while revenues fell by the same amount. On the other hand, inflation rose from 50 percent in 1962 to 75 percent in 1963; in the last months of Goulart's government, prices were rising at an annual rate of over 100 percent.[20] This sharp acceleration in prices fueled the already severe political conflict that followed Quadros's resignation. It triggered bitter wage struggles which polarized the political situation even further. But it would be misleading to view this political crisis, as

ford: Oxford University Press, 1967), chaps. 7 and 8. For another source supporting the arguments of this section, see Peter Flynn, *Brazil: A Political Analysis* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983).

[18] For an account of this episode, which foreshadowed what was to happen after Quadros's resignation, see Skidmore (fn. 17), 112-15.

[19] In other words, it was a classic crisis of business confidence that was largely responsible for the decline in growth. See Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics and Markets* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 170-88. For information on business opposition to Goulart, see Skidmore (fn 17), 225, 244-52; René A. Dreifuss, *1964: A Conquista do Estado* [1964: The Conquest of the State] (Petrópolis: Vozes, 1981). Also of interest is the concise history of the relation between the state and industrial elites in Renato R. Boschi, *Elites Industriais e Democracia* [Industrial Elites and Democracy] (Rio: Graal, 1979), and Eli Diniz and Renato R. Boschi, *Empresariado Nacional e Estado no Brasil* [National Entrepreneurs and the State in Brazil] (Rio: Forense-Universitaria, 1978).

[20] Alfred Stepan, *The Military in Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 139-41.

conomic explanations do, as the result of the decline in growth and the nsuing inflation. The economic crisis was itself originally triggered by ie political crisis generated by Quadros's resignation, and it merely ag-ravated the political situation.

Even if the decline in the growth rate had been part of the cyclical na-ure of economic growth, or partly the result of the usual difficulties of nport substitution, my analysis implies that, but for Quadros's resigna-ion and Goulart's succession, such a decline would have been far less se-ere. In other words, it is likely that the political crisis that followed Quadros's resignation transformed these problems into a severe economic risis. Economic explanations are therefore mistaken in considering the conomic crisis of the sixties to have been a structural crisis inherent to mport-substituting, or dependent capitalist, industrialization; dependent apitalist development could have proceeded without a military regime ad it not been for the political turmoil that followed Quadros's resig-ation.

## The Necessity of Military Autocracy

Although the political crisis was ultimately responsible for the emer-gence of the military regime, it could still be argued that this was so only ecause the political crisis generated an economic one. But that is not the ase. The military regime probably was *not* necessary to implement sta-ilization and other market-oriented policies, and the military probably vould not have intervened if it had been merely a matter of stabilizing he economy. The economic crisis was important, if at all, only because it ggravated the political crisis that caused it. In the end, it was the unfold-ng of the political crisis itself that led to the coup.

There is no need to expect that, whenever stagflation sets in, Latin American countries will seek a solution in an autocratic form of govern-nent. Indeed, most Latin American states have recently turned to de-nocracy in the midst of acute inflation and a severely depressed economy. Nor is there any reason to believe that only autocratic regimes can effect successful transition to economic orthodoxy. In the sixties both Colom-ia, during the Restrepo administration, and Chile, under Frei, saw a suc-essful transition to market-oriented policies while a democratic regime vas in power.[21]

Can it be said, nevertheless, that in the particular case of Brazil stabi-ization required the coercive hand of military autocracy? I do not think o. Although it is true that Goulart had only a slim chance of successfully

[21] Hirschman (fn. 5), 79.

stabilizing the economy, it is possible that he could have done so. And even if he could not, his successors would have had a good chance of implementing a stabilization program or effecting a transition toward orthodoxy under a democratic regime.

It is true that Goulart's attempt to stabilize the economy during the first half of 1963 failed largely because of the intense polarization of the political system. But it also failed in part because of Goulart's ambition to become a major historical figure.[22] In his stabilization plan, the Dantas-Furtado three-year plan, Goulart had proposed "basic reforms" of great magnitude; the extremists at the right therefore accused him of wanting to subvert the existing order. They proclaimed that his stabilization measures were half-hearted, and that his real motive was to impose revolutionary changes involving the distribution of wealth, power, and property. The left, on the other hand, accused Goulart of being half-hearted where the reforms were concerned, and maintained that his real motive was to please the capitalists and the imperialist powers by furthering the exploitation of workers through his stabilization program. His stabilization measures were also strongly opposed by the usual interest groups of businessmen, workers, middle-class professionals, civil servants, and even military officers, all of whom wanted to avoid paying their share of the cost of stabilization. Under all this pressure, Goulart abandoned the three-year plan in June 1963, hardly six months after it had been proposed.

It is possible that Goulart could have seen this plan through all of this pressure, but he was bored by the technical issues of stabilization, which were too banal to confer upon him the status of a major historical figure. He had always been much more attracted by the dramatic idea of the basic reforms advocated by the left. It was only natural, then, that he finally put all of his efforts into campaigning for such reforms and abandoned stabilization when the latter ran into major political trouble. Yet, it is perhaps unfair to blame him for the failure of the plan. Even if Goulart had been strong and humble, the fact that he was unacceptable to the right would probably have doomed his attempt at stabilizing the economy.

Still, there is no reason to infer an immediate need for a military regime. Goulart's term ended in 1965, and he was ineligible for reelection. Of the five presidential candidates for 1965, only one, Miguel Arraes (who was not likely to win), would probably have been unacceptable to the right.[23] The others were in principle perfectly capable of implementing at least a moderately successful anti-inflationary program.

[22] Skidmore (fn. 17), 248-52, 267. [23] *Ibid.*, 273-76.

Why, then, were the military and civilian conspirators unwilling to vait for the end of Goulart's legal term in office? The answer is that they robably would have waited if Goulart had chosen a different course of ction. As Skidmore notes, there were three possible courses of action pen to Goulart after the failure of the stabilization program.[24] He could ave played the extremes off against each other to justify his governing vith emergency powers. This strategy was too risky because he would ave had to rely on the military at the expense of organized labor, his nost important base of support. The second possibility was to maintain s unthreatening a stance as possible by alternating concessions between he groups in conflict. Goulart did not follow this rather passive strategy argely because of his ambition to make the history books as a major eader. The third option was to turn to the radical reforms of the extreme eft. Even after he had unambiguously made this choice, however, a large ontingent of military and civilian moderates were still unwilling to depose him: the politicians had a vested interest in electoral politics, and the nilitary were afraid of internal divisions such as those of 1961.[25] These noderates joined the active conspirators only when it became clear that Goulart was stepping outside the bounds of the democratic process.

Goulart's unmistakable turn to the radical left came at a massive rally n March 13, 1964, in Rio de Janeiro.[26] During that rally, he launched a ampaign for broad structural and political reforms involving land tenure and distribution, the nationalization of foreign enterprises, the enranchisement of illiterates and enlisted servicemen, and the legalization f the Communist Party. He also maintained that the Constitution had o be revised because it was obsolete and stood in the way of his reforms, vhich would create a more just and human society. Finally, he and his rother-in-law, Leonel Brizola, made it clear that their strategy was to gain sufficient mass support to bypass Congress, or even to close it; they vould carry out reforms by decree if Congress continued to block the weeping changes they believed the Brazilian people wanted.[27] Between

[24] *Ibid.*, 266-67.

[25] In 1961, the military ministers who attempted to block Goulart's accession to the presiency were openly opposed by the commander of the Third Army from Rio Grande do Sul, General Machado Lopes. This split later became a major deterrent against an attempt to overhrow Goulart. See Alfred Stepan, "Political Leadership and Regime Breakdown: Brazil," in uan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds., *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes* (Baltimore: The ohns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 121-22.

[26] For a concise account of Goulart's change in strategy beginning in mid-March of 1964, ee *ibid.*, 123-25. Also see Skidmore (fn. 17), 284-302.

[27] The usual argument concerning Congress was that it acted as a conservative body against he progressive policies of the Executive. Wanderley G. dos Santos has challenged this thesis, rguing that the Congress was fragmented and polarized, and suffering from decisional paalysis rather than conservatism. See his "The Calculus of Conflict: Impasse in Brazilian Polics and the Crisis of 1964," Ph.D. diss. (Stanford University, 1979).

the rally on March 13 and his annual message to Congress on March 15, in which he presented his program for basic reforms, Goulart had managed to intensify the fear of landowners, businessmen, foreign capitalists, congressmen, and military officers. Even the moderate left and the military and civilians of the center were beginning to withdraw their support. Still, it was not until Goulart's outright challenge of the military hierarchy during the naval mutiny on March 26 that the officers were unified and the moderates were persuaded that it was necessary to depose the President.[28]

To repeat: if Goulart had chosen a more moderate course of action, stabilization might have been achieved within a democratic context. Since the military hesitated to intervene even after Goulart had threatened the whole structure of power of Brazilian society, it is hard to see why they would have done so merely too stabilize the economy.[29]

## The Political Determinants of Military Regimes

Together, the foregoing arguments suggest that the decline in the growth rate, as well as the military coup, were the result of political polarization and ultimately of the radicalization of Brazilian politics. This poses a major problem for the general argument underlying economic explanations of military regimes, and opens the way for an alternative political explanation.

According to the economic explanations, military regimes emerged because the inherent structural weaknesses of dependent capitalist industrialization led to a decline in the rate of economic growth. They emerged in order to contain the rising demands of the lower classes that could no longer be accommodated because of the reduced rate of growth.[30] Since,

[28] When the naval minister tried to quell the mutiny, Goulart dismissed him instead of backing him, and allowed the labor leadership, which was clearly associated with the Communist Party, to participate in the choice of the new minister. That was too much even for the nationalist supporters of Goulart within the army. See Skidmore (fn. 17), 297, and Stepan (fn. 25), 130-31.

[29] The officers who led the coup would never have intervened merely to stabilize the economy. They clearly stated that they would only intervene if Goulart overstepped the boundaries of constitutionality. Their main motive was to stop Goulart and the left from using organized labor to overturn the constitutional structure—as the central document of the anti-Goulart conspiracy, the memorandum circulated by Castelo Branco on March 20, made clear. See Skidmore (fn. 17), 295. For greater detail on Castelo Branco's and other leaders' motives for staging the coup, see Ronald M. Schneider, *The Political System of Brazil: Emergence of a Modernizing Authoritarian Regime* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), and Luis Viana Filho, *O Governo Castelo Branco* [Castelo Branco's Government] (Rio: José Olympio, 1975). For a detailed study on the political attitudes of Brazilian elites, see Peter J. McDonough, *Power and Ideology in Brazil* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981).

[30] An alternative, equivalent way of saying this is that, with the "exhaustion," or crisis, of

ıs we have seen, the rate of growth declined actually because of a political ·risis involving the rise in the demands of the lower classes, economic ex-)lanations have to be corrected.

The argument should now be that military regimes emerged because he growing demands of the lower classes *themselves*, rather than any ,tructural weaknesses of the economy, led to a decline in the rate of growth. According to this corrected version, the threat to capitalism :omes from the political organization of the lower classes and their de-nands, rather than from the inherent problems of dependent capitalist levelopment. Even this corrected view, however, is far from accurate.

As such, the demands of the lower classes could not have led to the :mergence of military autocracy. As we have seen, the military coup in Brazil was a response to the double threat of radical reforms and the use )f extraconstitutional means to implement them. We know, however, hat the demands of the lower classes were much narrower and less rad-cal. Even economic explanations recognize this fact when they refer to wages and prices as the object of the workers' demands. There are several ources which confirm that this was indeed the case. Erickson has shown hat, in the early sixties, Brazilian workers were motivated to strike by oread-and-butter issues, not by political ones, and Weffort has noted that workers were upset with their leaders because the latter gave priority to lemands for reform, neglecting bread-and-butter issues.[31] There is also a :onsiderable body of survey evidence showing that urban lower classes ıad little interest in the broader issues of reform, the nature of which they

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he easy phase of import-substituting industrialization, the populist class coalition fell apart. The populist class compromise was possible because of the exuberant growth of the easy phase; with the decline in growth, the lower classes had to be excluded both politically and conomically. This is how O'Donnell, Erickson, and Furtado see it, for instance: see O'Don-ıell (fn. 2), 55-69; Kenneth P. Erickson, *The Brazilian Corporative State and Working-Class Pol-tics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 10; and Celso Furtado, "Political Obsta-les to the Economic Development of Brazil," in Claudio Veliz, *Obstacles to Change in Latin America* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965). Still another way of expressing this thesis s Stepan's; he maintains that the crisis leading to the coup was due to rising demands from he masses when the rate of growth was declining; or, as he puts it, to an increase in the loads of the "distributive capability" of the Brazilian system while its "extractive capability" was lecreasing. Stepan (fn. 20), 134-40. Thus, this thesis is shared even by explanations like Ste-pan's, which give almost equal weight to economic and political factors. The problem with Stepan's otherwise excellent book is that it still gives too much weight to economic factors and ails to show the important causal connection between the rise in demands and the decline in growth. The same is true of Stepan's most recent book, *The State and Society: Peru in Com-parative Perspective* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978). On pp. 79-80, he states that both the economic and the political crises were important in bringing about the military coup of 1964, but he never really discusses the causal connection between the two crises, or even anks them in terms of importance.

[31] See Erickson (fn. 30), 99; Francisco C. Weffort, "Sindicatos e Política" [Unions and Pol-tics], Ph.D. diss. (University of São Paulo, 1972).

barely understood.[32] Even rural workers viewed land reform in very narrow terms. They wanted mild forms of protection and help from the government rather than a sweeping transformation of the economic and political structure of the countryside. Only a tiny minority of highly politicized workers, mostly in the major urban centers, understood what was involved in the struggle for radical reforms. If this is the case, the narrower demands of the lower classes must have been converted into the broader demands for radical reform before they could trigger the coup.[33] This is the fact that economic explanations conceal, and it is a crucial one. For it is the way in which the political leadership and the political system convert the grievances and demands of the lower classes that determines whether an autocratic regime will emerge or not.[34] If the political leadership had transformed the demands of the Brazilian lower classes in a more moderate way, the military might never have intervened.[35]

Since it was the extreme left that in the end posed the threat of radical reforms through extraconstitutional means, we must understand the process by which the grievances of the urban lower classes were converted by the left into such threatening demands. The extreme left posed the threat that triggered the coup, primarily because of the intense and relentless opposition of the extreme right to Goulart's government. Using well-known strategies of dissensus politics, both extremes quickly polarized a polity stunned by Quadros's surprise resignation. Locked in a

[32] On the attitudes of workers, see Amaury de Souza, "The Nature of Corporative Representation," Ph.D. diss. (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1978); Peter McDonough "Repression and Representation in Brazil," *Comparative Politics* 14 (October 1982); Youssef Cohen, "The Benevolent Leviathan: Political Consciousness among Urban Workers under State Corporatism," *American Political Science Review* 76 (March 1982); Leôncio M. Rodrigues, *Industrialização e Atitudes Operárias* [Industrialization and the Attitudes of Workers] (São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1970). This literature suggests that the radical reforms were only one possible way of articulating the demands from the lower classes.

[33] Obviously, even the narrower demands were already the result of the organization and mobilization of the workers; even these were susceptible to control by the leadership. See Erickson (fn. 30).

[34] Economic explanations of military regimes tend to make the same mistake as their counterpart where the explanation of revolutions is concerned. They fail to take into account factors concerning the political mobilization of mass grievances. Charles Tilly has criticized such explanations in depth; see Tilly, "Does Modernization Breed Revolution?" *Comparative Politics* 5 (No. 4, 1973), 425-27, and "Revolutions and Collective Violence," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science* Vol. III (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975). For a recent review of resource mobilization theory, see Craig J. Jenkins, "Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements," *Annual Review of Sociology* 9 (1983), 527-53. Also relevant is the compelling analysis of how the organization of the state is related to social revolution; see Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

[35] Maria do Carmo Campello de Souza, in *Estado e Partidos Políticos no Brasil* [The State and Political Parties in Brazil] (São Paulo: Alfa-Omega, 1976), has argued that the party system and Brazilian democracy could have survived the socioeconomic changes of the fifties and early sixties.

deadly struggle, they jointly preempted a more moderate outcome and brought about the collapse of the democratic regime.

It was the merciless opposition to Goulart by the right-wingers of the National Democratic Union (UDN) that offered the radical left the opportunity to use the grievances of the lower classes in order to increase their power and push their sweeping radical reforms. Goulart needed support from the several groups on the left in order to counter the right's attempt to block his accession in 1961; later, he needed it again to recover his full presidential powers. In exchange, Goulart helped the leftist groups gain much power within the corporative labor structure and allowed them to build their own overarching inter-union organizations.[16]

When Goulart regained full powers in the beginning of 1963, however, he parted company with the extreme left. By that time he had decided to follow the more moderate course of action outlined by the Dantas-Furtado Three-Year Plan, which, as we have seen, was strongly opposed by the extreme left. To neutralize it as well as his enemies on the right, Goulart's strategy was to forge an alliance between a small group of moderate leftists and the center. He failed mainly because the extreme left used the resources it had accumulated during the previous year to discredit Goulart with the center. The groupings at the left astutely mobilized the economic grievances of the lower classes and skillfully manipulated strikes and demonstrations, both to show Goulart that he needed their help and to destroy the President's coalition.[17] Using dissensus politics, they led the center to demand that Goulart choose between its program and that of the left. Pressured by center, left, and right, amid extreme political polarization, Goulart swung back to what he thought was his strongest base of support, the left.

When Goulart adopted the strategy of the extreme left, which consisted of mobilizing popular pressure to force Congress to pass radical reforms, both the extreme left and the extreme right got what they wanted: between them, they prevented him from obtaining support from the center. Once the extreme left had enlisted the President to lead its aggressive

[16] For details on the major groupings of the left as well as on the major inter-union organizations that played an important role in the process of polarization, see Skidmore (fn. 17), 223-28, 276-84, and Timothy F. Harding, "The Political History of Organized Labor in Brazil," Ph.D. diss. (Stanford University, 1973), chaps. 9 and 10.

[17] According to Erickson, labor leaders had relatively little control over the rank and file. They appeared more powerful than they really were because they took advantage of special circumstances—such as the deteriorating economic conditions of the early sixties, which were quite independent from their organizational control—to call strikes and demonstrations, which they then used for their own political purposes. Goulart finally swung to the left because he believed that he could not afford to lose the support of the left and its labor clientele. See Erickson (fn. 30), 99, 148.

campaign for reforms, the extreme right got the moderates to join it in forming the grand civil-military coalition that ousted the President.[38]

Goulart's final turn to the left was due not only to the left's own power and strategy, but largely to the fact that most moderate congressmen distrusted his intentions. Because it was widely believed that Goulart wished to amend the Constitution so as to be eligible for reelection in 1965, center politicians who had a stake in the coming elections joined the right to form a coalition to veto *all* proposals for constitutional amendments.[39] Since radical reforms, such as the agrarian, required constitutional changes, they were consequently rejected by Congress.

This formation of a veto coalition had become part of a new pattern of congressional behavior. As dos Santos has shown, Congress had been both reflecting and furthering the increasing polarization of the political system since Quadros's resignation. Fragmented and polarized, Congress either formed momentary veto coalitions or failed altogether to reach relevant decisions.[40] Goulart responded in the usual way. On the one hand, he tried to change parliamentary coalitions by changing his cabinet; on the other, he tried to pressure Congress from the outside. The first strategy tended to produce administrative chaos, while the second polarized the political system even further.[41] Finally, as we have seen, despairing of influencing Congress by any other means, Goulart opted for the strategy of the extreme left—namely, massive popular mobilization to pressure Congress into pursuing reforms.[42] Both he and the extreme left, however, greatly overestimated their power over the masses. The left was divided and had barely begun to organize the masses for any serious confrontation with their opponents. Goulart found that out the hard way when almost no popular resistance could be mobilized against the military coup.[43]

Ironically, then, the intransigence of the right allowed the radical left

[38] Stepan (fn. 20), chap. 5, has shown that successful military coups have occurred only when the military had strong civilian support. By 1964, the Brazilian military knew that this was the case (see fn. 25).

[39] See W. G. dos Santos (fn. 27), 94-97, 190-93, 232-33.

[40] According to W. G. dos Santos, the deadlock and polarization were produced not so much by a conservative reaction of Congress to the reforms; rather, a decisional paralysis was caused by, and exacerbated, the fragmentation and polarization of the party system. W. G. dos Santos shows that after Quadros's resignation, the system moved toward what Sartori has called "a situation of *polarized pluralism*." See fn. 27, chaps. 1 and 2, and Giovanni Sartori, "European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism," in Joseph LaPalombara, ed., *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966). For a similar argument linking polarization and the breakdown of Chilean democracy, see Arturo Valenzuela, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Chile* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).

[41] W. G. dos Santos (fn. 27), 186-236.

[42] Stepan (fn. 25), 123.

[43] *Ibid.*, 124; Skidmore (fn. 17), 276-84, 294-302.

to convert the narrower grievances and demands of the lower classes into a demand for radical reforms. By enlisting the President to lead the campaign for those reforms, the left was able to catapult them to the forefront of the national agenda for the first time in the history of Brazil. But since the leftist groups were far from having the power to push their reforms beyond that point, they played straight into the hands of the extremists at the right, who saw in the campaign for radical reforms an excellent justification for the military coup. The intransigence of the extreme right thus combined with the irresponsibility of the extreme left to usher in a dictatorship that ultimately proved to be disastrous to the interests of both extremes.

Thus, the coup occurred because the political system could not generate a moderate solution to the crisis caused by Quadros's resignation. It allowed the extremes to dominate the political process in a way that proved fatal to democracy. It was the way in which the system transformed them, rather than the rise in the demands of the lower classes, that brought about the military regime. And it was the weakness of the democratic political system, rather than some structural flaw of dependent capitalist industrialization, that ultimately led to the emergence of a military autocracy.

## Democracy from Above and Its Consequences

If the proximate causes of military autocracy are to be sought in the polarization and radicalization of the political system, the question that follows naturally is, what causes polarization? A full answer cannot be given here. Nevertheless, I shall venture a sketchy answer, the essence of which is that, like the Brazilian democracy, some Latin American democracies have a tendency for polarization and radicalization because they are born from above. Again, I hope my discussion of the Brazilian case will be useful for understanding others.

In Latin America as well as in most third-world countries, it is the state rather than an entrepreneurial bourgeoisie that plays the major role in launching and sponsoring capitalist industrialization.[44] For this reason,

[44] This is not to say that the state played an insignificant role in the industrial revolution of Europe. The questioning of the myth of the "laissez faire" state goes back at least to Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1944). Even though the state no doubt had an important role in early industrialization, it had a far more central one in later industrialization, especially in third-world countries. For the role of the state among late developers, see Alexander Gerschenkron, "Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective," in Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), 5-30; Fernando H. Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, *Dependency and Development* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979); Fernando H. Cardoso, *Empresário In-*

also likely to drive them to denounce the political system as a sham, and, increasingly, to use nondemocratic means of opposition. The right will accuse the old elite of giving in to the lower classes and the left, and will play up the left's insurrectionary threats. In this way, it attempts to scare upper- and middle-class voters away from the dominant elite, and ultimately to form a right-wing coalition to seize power through a coup. The left will accuse the old elite of giving in to the upper classes and the right, and will play up the right's threats to stage a coup. In doing so, the left attempts to steer lower-class voters away from the old elite, and ultimately to enlist enough support to topple the regime.

The dominant elite is thus forced to swing ever more widely between the extremes, neutralizing each concession to one group of voters with a concession to the other. As a result, it is likely to lose its credibility, thereby further strengthening its opponents on both sides. The left and the right can thus effectively use each other to divide the center, strengthen themselves, and displace the dominant elite. But they can only succeed by denigrating the democratic system as a sham, by exaggerating each other's threats to use nondemocratic means, and by actually resorting to nondemocratic means of political action. In so doing, they are likely to bring about a polarization and radicalization of the political system that favors the emergence of modern forms of autocracy. Thus, by offering the political elite of the old regime the opportunity to maintain its monopoly of power by electoral means, democracy from above triggers a process of polarization that is likely to lead to the emergence of an autocratic regime.[48] That is what happened in Brazil.

The Brazilian democracy of 1946 was a democracy from above. At the end of the dictatorship of the Estado Novo, in 1945, Brazil had clearly become a state-dominated society. The state had been greatly expanded since 1930; by 1945, the central state apparatus had accumulated enough power to make major decisions almost unburdened by pressures from society. Consequently, Brazilian society was too powerless in the forties to extract democratic rights from the state. Democracy came from above, instead, as a result of international events.[49]

[48] My sketch of the links between "state-dominated society," "democracy from above," and polarization draws on the pioneering studies of the Brazilian system by Campello de Souza (fn. 35) and W. G. dos Santos (fn. 27).

[49] Alain Touraine (fn. 46), 87, has called the process by which democracy came to Brazil a "démocratisation par voie autoritaire." For a detailed history of the last years of Vargas's dictatorship and the inauguration of the Brazilian democracy of 1946, see Skidmore (fn. 17), 39-64; also Campello de Souza (fn. 35), 64. For an interesting explanation of the continuity of Brazilian authoritarianism based on Weber's notion of patrimonialism and Faoro's earlier work, see Simon Schwartzman, "Back to Weber: Corporatism and Patrimonialism in the Seventies," in Malloy (fn. 2), 47-88, and Schwartzman, *Bases do Autoritarismo Brasileiro* [The Bases of Brazilian Authoritarianism] (Rio: Campus, 1982).

Toward the end of World War II, the political elite that controlled the state apparatus of the Estado Novo realized that, with the coming demise of fascism in Europe, its semi-fascist regime would be in trouble. Rather than resist change, it recognized that it stood to gain from taking the lead in transforming the dictatorship into a democratic regime. This elite understood that the state-dominated character of Brazilian society held the opportunity to perpetuate both its own power and that of the state after the advent of democracy: if democratic rights were granted peacefully, the resources of the state could be used to maintain the structure of power of the old regime even after formal democratic institutions had been introduced. Led by Vargas, the political elite of the old regime therefore promised a return to democracy after the war. In this way, it could reach a compromise with those who were later to form the National Democratic Union (UDN),[50] the most determined enemy of the Vargas camp. This compromise gave the dominant elite much leeway in preparing itself for competition in the new regime.

The Estado Novo had greatly expanded the power of central government over the old state oligarchies and over urban workers, whom it had co-opted through corporative institutions.[51] During the relatively peaceful transition to democracy between 1943 and 1945, the political elite used the resources of this greatly expanded state to forge the broad electoral coalition that would allow it to perpetuate its power in the future regime. In preparation for electoral competition, the men who ran the powerful bureaucracies of the Estado Novo in the states used them, as well as their alliances with the landowners, bankers, and industrialists who had ben-

[50] For documentation, see Campello de Souza (fn. 35), chap. 5. The elite's willingness to cooperate was not only due to Vargas's power and to strategic considerations. Vargas's ability to perpetuate his power was greatly helped by the fact that Brazilian elites shared a basic distrust in democracy, a distrust that ultimately favored the perpetuation of a state-dominated society. For the roots of distrust in democracy, see W. G. dos Santos, *Ordem Burguesa e Liberalismo Político* [Bourgeois Order and Political Liberalism] (São Paulo: Duas Cidades, 1978), and Bolívar Lamounier, "Formação de um Pensamento Político Autoritário na Primeira República" [Formation of an Authoritarian Political Thought in the First Republic], in Boris Fausto, ed., *O Brasil Republicano* [Republican Brazil], Vol. II (Rio: Difel, 1978).

[51] The process by which Vargas extended the power of central government over state oligarchies is described in Campello de Souza (fn. 35), chap. 4. On the corporative labor structure, see Aziz Simão, *Sindicato e Estado* [The Sindicato and the State] (São Paulo: Dominus, 1966); Evaristo de M. Filho, *O Problema do Sindicato Unico no Brasil* [The Problem of the Non-Competitive Sindicato in Brazil] (São Paulo: Alfa-Omega, 1952); Leôncio M. Rodrigues, *Conflito Industrial e Sindicalismo no Brasil* [Industrial Conflict and Unionism in Brazil] (São Paulo: Difusão Européia do Livro, 1966); J. Albertino Rodrigues, *Sindicato e Desenvolvimento no Brasil* [The Sindicato and Development in Brazil] (São Paulo: Difusão Européia do Livro, 1968); Francisco C. Weffort (fn. 31); Philippe C. Schmitter, *Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968); Erickson (fn. 30); Kenneth S. Mericle, "Conflict Regulation in the Brazilian Industrial Relations System," Ph.D. diss. (University of Wisconsin, 1974); Amaury de Souza (fn. 32); and Luiz W. Vianna, *Liberalismo e Sindicato no Brasil* [Liberalism and the Sindicato in Brazil] (Rio: Paz e Terra, 1976).

efited from Vargas's dictatorship, to organize the Social Democratic Party, the PSD. Those who were in charge of the Estado Novo's corporative labor structure, through which the state controlled the working class, used it to form the Labor Party, the PTB.[52] By bringing these two groups together, the political elite of the old regime forged the broad class coalition underlying the electoral alliance between the PSD and the PTB that allowed it to rule virtually unchallenged for the greater part of the democratic period.

While democracy from above favored the old elite led by Vargas, it was highly detrimental to the future of democracy in Brazil. Vargas's gift of democracy to the Brazilian people turned out to be a Trojan horse. The enemies of the political elites of the Estado Novo did not fully realize this until it was already too late. The antistatist liberals of the UDN did not yet see the extent to which the Vargas elite had prepared the ground to perpetuate the state-dominated society that had been the Estado Novo, and, through it, to perpetuate its own power. As both Leff and Weffort have noted, the small elite at the head of the Vargas camp was able to maintain its control over the Executive for the better part of the democratic period by distributing patronage-type benefits through the immense clientelistic network formed by the state bureaucracy, the two major parties, and the corporative labor structure.[53] In this way, it made the most important decisions concerning the country—virtually unencumbered by pressures from the rest of society. In other words, the old elite successfully perpetuated its own power and that of the state while maintaining the weakness of the parties, the party system, interest groups, the legislature and, more generally, of Brazilian society, keeping them dependent on the state.[54]

The success of the political elite of the old regime was adverse to Bra-

[52] On the formation and history of these parties, see Phillys J. Peterson, "Brazilian Political Parties: Formation, Organization and Leadership," Ph.D. diss. (University of Michigan, 1962). See also G. A. Dillon Soares, *Sociedade e Política no Brasil* [Society and Politics in Brazil] (São Paulo: Difusão Européia do Livro, 1973). For a detailed analysis of how Vargas shaped the electoral system, see Campello de Souza (fn. 35), 105-34. For a review of the extensive literature on political parties, see Bolívar Lamounier and M.D.G. Kinzo, "Partidos Políticos, Representação e Comportamento Eleitoral no Brasil, 1946-1978" [Political Parties, Representation and Electoral Behavior in Brazil, 1946-1978], *Dados* (No. 19, 1978).

[53] Nathaniel H. Leff, *Economic Policy-Making and Development in Brazil, 1947-1964* (New York: Wiley, 1968). Weffort (fn. 46), 146, notes that the democratic regime of 1946 was radically different from the model of democracy known in Western Europe and the United States, in that "all important organizations that mediate between the state and individuals were, *in reality*, extensions of the state rather than genuinely autonomous organizations."

[54] Campello de Souza (fn. 35, pp. 32-33) is the first scholar who has explicitly attributed the weakness and clientelism of the parties and the party system to the fact that they emerged after much power had been concentrated in the state. Since they did not participate in the decision-making process, their function was to purchase support and quiescence through the dispensation of patronage.

zilian democracy, not only because it kept civil society weak in relation to the state, but also because the opposition was almost completely excluded from power during most of the democratic period. Democracy from above had given that elite a huge advantage over its major opponent to the right, the UDN. Between the first election in 1945 and Quadros's ascension in 1960, the UDN was consistently defeated in presidential elections, and the gulf between its members and those of the Vargas camp kept widening.[55] When the UDN realized that it could not win against the Vargas camp in the electoral arena, it began to resort to nondemocratic forms of action. Typically, it accused the victorious Vargas coalition of fraud, corruption, or of veering to the left, and did not hesitate to ask the military either to depose incumbent presidents or to prevent them from assuming office. Even after deposing Vargas in 1945, the party still complained bitterly about the unfair advantages that Dutra, the "official" candidate, was given by the Vargas elite. Shocked by Vargas's return in 1950, the UDN again joined the military in deposing him in 1954. When Kubitscheck won the election of 1955, the defeated UDN tried but failed to prevent him from taking office. Only when the charismatic Jânio Quadros ran and won under the UDN label did the UDN relent—but not for long. Its first and last major electoral victory proved to be a pyrrhic one. Quadros was too independent to be controlled by any party, and his charisma did not prevent Goulart, the UDN's most hated enemy after Vargas, from winning the Vice-Presidency. Thus, when Quadros resigned in 1961, the UDN once more resorted to the nondemocratic tactics of opposition that eventually led to autocracy.[56]

The potential for polarization was heightened in the fifties, under Vargas's democratic government, when the left was more actively drawn into the bitter conflict between the Vargas camp and the UDN. As we have seen, the strategy of the left was to infiltrate the corporative labor structure and to use it for its radical purposes. Profiting from the bitter conflicts between the two factions of the elite, the left exchanged votes and support for power positions within the corporative structure.[57] Before the

[55] For a detailed history of the relations between the UDN, the military, and the Vargas camp, see Maria Victoria de Mesquita Benevides, *A UDN e o Udenismo* [The UDN and Udenism] (Rio: Paz e Terra, 1981).

[56] Between 1945 and 1964, the UDN (or factions within it) urged the military to intervene on at least six different occasions. In view of the awful performance of what Stepan calls the "moderating pattern," it is not surprising that the military finally stayed in power in 1964. That this fact may have been instrumental in the breakdown of this pattern (rather than the ideological changes Stepan mentions as the causes of the breakdown), is suggested by John Markoff and Silvio R.D. Baretta,"Professional Ideology and Military Activism in Brazil," *Comparative Politics* 17 (No. 2, 1985), 175-91, in a recent critique of Stepan (fn. 20).

[57] For the strategy of the left, see Erickson (fn. 30), Parts II and III. On the Communist Party, see Ronald H. Chilcote, *The Brazilian Communist Party* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974).

fifties, however, the opportunities to do so had been rather scarce. Although Vargas had always courted the working-class vote, he had done so mostly through the old populist politicians of the PTB and the coopted leaders of his corporative structure rather than through the left. He had cautiously avoided the left because he did not want to alienate the moderate middle- and upper-class groups within his coalition. In 1953, however, Vargas embarked on a new political strategy that required the more aggressive support from labor that could be mobilized by the left. He therefore appointed Goulart to be his Labor Minister. Goulart, who was known for his collaboration with the left, allowed it to gain more power and actively to mobilize the working class. The UDN responded in a way that foreshadowed its response to Goulart later, in the years that preceded the coup.[58] As the situation polarized, the UDN and the military forced Goulart to resign. (The following year, they did the same to Vargas, which ultimately led him to commit suicide.)

The UDN, which had been asserting all along that the Vargas camp was corrupt, demagogic, and incompetent, now added the accusation that it fostered communism in Brazil. Whenever it could, the UDN launched an anticommunist crusade against the Vargas coalition. When Kubitscheck and Goulart were elected, members of the UDN maintained that they had been elected by the communists, and therefore had no right to take office.[59] A few years later it was to accuse its own victorious candidate of flirting with communism. Disturbed by Quadros's drift away from UDN control and his adoption of a somewhat anti-American foreign policy, the usual right-wing coalition of military officers and UDN politicians once again launched an attack against an incumbent President. In a clumsy attempt to gain even wider powers, Quadros resigned, triggering the severe political crisis that led to the coup. Ultimately, in order to block Goulart's accession to the presidency in 1961, and to depose him in 1964, the UDN once more accused its opponents of fostering communism.

For its part, the radical left used the right's attack on the populist politicians of the Vargas camp to strengthen its power over the working class. By 1964, the radicalization of both the extreme left and right had probably already gone too far for the military to step down after the coup. Although the more moderate military officers, led by Castelo Branco, wanted to return power to the civilians as quickly as they could, they had to defer to the "hard-line" military who believed they should stay on until major politico-economic changes had been effected. As Cardoso has

[58] Skidmore (fn. 17), 112-42. [59] *Ibid.*, 149-50.

pointed out, the hard-liners among the military won, largely because both political extremes engaged in even more radical forms of action.[60] As the left took to the streets, and the extreme left increasingly engaged in armed opposition, the extreme right retaliated in an ever more violent way, and the hard-line officers were able to impose their views on the rest of the military. The extremes thus gave the hard-line officers their justification for establishing an autocratic regime that was to last for two very long decades.

By the time of Vargas's suicide, the potential radicalization of Brazilian politics by the extremes was already evident. As the radical left increased its power, it became more and more difficult to maintain a middle course between the extremes. With Quadros's resignation, and Goulart's rise to the presidency, it became nearly impossible. After the military coup, nothing short of a miracle could have allowed a relatively quick return to democratic rule. By then, the dynamics of democracy from above had loaded the dice too heavily against the Brazilian democracy of 1946.

## Conclusion

I have described the dynamics that make the success of democratic regimes difficult where a powerful state presides over both the process of capitalist industrialization and the inauguration of democracy. In such cases, where democracy is born from above, there is a tendency toward a polarization of the new regime that can ultimately lead to dictatorship.

The Brazilian case shows how the dynamics of democracy from above can lead to autocracy. The success of the political elite of the old regime in perpetuating both its own power and that of the state ultimately led to the radicalization of Brazilian politics by virtually excluding the opposition from power. Since the power of the old elite was based on the broad class coalition underlying the electoral alliance between the PSD and the PTB, the excluded opposition groups retaliated by undermining it in any way they could. The right exaggerated the threat from the left in order to frighten the middle- and upper-class out of Vargas's coalition, while the left used the attack from the right to increase its power over the work-

[60] On the division within the military, see Skidmore (fn. 17), 303-21. As for the dynamics that led to the victory of the hard-liners, see Fernando H. Cardoso, *O Modelo Político Brasileiro* [The Brazilian Political Model] (São Paulo: Difel, 1979), 77-78. Of course, the further radicalization of the extremes was not the only factor that prevented a return to civilian rule. By 1964, military officers felt they were prepared to rule and had developed a new ideology that could justify their rule. See Stepan (fn. 20), chap. 8. Recently, however, Markoff and Bareta (fn. 56) have criticized Stepan and suggested, among other things, that it was the poor functioning of the "moderating pattern" rather than the ideological changes mentioned by Stepan that led the military to remain in power.

ing class in order to push its radical program of change. Together, they succeeded in eroding Vargas's coalition. In doing so, however, they also radicalized Brazilian politics, thus preventing the formation of an alternative moderate coalition that could have saved the democratic regime.

Caught between extremes, the growing urban lower classes were drawn into a struggle that was not really theirs. Having no political organizations of their own, they had to express and to defend their interests either through co-opted labor leaders and opportunistic populist politicians or through the left, which was benefiting from the polarization it was creating in conjunction with the extreme right. When autonomous working class organizations were formed, they were formed under the auspices of the left. And the left used them in the battle of extremes that ultimately destroyed, in one stroke and for a long time to come, both democracy and the prospects of an autonomous labor movement.

If there is a general lesson to be learned from the Brazilian case, it is that democracies born from above shape the potential conflicts of capitalist industrialization in a way that militates against their transformation into pluralist democracies—that is, into democracies in which power is considerably more diffused. Instead, democracies from above favor the emergence of modern forms of autocracy. Democracy from above is yet another disguise worn by autocracy to slip unnoticed into the modern world.

# THE PARTY, THE MILITARY, AND DECISION AUTHORITY IN THE SOVIET UNION

By CONDOLEEZZA RICE*

THE relationship between civilian authority and military expertise in the formulation of Soviet defense policy presents a vexing research problem. Not only are the data sparse, but what we do know about the role of the Soviet military is, on the surface, contradictory. Historical and ideological suspicion of standing professional armies and powerful officers runs deep in the Soviet Union. But, in creating a defense policy apparatus, the Communist Party has centralized the key military functions in both peacetime and wartime in the General Staff. To date, it has failed to create a comparable institutional base for civilian expertise in military affairs. Although the party leadership is the final authority in matters of defense, the absence of a coherent civilian staff institution that is competent to develop military strategy and force posture leaves political authorities heavily dependent on the professional military for information, expertise, and ultimately, policy options.[1]

This situation is not caused by neglect on the part of the Communist Party. On the contrary, the party leadership has paid considerable attention to the evolution and development of the military planning system. When we investigate the characteristics of this system more closely, it becomes clear that both party authority and military expertise are accommodated.

The Soviet military decision-making system operates as what organization theorists call a "loosely coupled" system:[2] one in which the leadership concentrates on setting the broad outlines of policy while option formation and implementation are left to the professional core. The crit-

* The author wishes to acknowledge the support of the Carnegie Corporation and the Foreign Systems Research Center of SAIC. The views reflected here are solely her own.

[1] Stephen Meyer makes this argument and links it to technology in "Civilian and Military Influence in Managing the Arms Race in the U.S.S.R.," in Robert J. Art, Vincent Davis, and Samuel P. Huntington, eds., *Reorganizing America's Defense: Leadership in War and Peace* (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985), 37-61.

[2] W. Richard Scott, *Organizations: Rational, Natural and Open Systems* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1981), 256-57.

ical issue, then, is how linkage is maintained between political directives the formation of options, and the implementation of decisions.

In this paper we will first examine the historical process by which the professional military in general, and the General Staff in particular, developed expertise and organizational capabilities to support the role they currently play in defense decision making. The General Staff acquired its functions through a slow, evolutionary, and above all political process in which it developed the competence to handle the critical functions of military management. In doing so, it arrived at a key historical juncture—the fall of Nikita Khrushchev—with a solid claim to competence and expertise in the military-technical sphere. The General Staff was able to eliminate competitors largely because parallelism and overlapping authority could not be tolerated. The Soviet Union has had to acquire military power fast and in a race with technologically and economically superior states; the result is a streamlined system for military planning. Second, we will explore the way loose coupling functions in the area of military policy that is dominated by the General Staff: issues of strategy, organization, and force posture. Third, we will look beyond this narrow sphere to other areas of military policy in which the General Staff's role is not as secure. Finally, we will examine some of the tensions inherent in a loosely coupled system and speculate briefly on its future under General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev.

## The Origins of Loose Coupling

The early Bolsheviks intended to disband their army altogether once danger to the regime—first from Germany, and then from the White forces in the civil war—had disappeared. They never achieved this; after a period in which there was a mixed system, with some militia forces and some regular army detachments, the Red Army developed in accordance with the prevailing trends for European armies of the day.[1]

As the regular army developed, so did the competence of Soviet military theoreticians. The creation of the Red Army Main Staff in 1918 and its subsequent reorganization under the Frunze reforms of 1924-1925 was a watershed. First under Frunze and then under Mikhail Tukhachevsky, the staff consisted of brilliant young officers, many of whom had served on the imperial staff (as had Tukhachevsky). Officers like

[1] The best English-language source on this period is John Erickson's classic, *The Soviet High Command* (London: St. Martin's Press, 1962). Soviet sources include S. A. Tyushkevich et al., *Sovetski'ye vooruzhenni'ye sily* [The Soviet armed forces] (Moscow: Voennoe izdatel'stvo, 1978), and I. A. Korotkov, *Istoriya sovetskoi voennoi mysli: korotkii ocherk* [History of Soviet military thought: a short outline] (Moscow: Voennoe izdatel'stvo, 1980).

V. Triandifilov, A. A. Svechin, G. Isserson, and Tukhachevsky himself debated the impact of the mechanization of forces openly and sometimes heatedly. Soviet military theoreticians viewed themselves as a part of the international community of military specialists. They read and translated the works of Guderian in Germany, and Fuller and Liddell Hart in Britain. They sought a military strategy that best suited the Soviet Union's geographic position, political circumstances, and requirements. The strategy of "combined-arms operations in depth," which they developed, soon became the centerpiece of Soviet military thought.

What is striking about this period is the freedom of debate by military professionals.[4] Stalin's lieutenant, Kliment Voroshilov, was considered militarily illiterate by these officers; although he attempted to participate in the debate, he was often ignored. Eventually, in conjunction with military officers who opposed Tukhachevsky's line of thought, Voroshilov was able to make his views known. But Tukhachevsky appealed directly to Stalin on the issue of the mechanization of forces and won, albeit briefly, on the strength of his military arguments.[5]

As an institution, the military also triumphed over potential competitors for the right to conduct military science (essentially, the right to debate matters of military strategy). From the very beginning, the Soviet leadership employed political commissars and secret police moles within the army to make certain that officers were politically loyal; but the commissars did not gain influence over matters of military strategy. With the breakup of "dual command" in warfare (where a commander could not make a decision or issue an order without the concurrence of the political officer), the political administration lost its role as an equal in matters of military strategy. The Main Political Administration (MPA), which was both a department of the Central Committee and a directorate within the People's Commissariat for Defense, concentrated primarily on matters of administration and personnel.[6]

In its attempts to expand its role in the economics of defense, the professional military did not fare well in this period. Early treatises on staff organization by Tukhachevsky and by Boris Shaposhnikov (who was to become Chief of the General Staff) envisioned a unified military-

[4] Condoleezza Rice, "The Making of Soviet Strategy," in Peter Paret, ed., *The Makers of Modern Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), at 666-67.

[5] Lev Nikulin, *Tukhachevskii: biograficheskii ocherk* [Tukhackevsky: a biographical outline] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1964). Also see an account in Budu Svanidze, *My Uncle Joseph Stalin* (New York: G. P. Putnam Sons, 1953).

[6] Timothy Colton's *Commissars, Commanders and Civilian Authority: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979) is the definitive work on Soviet military politics and the development of the MPA.

political organ that would have wide-ranging powers.[7] In Tukhachevsky's model, the General Staff would have played an extensive role in economic policy through the integration of industrial and war plans. Reversing priorities, Tukhachevsky developed a thesis on how the economy and diplomacy could serve military objectives. Although Tukhachevsky enjoyed great authority as Chief for Armaments during the massive industrialization and militarization drive of the early 1930s, the military's role in this area was never secure. Defense-related industrial concerns were kept under the watchful eye of a Central Committee department and, more importantly, of a trusted lieutenant—who in Tukhachevsky's time was Voroshilov. Stalin rejected the more grandiose plans for the role of the General Staff in planning the development of the economy.

In retrospect, it is surprising that the party, especially under the Stalinist expansion of the 1930s, did not create a Central Committee apparatus to parallel even those limited functions of the General Staff. Such departments were created for other governmental functions—for example, education and foreign affairs. In 1924, the Soviets considered creating a Secretariat for the Council of Labor and Defense as a working apparatus for questions of defense.[8] The plan was rejected, however, precisely because it might have infringed upon the responsibilities of the General Staff and caused "disconnections" in the strategic plan. With no institutional competitors, matters of military science were now the preserve of the professional military. The reforms of 1935, renaming the Red Army Staff the General Staff and expanding its function, further strengthened the role of central staff organs in military policy. The Soviets now had a General Staff in the great German and Russian imperial traditions to which they often looked; but the development of this staff system had not been automatic or inevitable. It soon became evident that the political position of the General Staff was still very fragile.

In 1937, in the face of developments in Germany and Japan, Stalin undertook a ruthless purge of the high command. Among the casualties were some of the Soviets' best military theoreticians such as Tukhachevsky. Loose coupling between political authority and military science was also eliminated. As a theory associated with "the enemy of the people" (Tukhachevsky), "deep operations" could not even be taught in the General Staff Academy.[9] Those who were associated with Voroshilov

[7] M. V. Tukhachevsky, *Voina kak problema vooruzhennoi bor'by* [War as a problem of armed struggle] (Moscow: Voennoe izdatel'stvo, 1930).

[8] M. A. Gareyev, *Frunze: Voennii teoretik* [Frunze: military theoretician] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1985), 180-81.

[9] See Pyotr Grigorenko, *Grigorenko* (Memoirs) (New York: Holt, Reinhart & Winston, 1982).

and theories opposed to Tukhachevsky's gained ascendance. The disarray caused by the politicization of strategy was evident at the outset of World War II and contributed heavily to the near-victory of Germany in the first months.

Stalin's and Voroshilov's interference and the understandable timidity of the recently purged high command also fostered confusion. The General Staff was constantly challenged by various political institutions for control of several critical functions. Matters of mobilization that were closely linked with organizational issues had only recently been centralized in the creation of a mobilization directorate for the General Staff. According to a number of accounts, however, several other organizations infringed upon the General Staff's role in this sphere. During this period, organizations were regularly created and disbanded, and replaced by new organizations. In 1941, for instance, the People's Commissariat for Defense created *Glavupraform* (Main Administration for Forming and Bringing Up to Strength the Forces of the Red Army), which siphoned off much of the General Staff's authority in matters of mobilization and the use of reserves. In June 1942, Stalin personally was forced to issue a directive delineating the functions of the General Staff and *Glavupraform*, but this measure only created more confusion. Eventually, mobilization and organizational matters were returned to the General Staff on a permanent basis.[10]

Similar challenges occurred in the area of intelligence. The purges had left the General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) depleted and nervous. The NKVD began to take on many of the functions of the military intelligence organ and proceeded to sew distrust of the GRU in Stalin's mind. This was one reason for his virtual disregard of GRU reports on the imminent German attack in June 1941; only after several months of warfare was the position of the GRU reestablished in matters of military intelligence.

Even at this darkest moment for the General Staff, Stalin did not create an institution parallel to it that was capable of managing the entire range of military-technical functions. Rather, he exercised his personal power through the demoralized General Staff. Calling its members in to report to him, berating them and personally altering their plans, Stalin asserted his authority over the military. Later, facing the possible loss of the war, he relied increasingly on the expertise of his staff officers; it was the General Staff to whom Stalin delegated the task of option generation. There was, however, no doubt that *everything* was the preserve of the

[10] S. M. Shtemenko, *General'nyi stab v gody voini*, 2 vols. [The General Staff in the years of the war] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1973) chap. 2, p. 4.

General Secretary. *Structurally, loose coupling survived,* but the reality was very different.

After the war, in spite of the near-disasters that had befallen the Soviet Union, Stalin again personally determined which questions the military should discuss. He would not allow, for instance, debate on the impact of the nuclear revolution on warfare (though he did order the rapid development of the A-bomb). Less than a year after his death, the professional military broke out of the Stalinist straitjacket. The first conference on the impact of nuclear weapons was held in 1954.

Just when the military was regaining its bearings in matters of military science, however, Nikita Khrushchev began to meddle in matters of military strategy. Khrushchev fancied himself as something of a military genius, or rather, he insisted that nuclear weapons made military genius unnecessary. Siding with radicals in the military—like the theoretician General A. I. Gastilovich who believed that any war would automatically become a strategic nuclear war—Khrushchev pushed Soviet military doctrine toward the extreme of "one-variant" war. Missiles were declared to be the decisive element of military power, and Khrushchev recommended massive cuts in the size of the armed forces and abolished the ground forces command, which he considered an anachronism in the nuclear age.

Khrushchev also attempted to use the Main Political Administration as an institutional base of support for his position, but found that the positions of the MPA officials were as diverse as those of the General Staff. To an extent, Khrushchev and his supporters were ignored. Even his handpicked Minister of Defense, Marshal Malinovsky, refused to support "one-variant" war fully: he defended the need to prepare for other contingencies and argued that the Soviet military needed to prepare for other types of war.[11] Within a few years, after the folly of Khrushchev's nuclear diplomacy had been exposed in Cuba, the military was able to debate nuclear strategy more openly.

Once Khrushchev was removed, the military lobbied actively for control of the military-technical sphere and for insulation from haphazard political interference. The General Staff, under the leadership of Marshal M. V. Zakharov (who had been dismissed by Khrushchev, but regained his position a few months after Khrushchev's fall) argued forcefully for "scientific approaches" to military planning and against "subjectivism and voluntarism," code words of Stalin's and Khrushchev's interven-

[11] Malinovsky stated, "Although nuclear weapons will hold the decisive place in future war . . . we are devoting due attention to the perfection of weapons of all types," *Izvestiya*, October 25, 1961. (Unless otherwise noted, all translations are by the present author.)

tions. The military was not questioning the right of the party to direct military policy.[12] It simply wanted to make the point that "the more the political leadership relies on the conclusions prepared by military science, the more effective and effectual will be the decisions that are taken."[13]

## Professionalization and the Ascendance of the General Staff

Under Leonid Brezhnev, the entire system of military management was overhauled. The General Staff, which grew in technological sophistication, was the primary beneficiary of the trend toward "scientific management." Its members insisted that military thought, military management, and ultimately the conduct of warfare needed to be integrated and brought firmly under its jurisdiction.

In Clausewitzian fashion, the Soviet military pressed the case for the systematic study of warfare. The General Staff rejected the notion of war as a series of random and mysterious events, arguing that there were laws that could be discovered through research and debate. In support of this position, they invoked the Marxist assertion that all of history developed scientifically. Scientific socialism, they argued, demanded that all phenomena, including warfare, be studied systematically. The drive to uncover the laws of warfare and to make decisions in a scientific fashion led to new methods of planning. Operations research, systems analysis, decision theory, and other methods taken from the hard sciences were instituted in all planning and operations agencies. As a result, major changes were made in both the curriculum of military academies and in the creation of new military specialties.

The growth of technical sciences and military economics as specialities had actually begun in the early 1960s. Interest increased in the use of new methods of planning in other countries—especially in those that were beginning to develop in McNamara's Pentagon. By the mid-1960s, the military had an entire cohort of officers who were trained in scientific methods of planning and analysis. There was to be a scientific basis both for decision making in peacetime planning and for the commander on the battlefield.[14] The decisions of the 23rd Party Congress (1966) have often

[12] M. V. Zakharov, *Krasnaya zvezda*, February 4, 1965.

[13] K. Ivanov, "Nauchniye printsipy rukovodstva zashchiniye socialist-icheskogo otechestva," [The scientific principles of leading the defense of the fatherland], *Kommunist vooruzhenykh sil'* (No. 16, 1969), 12; cited in David Holloway's excellent analysis of Soviet military management, *Technology and Military Management in the Soviet Union*, Adelphi Paper No. 76 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1977).

[14] See John Erickson's "Soviet Cybermen: Men and Machines in the Soviet System," *Signal* (December 1984). The classic Soviet work on this subject is V. V. Druzhinin and I. A. Korontov, *Ideiya, algorithm i resheniya* [Idea, algorithm and decision] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1972).

been cited as the rationale for improvements in the planning system of the entire state. In fact, advocacy of scientific planning by key military officers pre-dated by at least two to three years the emphasis on improved planning that appeared in the party documents.

The General Staff Academy, long the military's primary think tank, improved its ability to conduct games and simulations in order to "scientifically substantiate" the efficacy of various options for strategy and for the solution of "military theoretical problems."[15] Senior officers with technical backgrounds were promoted rapidly and appointed to boards and advisory positions, thus ensuring the integration of the technical disciplines into mainstream military thought. For instance, General I. I. Anureyev, a specialist in operations research, was moved onto the Council of the Academy of the General Staff. General V. V. Druzhinin, a specialist in decision theory, became a member of the editorial board of the limited-distribution journal *Military Thought* in order to encourage the publication of scientific articles in that key journal.

At the same time, numerous officers who were not as technically sophisticated were released from service. This caused considerable resentment and set off a debate about the role of the "commander-engineer" in the leadership of the armed forces. Some argued that qualities like courage and moral leadership should not be underestimated in the urgency to search for computer knowledge.[16] But the trend did not abate. Colonel General Nikolai Ogarkov was appointed Deputy Chief of the General Staff in 1968, apparently to improve the management of the military-technological side of defense planning. In 1977 Ogarkov, an engineer, was promoted to marshal and appointed Chief of the General Staff.

While emphasizing modern methods, the General Staff did not lose sight of traditional modes of analysis. As a counterpoint to quantitative analysis, it rejuvenated the role of the study of military history. Long, dry volumes on the history of "the Great Patriotic War" were finally completed in the late 1960s. In the early 1970s, the General Staff became interested in the study of military history as a basis for understanding contemporary warfare. In 1970, the Ministry of Defense had requested the General Staff to study a number of lessons of World War II, including those of the beginning period of the war and the problems of command and control that it exposed. The General Staff Academy, which in 1953

[15] Viktor Kulikov, *Akademiya general'nogo staba* [Academy of the General Staff] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976), 208.

[16] The need for caution is sounded in V. Bondarenko and S. Tyushkevich, "Soveremennyi etap revolutsii v voennom dele i trebovaniya k voennym kadram" [The contemporary stage of the revolution in military affairs and the demands for military cadres], *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil'* (No. 6, 1968).

had abolished its faculty of military history, reestablished it in 1973. With the decision to bring military historians back to the most important military academy in the Soviet Union, the General Staff reasserted its interest in shaping the collective memory of the Soviet Armed Forces.[17]

While securing its role in the formulation of military thought, the General Staff simultaneously pressed for more purposeful integration of new functions into its domain and for greater authority over the services in matters of organization. The Soviet General Staff is not only a planning staff, but a command staff as well. Since the reforms of 1935, it has had directorates for mobilization, intelligence, and communications, as well as for military science and operations. Currently, it also has directorates for topography, external relations, foreign military assistance, as well as free-standing departments for military history, legal and treaty matters, and a political department.

As we have seen, many of these changes were brought about in response to the demands of new technologies, particularly in communications and intelligence, and to the growing importance of military satellites and electronic means as key intelligence assets. The General Staff's role in coordinating the huge and redundant layered warning system of the Soviet Union grew as the information became directly available to the central command. A similar centralizing trend has taken place in communications. The chief of the signal troops, General A. I. Belov, has served simultaneously as chief of the General Staff's communications directorate since the late 1970s.

Mirroring this centralization of functions, major efforts to integrate planning and to create a "single strategic view" were, and still are, aggressively pursued. The primacy of combined-arms doctrine provides the rationale for the General Staff's dominance of strategy. The main staffs of the services are responsible for developing the operational art and tactics that are service-specific. The General Staff reviews changes in the operational art of the services to make certain that it is consistent with the overall thrust of national military strategy.

The General Staff has tried to prevent diversions from national strategy by improving its input in the service staff's planning processes and by a unified training program even for senior officers. As early as 1960, an already strong all-service perspective was strengthened with the abolition of separate service faculties at the Voroshilov Academy. Instead, all senior officers were put through a unified arms course.[18] There have also been extensive efforts to standardize methods of planning. Planning indices

[17] Kulikov (fn. 15), 204.

[18] *Ibid.*, 144.

have long required the General Staff's approval. In the 1960s, this requirement was extended to the development of textbooks on planning methods for use in all agencies, staffs, academic institutions, and military-scientific societies. This effort to integrate planning is reflected in the designated role of the General Staff. Until 1982, it was said to *coordinate* the work of the service staffs, but it is now said to *direct* that work.[19]

Progress has even been made in integrating what has always been a somewhat unruly navy. The Soviet Navy has twice had its own ministry, and has at times made clear that the army-dominated General Staff knows little about sea power. It is true that, like most army-dominated staffs, the General Staff has tended to view naval power as an appendage of ground power, best used in a support role. This position has grown unpalatable for an increasingly sophisticated navy; there have been several altercations between the admirals and the General Staff. The publication of V. D. Sokolovskii's *Military Strategy* in 1963 touched off one such dispute, to which the leadership responded by creating the post of Special Assistant to the Chief of the General Staff for Naval Affairs. Since at least 1972, a post of Deputy Chief of the General Staff has been reserved for an admiral. This did not prevent a round of disagreement between the General Staff and the former Chief of the Navy, Admiral S. F. Gorshkov, on the role of naval power in modern warfare. Generally, though, the navy has had to compromise and find a way to justify its views in terms consistent with General Staff strategy.[20]

This evolution has given the Soviets a sophisticated and modern military, capable of the entire range of intellectual, planning, and management functions, and perhaps more insulated from the kind of personalistic intrusions that were characteristic of the rule of Stalin and Khrushchev. Advances in technology have helped to rationalize and justify the integration of functions. But the changes in the staff's role are still well within the bounds of the military-technical sphere and subject to political authority when the Party chooses to exercise it.

## Loose Coupling, Option Formation, and Decision Authority

How does this loosely coupled system work? In order to accommodate political concerns for control and military demands for efficiency simultaneously, the party and the military must link up effectively in the de-

[19] "General'nyi stab" [General Staff], *Sovetskoi voennoi entsikolopedii* [Soviet military encyclopedia] (Moscow: Voennoe izdatel'stvo, 1982).

[20] See James McConnell, "The Gorshkov Articles, the New Gorshkov Book, and their Relation to Policy," in Michael MccGwire and James McConnell, eds., *Soviet Naval Influence* (New York: Praeger, 1977), 565-617.

cision process. If they do not, institutional loose coupling can lead to no coupling at all.

An analysis of decision making must begin by distinguishing between type and level of decision. In modern statecraft, political leaders are unconcerned with routine, day-to-day management of the military. The military decisions that attract their attention are the major ones: large-scale organizational changes (such as the creation of commands), questions of military doctrine (first use of nuclear weapons, for example) and the decision to buy major weapons systems. Even important decisions must rest upon analysis and development of options at subordinate levels, since busy political leaders lack the time and expertise to perform these functions themselves. In the strictest sense, therefore, any military decision-making system is loosely coupled.

What distinguishes the Soviet system is the apparent absence of civilian expertise at the staff level where option formation takes place. Institutional loose coupling in the Soviet Union amounts to a split along civilian and military lines. The U.S.S.R. is not unique in this regard. Highly centralized military systems, employing general staffs, do not as a rule have a parallel civilian/political apparatus for analysis and option formation. There is no reason to expect that the Soviets would, as the American system does, equate the maintenance of political authority with a civilian/political apparatus for analysis and option formation. It is the American system that is unique in that a civilian chain (the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the civilian secretaries of the services) functions parallel to those of the professional military staffs.

But within the context of Soviet policy the failure to create a parallel civilian apparatus is peculiar. The absence of a civilian staff institution for military policy cannot be attributed to the character of decision making in a totalitarian system. In fact, totalitarian systems are characterized by precisely the opposite trend: the politicization of every sphere of life. In other policy areas in the Soviet Union, there is both a professional core of government experts and a parallel party organization with its own cadre of experts. In the foreign policy sphere, for instance, there is the Foreign Ministry on the government side and an International Department of the Central Committee with an expert foreign policy staff on the party side.

On closer examination, however, the absence of civilian experts is not nearly so surprising or impressive. If defense policy is thought of as a series of concentric circles, the Soviet military dominates the innermost circle: strategy, force posture, and matters of organization.[21] The military's

[21] Timothy Colton has developed a useful scheme for understanding the role of the Soviet military; see Colton (fn. 6), 234. See also the work of William E. Odom, including his com-

monopoly on expertise, information, and option generation does not extend beyond this narrow area.

Dominance of strategy, organization, and force posture is not to be taken lightly. Military-technical issues have an important impact on peacetime resource allocation and the conduct of foreign policy. The absence of civilian expertise at the staff level for these important matters means that civilian authority is exercised either late in the process of deciding between policy options, or very early—through requests for analysis and recommendations. Oversight rests with officials (and perhaps with their personal staffs) who are so high up in the process that they are unlikely to pay attention to military issues on a daily basis.

Data on decision linkages in the Soviet Union are scarce, of course. Still, the concept of loose coupling is consistent both with the way the Soviets talk about decision making and with what we know of their institutional arrangements. The Soviets assert that the party, through the Central Committee (which is big and meets too infrequently to play this role in reality), the Politburo, and the Defense Council provide guidance and leadership, while the Ministry of Defense (and its subordinate organs) manage, administer, and implement decisions on the basis of broad directives.[22]

The Defense Council, a largely civilian body, is responsible for continuous oversight of Soviet defense policy and for major defense decisions.[23] Headed by the General Secretary and consisting of at least the Minister of Defense, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Chairman of the KGB, the Politburo member with responsibility for defense-industrial concerns, and the Chief of the General Staff (perhaps as a voting member), this body is in effect the highest authority on matters of defense in the Soviet Union.

The Defense Council apparently passes requests for options and for analyses to support decisions to the General Staff through the Minister of Defense. There are possibly a few individuals or even small groups competent to advise party leaders on certain aspects of military policy, but there is no evidence that a civilian apparatus for the kind of analysis and option formation carried out by the General Staff has ever existed in the

mentary in Dale E. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes, *Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1977).

[22] A recent reference to this hierarchy can be found in the speech by Minister of Defense Marshal S. L. Sokolov to the 27th Party Congress. *Krasnaya zvezda*, March 2, 1986.

[23] For the most detailed description of the Defense Council, see the work of Ellen Jones, including the section on Soviet decision making, in Jones, *Red Army and Society* (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985). Also see Harriett Fast Scott and William F. Scott, *The Armed Forces of the USSR* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1979).

Soviet Union.[24] All available evidence suggests that the staff work for the Defense Council is carried out by the General Staff which is, according to the Soviets, "the administrative organ of the military forces in peace and war."[25]

Once the General Staff is asked to investigate an issue, it apparently recommends a solution, but others are also presented. Considerations other than military efficiency are factored in, and a militarily optimal solution may be rejected for other reasons, including economic or political ones.[26] Moreover, there are differences of opinion even in the debate that leads to formation of options. For instance, when the Soviets had to decide how to integrate nuclear weapons into their forces, there were several different options.[27] The final decision—the creation of an integrated command called the Strategic Rocket Forces—was clearly the one preferred by General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev. The system may not have alternative institutions, but that does not necessarily mean that political leaders are without alternative solutions to the problems they face.

The Soviets thus draw a distinction between the role of the analyst and that of the decision maker. Decision makers, according to one source, should be presented with "the qualities that characterize the advantages and disadvantages of alternate variants. The making of the decision is the function of command or leadership."[28] The Chief of the General Staff (who participates in the deliberations of the Defense Council) and the Minister of Defense are both decision makers in their roles on the Council. They also provide the link between political authority and military direction and management. It is not surprising that political authorities have the final say in the selection of these key actors.

But the top-to-bottom picture of decisionmaking does not tell the whole story. The professional military does have the critical role of identifying new problems in the conduct of war. The "military scientists," as the Soviets call their analysts, do this through research and debate on an ongoing basis. One example of the military's role in determining the agenda from below is the recent reorganization of the Soviet armed

[24] The range and scope of General Staff activities is one indicator. Military staffs are said to resemble "large research institutes" with specialists from a variety of disciplines coming together to analyze problems. The General Staff also "contracts out" to the Voroshilov and Frunze Academies, and sometimes to specialists from the Academy of Sciences. Kulikov (fn. 15), 20.

[25] "General'nyi stab" [General Staff], *Voennyi entsiklopedicheskii slovar* [Military encyclopedic dictionary]; (Moscow: Voennoe izdatel'stvo, 1983), 186.

[26] See, for example, Yu S. Solnyshkov, *Optimizatsiya vybora vooruzheniya* [Optimal selection of armaments] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1968).

[27] V. F. Tolubko, *Nedelin* (Moscow: Molodaya Gvardiay, 1979).

[28] Solnyshkov (fn. 26), 11.

forces for war. The policy outcome was the creation of an intermediate level of command between Moscow and the front level of command in the field. The decision to create theaters of military operations as permanent commands in order to facilitate centralized leadership in warfare is *not* likely to have come about because the Defense Council, upon reflection, decided that the Soviet armed forces were missing a command link. Rather, we can identify the emergence of the concept of theaters of military operations as a command level in the military theoretical literature; support for the concept in the writings of Chiefs of the General Staff led to the creation of one such command and the subsequent creation of three others.

Soviet nuclear strategy in the late 1950s and early 1960s envisioned a very short war in which a decisive nuclear blow would be struck in the first hours. In the most extreme sectors of the military, this was thought to obviate the need for conventional strategy, since wars would now be won by "nuclear missile warfare." The debate culminated in the publication of a report by a commission headed by former Chief of the General Staff Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii.[29] The volume supported Khrushchev's view somewhat equivocally and opened up a storm of debate about the future character of warfare.

On the heels of Khrushchev's nuclear debacle in Cuba and of debate in NATO about the need for flexibility in military forces, Soviet military theoreticians became even more alarmed at the dominance of "one-variant war." The belief that warfare might be protracted or might even begin with a conventional phase began to gain ascendance. Admission of the possibility of a conventional phase led theoreticians to worry about command and control, and to turn to a purposeful study of the problems of strategic leadership in World War II.

The General Staff Academy, on orders of the General Staff, conducted a number of studies concerned with this question.[30] One of these was an analysis, in 1964, of strategic leadership of large-scale formations (groups of fronts) in theaters of military operations. Over the next few years, theoreticians began to talk about theaters of military operations, not as geographic designations, but as separate command levels. By 1968, there were seminars at the General Staff Academy on the problem of leadership of large-scale formations. The issue came to the attention and received the support of Marshal Viktor Kulikov, who was Chief of the General Staff at the time; he wrote the definitive article about the concept

[29] Sokolovskii et al., *Voennaya strategiya* [Military strategy] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1963).
[30] See Kulikov (fn. 15), 181.

in 1975.[31] Referring to the creation of such a command for the Far Eastern campaign of World War II, Kulikov recommended an intermediate command level that would strengthen centralized leadership of front-level commands. Four years later, under a new Chief of the General Staff, Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, the first of such commands was set up in the Far East and entrusted to Army General Vasily Petrov. Ogarkov continued to press the case for these commands on a worldwide basis, and for their readiness in peacetime.[32] Eventually, three other commands were created, completing the reorganization.

Unfortunately, we do not know the process by which Kulikov and Ogarkov finally received approval for their theater-level commands. Because the new commands would have considerable impact on the political-military direction of a war effort and because they required resources, the Defense Council probably approved the request. The important point, however, is that this was an initiative from below. In a system which lacks civilian experts at the staff level, that may well be a frequent occurrence.

In short, the delegation of these functions to the professional military without a parallel party apparatus gives the military broad jurisdiction in the generation of options and in setting the agenda for defense decisions. There are at least two reasons why the Soviets have this structure. First, institutions have a way of solidifying their hold over matters that have historically been within their jurisdiction. This is especially true in circumstances where competitors—who might have developed expertise and competence over time—have been eliminated. In the few cases in which competitors did emerge in embryonic form, the results have not been good. The politicization of military strategy has led to a number of debacles; the most dramatic, of course, was the Soviet Union's near-defeat at the hands of Germany in 1941. It is probably not accidental that the General Staff constantly and not at all subtly reminds the leadership of that experience.

Second, there are the dangers of diffusion of authority and the spread of information that would accompany the creation of competitive institutions. Competitive options formation, flowing from parallel institutions, would require access to information for another set of actors. It is doubtful that even those who formulate the options within the General

[31] Kulikov, "Strategicheskiye rukovodstvo vooruzhennykh sila" [Strategic leadership of the armed forces], *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal* (No. 6, 1975), 12-24.

[32] Ogarkov, *Vsegda v gotovnosti k zashchite otechestva* [Always prepared to defend the fatherland] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1982).

Staff are privy to all relevant data. Rather, pieces of information are put together as decisions move up the pyramidal structure until they come together at the very top of the hierarchy. Those who make the decisions can hold sensitive information very tightly. Serial rather than parallel structures maximize information control. Since no information is more sensitive than the facts of Soviet military power, the absence of multiple, parallel institutions is not so surprising.

More importantly, the boundary around military-technical issues is not so impermeable as to isolate the party completely from matters of strategy. This is especially true when the party leadership, for whatever reason, has chosen to focus on an issue, as has been the case with Soviet nuclear strategy.

It is often argued that technology demands expertise and leads to tyranny of the experts. For a while, nuclear weapons did lead to such a tyranny of military experts in the Soviet Union. In the early days of the development of nuclear strategy, Soviet officers seemed to think of nuclear missiles as very high-yield artillery pieces. In time, however, the view that nuclear weapons were not just like any other weapon began to surface. Some sociologists and philosophers outside the military, who tried to understand the character of war and society in the nuclear age, believed that the Soviet military was too optimistic about the winnability of nuclear war.[33] The General Staff seems to have objected to these activities of non-military specialists and was able to silence some of the debate.

Concern about the devastating power of nuclear weapons persisted, however. Physicists, in particular, provided considerable support for the belief that nuclear war would be unlike any other in human history. These views were not lost on the political leadership. After years of debate about the character of nuclear war and the role of military superiority, Brezhnev announced that parity, not military superiority, was the Soviet goal. A few years later, he pronounced nuclear war to be unwinnable.[34] Military comment hardly fell into lockstep immediately: the Soviet military was preparing to fight wars, not to prevent them. Eventually, however, the debate incorporated the Brezhnev theses, though Soviet military strategy and force posture are still structured to provide real military options, even in a nuclear war. There is a considerable difference, therefore, between political doctrine and military strategy. This is a familiar problem even in the United States, where declaratory doctrine and military strategy have not always been in step. But the problem

[33] Ilya Zemsov, *Soviet Sociology: A Study of Lost Illusion* (Fairfax, VA: Hero Books, 1984). I am indebted to Notra Trulock for pointing out this source to me.

[34] *Pravda*, October 21, 1981.

is more acute in the Soviet Union. Without a set of civilian experts who know both the nature of nuclear weapons and the details of Soviet military strategy, the power of the political leadership to bridge that gap depends on its ability to change the views of the General Staff. Perhaps the considerable attention given to the possibility of fighting a conventional war without the employment of nuclear weapons is the Soviet military's answer to the question, "What becomes of military strategy if nuclear war cannot be won?"

## Force-Posture Decisions and Resource Allocation

The issue of force structure has also been subjected to the search for "scientific solutions." The professional military, particularly the General Staff, is still the key body in formulating options for force structure. But, since this matter impinges upon broader economic issues, the apparatus for military-economic decisions is very complex. In view of the garrison-state mentality of the Soviet political leadership, one does not have to posit the military's dominance to explain the Soviet Union's large expenditures for defense. Presumably, the professional military is a powerful—even aggressive—voice in the defense consensus, but it does not control, as it does in matters of strategy, all of the assets, sources of information, and expertise on military budgetary matters.

Important party functionaries, presumably with staffs, oversee defense-industrial concerns. The key actor is the Party Secretary with responsibility for this area. L. N. Zaikov, who holds this position at present, is a member of the Politburo, as was his predecessor, R. G. Romanov. Both men gained their experience as heads of the Leningrad party organization, a center for the development of defense technology. If a change in priorities is indicated, this is the key position for the General Secretary to control.

Several institutions below the Politburo level provide wide-ranging expertise to the party and the government. A Central Committee Department for Defense Industries gives the party the kind of oversight in this area that it does not have in matters of doctrine and strategy. The Military Industrial Commission and, on occasion, joint *ad hoc* committees to settle disputed resource-allocation questions bring together professional military officers, officials of the Department of Defense Industries of the Ministry of Defense, scientists, and *Gosplan* economists. The State Committee for Science and Technology is also said to have a role in resource allocation in the research-and-development stage. Within the Ministry of Defense itself, there are parallel institutions concerned with armament: the

defense industries group and the General and service staffs. The officers of the defense industries sector have usually had career paths separate from the core professional military.

There have been changes in the military's role in this sphere, but these changes have not necessarily enhanced its voice in determining its own share of resources. This is, of course, the area in which there is the greatest potential for civilian-military conflict. For about twelve years, from the ouster of Khrushchev until around 1976, the military had little reason to complain. Soviet defense spending data are always suspect, but most analysts would agree that the share of GNP devoted to defense was exceptionally high (12 to 18 percent). Sometime in the mid-1970s, the growth in the rate of procurement began to slow down.[35] Was this a conscious policy decision by the party leadership, the end of a procurement cycle, or was it tied to the general slowdown in the Soviet economy? One article offered a thinly veiled suggestion that strategic planning would be facilitated by more closely tying defense allocations to long-term (ten-year) plans.[36] The rate of GNP was mentioned as one possible determinant of the share devoted to military needs. If military spending had been tied to GNP, it would have been protected from sudden reductions due to political interference; but the proponents of this idea may not have foreseen economic recessions. It is not clear whether this proposal was ever taken seriously, but it is one conceivable explanation for the slowdown in procurement in the mid-1970s, corresponding to a slowdown in general economic growth. Unfortunately, difficulties in measuring Soviet defense spending make it impossible to establish this relationship definitively.

After 1969, there was a major push to incorporate measures of economic efficiency into armament selection. The military had gained a reputation as big spenders who took little care in selecting research projects for funding and in awarding contracts.[37] In response, the Soviet military developed a keen interest in the McNamara revolution in the Pentagon.[38] A subsequent controversy over how to price military goods turned on whether the military budget had to reflect resource scarcity. One military economist noted that

[35] The size of the slowdown is a matter of controversy, and the dollar costing method used is replete with methodological problems. David Holloway has provided a useful discussion of this problem in *The Soviet Union and the Arms Race* (New Haven: Yale, 1983), 114.

[36] V. D. Sokolovskii and M. Cherednichenko, in "Some Problems of Military Science," *Military Thought* (July 1968), 14, tried to suggest more systematic methods for determining the share of state expenditures to defense.

[37] Henry Firdman. *Decisionmaking in the Soviet Microelectronics Industry* (Falls Church, VA: Delphic Emigre Series, 1985).

[38] Solnyshkov (fn. 26), 18.

> the comparability of value indices is not achieved by the monetary form alone. It is necessary to apply a uniform level of wholesale prices.... Only in that way is it possible to know society's real outlays on the country's defense and compare them with other economic indices of the economy's development.[39]

Perhaps in order to preempt the civilianization of this function, military economists—most of them working for the defense industries sector—incorporated efficiency measures and costing procedures in their own work. The promotion of Dmitri Ustinov, whose experience was in the defense-industrial sector, to Defense Minister in 1976 probably accelerated this trend.

The optimization measures were of two types: selecting between two models of the same weapon (a tank prototype, for instance) and deciding on the correct mix of weapons to perform a particular mission—for instance, "Which is it better to develop in order to keep military-industrial objectives of a probable enemy under threat: aircraft-bombers, intercontinental missiles, or missile submarines?"[40] The first type of decision could presumably be made primarily by the service staffs. It was the second type of decision that increased the General Staff's role in weapons acquisition and resource allocation. The scientific-technical committee of the General Staff provided better machinery for decisions based on mission requirements. It was headed, apparently in an effort to ensure complete cooperation, by N. N. Alekseyev, a former Deputy Chief of the General Staff who became Deputy Minister of Defense for Armaments.

When Alekseyev died in 1978, his replacement, Army General Shabanov, did not come from the General Staff, but from the electronics sector of the defense industries; there is no mention of the Scientific Technical Committee in his identification. The reasons for this are unknown. Perhaps the leadership, with defense-industrial specialist Dimitri Ustinov now Minister of Defense, decided to strengthen the hand of the defense-industrial sector. Or they may have viewed too close a connection between the General Staff and the armaments process as unwise. When the appropriate use of resources within the military was at issue, the General Staff seems to have played a major role in harmonizing service interests. With the onset of resource scarcity, however, it may have been necessary to turn to those with a background in the defense industries in order to promote efficiency. In this regard, 1976 and the appointment of Ustinov may have been a watershed.

[39] P. V. Sokolov, *Voenno-ekonomicheskiye voprosi v kurse politekonomii* [Military-economic questions in the course of political economy] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1968).

[40] Solnyshkov (fn. 26), 11.

In matters of weapons selection and resource allocation, the picture is therefore more complicated than in the inner circle that is concerned with development of strategy. The role that the General Staff plays in optimizing by mission and harmonizing service interests may quite properly be a part of that inner circle. On the other hand, expertise for costing weapons systems and developing technical requirements exists within other institutions. Although there is a great deal of overlap between the functions, the party does not have to rely on the General Staff to tell it how much money to spend and what to buy with its enormous expenditure. This gives the party bodies responsible for oversight for this area a strong lever in guiding the direction of force posture.

## Foreign Policy and Arms Control

In the areas of intelligence, arms control, and foreign policy, the General Staff's role is even weaker. A number of parallel institutions are available to help the party leadership decide how to use its military forces. The GRU, which is the Intelligence Directorate under the General Staff, is the kingpin for military intelligence, and the KGB can provide a second opinion when needed. Moreover, in matters of political intelligence, the KGB is all-pervasive, and even capable of providing a source for intelligence about the military itself.

In foreign policy and arms control, many institutions are expert and competent to offer advice and information. The arms control delegations of the Soviet Union show remarkable continuity, suggesting that they have become an important source of advice. There is an Arms Control and Disarmament section in the Foreign Ministry. The Academy of Sciences Institutes, especially the Institute for the U.S.A. and Canada, are important sources of information on American attitudes and, perhaps through KGB contacts, on American defense and scientific programs. Their experts are also increasingly competent on matters of the strategic interaction between the Soviet Union and the United States. But their role is rightfully outside of this circle, not in the circle concerned with Soviet military strategy. On this subject, they apparently lack sources of information and intelligence, and so cannot comment on what Soviet strategy and force posture ought to be.

An important technical community, composed of high-ranking physicists of the Academy of Sciences and of weapons designers, has traditionally played an influential part in Soviet nuclear policy. To develop an atomic bomb, Stalin turned primarily to I. A. Kurchotov and other Soviet

scientists, virtually isolating the military from the project.[41] Brezhnev, who played a major role in early ICBM development, was in direct contact with design bureau chiefs at least as often as with the military. The nuclear physicist Ye. Velikhov was perhaps the closest advisor to Gorbachev at the Geneva summit in 1985 and again at Reykjavik in October 1986. The technical community is thus an important source of information and advice on the effects of nuclear weapons and the potential of new technologies.

In matters of arms control, nevertheless, the General Staff has great visibility. Since arms control affects force posture, it is not surprising that key officers like Ogarkov and Alekseyev have played important roles on Soviet arms control delegations. Neither is it surprising that there is a Legal and Treaty Department of the General Staff, headed by the very visible General Nikolai Chervov. Gorbachev took Chief of the General Staff Marshal Akhromeyev to the Reykjavik summit despite the fact that his American counterpart, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral William Crowe, was not present.

But the General Staff is only one source for arms control options, and its advice can be rejected. It is difficult to believe that the General Staff agrees with Gorbachev's recent arms control proposals which, at the very least, would eliminate intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe. The military was reportedly very unhappy about Gorbachev's insistence on a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing (recently revoked) when there was little prospect that the United States would reciprocate.

The Treaty on Security and Confidence-Building Measures in Europe, signed in Stockholm in 1987, carried cumbersome measures for the notification of exercises and intrusive verification means to allow inspection of troop formations deep in Soviet territory; it must have been quite unpalatable for the General Staff. This kind of arms control stands in marked contrast to the measured limitations on U.S. and Soviet forces characteristic of the Brezhnev era. Arms control that places limits on American technology and systems that threaten the Soviet Union are, arguably, acceptable to the Soviet military, even if Soviet systems are limited in the process. Because these agreements have focused on bilateral limitations on already extraordinarily high numbers of weapons, the military's ability to meet its targeting requirements has not been threatened.

But arms control appears to be entering another phase altogether un-

[41] See especially David Holloway's work on the early nuclear program, "Entering the Nuclear Arms Race: The Soviet Decision to Build the A-Bomb: 1939-45, *Social Studies of Science* 11 (Summer 1981).

der Gorbachev. The measures agreed to at Stockholm begin to impinge upon the operational readiness of Soviet conventional forces through extensive verification and notification procedures. Recent suggestions that the Warsaw Pact is ready to entertain deep conventional force reductions and "discussions" on military doctrine cut right to the heart of the General Staff's traditional domain. The Soviets have even proclaimed that they have a new military doctrine and that they are ready to discuss the problems of surprise attack in Europe. It is far too early to take any of this at face value, but these measures could have significant implications for the very essence of Soviet military strategy, the rapid offensive. There may yet be a jurisdictional battle between the General Staff and other institutions with a stake in arms control policy over the boundaries of the "military-technical" side of doctrine.[42]

In this, as in other jurisdictional battles throughout Soviet history, the party will be the final arbiter. General Secretaries, in particular, have played a critical role in deciding how permeable the boundaries of the "military-technical" side of doctrine will be.

The fact that the Soviets have not equated civilian control and authority with civilian management (through a set of experts whose functions parallel those of the General Staff) may be a strength of the system. The party exercises effective control, not by delegating authority to the professional military, but by holding them responsible and accountable for the faithful execution of their duties. This principle was recently exercised in the "Cessna Affair," which Gorbachev used to fire an "incompetent" Chief of the Air Defense Forces and an "aging" Minister of Defense. Historically, the Chief of the General Staff has been the point man for responsibility. There have been ten changes in the position since World War II. The last two Chiefs of the General Staff have been dismissed.

The party has every reason to believe that the military services wish to give them their best estimates on how to win the next war. Moreover, *nomenklatura* (a party-approved list of potential candidates) provides the party with a strong hand in deciding who occupies important military posts. Control of personnel is the key to party dominance of military matters. The KGB is a counterweight to the military, and an effective mechanism to assuage residual fears of "Bonapartism" (military takeover). Most importantly, high-ranking officers are also high-ranking communists with an enormous stake in the system. Military men are incorporated into the Central Committee in peacetime and STAVKA (Supreme

[42] Defense Minister D. T. Yazov discusses the Warsaw Pact's appeal for these discussions in *Pravda*, June 27, 1987. He forcefully asserts, however, that Pact doctrine is already defensive.

High Command) in wartime to assure unity of military and political goals. The complex network in which important military men are simultaneously senior party officials complicates the application of the concepts "civilian" and "military" in an analysis of defense decision making. Some of the benefits of parallelism and civilian management—in particular, constant contact with the professional military—are available to the leadership even without a civilian apparatus to plan for defense.

One potential problem with loose coupling is the delicate process of keeping military and political goals in balance. Does a system in which strategy is left to the professional military put civilians at a disadvantage in time of war? Some would argue that military dominance of strategy can lead to militarily brilliant strategies that are politically stupid.[43]

Soviet political doctrine, which posits resort to war only "if the imperialists unleash it," is defensive in tone; but Soviet military strategy is unselfconsciously offensive, even preemptive, in character. New wrinkles, such as the conventional-warfare option, place a premium on speed and decisiveness; they would seem to exert great pressure on civilian leaders to use their forces early and massively. In view of the institutional structure discussed above, the Soviet Union would appear to be an ideal candidate to initiate the type of nightmare associated with World War I and the prerogatives of the German General Staff.

The outside observer is confronted by an uncomfortable gap in Soviet doctrine between an offensive military strategy and a defensive political doctrine. The Soviets have been unwilling to remove the ambiguity and, in the absence of actual experience, it is difficult to know whether it is real or imagined. But surface similarities between the German and Soviet cases can easily be overdrawn. First, it is important to ask whether military strategies alone can lead to war.[44] At every step, both political and diplomatic measures can be taken. The Soviets fashioned in 1941, and continue to refine, a system for the conduct of war that rests heavily on combined military and political expertise. The leadership will have to read political and military intelligence and also try to guess the intentions of the adversary. Those are problems with which any leadership, whatever its military strategy, is faced.

If the Soviet Union decided to initiate a war, there would be great pressure from the military to allow a massive and rapid advance. The Soviet

[43] Ned Lebow. "The Soviet Offensive in Europe: The Schlieffen Plan Revisited?" *International Security* (Spring-Summer 1985), 44-78.

[44] There is an excellent discussion of the role of other factors in Jack S. Levy's "Organizational Routines and the Causes of War," *International Studies Quarterly* (No. 30, 1986), 193-222.

military, and presumably the Soviet leadership, would rather fight on NATO's territory than on its own. They believe that, especially given the character of modern technologies, the offense is favored in the offense/defense balance. But Soviet strategists do have options short of preemption, and ones in which they do not fire the first shot.

Soviet military theorists are currently warning the political leadership that in the event of hostilities, measures should be taken immediately to bring the forces to full combat readiness. The military, which is devoting a great deal of attention to the failure of Stalin in 1941 to heed strategic warnings of the German attack and the consequent failure to mobilize, keeps reminding the political leadership that Stalin's fear of provoking Hitler almost proved to be fatal. Chastened by the experiences of 1941, the military plans as if its prerogatives might be circumscribed by the political leadership. Some officers have noted that fear of "countermobilization" may again lead political leaders to delay mobilizing their forces.[45] We have (fortunately) little recent experience in observing Soviet political management of military power in a crisis. The few examples that we do have suggest that the political leadership has shown itself capable of tailoring its military responses to fit the political demands of crises.

Finally, indirect evidence suggests that even in the midst of the current war in Afghanistan, the hand of Soviet political authority is discernable. The military has clearly been constrained, in pursuing the "rebels," by the political limitations imposed by the Pakistani border. There have been airspace incursions, but—given the safe haven that the rebels enjoy—the Soviet army can only have been prevented from crossing the border because of the political costs of widening the war.

It should be noted, however, that these crises have been local in scope, and not severe. Control of the military forces in the kinds of crises that lead to world war may be another thing. Again, this problem is not unique to the Soviet Union. Political control of military prerogatives and initiatives is difficult and dangerous whatever the strategy or institutional arrangements. The balance between control of the situation and intrusive and dangerous micromanagement of the battlefield is hard to maintain. In a hostile political environment there is an irreconcilable tension between preparing for war and preventing it.

## Conclusion: Will Loose Coupling Survive Gorbachev?

The attitude of the General Secretary toward expert advice has been important. Military issues are more complicated and the scope of Soviet

[45] Gareyev (fn. 8).

military power is broader than it was in Stalin's day; it is unlikely that anyone could personally dominate an institution in that fashion again. In arms control, Gorbachev has been wildly innovative, at times without apparent regard for the advice of his General Staff. But the structural constraints of loose coupling are there for him just as they have been for his predecessors. Will he be content with the system as it is?

If Gorbachev's primary concerns are with the military economy and resource allocation, there are many sources of information, advice, and oversight that he can use to understand the economics of defense. He can strengthen his hand in that area through appointments to the Secretariat, a body that he appears to be reviving as a center of policy implementation. In his technical community, he has scientists and weapons designers who can advise him on the potential of expensive new weapons technologies. If Geneva and Reykjavik are any indication, he appears to be inclined to use that community fully.

If, on the other hand, he is interested in finding civilian experts to devise options for Soviet strategy and force posture, and to debate those issues with the General Staff, there really are no institutions to do that. There have long been rumors that the International Department of the Central Committee or one of the Academy institutes would become more active centers for the study of national security issues. The recent formation of a military department (it was previously a section) within the International Department of the Central Committee is a step in this direction. General Viktor Staradubov, a military officer with considerable experience in arms control, has reportedly been transferred to that department. But these steps are still far from the creation of an apparatus large enough and with sufficient access to information and expertise to challenge the General Staff. A department of this kind could be very useful in providing an institutional home for the consideration of political-military issues.

The Soviet Union's expanding role in the third world is a case in point. Small-scale operations like Angola or Ethiopia, which have a strong political component as well as a military side, require significant political-military coordination. The inability of the Soviet military to subdue the Afghan resistance may cause the political leadership to wonder just how much the General Staff knows about the third world and limited wars, where political skill and military force go hand in hand.[46]

The Soviet military will have to face the fact that the wartime contingencies that dominate most of the military-scientific debate—confronta-

[46] I am debted to David Albright and to Gary Sojka for their insights on the future role of the General Staff.

tions with NATO and the United States—are those least likely to occur. The cold war has been, and will probably continue to be, a struggle at lower levels of conflict in remote areas of the world. The use of military power for symbolic purposes in the day-to-day competition with the United States will also continue. If the General Staff is incapable of adapting to these challenges, its role may yet be usurped by new institutions. The early indications are, though, that the General Staff is beginning to adapt. General Chervov of the Legal and Treaty Department spends a good deal of his time promoting Soviet arms control proposals—even those of questionable military value—abroad. Even press conferences by Soviet generals are now common occurrences.

It is, of course, possible that Gorbachev will want a civilian apparatus to help him understand issues that go to the heart of the General Staff's traditional domain. Recently, Anatoly Dobrynin pointedly stated that issues of war and peace could not be left to technical experts. Since the technical experts, at least on matters of war, in the Soviet Union are overwhelmingly professional military officers, this remark may have been directed at the nature of the system of defense planning itself. Matters like the impact of the aggressively offensive conventional military posture in Europe, or on the Soviets' political position there, may be precisely the kind of gap that Dobrynin had in mind. Interestingly, issues of political constraints on mobilization and readiness surfaced in a tentative fashion in work by professional military officers like General Gareyev long before any recognition of them appeared in the comparable political literature. The General Staff is not unaware of the political-military sphere; it may be adaptable enough to preempt the civilianization of those issues that are close to the heart of military strategy. In any case, a civilian staff would have to do a lot of catching up if it wanted to challenge the entrenched military apparatus.

The present analysis says nothing about whether party-military relations will be without conflict. The party and the military have made the system work by being responsive to each other. When political authorities fail to accept military advice, the military grumbles, but there is no evidence that it can do very much about it.

The place of military power in Soviet foreign policy is not determined by the professional officer. It never has been. The Soviet Union has invested heavily in military power because the party viewed the international system with suspicion and placed considerable faith in military power as an instrument of foreign policy. If a party secretary wished to make heavy cuts in defense, he would probably face resistance from his

colleagues at the highest levels of power long before the professional military could mobilize any challenge.

In domestic politics, the party is sensitive to and watchful of the potential of the military. That element of the historical and ideological legacy of distrust is still very much alive. Barring radical changes in the political environment, existing measures are sufficient to keep the military out of factional politics. Indeed, military officers who get tangled up in factional politics usually end up out of power. The "Zhukov affair," in which the Soviet Union's greatest war hero was unceremoniously dumped from the Politburo for political activity, is a constant reminder to the military that it is very risky to play party politics. The party holds the ultimate trump card; it can fire officers who are too ambitious, which is apparently what happened recently in the removal of Chief of the General Staff Ogarkov. The military is confined to advising the party of the best options for constructing the strongest and most advanced armed forces possible. It is not a perfect system of military management, but it has worked pretty well.

# *Research Note*

# DECLINING POWER AND THE PREVENTIVE MOTIVATION FOR WAR

By JACK S. LEVY*

THE concept of "preventive war" is widely used in the theoretical and historical literature on international politics. It generally refers to a war fought *now* in order to avoid the risks of war under worsening circumstances *later*. To label a war as preventive is to provide a presumed explanation for its occurrence, but the explanatory power of the concept is diminished considerably by definitional ambiguities and by the failure to specify the antecedent conditions contributing to preventive war. In this study, I focus on the *preventive motivation* as a contributory cause of war. The concept of the preventive motivation for war is defined and differentiated from preemption and other sources of better-now-than-later logic, and the theoretical conditions affecting its strength are specified. These conceptual distinctions and theoretical propositions are illustrated with examples from a variety of historical cases, but I make no attempt to undertake a systematic empirical test of the propositions or an analysis of the historical frequency of preventive war.[1]

## The Literature on Preventive War

The theoretical significance of preventive war derives from the importance of the phenomenon of changing power differentials between states arising from uneven rates of growth—long a central theme in the "real-

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[1] Until I complete my argument that it is more useful to focus on the preventive motivation as a contributory cause of war than on preventive war as a type of war, I will continue to refer to the concept of "preventive war" in my review of the literature.

ist" literature on international politics. The idea can be traced to Thucydides' argument that "what made the Peloponnesian War inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta." Similarly, Michael Howard maintains that the causes of most wars can be found in "perceptions by statesmen of the growth of hostile power and the fears for the restriction, if not the extinction, of their own." Morgenthau refers to preventive war as a necessary means of maintaining equilibrium in the system. Gilpin concludes that, "according to realism, the fundamental cause of wars among states and changes in international systems is the uneven growth of power among states."[2]

Changes in relative power capabilities generated by differential rates of national growth have recently received even greater emphasis in Organski's power transition theory, which suggests that war is most likely during the periods when the power capabilities of a rising and dissatisfied challenger begin to approach those of the leading state. This hypothesis has been incorporated into much of the recent literature on world systems dynamics and hegemonic transitions.[3] In addition, many theorists have expressed great concern about the military as well as the economic stability of the contemporary era in the face of the decline of American power or "hegemony."[4]

There is some disagreement among theorists regarding the causal mechanism by which power transitions lead to war. One point that is central to Organski's theory but less important in the other formulations concerns the identity of the aggressor or initiator of the war. Organski and Kugler argue that the weaker but rising challenger initiates the war against the dominant power. On theoretical grounds, however, there is no compelling reason to accept this hypothesis over the alternative prop-

[2] Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, trans. by Rex Warner (New York: Penguin, 1954), /23; Michael Howard, *The Causes of Wars* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), 18; Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 4th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1967), 202-3; Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 94.

[3] A.F.K. Organski, *World Politics*, 2d ed. (New York: Knopf, 1968), chap. 12. For other theories of hegemonic transitions, see Gilpin (fn. 2); George Modelski, "The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State," *Comparative Studies of Society and History* 20 (April 1978), 214-35; William R. Thompson, ed., *Contending Approaches to World System Analysis* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1983); Charles F. Doran, "Power Cycle Theory and the Contemporary State System," *ibid.*, 165-82; Raimo Väyrynen, "Economic Cycles, Power Transitions, Political Management and Wars between Major Powers," *International Studies Quarterly* 27 (December 1983), 389-418; Christopher Chase-Dunn, "Interstate System and Capitalist World-Economy: One Logic or Two?" *International Studies Quarterly* 25 (March 1981), 19-42.

[4] Gilpin (fn. 2), 231-44; Robert O. Keohane, "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond," in Ada W. Finifter, ed., *Political Science: The State of the Discipline* (Washington, DC: American Political Science Association, 1983), chap. 16; George Modelski and Patrick M. Morgan, "Understanding Global War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 29 (September 1985), 391-417.

osition that the dominant power initiates preventive action to block the rising challenger while the latter is still too weak to mount a serious threat. Why should the challenger incur the risks of fighting while it is still inferior? Why doesn't it wait until existing trends in economic and military power, which Organski and Kugler consider to be irreversible, catapult it into the stronger position? Organski concedes the plausibility of this alternative hypothesis, and mentions the possibility of "a preventive war launched by the dominant nation to destroy a competitor before it became strong enough to upset the existing international order." He notes, however, that in recent history, it has been the challengers—Germany, Italy, and Japan—who "attacked the dominant nation and its allies long before they equaled them in power," and generalizes that initiation by the challenger is the standard pattern.[5]

The idea of a preventive war by the dominant power to weaken or destroy a rising challenger while that opportunity is still available is asserted by Gilpin to be the "most attractive response" open to a dominant power in decline, and its importance is widely recognized in the historical literature.[6] Schroeder asserts that "preventive wars, even risky preventive wars, are not extreme anomalies in politics. ... They are normal, even common, tools of statecraft. ..." A.J.P. Taylor argues:

> The war of 1866, like the war of 1859 before it and the wars of 1870 and 1914 after it, was launched by the conservative Power, the Power standing on the defensive, which, baited beyond endurance, broke out on its tormentors. Every war between Great Powers [in the 1848-1918 period] started as a preventive war, not a war of conquest.

Anderson refers to Prussia's attack against Austria in 1756 as "the most famous preventive war in history." Numerous other cases have been described as preventive wars.[7]

The role of the preventive motivation in the 1914 case in particular has attracted a great deal of attention from historians;[8] some recent work by political scientists on World War I has also focused on this variable. The

[5] A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, *The War Ledger* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), chaps. 1 and 3; Organski (fn. 3), 371. Note that the identification of leader and challenger is critically dependent upon the conception of the geographical scope of the system and the basis of power in the system. See Jack S. Levy, "Theories of General War," *World Politics* 37 (April 1985), 344-74.

[6] Gilpin (fn. 2), 191, 201.

[7] Paul W. Schroeder, "World War I as Galloping Gertie: A Reply to Joachim Remak," *Journal of Modern History* 44 (September 1972), 319-45; A.J.P. Taylor, *The Struggle for the Mastery of Europe, 1848-1918* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954), 166; M. S. Anderson, *18th-Century Europe, 1713-1789* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), 34. For other cases, see Jack S. Levy and Rick Collis, "Power-Cycle Theory and the Preventive Motivation: A Preliminary Empirical Investigation," paper presented to the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, August 1985.

[8] Fritz Fischer, *Germany's Aims in the First World War* (New York: Norton, 1961), and

theoretical and historical work of Lebow, Van Evera, and Snyder, which considers both preventive war and a preemptive strike as falling within the larger category of windows of vulnerability and opportunity, has been particularly influential. Van Evera, Snyder, and others argue that World War I can be interpreted as a preventive war. Lebow is more skeptical, though he supported that position in his earlier book. He argues that strategic considerations were more favorable for Germany in 1905, 1909, and 1912 than they were in 1914, and suggests that cognitive and domestic political variables are needed to explain why military pressures for preventive war were rejected in the first three cases, but not in 1914. He also points out that the rising power of the Soviet Union did not lead to preventive action by the United States after World War II, and that the Soviet Union did not move against China in the 1960s. Similarly, the decline of Britain's world position did not lead to a preventive war against the rising United States in the late nineteenth century. In other words, sometimes impending declines in relative power lead to preventive military action and sometimes they don't—a generalization that draws additional support from the mixed findings of some recent quantitative work. The important theoretical question concerns the conditions under which each outcome is most likely to occur.[9]

Organski attempts to answer this question by asserting (without discussion) that

> war is most apt to occur: if the challenger is of such a size that at its peak it will roughly equal the dominant nation in power; if the rise of the challenger is rapid; if the dominant nation is inflexible in its policies; if there is no tradition of friendship between the dominant nation and the challenger;

Fischer, *War of Illusions* (New York: Norton, 1975); Luigi Albertini, *The Origins of the War of 1914*, 3 vols., trans. by I. M. Massey (London: Oxford University Press, 1952-57); Gerhard Ritter, *The Sword and the Scepter*, trans. by H. Norden (Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami Press, 1970), Vol. 2; Immanuel Geiss, ed., *July 1914* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967).

[9] Richard Ned Lebow, *Between Peace and War* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 254-63; Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of World War I," *International Security* 9 (Summer 1984), 58-107; Jack L. Snyder, "Perceptions of the Security Dilemma in 1914," in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, *Psychology and Deterrence* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 153-79. Lebow's more recent position can be found in his "Windows of Opportunity: Do States Jump Through Them?" *International Security* 9 (Summer 1984), 147-86. Lebow's comparative analysis is based more on opportunities arising from a favorable dyadic balance of military power than on constraints and fears arising from an impending negative shift in power and potential, and may be more relevant for static power models than for a power transition hypothesis. For quantitative empirical studies bearing on this question, see Zeev Maoz, *Paths to Conflict* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1982), chaps. 4-6; Frank Whelon Wayman, "Power Transitions, Rivalries, and War, 1816-1970," mimeo (University of Michigan, 1983). For formal theoretical treatments, see James F. Morrow, "A Twist of Truth, A Reexamination of the Effects of Arms Races in the Occurrences of War," mimeo (University of Michigan, 1984); Emerson M. S. Niou and Peter C. Ordeshook, "Preventive War and the Balance of Power: A Game-Theoretic Approach," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 31 (September 1987).

and if the challenger sets out to replace the existing international order with a competitive order of its own.

Van Evera and Snyder suggest that the likelihood of a preventive war or a preemptive strike depends on the magnitude of the power shift, the offensive/defensive balance, and the probability that the adversary will initiate a war during the period of vulnerability. These are useful beginnings, but there are additional variables that affect the likelihood that a state's decline in relative power will lead to preventive military action, and these complex processes need to be explored in further detail. A major purpose of this study is to propose a more comprehensive explanatory framework for the analysis of power shifts, the preventive motivation, and war. Before this can be done, however, it is necessary to refine the concept of preventive war, for its explanatory power is limited by some serious analytical problems.[10]

## Definition of the Preventive Motivation

As Van Evera notes, the concept of preventive war is generally used in the literature to refer to a *type* of war, which is defined by a particular cause—the incentive or motivation for preventive action.[11] This might be useful if we wanted to restrict our attention to this one causal sequence and ignore other causes, for then the linkage between shifting power differentials, the preventive motivation, and the outbreak of war would be neatly summarized by the concept of preventive war. A problem arises, however, if our aim is a more general theoretical and empirical analysis of the causes of war. What we are ultimately trying to explain is the outbreak of *war*, not merely preventive war. Power shifts are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for war, but one cause among many, the relative importance of which we want to analyze. The confounding of cause and effect in the single concept of preventive war makes it very difficult to analyze cases in which power shifts are not followed by war, in which wars occur in the absence of power shifts, or in which power shifts interact with other variables in complex ways. Each of these is necessary for a controlled analysis of the causes of war. It is precisely because there is no perfect correlation between power shifts and war that it is useful to conceptualize the preventive motivation as an intervening variable between power shifts and the outbreak of war. In addition, power shifts may lead to war through other mechanisms besides the preventive moti-

[10] Organski (fn. 3), 376; Stephen Van Evera, "The Causes of War," Ph.D. diss. (University of California, Berkeley, 1984), 72-76; Snyder (fn. 9), 160-61.

[11] Van Evera (fn. 10), 71.

vation (for example, war may be initiated by the rising challenger rather than the declining leader), and the intensity of the preventive motivation may be affected not only by the nature of the power shift but also by other variables, such as historical antagonisms. An analysis of the effects of power shifts and other variables on the intensity of the preventive motivation (which is a continuous, not dichotomous, variable), and of the conditions under which the preventive motivation leads to war, requires that the antecedent, intervening, and dependent variables be defined and operationalized independently of each other.

Thus, the notion of *a* preventive war is not very useful for a theoretical and empirical analysis of the causes of war. The key question is not whether a particular war is preventive; instead, it concerns the relative importance of the preventive motivation with respect to other variables in the processes leading to war and the conditions affecting its intensity. After defining the concept of the preventive motivation and distinguishing it from other concepts with which it is often confused, this analysis will examine the conditions affecting the strength of the preventive motivation.

The preventive motivation for war arises from the perception that one's military power and potential are declining relative to that of a rising adversary, and from the fear of the consequences of that decline.[12] There is an apprehension that this decline will be accompanied by a weakening of one's bargaining position and a corresponding decline in the political, economic, cultural, and other benefits that one receives from the status quo; and further, that one might be faced with a future choice between a dangerous war and the sacrifice of vital national interests. The temptation is to fight a war under relatively favorable circumstances *now* in order to block or retard the further rise of an adversary and to avoid both the worsening of the status quo over time and the risk of war under less favorable circumstances later.[13] The situation is particularly serious because

[12] Note that the emphasis is on the decline in *relative* strength, consistent with the conception of power in relational and zero-sum terms. See Robert Gilpin, *U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation* (New York: Basic Books, 1975), chap. 1. A state whose capabilities are increasing in absolute terms may have an incentive for preventive action if its adversary is growing even faster. Note also that the emphasis is on the *perception* of changing power differentials by state decision makers.

[13] Preventive military action is not, of course, the only possible "solution" to the problem of an impending decline in relative military potential. Future security might also be provided by alliances. Although the conditions under which states resort to alliances rather than to preventive military action is an important research question, my working hypothesis is that great powers are hesitant to rely on others to satisfy their *long-term* security needs. Alliances tend to be transient in nature and excessively affected by domestic politics and personalities; consequently, they are unreliable over the long haul. Moreover, alliances deal with the symptoms rather than with the causes of a future threat, whereas preventive military action sometimes

of the tendency for states to give greater weight to losses than to gains. They are more likely to fight to maintain an existing status quo than to change the status quo in their favor. Preventive war is more concerned with minimizing one's losses from future decline than with maximizing one's gains by fighting now.[14]

This definition of the preventive motivation is broader than most that are suggested in the literature. In addition to the perception of a decline in relative power capabilities, one or more of the following assumptions are usually included: the preventer's perception of the inevitability, or at least high probability, of a future war; his expectation of being surpassed in power capabilities by the rising adversary; the preventer's initiation of the war; and his military superiority. Although it is common to define prevention to include the preventer's perception of the high probability of a future war, that is neither necessary nor desirable. Statesmen act on the basis of expected utility rather than probability alone. If they fear what their rising adversary *might* do once he gains superiority, and if they believe that this is their "last chance" to avoid a situation in which the adversary has the potential to do substantial harm, a war launched for these reasons should be considered preventive. The perception of a high probability of war may make a preventive action more likely, but that is a hypothesis to be tested rather than a definitional requirement for the preventive motivation. Similar reasoning leads to a rejection of the definitional requirement that the preventer perceive that he will soon be overtaken by the adversary. The same motivation for prevention would apply, though perhaps with less force, if the declining state expected only

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provides the hope of dealing more directly with the source of the threat (though the true sources are often economic).

Another alternative to preventive military action, for certain states under certain conditions, would be an attempt to reverse one's decline through internal means, such as a policy of industrial revitalization. Although such efforts are more viable over the long term than the short term, this may be the preferred alternative if the immediate military threat is not too great. At this stage, the preventive motivation for war can best be analyzed by isolating it from alternative policy instruments, but ultimately the role of alliances and of internal change will have to be included in an integrated model. (The possible importance of industrial revitalization has been emphasized to me by David Lake.)

[14] My assertion that states tend to give greater weight to losses than to gains is consistent with recent findings from experimental psychology. If *A* is preferred to *B*, an individual at *A* would be willing to pay more to avoid dropping to *B* than the same individual at *B* would be willing to pay to move up to *A*. See Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk," *Econometrica* 47 (March 1979); 263-91; Kahneman and Tversky, "Choices, Values, and Frames," *American Psychologist* 39 (April 1984), 341-50; Jack L. Knetsch and John A. Sinden, "Willingness to Pay and Compensation Demanded: Experimental Evidence of an Unexpected Disparity in Measures of Value," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 99 (August 1984), 507-21. This phenomenon is related to the concept of framing and to risk orientation, which are discussed later. See fn. 45.

to be weakened rather than actually surpassed in strength. Victory might still be expected later, but with less certainty and at higher costs.[15]

It is generally assumed that the preventer initiates the war, but this may not be true if the initiator is defined as the actor who strikes first. Even if the preventer wants a war, he may have diplomatic or domestic political incentives for provoking his adversary into striking first. An attack by the adversary would contribute to his diplomatic isolation and to the mobilization of one's own population behind the war effort (or at least minimize any domestic political costs of the war).[16] It is also generally assumed that the preventer must be the stronger actor, or at least perceive himself as the stronger actor. Yet the logic of prevention would also apply to a weaker state which perceives that its inferiority will increase in the future and that the status quo will deteriorate even further. Though such a state would be likely to lose a preventive war, the probability and costs of defeat in a later war would presumably be even greater, so that the expected utility of fighting now would exceed the expected utility of delay. Moreover, most of the hypotheses generated later in this study to specify the conditions under which a stronger state in decline is most likely to act preventively are equally applicable to a weaker state in decline; they actually explain why preventive action by a weaker state is so rare historically. My definition of the preventive motivation is thus not formally restricted to the stronger actor, though there are few historical cases in which the preventive motivation was an important factor in a war initiated or provoked by a weaker state in decline.[17]

[15] For other definitions of "preventive war," see Alfred Vagts, *Defense and Diplomacy* (New York: King's Crown, 1956), 263; Julian Lider, *On the Nature of War* (Farnborough, England: Saxon House, 1977), 63; Lebow (fn. 9, 1984), 154; Van Evera (fn. 11), 60-61; Organski (fn. 3), 371; Bernard Brodie, *War and Politics* (New York: Macmillan, 1973), 25; Gilpin (fn. 2), 191; Fischer (fn. 8, 1975), 468. Fischer's definition, which requires not just the perception of inevitability but also the actual intention by the target state to launch a war against the preventer within a few years, is very restrictive. It is also self-serving, for it facilitates his thesis of German war guilt and the argument that the German decision for war was not a preventive action deriving from perceived military necessity, but instead an unprovoked war of aggression. Because the concept of the preventive motivation refers to the motivation of the preventer, it is proper to focus on his perceptions alone, without including the intentions of the target.

[16] For example, German Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg insisted to the military that they must allow Russia to mobilize first. He was concerned about the reaction not only of England, but also of the Social Democrats in Germany who, he believed, would approve war credits only for a defensive war against Russia. Similarly, German Admiral von Müller argued that Germany should "present Russia or France or both with an ultimatum which would unleash the war with right on our side." Moltke later agreed that "the attack must come from the Slavs." See Fischer (fn. 8, 1975), 162; (fn. 8, 1961), 33; Fischer, *World Power or Decline?* (New York: Norton, 1974), 30. See also Vagts (fn. 15), 290-91.

[17] The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor may be one example. It should be emphasized that preventive military action can be taken by *any* state in decline relative to a particular adver-

This analysis has been based on the implicit assumption that the perceived threat derives from a continuing long-term secular decline in a state's relative military power and potential—presumably the result of a comparative decline in economic efficiency and rate of growth. The preventive motivation may also arise in a situation in which the decline in relative power is expected to be more transient in nature, spanning years rather than generations. Such a power shift may result from a military reorganization, an arms build-up, the procurement of armaments from abroad, an advance in military technology, or the formation of a hostile military coalition. Each of these generates intermediate-term changes in relative power and temporary windows of vulnerability. Although the latter may be less serious than a long-term decline (in that states can resort to short-term expedients such as alliances or conciliation to provide for their immediate security), they may also have the opposite effect: preventive military action may be more effective in averting a short-term cyclical downswing than a long-term secular decline. In fact, temporary windows of vulnerability have been the primary source of the preventive motivation in several historical cases, including the Seven Years' War (Frederick's fear that a hostile military coalition would form within a year) and World War I (Germany's fear of Russia's increased strength by 1917 after the latter's military reorganization and the upgrading of her railroad system).

## Analytical Distinctions

The preventive motivation for war is often confused with other sources of better-now-than-later logic, particularly the preemptive motivation. Whereas prevention involves fighting a winnable war now in order to avoid the risk of war later under less favorable circumstances, preemption involves the initiation of military action because it is perceived that an adversary's attack is imminent and that there are advantages in striking first, or at least in preventing the adversary from doing so. The two differ along several separate dimensions.[18]

One is simply the *time* that elapses until the actual threat of war ma-

sary, though it may be more common for the leading state in an international system or at least in a regional subsystem.

[18] This discussion builds on some earlier distinctions made by Van Evera (fn. 9), 64n; (fn 11), chaps. 1-2. See also Snyder (fn. 9), 160; Robert E. Harkavy, "Preemption and Two-Front Conventional Warfare" (Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems, No. 23, Hebrew University 1977), 6-7. Note that the distinction between prevention and preemption applies across the entire continuum of military action, from the surgical use of force to all-out war. The Israel attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1982 was preventive, whereas the Israeli attack against Egyptian airfields in 1967 was preemptive.

terializes. A preemptive strike is undertaken in response to the threat of an attack that is perceived to be imminent, whereas preventive action is a response to a threat that will generally take several years to develop. Preemption is a tactical response to an immediate threat, whereas prevention is a more strategic response to a long-term threat. The *source of the threat* also differs. A preemptive attack is designed to forestall the mobilization and deployment of the adversary's existing military forces, whereas prevention aims to forestall the creation of new military assets. Thus, the *consequences of the failure to act* are different for the preventer and the preemptor. The preemptor perceives (by definition) that the near-certain consequence of his failure to attack is an attack by the adversary. He knows that he will probably have no opportunity to reverse his decision, no opportunity to monitor the adversary's behavior and respond appropriately. For the preventor, the consequence of non-action is not an imminent attack by the adversary; instead, it is the gradual deterioration of his own relative military power and the risk of a more costly war from a position of inferiority. He still may have time to attempt to reverse his decline in relative power capabilities through internal economic, political, or military changes; to secure allies; to attempt to mend relations with the threatening adversary; to adjust to the changing distribution of power; to wait and see if the anticipated threat actually materializes; or to fight a preventive (or preemptive) war later if conditions warrant it.[19]

Thus, the *incentives to strike first* are different for the preemptor and the preventer. The preemptor, by definition, has an incentive to strike first, which may be intensified by a military technology favoring the offense or by the existence of military doctrines emphasizing the offensive.[20] The preventer does not necessarily have an incentive to strike first. It may be desirable for diplomatic and domestic political reasons to induce an adversary to strike first; and it may also be feasible because of the margin of safety provided by the preventer's own military superiority (assuming he is stronger).[21] Note that the incentive to preempt does not require that the adversary have an *objective* incentive to strike first. All that is necessary is

[19] The less time for these corrective measures, the more similar the situation is to preemption and the greater the incentive for military action. The preemptive motivation is generally stronger than the preventive one; the presence of both motivations is particularly destabilizing.

[20] Van Evera (fn. 9), 63-65.

[21] In a crisis in which both states consider preemption, the stronger state may have an incentive to allow the adversary to strike first, as illustrated by Israel in 1973. The weaker state rarely has the luxury of waiting. For this reason, preemption is generally perceived as more legitimate for weaker states. This legitimacy reduces, to a certain extent, the potential diplo-

that the preemptor *perceive* that his failure to initiate will result in an adversary attack, or at least that the probability of such an attack in conjunction with its expected costs require preemptive action.[22] These differences in incentives for the preventer and the preemptor are related to differences in their *military strength*. Whereas a preventer is usually the militarily stronger state, a preemptor may be either the weaker or the stronger; for reasons discussed above, he is usually the weaker.[23]

Because the concepts of preventive and preemptive motivations can be distinguished along a number of dimensions, a theory of preemption cannot be used to explain preventive action. A separate analysis of the conditions determining the strength of the preventive motivation is necessary.[24]

It is conceivable, of course, that a state may find itself in both a preemptive and a preventive situation: it may perceive that its failure to attack may result not only in the gradual decline in its relative military power but also in an imminent attack by the adversary; that may have been the situation perceived by Germany in late July 1914. In this case, the preference for war and the incentive to strike first are particularly strong. It is also possible for war to be simultaneously preventive for one state and preemptive for its adversary: *B*'s recognition that *A* is preparing for preventive action may lead *B* to preempt, which may play exactly into *A*'s

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matic and domestic political costs of preemption, and thus makes such preemption more likely.

[22] Van Evera (fn. 9, p. 64) and Snyder (fn, 9, p. 160 n.) argue that preemption involves the simultaneous incentive by both parties to strike first, whereas with prevention, the incentive is one-way. My analysis suggests that they are wrong on both counts.

[23] There are some secondary differences between prevention and preemption. Whereas the preventer basically "wants war" in the sense that it would demand enormous concessions by the adversary and make few (if any) of its own in order to avoid war, that is not necessarily true for the preemptor, who may prefer to avoid war but feel compelled by circumstances to preempt. Finally, even when prevention involves (as it usually does) the perception of a high probability of a future war, the preemptor perceives the probability of an immediate war to be even greater.

[24] "Windows" generated by the anticipated formation of a hostile military coalition present some analytical problems, for they blur the distinction between preemption and prevention. The greater the certainty that such a coalition will form—and particularly if it has already formed—the greater the expected likelihood that war will follow, and consequently the greater the incentive to strike first. The situation then begins to resemble preemption more than prevention, and our hypotheses on the preventive motivation are less likely to be valid. An example of the preemption of a hostile coalition before it is formed is Frederick the Great's action initiating the Seven Years' War (see fn. 37); an example of the preemption of a coalition after it has formed is France's initiation of the Revolutionary Wars. Betts's argument that throughout most of the nuclear age the likelihood of preventive war has been "close to zero" while the likelihood of preemption has been considerably higher, is, if correct, but one example of the utility of this distinction. See Richard K. Betts, "Surprise Attack and Preemption," in Graham T. Allison, Albert Carnesale, and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., eds., *Hawks, Doves, and Owls* (New York: Norton, 1985), 54-79.

hands.[25] In another variation, *both* sides may anticipate their own decline and thus both have an incentive for prevention.[26]

Preventive-strike logic should also be differentiated from other sources of better-now-than-later logic. One reason why a state may prefer war now to the costs and risks involved in delay has to do with credibility or reputation. Statesmen often believe that the failure to go to war when challenged, or at least to take firm action involving the risk of war, may lower their country's (or their own personal) reputation for resolve, and hence undermine deterrence and increase the danger of a future war by miscalculation. This incentive to take additional risks, and perhaps even precipitate a war to maintain credibility, may be particularly important for great powers in decline because their authority is most in doubt. Similarly, great powers may intervene in small wars in order to demonstrate resolve and to reinforce deterrence against their primary adversaries with regard to more vital interests. Statesmen's concerns for credibility are undeniably important in decisions for war, but they are analytically distinct from the logic of preventive action based primarily on declining capabilities. Statesmen may also decide to fight a small war now in order to resolve certain disputes before they become more serious, and in this way minimize the risk of having to fight a larger war later.[27] This differs from

[25] This situation raises a difficult methodological problem. If *B* preempts, how do we determine whether this is exclusively a preemptive action by *B* or whether it also involves the preventive motivation by *A*? These situations cannot be distinguished on *behavioral* grounds alone, for observed state behavior may be identical in the two situations. It is therefore necessary to examine the actual motivations of *A*'s decision makers in order to determine if they wanted a war to block the rise of *B*, yet preferred that *B* initiate the war. This problem is complicated by the possibility that a state may launch a purely aggressive war for nonpreventive reasons but, for diplomatic and internal political purposes, will try to justify it as preventive action that is necessary in the face of a rapidly rising adversary and the inevitability of a future war.

[26] Mutual preventive motivations could occur because of a faulty assessment, by at least one state, of existing military capabilities and their trends in the near future. One example might be the Franco-Prussian War, with France fearing a rising Prussia and Prussia being concerned about the impact of French army reforms. Another might be the Russo-Japanese War, where the rising Japanese may have feared the completion of the Russian railroad in Manchuria. See Michael Howard, *The Franco-Prussian War* (London: Methuen, 1981), 54; William L. Langer, "The Origin of the Russo-Japanese War," in Langer, *Explorations in Crises* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), 37, 40. Mutual preventive motivations could also occur if two states evaluate military power from two different analytical frameworks. A global power may perceive the erosion of its global dominance by a rising regional power; the latter may simultaneously perceive the erosion of its regional dominance by an expanding global power. For example, the attack on Pearl Harbor may have been in part a preventive action by the Japanese to consolidate their regional superiority before the opportunity vanished; at the same time, the United States may have undertaken strong coercive measures in part to prevent the erosion of its global power position by an expansionist Japan.

[27] Jack S. Levy and T. Clifton Morgan, "The Frequency and Seriousness of War: An Inverse Relationship?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 28 (December 1984), 731-49.

the preventive motivation in that it does not necessarily involve the perception of a decline in relative power capabilities. These latter situations also differ from preventive logic because the consequences of delay include not only the future capabilities and intentions of a particular adversary, but also the future behavior of third states.

This is an important point. The preventive motivation, as defined here and in nearly all of the literature, involves action against a particular adversary now rather than running the risk of a more costly war against that same adversary later. It is an intervening variable in a causal chain leading from changing power differentials to the outbreak of war, and describes national-level behavior motivated by a concern for a dyadic power relationship. It is subsumed under, but not equivalent to, the more general concern that the failure to act may leave one worse off. The latter :oncern would apply to any actor in any situation, but such a broadening of the concept of prevention would severely restrict its utility. Thus, a statement to the effect that "all wars are basically preventive" may be true n one sense, but it is not very useful.

Statesmen may also have domestic political reasons for believing that t is preferable to fight a war now rather than later. Under certain conditions, policy makers may believe that a successful war would increase or at least maintain their domestic political support. Such a war might satisfy specific interest-group pressures, exploit more generalized jingoistic sentiment, or distract the public's attention from internal social or economic problems through the creation of an external scapegoat. These causes of war may be important under certain conditions, but they should not be confused with preventive logic. The scapegoat motive and the preventive motive are analytically distinct, though both of them may operate n a particular case and reinforce each other.[28]

Perhaps the most obvious reason why statesmen may prefer war now rather than later is that they perceive vital national interests to be directly

[28] In fact, we might expect to find the preventive and scapegoat motivations to occur together frequently, for they may be the product of the same underlying processes. Economic ecline often generates social problems and political insecurity for the elite at the same time undercuts the military power and potential of the state. It is often argued, for example, that German and Austro-Hungarian leaders were driven to war in 1914 by the combined fear of he decline of German military power abroad and the rise of social democracy and disorder t home. V. R. Berghahn concludes that the ruling elites in Germany "were increasingly aunted by the nightmare of impending internal chaos and external defeat so that an offensive var appeared to be the only way out of the general deadlock." Berghahn, *Germany and the pproach of War in 1914* (New York: St. Martin's, 1973), 213. See also Fischer (fn. 8, 1975), 98; Ritter (fn. 8), 227-39. For more general analyses of the use of force externally for internal olitical purposes, see Arno J. Mayer, "Internal Causes and Purposes of War in Europe, 1870-956: A Research Assignment," *Journal of Modern History* 41 (September 1969), 291-303; Jack . Levy, "Domestic Politics and War," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18 (Spring 1988).

and immediately threatened. If the adversary cannot be persuaded to remove the threat, war may be perceived as the only viable means of preserving those interests. This would clearly *not* be a case of preventive motivation, for which immediate interests are secondary. The more important the immediate threat to well-defined national interests, the less the relative importance of the preventive motivation. The "ideal type" case of preventive action is one in which there is no immediate conflict of strategic or economic interests, only the recognition of the state's deteriorating power position and the fear of potentially fatal consequences should an adversary resort to war once he has achieved a position of superiority. Recognizing that the preventive motivation may be more important than the tangible interests immediately at stake, Michael Howard argues that

> in 1914 many of the German people, and in 1939 nearly all of the British, felt justified in going to war, not over any specific issue that could have been settled by negotiation, but *to maintain their power*; and to do so while it was still possible, before they found themselves so isolated, so impotent, that they had no power left to maintain and had to accept a subordinate position within an international system dominated by their adversaries.

This theme is implicit in much of the balance-of-power literature. Morgenthau, for example, argues that, whatever the ultimate aims of states, their immediate objective is to maintain their power and prestige.[29] Preventive war is one response to the expectation of decline in relative power and the fear of its consequences. Let us now consider the conditions contributing to the motivation for preventive military action.

## The Strength of the Preventive Motivation: Some Hypotheses

A first approximation of the strength of the preventive motivation for war can be determined by a rational cost-benefit framework based on expected-utility calculations, comparing the advantages and disadvantages of war now with those of delay. It will then be necessary to modify this framework by including misperceptions and domestic and bureaucratic politics in the analysis.[30] Before we begin, however, it would be useful to

[29] Howard (fn. 2), 16; Morgenthau (fn. 2). As Richard W. Mansbach and John A. Vasquez argue, traditional realist theory emphasizes the "issue of power" and minimizes the "power of issues." See their critique of realism in *In Search of Theory* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981). See also Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977).

[30] Recall that the preventive motivation is only one of several possible responses to declining military power and potential. A complete analysis would have to evaluate the relative costs and benefits of alternative policy options, particularly alliances. See fn. 13; also, Benjamin A.

consider an important objection to the basic expected-utility framework guiding this analysis. One might argue that the costs and benefits of the rising state should also be included, and that the problem be conceived as one of bargaining. There is some level of concessions that the challenger would prefer to grant rather than to fight, particularly since he can always hope to regain those concessions later when he is stronger. Similarly, there is some level of concessions that the declining state would prefer to accept from the challenger rather than to initiate a war. If the challenger's offer exceeded the declining state's demands, war would not occur. Moreover, if both states agreed on the likely outcome of the war, they would be better off accepting that outcome without incurring the actual costs of war.

My argument, however, is that this problem is not best conceived as one of bargaining. The issue is not a conflict of concrete interests in which each party can easily calculate its gains and losses from different levels of concessions and negotiate accordingly, but a question of future influence over a range of diverse and partly unpredictable issues that cannot be calculated with any degree of precision and that are not easily amenable to negotiation. Moreover, the very intensity of the conflict tends to generate different perceptions by the adversaries of the stakes, threats, legitimate aims, and acceptable alternatives to war. It is extremely unlikely that any level of concessions exists that would be both sufficient for the preventer and reasonable for the challenger. The very fact that the declining state knows that the rising adversary will probably be able to regain any concession later makes the former less likely to accept those concessions. The kind of concessions most acceptable to the declining state would be those that impeded the further increase in the military power of the rising adversary. But the source of the challenger's increasing military potential is often the fundamental restructuring of his internal economic system in response to changes in technology and other factors of production, which cannot easily be bartered away. Moreover, it is unlikely that the political leaders of a rising state would accept an agreement that would condemn them to a permanent position of inferiority, involve substantial reputational costs, and generate enormous domestic political opposition. Such concessions can perhaps be successfully demanded from a thoroughly defeated state, but not from one on the rise. If the preventer chooses to block his adversary's further increases in strength rather than delay or accelerate his own armaments program, he generally finds that he has few op-

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Most and Harvey Starr, "International Relations Theory, Foreign Policy Substitutability, and 'Nice' Laws," *World Politics* 36 (April 1984), 383-406.

tions other than war. It would not be technically incorrect to introduce the defender's calculations into the model, but this would probably add far more complexity than explanatory power, and enormously complicate any empirical analysis.[31]

THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF DELAY

The most important factor affecting the strength of the preventive motivation is the preventer's perception of the extent to which military power and potential are shifting in favor of a particular adversary. This decline will have a direct impact on his future bargaining power and the distribution of benefits from the status quo, and an indirect impact on the probability of a future war. The greater the expected advantage of the adversary, the greater his relative bargaining position, the extent of the preventer's likely concessions, and the likely costs of a future war; hence, the greater the incentive for preventive action now in an attempt to impede the rise of the adversary. If the challenger's potential for growth is limited, and particularly if the challenger is unlikely to surpass the leading power, the preventive motivation is much weaker.[32] The stronger power may still have an incentive to maintain its margin of superiority, but in the absence of a more serious future threat, the potential costs of war may be too high.

An alternative hypothesis is suggested by William R. Thompson. He argues that "the probability of conflict is also reduced if the challenger's potential for growth is so great that its eventual rise to dominance seems inevitable. Both the challenger and the dominant power are more likely to have time to adjust to the likelihood of transition." This assumes the expectation that war would have no effect on the evolution of relative power capabilities. Statesmen have often convinced themselves that war will reverse or retard the rising military power of the adversary, however, and history provides few examples of states' nonviolent acceptance of their national decline.[33]

The rate at which the power differential is closing may be even more important than its ultimate magnitude. Whereas the adversary's ultimate

[31] For an argument reaching similar conclusions, see Bruce M. Russett, "Pearl Harbor: Deterrence Theory and Decision Theory," *Journal of Peace Research* 4 (1967), 89-105. Also see Betts. (fn. 24), 62.

[32] In cases where the preventer is not fearful of being overtaken in the near future, certain critical thresholds of adversary strength may still be important (for example, Israel's concern in 1982 about Iraq's acquisition of a nuclear capability).

[33] Thompson, "Succession Crises in the Global Political System: A Test of the Transition Model," in Albert L. Bergesen, ed., *Crises in the World System* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1983), chap. 5, 93-116, at 96; also, Organski (fn. 3), 376.

power potential is distant in time and difficult to predict, his rate of growth is readily observable and therefore more threatening. The faster the relative rise of the challenger, the greater the incentive for prevention. A rapid rise increases the expectation of the declining state that it will in fact be overtaken and that it will be overtaken quickly, as well as the tendency to exaggerate these trends. It also reduces the declining state's time to increase its own power, gain allies, seek an accommodation with its rival, or otherwise adjust to the changing distribution of power.[34]

The strength of the preventive motivation is also an increasing function of the expected probability of a future war with an ever more powerful adversary, which in turn is a function of numerous variables. The greater the ultimate superiority of the rising challenger, the stronger his future bargaining position and his disenchantment with the present status quo, the greater his confidence in a military victory in the event of war, the greater his demands for concessions, and consequently the greater the likelihood of either unacceptable concessions or a future war. Admittedly, a pure power model cannot fully account for a decision maker's expected probability of a future war with a particular adversary. Britain, for example, was surely more concerned about the rise of Germany in the late 19th century than about the rise of the United States, and Germany was more concerned about the rise of Russia than about that of the United States. In addition to variables' modifying strict power ratios, such as geographical proximity and asymmetries in the elements of military power, historical antagonisms and ideological conflicts must also be considered. The importance of these should not be exaggerated, however, particularly for the leading state in the system, and especially if it faces one well-defined challenger in a bipolar situation. The threats perceived by these states and their subsequent behavior are usually determined primarily by their general interest in the configuration of power in the system rather than by their particular interests (including specific historical, economic, and ideological conflicts).[35]

A related factor that increases the historical importance of the preventive motivation is the tendency of decision makers, when faced with a rapidly rising adversary, to speak of the "inevitability" of war. When de-

[34] Organski (fn. 3) and Thompson (fn. 33) suggest that a rapid rise may increase the challenger's incentives for war, but this is less significant than the effect of a narrowing power differential on the stronger state.

[35] On the importance of systemic interests for leading states, see Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), chap. 8; Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict Among Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), chap. 6; Gilpin (fn. 2). The incentives for prevention by a leading or "hegemonic" state will be particularly great since it has a disproportionate influence on the distribution of benefits and influence in the system. See *ibid*.

cision makers perceive war to be "inevitable," they have fewer incentiv to attempt to manage the crisis; instead, they concentrate their efforts o defensive preparations for war or on trying to ensure that it occurs at a opportune moment. As Bismarck remarked, "No government, if it re gards war as inevitable even if it does not want it, would be so foolish a to leave to the enemy the choice of time and occasion and to wait for th moment which is most convenient for the enemy."[36] Perceptions of in evitability are also important because of their impact on the political de cision-making process: the internal opponents of war are deprived c their most compelling argument, for avoiding preventive action will nc help to avoid war. Perceptions of the inevitability of war may themselv contribute to the outbreak of war by generating self-fulfilling proph ecies.[37]

## The Costs and Benefits of War Now

The expected costs of delay can be a powerful motivation for preven tion, but fighting a war now can also be costly. The critical variables her are the preventer's expected probability of victory and the associated risk of defeat, and the expected costs of each.[38] The greater the probability c victory and the lower the expected costs of war, the stronger the preven tive motivation.[39] Although the degree of military superiority of the pre

[36] Fischer (fn. 8 1975), 461. Though statesmen frequently use the term "inevitability," the presumably mean a very high probability of war. For one of the few discussions of this im portant variable, see Lebow (fn. 9, 1981), 254-63. Note that a limited preventive attack ir volves fewer risks and may be more common in the absence of such fatalism.

[37] A major reason why the preventive motivation was important in the Seven Years' Wa in Europe was that the war was perceived as inevitable by Frederick. See Walter L. Dorn *Competition for Empire, 1740-1763* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), 312-14; Vagts (fn. 15 277; R. B. Mowat, *A History of European Diplomacy, 1451-1789* (Hamden, CT: Archon, 1971 244-46. The elder Moltke's belief in the inevitability of war undoubtedly contributed to h advocacy of preventive action against France in 1867 and against Russia in 1887 (Howard, fi 26, p. 41). In the period prior to World War I, the perception by German and Austrian dec sion makers that war was inevitable (against France or Russia or both) was critical. Germa Chief of Staff Moltke, for example, said in 1912, "I believe a war to be unavoidable and: th sooner the better." This fatalism was shared by political leaders and the general public as we as by the military. See Fischer (fn. 8, 1961), 29-38; Fischer (fn. 8, 1975), 162; Albertini (fn. 8 vol. II, p. 610; vol. III, p. 441; Ritter (fn. 8), 107; Geiss (fn. 8), 41; Sidney B. Fay, *The Origir of the World War* (New York: Macmillan, 1928), Vol. I, p. 43; Lebow (fn. 9, 1981), 255-57.

[38] In actuality, of course, victory and defeat constitute two ends of a continuous range c possible outcomes, each associated with an expected probability of occurrence and net cost c benefit. Note that the positive benefits from a victorious war may be a powerful incentive fc *war*, but this would exist independently of declining power, and hence independently of th preventive motivation.

[39] This hypothesis explains why weaker states rarely succumb to the preventive motivatior If we control for the fear of the future or degree of anticipated decline, this hypothesis is vali for only a restricted range of probabilities. If the expected probability of victory is too larg reflecting an enormous military advantage for the preventer over a weak but growing oppc nent, there is no immediate threat to one's position and fewer incentives for preventive actior

venter is the primary determinant of the expected probability of victory and its costs, other factors may also be important. Expectations regarding the possible intervention of other states, particularly great powers, may be critical. The diplomatic isolation of a strong and rising adversary is especially conducive to an incentive for prevention, as it reduces the costs and risks of defeat for the preventer.[40] Great-power intervention in support of the stronger state—that is, a "preventive war" by a coalition—is much less likely, particularly if the stronger state is the leading state in the system. The stronger the leading state, the greater its general interest in maintaining the existing system, and the greater the incentives to provide the collective goods for all by taking on the challenger. Other great powers are less concerned with systemic interests than with their particular strategic, economic, and ideological interests in specific issues. They have an incentive to free-ride and let the leader handle the rising challenger. Moreover, the stronger the leading state, the greater the extent to which *it*, and not the rising challenger, is perceived by other states as the primary threat to their interests, and the greater the likelihood of a general coalition *against* the leading state. For these reasons, a consensus for collective action against the rising state is unlikely to form.[41]

One factor that interacts with the dyadic military balance to affect the outcome of the war is the offensive/defensive balance of military technology, defined in terms of the degree of superiority needed by the attacker to overcome a defender. The greater the offensive advantage, the greater the potential advantage for a preventer who chooses to strike first, and hence the stronger the preventive motivation. This is particularly compelling if the offensive advantage is expected to persist into the future period of the adversary's superiority, for that would increase the seriousness of the future threat. In addition, the actual conduct of a preventive war is facilitated by offensive military doctrines calling for territorial penetration; states facing a decline in relative military capabilities may adopt offensive doctrines for this reason.[42]

[40] On the importance of expectations of intervention by third states, see Geoffrey Blainey, *The Causes of War* (New York: Free Press, 1973), chap. 4; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, *The War Trap* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980).

[41] Vagts (fn. 15, p. 290) argues that "preventive wars cannot easily be undertaken by an alliance or a coalition. Preventive wars are essentially wars of a single autocratic power acting alone or in absolute dominance within a coalition." On the tendency for great powers to align against the leading state, to balance rather than bandwagon, see Waltz (fn. 35), 126-27; Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," *International Security* 9 (Spring 1985), 3-43. The main exception is a situation in which the rising challenger expounds a revolutionary ideology which is perceived by other great powers as a threat to their own internal stability as well as to their military superiority (for example, revolutionary France in 1792). See also fn. 13.

[42] On the concept of the offensive/defensive balance, see Jack S. Levy, "The Offensive/De-

OTHER VARIABLES

Although the straightforward cost-benefit calculations provide a good approximation of the strength of the preventive motivation for war, they must be modified by other factors that may also have a significant impact. Among the most important are misperceptions, policy makers' orientations toward risk and uncertainty, domestic politics, and the policy preferences and political influence of the military.

The expected probabilities of victory and defeat and their associated costs—and hence, the strength of the preventive motivation for war—are greatly affected by misperceptions. Decision makers often exaggerate their own military strength relative to that of the adversary; they therefore overestimate the probability of victory and underestimate its probable costs. They tend to underestimate the likelihood of third parties' intervening on the side of their adversary and the likelihood of their own potential friends' staying neutral. They also tend to underestimate the military strength and impact of adversaries who intervene, and to overestimate the impact of allies who do so. The sources of misperception have received considerable attention and do not need to be elaborated here. It is useful to note, however, that the conditions under which preventive action is often considered are particularly likely to generate misperceptions. The greater the deterioration in one's position and the absence of alternative options, and, generally, the bleaker the future, the greater decision makers' motivated biases to exaggerate the feasibility of war as a solution to their problems.[43]

A decision to initiate a war for preventive purposes involves enormous risks and uncertainties, and the risk propensities of decision makers can have a significant impact.[44] This issue is particularly complex because it

fensive Balance of Military Technology and the Incidence of War: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," *International Studies Quarterly* 28 (June 1984), 219-38; Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30 (January 1978), 167-214. On the link between offensive doctrines and preventive war, see Van Evera (fn. 9), 64, and (fn. 11), 74-76; Barry Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), 69-70. The importance of this factor for preventive war should not be exaggerated, however, for the marginal impact of the offensive/defensive balance of military technology is greatest when the difference in military capabilities is small, but the preventive motivation is weakest under those conditions.

[43] On the consequences of misperception, see Jack. S. Levy, "Misperception and the Causes of War: Theoretical Linkages and Analytical Problems," *World Politics* 36 (October 1983), 76-99; Blainey (fn. 40), chap. 3; Lebow (fn. 9, 1981), 242-47. On the sources of misperception, see Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), and "Perceiving and Coping with Threat," in Jervis, Lebow, and Stein (fn. 9), 13-33; Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross, *Human Inference* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1980).

[44] Risk refers to a situation in which the probabilities of different outcomes are known, whereas in a situation of uncertainty the probabilities of various outcomes are not known.

consists of two sets of risks and uncertainties: the uncertainties inherent in a war fought now and the uncertainties involved in delay. The first set involves the inability to predict precisely the probability of victory in a preventive war or its likely costs, including the risk of an expansion of the war. The second involves uncertainties regarding whether, and how far, one's power position will continue to decline; the adversary's intentions once he achieves superiority; one's ability to secure diplomatic support or to appease the adversary successfully; and the likely costs of war in the worst case. It is not at all clear which set of risks and uncertainties will dominate. Will a risk-averse actor shy away from taking a preventive action because of the short-term risks? Or is such a war the risk-averse strategy in the face of the expected loss of one's military superiority? A detailed analysis of risk and uncertainty and their consequences cannot be undertaken here, but a few conflicting tendencies should be mentioned.

First, because the range of outcomes and the number and magnitude of negative outcomes are greater in the future than in the present, risk-averse actors might have a tendency to prefer preventive action and risk-acceptant actors to prefer delay. This assumes that the expected utility of preventive war and delay are equal for risk-neutral actors. The argument is reinforced by some recent findings from experimental psychology: individuals tend to be risk-averse with respect to gains and risk-acceptant with respect to losses.[45] To the extent that these rather robust findings regarding individual behavior are applicable to state decision making on security issues, we would expect that actors facing almost certain losses (military or diplomatic) resulting from declining military power would be inclined to accept a risky gamble in an attempt to avoid those losses—that is, to gamble on a preventive war in an attempt to halt or reverse their deteriorating situation.[46]

Because of the inherent unpredictability of international behavior, uncertainty is more important than risk. I shall use risk orientation loosely to refer to attitudes toward uncertainty as well as risk. Technically, the analysis of the expected utility of preventive war and delay is inseparable from an analysis of orientation toward risk.

[45] Given a choice between a certain gain $x$ and a lottery involving an expected value $y > x$ (in typical experiments $x$ and $y$ differ by 20-30%), individuals generally choose $x$; but given a choice between a certain loss $x$ and a lottery involving an expected value $y < x$, they choose to gamble and choose $y$. These findings are robust and contrary to the assumptions of expected-utility theory. They are generally explained by the tendency to give disproportionately high weight to nearly certain outcomes (the "certainty effect"), by the asymmetry of losses and gains and the steeper slope of loss curves, and by the tendency to frame the choice in terms of the status quo rather than of an absolute or arbitrary standard. See fn. 14. Also see John C. Hershey and Paul Schoemaker, "Risk Taking and Problem Context in the Domain of Losses; An Expected Utility Analysis," *Journal of Risk and Insurance* 47 (March 1980), 111-32; Robert Jervis, "War and Misperception," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18 (Spring 1988).

[46] This same experimental finding suggests that the rising state facing a near-certain future

Internal political considerations relating to risk orientation may point in the opposite direction. Decision makers know that they themselves must bear the costs of a war fought now, whereas the costs of delay can most likely be passed on to their successors. Risk-averse actors, particularly those sensitive to domestic political considerations, will prefer to avoid the risks of preventive war and to leave to their successors the problem of conducting foreign policy in an era of impending weakness. Perhaps this is the basis for Bernard Brodie's assertion that the "willingness to gamble *now* at unlimited stakes for what is a highly speculative long-term gain," which is so essential for preventive action, is "normally most uncharacteristic of politicians." The relative strength of these opposing tendencies is, however, ultimately an empirical question.[47]

Bismarck's aversion to preventive war appears to derive in part from a tendency to focus on immediate uncertainties and to react cautiously. Many of his statements in the public and documentary record refer to the inherent uncertainties involved in preventive war and the need to avoid them if at all possible. In one of his most widely quoted passages, Bismarck declared that "preventive war is like suicide from fear of death." He rejected the notion that the danger of war in the future provided a justification for war in the present:

> The idea of undertaking a war because it might be inevitable later on and might then have to be fought under more unfavorable conditions has always remained foreign to me, and I have always fought against it. . . . For I cannot look into Providence's cards in such a manner that I would know things beforehand.

Bismarck also stated, in a passage that reflects his fears of the uncertain dangers of a war now as well as the lack of certainty regarding the inevitability of a future war,

> We have to wait, rifle at rest, and see what smoke clouds and eruptions that volcano of Europe will bring forth. A policy like that of Frederick at the outset of the Seven Years' War we shall not follow—suddenly attack the enemy who is preparing the attack. It seems, indeed, to break eggs out of which very dangerous chickens might arise.[48]

Domestic political considerations may also affect the strength of the preventive motivation for war. Internal social and political change may be a major cause of a state's decline in relative military power and poten-

gain should be risk-adverse and prefer to avoid gambling on a risky war—contrary to Organski's argument (fn. 3) that the rising challenger will initiate the war.

[47] Brodie (fn. 15), 26.

[48] Fischer (fn. 8, 1975), 377, 461; Vagts (fn. 15), 290-91. Bismarck's interpretation of this case appears to refer more to preemption than to prevention.

tial, either directly or, more indirectly, through its adverse impact on economic productivity and comparative advantage. The internal sources of Austria's decline in 1914, for example, were demographic, social, and political as much as economic.[49] Similarly, the anticipated increase in Russia's strength from 1914 to 1917, which was the basis for Germany's preventive motivation for war, derived as much from the reorganization of the Russian army as from underlying economic and industrial changes in Russia.[50]

The intensity of the preventive motivation may also be affected by bureaucratic political considerations, particularly the policy preferences of the military and their influence in the policy-making process. Pressures for preventive action are more likely to come from the military than from civilians. By professional training, they are more sensitive to military threats to their country's security, more predisposed to worst-case analysis, more concerned about a long-term decline in military assets, and perhaps more willing to resort to extreme solutions in order to avert any further decline in military strength.[51] Although military pressure alone is rarely a sufficient condition for preventive military action, it may be very nearly a necessary condition. It is unlikely that the preventive motivation could be strong in the face of military opposition; it would be difficult for civilians to overrule a collective military judgment that a preventive war would be too risky.

The political influence of the military is determined not only by the seriousness of the external threat to vital national interests, but also by institutional arrangements, by the belief systems and personalities of key individuals, and by political leaders' expertise in and knowledge of military issues and planning. In the case of Germany before 1914, Klaus Epstein emphasizes the institutional weaknesses of the chancellor's office under the Bismarckian constitution, Bethmann's lack of personal strength and prestige, and the absence of a tradition of civilian supremacy over the military in German political culture. Bismarck himself wrote that the General Staff's desire for preventive war was natural for such a military institution, and not necessarily a bad thing, but that he feared the

[49] Austrian Chief of Staff Conrad perceived that the nationality problem was dividing the army, and feared that in a country in which two-thirds of the population were Slavs, the army would soon no longer fight for Germans and Magyars. He questioned "whether we should wait until France and Russia were ready to attack us together or whether it was not more desirable to settle the inevitable conflict earlier." Fischer (fn. 8, 1975), 398. See also Vagts (fn. 15), 304; Ritter (fn. 8), 229-31.

[50] Fischer (fn. 8, 1975), 371, 399; L.C.F. Turner, *The Origins of the First World War* (New York: Norton, 1970), 74. Domestic politics may affect the outbreak of war, of course, quite independently of the fear of one's deteriorating international position. See fn. 28.

[51] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (New York: Vintage, 1957), chap. 3; Richard K. Betts, *Soldiers, Statesmen and Cold War Crises* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977); Posen (fn. 42), chap. 2; Vagts (fn. 15), 263.

possibility of an aggressive chief of staff in combination with a weak and incompetent monarch and a chancellor without political perspective or influence.[52] The military cannot be viewed as a single actor, however, with respect to attitudes toward preventive war. There may be some divisions along organizational lines. While Moltke and the German army argued forcefully for war in 1911-12, for example, Tirpitz and the navy argued strongly for delay, and were able to persuade the kaiser to postpone military action.[53]

The general attitude toward war in society may also influence the intensity of the preventive motivation. The greater the extent to which war is viewed in Clausewitzian terms as a legitimate instrument of policy for the attainment of a wide range of national political objectives (and not just as a policy of last resort when the territorial and constitutional integrity of the state is most directly and immediately threatened), the fewer the domestic political constraints inhibiting policy makers from resorting to force, and hence the stronger the preventive motivation. This attitude toward war may vary in different types of political systems.[54]

## Summary and Conclusions

The preventive motivation is an intervening variable between a state's decline in relative military power and potential and a decision for war. It is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for war, but contributes

[52] Lewis J. Edinger, "Military Leaders and Foreign Policymaking," *American Political Science Review* 57 (June 1963), 392-405; Betts (fn. 51); Klaus Epstein, "Gerhard Ritter and the First World War," *Journal of Contemporary History* 1 (July 1966), 193-210; Walter Goerlitz, *History of the German General Staff*, trans. by Brian Battershaw (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1975), 101.

On several occasions, Bismarck blocked military demands for preventive war. After he departed as chancellor in 1890, the German military gradually gained the upper hand. Although military pressures for preventive war were rejected in the crises of 1905, 1909, and 1912, these pressures had become much stronger in 1914. The political influence of the military was also greater in part because of the ignorance of military issues and planning by political leaders, and the resulting tendency to defer to the military on security issues. See George F. Kennan, *The Decline of Bismarck's European Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 364-66; Gordon A. Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1955), chap. 7; Fischer (fn. 8, 1961, 1975); Geiss (fn. 8), 38-48; Berghahn (fn. 28), chap. 9; Jack S. Levy, "Organizational Routines and the Causes of War," *International Studies Quarterly* 30 (June 1986), 193-222.

[53] Divisions over preventive war may also follow generational lines, with the younger military officers being the most eager. Vagts (fn. 15, pp. 291, 306-8), argues that this was true for both Germany and Austria in the decades prior to World War I. See also Ritter (fn. 8), 308.

[54] This variable is potentially important but conceptually difficult, and is generally neglected. See Lebow (fn. 9, 1981), 247-54. Although the question whether democratic states are less war-prone than nondemocratic states has yet to be answered conclusively (though democracies almost never fight other democracies), it is not unreasonable to hypothesize that the *preventive* motivation for war is less intense in democratic states. See Steve Chan, "Mirror, Mirror on the Wall . . . : Are the Freer Countries More Pacific?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 28 (December 1984), 617-48.

to war in combination with other variables and other causal sequences. I
this study, I have been more interested in developing a comprehensi'
explanatory framework for the analysis of the preventive motivation f
war than in constructing a parsimonious and easily testable model. Co
sequently, I have not conducted a systematic empirical analysis to dete
mine the frequency with which power shifts and the preventive motiv
tion are associated with war, and have not empirically tested m
hypotheses regarding the conditions affecting the intensity of the preve
tive motivation. It would be useful, however, to note briefly how such
model might be tested.

A preliminary test might focus, not on the individual hypotheses then
selves, but on the causal sequence as a whole; it would examine the en
pirical association between dyadic power shifts and the outbreak of wa
ignoring for the moment the role of perceptual and internal political va
iables. Given existing data on war and military capabilities, it would l
possible to conduct a quantitative test of the simple power shift hypothes
for all dyads or for major power dyads for the period since 1815. The th
oretical literature implies, however, that power transitions between th
leading states in the system are particularly important. Because there a
relative few cases of such transitions and of major wars since 1815,
would be necessary to extend the temporal domain of the study back i
time to permit the analysis of additional cases. A useful starting poi
would be about 1500, for a number of historical and theoretical studi
identify this as the beginning of the modern system. Although adequat
war data do exist for this period, there are no data on major power mil
tary capabilities prior to 1815.[55] The collection of such data would be
enormous theoretical value, but the task of constructing valid indicato
of military capabilities over five centuries would be difficult, and the a
tual collection of the data would be time-consuming and expensive. A le
rigorous test of many of the above-mentioned hypotheses through
methodology of structured focused comparison would be a more imm
diately feasible alternative. A modest number of cases of power shifts, c
decision points within the same power shift, could be examined in orde
to determine the conditions under which power shifts are most likely t
lead to war.[56]

[55] The war and capability data for the post-1815 period are from J. David Singer's Corr
lates of War project, available at the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social R
search at the University of Michigan. For war data spanning the last five centuries and a ju
tification of the temporal extension of the system, see Jack S. Levy, *War in the Modern Gre
Power System, 1495-1975* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1983).

[56] Such an analysis would bear on the question of the sufficient conditions for war; a com
plete analysis would also have to consider necessary conditions and to include cases of ur
changing power differentials.

A related question—which has been mentioned but not resolved i this study, and which requires further theoretical and ultimately empi ical analysis—concerns the conditions under which declining state choose to provide for their future security through alliances, an expande armaments program, or other internal changes rather than through pr ventive military action. This leads to the more general questions of th conditions of peaceful systemic change, and what a rising state might d to reduce the pressure on the declining leader for preventive military a tion. These questions are, of course, important for contemporary polic as well as for theory.

# *Review Article*

# THE STEPS TO WAR: Toward a Scientific Explanation of Correlates of War Findings

By JOHN A. VASQUEZ*

J. David Singer, ed., *The Correlates of War*, Vol. I, *Research Origins and Rationale*. New York: Free Press, 1979, 405 pp.
J. David Singer and Associates, *Explaining War: Selected Papers from the Correlates of War Project*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1979, 328 pp.
J. David Singer and Michael D. Wallace, eds., *To Augur Well: Early Warning Indicators in World Politics*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1979, 308 pp.
J. David Singer, ed., *The Correlates of War*, Vol. II, *Testing Some Realpolitik Models*. New York: Free Press, 1980, 328 pp.
Melvin Small and J. David Singer, *Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816-1980*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1982, 373 pp.
J. David Singer and Richard J. Stoll, eds., *Quantitative Indicators in World Politics: Timely Assurance and Early Warning*. New York: Praeger, 1984, 221 pp.
J. David Singer, *Deterrence, Arms Control, and Disarmament* (with a new Epilogue). Lanham, Mass.: University Press of America, 1984 (first published 1962), 303 pp.
Alan Ned Sabrosky, ed., *Polarity and War: The Changing Structure of International Conflict*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985, 231 pp.
Melvin Small and J. David Singer, eds., *International War: An Anthology and Study Guide*. Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press, 1985, 393 pp.

## INTRODUCTION

THE scientific study of war began with the hope and promise that the collection of reproducible evidence and its systematic analysis would result in a major breakthrough in our understanding of general factors associated with war and peace. That breakthrough has not yet occurred; the task has been more intractible than was thought. Nevertheless, during the last fifteen years an increase in statistical findings on war has contributed a new body of evidence and insight separate from those provided by history, traditional discourse, and political philosophy.

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These findings and the testing process itself have exposed some lon held beliefs as erroneous or confused. What is of greater significance that these analyses may constitute the critical mass of evidence that cou provide a turning point in the long effort to discover the causes of war. that turning point occurs, a large part of the credit will have to go to tl Correlates of War project and its director, J. David Singer, for it is in tl research of the project and in the secondary analysis of its data that tl main relationships and patterns are being uncovered.

The books under review trace the history of the project from the ear theoretical and policy concerns of Singer that gave rise to the projec through the publication and listing of the major data sets, to ongoing da analysis. The review will begin by giving a brief history of the Correlat of War project. Next, some of the early epistemological criticisms mac of the project will be examined in light of recent findings. The main boc of the essay will be devoted to delineating what has been learned in ord to synthesize the major findings into a coherent scientific explanation war. This will involve a systematic and detailed review of the work c alliances, polarization, arms races, and crisis escalation. The analysis w conclude with a brief look at some of the findings that pertain to cond tions of peace and the policy relevance of the project. Throughout the r view, attention will be paid to the extent to which realist practices ar conceptions either help to account for war or are misleading because th are incomplete.

The Correlates of War project began in 1963 with a grant from tl Carnegie Corporation to the University of Michigan's Center for R search on Conflict Resolution; a part went to Singer to investigate the hi torical conditions associated with war. This early funding was later su plemented by several grants from the National Science Foundation.

The initial efforts concentrated on data collection. The first data s compiled by Singer and his co-investigator, Melvin Small, provided i dicators and documented information on the frequency, severity, an magnitude of war since 1815.[1] It was followed by data sets on alliance diplomatic ties between states, the number of intergovernmental organ zations in the system, and the national capability of the major powe (based on demographic, economic, and military dimensions),[2] all

[1] J. David Singer and Melvin Small, *The Wages of War, 1816-1965: A Statistical Handbo* (New York: Wiley, 1972). This handbook has been updated, and expanded to include ne data on civil wars, in Small and Singer, 1982.

[2] See Singer and Small, "Formal Alliances, 1815-1939: A Quantitative Description," *Jou nal of Peace Research*, No. 3 (1966), 1-32; Small and Singer, "Formal Alliances, 1816-1965: Extension of the Basic Data," *Journal of Peace Research*, No. 3 (1969), 257-82; Small a Singer, "The Diplomatic Importance of States, 1816-1970: An Extension and Refinement the Indicator," *World Politics* 25 (July 1973), 577-99, reprinted in Singer, 1979, pp. 199-222.

which were viewed as important indicators of the factors that might be associated with war.

Unlike some projects, the Correlates of War project has not been so diverted by data collection that data analysis has had to be delayed; instead, data analysis has proceeded hand in hand with data collection. From the start, the project has focused on conducting empirical research rather than trying to be merely a data bank for the field. Data have always been collected with an eye toward specific research questions within the project.

As new individuals entered the project, they brought research interests that helped generate new measures and new data sets. Scholars like Michael Wallace, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James Lee Ray, Charles Gochman, Alan Ned Sabrosky, and Zeev Maoz, who entered the project while they were graduate students at Michigan, were instrumental in creating new measures for polarization, status inconsistency, concentration of power, arms spending, and new data sets such as that on serious disputes, as well as in updating and extending the original data sets.[3] Established scholars who came into the project had a similar impact. Russell Leng, for example, developed the Behavioral Correlates of War and collected data on bargaining techniques in specific dyadic conflicts. Stuart Bremer was a major influence in improving the methodological sophistication of the project. Frank Whelon Wayman, Urs Luterbacher, and Peter Wallensteen conducted important data analyses that broadened the research agenda of the project.

In addition to the above scholars, who might be regarded as core members, an invisible college has evolved around the project. Early on, Singer and Small decided that the creation of a science of international relations would be best advanced if they made their data as widely available as possible. This has resulted in a number of important studies by scholars who are not members of the project. These studies—particularly those by Wayne Ferris, Randolph Siverson, David Garnham, Charles Kegley and Gregory Raymond, Jack Levy, Michael Ward, Brian Job, and Manus Midlarsky in the United States, and Erich Weede, Henk Houweling, Jan Siccama, Nils Petter Gleditsch, Kjell Skjelsbaek, and Wolf-Dieter Eberwein in Europe—have produced findings that have extended and advanced the research program of the project and must be integrated into the corpus of the project's work.

As the project approaches its twenty-fifth anniversary, data collection and improvements in measurements have been invigorated by the 1986

[3] Other important analysts who entered the project while they were graduate students at Michigan include: John Stuckey, Yoshinobu Yamamoto, Hugh Wheeler, Cynthia Cannizzo, Michael Mihalka, Thomas Cusack, Richard Stoll, Michael Champion, and Paul Diehl.

National Science Foundation funding of the omnibus three-year Dat Development for International Research. Existing data on global war, al liances, and the recently collected information on civil war and seriou disputes will be updated to 1985. More importantly, separate grants (in cluding grants to individuals like Levy and Midlarsky who are outsid the project) will fund the collection of data on inter-state wars from 149 to 1815. Also critical for future research will be the collection of capabilit data on "middle" powers. This new funding will take data analysis wel into the mid-1990s; before it begins, it is important not only to take stoc of what has been learned to this point, but to reexamine some of the earl criticism of the project.

Such criticism has come from both traditional scholars who eschew th possibility or value of quantitative analysis as well as from more quanti tatively oriented scholars. Despite these differences in perspective, certai common themes have emerged, which can be grouped into three sets o interrelated criticisms: (1) The project is too inductive. (2) There is greater need for "theory"; the project has failed to offer an explanation o war; the findings have not cumulated to provide an obvious and over whelming support for a particular set of hypotheses about war. (3) Th findings are complex and sometimes contradictory; their significance i not clear because of disagreements over the proper specification of prop ositions, the meaning and validity of certain indicators, and the use o particular research designs. In reviewing these criticisms, one must kee in mind the criteria that determine the *extent* to which any given criticisr is valid, and the impact that a valid criticism has on the ability of the proj ect to advance knowledge. All too often criticisms are presented as if the were such fundamental logical points that the endeavor being criticize is demonstrated to be worthless; a more constructive approach would as whether a project has changed or can change its practices to meet vali objections.

The criticism that the Correlates of War project, as well as quantitativ analysis in general, is disposed to errors of induction has been most for cibly argued in recent times by Kenneth Waltz. He argues that pure in duction is impossible because, without a theory, one does not know wher to begin, what data to generate.[4] Moreover, without a precise "theory," testing will not be done properly and much time will be wasted.[5] He fur ther states that correlations can never of themselves get beyond accurat

[4] Kenneth Waltz, "Theory of International Relations," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelso W. Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science, International Politics*, Vol. 8 (Reading, MA: Ad dison-Wesley, 1975), 9; cf. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison Wesley, 1979), 5, 8.

[5] *Ibid.* (1979), 12-13.

description,[6] and that knowledge is not going to be produced by accu mulating more and more information.[7] For these reasons, he conclude that "in itself induction leads to a theoretical dead end,"[8] but qualifies tha by saying that "we nevertheless need some sense of the puzzling connec tions of things and events before we can worry about constructing theo ries."[9] When he concedes this last point, one cannot help wonderin whether Waltz has been arguing against a straw man. Who, for example would dispute his position, "The point is not to reject induction, but t ask what induction can and cannot accomplish"?[10]

Certainly, no one can disagree with Waltz that pure induction is im possible, since without some theoretical assumptions, one indeed does no know where to begin. Singer's argument in favor of induction, however does not mean that he attempted to collect data on every possible facto associated with the onset of war. His time and funding forced him an Small to place their research bets on the variables that they thought wer most critical. Such decisions must perforce be theory-laden; they show that the practical constraints of quantitative research make for a ver rapid narrowing of what is examined. It is no accident that the independ ent variables upon which Singer and Small spent the most time dealt wit alliances and national capability, both of which have been seen as theo retically significant facts by the dominant realist approaches. Still, how alliances and capability should be understood in comparison to such othe relevant concepts as the balance of power, preponderance of power, an polarity is not a matter of consensus within the field; and how alliance and capability are related to war and peace is still an open question. Th variables for which data were collected were not "arbitrarily chosen,"[11] but reflected a paradigmatic consensus among traditional and quantita tive scholars of international politics.[12] In addition, as the publication o the first volume of *The Correlates of War* makes clear, Singer had written about the factors he believed to be associated with war and peace lon before the project began. (See also Singer, 1984, originally published in 1962.)

[6] *Ibid.*, 8-10. [7] *Ibid.*, 4.

[8] *Ibid.*, 8. In an earlier version (fn. 4, 1975, p. 9), the term "theoretical" did not appear. This new qualification makes Waltz's argument true by definition, since the real question is not whether facts produce explanation, but whether the documentation of patterns through research is an essential step in producing knowledge.

[9] Waltz (fn. 4, 1979), 8. [10] *Ibid.*, 7.

[11] Waltz (fn. 4, 1975), 7, 14.

[12] See John A. Vasquez, "Colouring It Morgenthau: New Evidence for an Old Thesis on Quantitative International Politics," *British Journal of International Studies* 5 (October 1979), 210-28; John A. Vasquez, *The Power of Power Politics: A Critique* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1983), chap. 5.

What Singer and members of the project have not done is to try to improve the quality of the "theories" and explanations in the field before they test them; that is what really bothers Waltz. Waltz seems to be saying that, until the theoretical quality of the field has improved dramatically, testing will waste time. One can accept his description of the inadequacy of international relations theory without necessarily accepting the conclusion that testing must wait. From Singer's perspective, theorizing conjecture, and speculation about war and peace have been going on since Thucydides without much advancement; why should more of the same lead to a major breakthrough? Even Waltz laments that "nothing seems to accumulate, not even criticism."[13] Part of the disagreement between Waltz and Singer is over which will lead to an advancement of knowledge—clearer conceptualization and harder thinking, or more careful observation and new information. Although an individual scholar may choose to emphasize one path rather than another, these two strategies are not incompatible, and a discipline should have some of its scholars devoted to each strategy, rather than everyone pursuing only one emphasis to the neglect of the other.

*In this sense, while Waltz's defense of theorizing and deduction is a* legitimate justification of his own work, his attacks on induction are too extreme. Such a position could only be accepted if there were in international relations a documented body of behavioral patterns (what Waltz calls *laws*). If the main task of the field were to explain known patterns Waltz would be correct, but if the main task is to discover and confirm patterns—which can be explained once they are known—Singer is correct.

On the basis of this distinction, one can see that a fundamental difference between Singer and Waltz (and all who take such a highly deductive approach) is that Singer does not profess to know what regularities of behavior pervade world politics, and therefore he has nothing to explain until he has documented the regularities that do in fact exist. Waltz, on the other hand, knows what the regularities are (indeed, he may find them somewhat obvious), and sees his main purpose as explaining why they occur, and how and why they might change. In part, then, the argument over induction can be reduced to empirical questions: Are the regularities and "laws" Waltz wants to explain really known, and are they "laws," or as Singer would argue, merely untested propositions? Can the use of the scientific method bring to light heretofore unknown relationships? If the scientific study of war is to be vindicated, it will have to produce a set of

[13] Waltz (fn. 4, 1975), 2.

empirical generalizations for which it has adduced new evidence a which, at least in some cases, reveal relationships previously not rec nized.

Ironically, as the scientific study of war becomes more successful suggesting empirical generalizations, a second criticism—that there greater need for theory in the project—takes on more weight. Fift years ago, Singer was justified in maintaining that we must first descr the correlates of war before we can explain them;[14] that position n needs to be rethought because the project is succeeding in documentin set of behavioral patterns. Thus, the argument of Waltz and others t explanation will not simply emerge out of description takes on new r evance. At a more fundamental level, it must be recognized that descr tion itself is theory-laden;[15] without a more conscious theoretical persp tive within a project—particularly one that is evolving into a larg invisible college—it becomes difficult even to describe, let alone expla the factors that are being delineated and to integrate them into a coher set of generalizations.

This philosophical difficulty is accentuated by the fact that the resea of the project has not been producing a clear line of evidence in supp of one or more of the theoretical suggestions in the literature. In ma (but not all) ways, the criticism that the findings are not cumulating correct. Normally, in the standard view of science (justified in vari ways by Carl Hempel, Karl Popper, and Imre Lakatos), progress is ma by deriving a hypothesis from a theory, testing it, and reformulating rejecting it in light of the results. In international relations, progress a cumulation has not come from following this deductive "logic of con mation." If one takes this deductive approach, the findings *seem* mu more inconsistent, ambiguous, and far away from cumulation than th actually are, since from the perspective of "confirmation" the mean and significance of the findings are not self-evident.

The situation is much more encouraging, however, if one treats t research from the perspective of the "logic of discovery." If one takes t findings to be a set of clues or pieces of a puzzle, it becomes clear th research has made progress by testing a variety of hypotheses out which a few highly suggestive relationships have emerged. For this mo inductive strategy to succeed, the pieces need to be put together; but to that, one needs a theoretical perspective.

In this approach, the findings would not be used simply to assess t

[14] Singer, "The 'Correlates of War' Project: Interim Report and Rationale," *World Pol* 24 (January 1972), 243-70, at 251.

[15] Robert Brown, *Explanation in Social Science* (Chicago: Aldine, 1963), chap. 2.

tested proposition, but used imaginatively as a basis for *inductive theory construction*.[16] Explanations constructed in this manner would have to be retested according to standard procedures. Such an approach to theory construction is further warranted because, in my view, the evidence is trying to tell us that much of our conventional understanding about the causes of war and of peace is wrong.[17] Consequently, tests are not confirming propositions that lead us in obvious directions. Put another way the kinds of research outcomes that have been produced within the Correlates of War project, as well as in related projects, are precisely the kinds of outcomes one would expect when many of the underlying theoretical assumptions guiding the research are wrong or flawed.

This leads to a consideration of the third set of criticisms, which involves whether specific pieces of research (or for some, quantitative analysis itself) can, in principle, provide a sound basis for observation and the generation of new information. Some critics have argued that specific pieces of the research have not properly specified some of the propositions they have tested (such as those on balance of power and on polarity); that they have made errors in research design; or that they have employed questionable measures.[18] The mere presence of these ongoing criticisms makes the project's findings and their meaning exceedingly complicated and difficult to interpret.

However, it must be kept in mind that criticisms on specification and measurement validity that were suggested by nonquantitative scholars like Jervis have also been made by quantitative scholars, including those within the project itself. In fact, there is constant discussion on these

[16] This approach follows the spirit of Jervis's call for the improvement of cumulation through the development of richer theories by asking questions such as: If this explanation is true (or inaccurate), then what else should follow? What are the implications? What other events should or should not occur? What does the theory say about cases or data not yet analyzed? See Robert Jervis, "Cumulation, Correlations, and Woozles," in James Rosenau, ed., *In Search of Global Patterns* (New York: Free Press, 1976), 183.

[17] Vasquez (fn. 12, 1983), chap. 8.

[18] On misspecification, see Dina Zinnes, "An Analytical Study of the Balance of Power Theories," *Journal of Peace Research*, No. 3 (1967), 270-88; Waltz (fn. 4, 1975), 12-14; Robert Jervis, "The Costs of the Quantitative Study of International Relations," in Klaus Knorr and James Rosenau, eds. *Contending Approaches to International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), 177-217. On research designs, see the essays on the Correlates of War project in Francis Hoole and Dina Zinnes, eds., *Quantitative International Politics: An Appraisal* (New York: Praeger, 1976), 21-145; Benjamin Most and Harvey Starr, "Conceptualizing 'War': Consequences for Theory and Research," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 27 (March 1983), 137-59; Randolph Siverson and Michael P. Sullivan, "The Distribution of Power and the Onset of War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 27 (September 1983), 473-94. On measurement, see Michael Altfeld, "Arms Races?—and Escalation?: A Comment on Wallace," *International Studies Quarterly* 27 (June 1983), 225-31, and Michael Wallace's reply in the same issue; Gary Goertz and Paul Diehl, "Measuring Military Allocations," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 30 (September 1986), 553-81.

points, only a small proportion of which finds its way into print. This cı icism, as Michael Wallace points out, does not reflect an effort thaı doomed to failure, but "the productive confusion of path-breaking s ence ... [in which] a genuine scientific cumulativeness is beginning take hold."[19]

The project's answer to these early criticisms of quantitative work l been to take this *type* of criticism seriously and to do more and better search in order to improve the quality of the work, rather than to ab don the entire enterprise, as some traditionalists were too quick to sı gest. Certainly, the studies published in the seventies and early eight are much better than those published at the end of the sixties. This is ı to say that current research is above criticism and that measures and ‹ signs are perfect: part of the maturity of a science is the realization tl progress is made through criticism and growth and continuous inve gation, and not through the elusive search for a definitive test and me ures that are so valid that they tap the entire robustness of a concept stead of just aspects of it.

If cumulation is to occur, however, there must be more explicit tempts at explanation through the integration of findings. The pres review is an initial attempt, by someone outside the Correlates of W project, to piece existing clues together and build upon various theoreti suggestions within the project in order to construct a scientific explaı tion of war.[20] The analysis will begin by examining the overall picture the factors that lead to war that is suggested by the project's findings. explanation of war will then be constructed by looking at (1) how secur issues arise; (2) how alliances are a response to the rise of security issu and how they affect the onset and expansion of war; (3) the effect of al ances on polarization and changes in power, and how these factors infl ence the probability of world war; (4) how differences in findings for t 19th and 20th centuries can be explained by looking at differences in liances and the role of arms races; (5) how arms races are a response security issues; and (6) why some crises escalate to war and others do n

[19] Michael D. Wallace, "Polarization: Towards a Scientific Conception," in Sabrosky, 19 pp. 95-113, at 112.

[20] It should be pointed out that the Correlates of War project has not yet produced an tegrated explanation. For Singer's view of what, in principle, would constitute an adequ explanation of war, see his "Peace Research and Foreign Policy Prediction" (Presidential dress to the Peace Research Society) *Peace Science Society (International) Papers* 21 (1973) 13, reprinted in Singer, 1979, pp. 155-71, at 161-63. For his own review and assessment Correlates of War findings, see J. David Singer, "Accounting for International War: T State of the Discipline," *Journal of Peace Research* 18 (No. 1, 1981), 1-18. For an early sur of a variety of studies on war, see Karl Deutsch and Dieter Senghaas, "The Steps to War Survey of System Levels, Decision Stages, and Research Results," in Patrick J. McGowan, ‹ *Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies* 1 (1973), 275-329.

## Explaining War as a Series of Steps

If we piece together some of the findings and theoretical suggestions made within the Correlates of War project, we get the following picture of the process that leads two or more actors to war, a process best characterized as steps to war.[21] As a situation develops that might portend the use of force, leaders and various policy influencers become concerned primarily with security goals and/or the use of force to gain stakes that they have been unable to attain up to this point.[22] In order to test their rival and to demonstrate resolve, leaders rely on threats and coercive tactics, which involves them in crises (or serious disputes).[23] Leaders respond to a crisis and to security issues that are perceived as posing a long-term threat by attempting to increase their military power through alliances and/or a military build-up.[24] In a tense environment, military build-ups lead to arms races, and alliance-making may result in a polarization (of blocs), both of which increase insecurity. In serious disputes between equals, actors employ realpolitik tactics.[25] Eventually a dispute arises that escalates to war. Disputes or crises are most likely to escalate if there is an ongoing arms race,[26] and if (1) they are triggered by physical threats to vital issues;[27] (2) they are the second or third crisis with the same rival (with realpolitik tactics becoming more coercive and hostile in each succeeding crisis);[28] (3) a hostile interaction spiral emerges during the crisis;[29] and (4) hard-liners dominate the leadership of at least one side.[30]

This process assumes that war results from a series of steps taken by

[21] Singer has suggested that conflict be seen as an unfolding escalatory process involving different stages; see Singer, 1980, pp. xxiv, xxix-xxx.

[22] J. David Singer, "Confrontational Behavior and Escalation to War 1816-1980: A Research Plan," *Journal of Peace Research* 19 (No. 1, 1982), 40.

[23] See R. J. Rummel, *War, Power, Peace, Understanding Conflict and War*, Vol. 4 (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1979), 186 on testing; Zeev Maoz, "Resolve, Capabilities, and the Outcomes of Interstate Disputes, 1816-1976," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 27 (June 1983), 195-229.

[24] See Michael D. Wallace, "Status, Formal Organization, and Arms Levels as Factors Leading to the Onset of War, 1820-1964," in Bruce M. Russett, ed., *Peace, War, and Numbers* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1972), 49-69; Paul F. Diehl, "Arms Races to War: Testing Some Empirical Linkages," *The Sociological Quarterly* 26, (No. 3, 1985), 331-32.

[25] Russell J. Leng, "When Will They Ever Learn? Coercive Bargaining in Recurrent Crises," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 27 (September 1983), 379-419.

[26] Michael D. Wallace, "Arms Races and Escalation: Some New Evidence," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 23 (March 1979), 3-16, reprinted in J. David Singer and Associates, 1979, pp. 240-252, and in Small and Singer, 1985, pp. 196-206.

[27] Charles S. Gochman and Russell J. Leng, "Realpolitik and the Road to War: An Analysis of Attributes and Behavior," *International Studies Quarterly* 27 (March 1983), 97-120.

[28] Leng (fn. 25).

[29] Ole R. Holsti, Robert C. North, and Richard A. Brody, "Perception and Action in the 1914 Crisis," in J. David Singer, ed., *Quantitative International Politics* (New York: Free Press, 1968), 123-58.

[30] For a justification of this assumption, see John A. Vasquez, "Foreign Policy, Learning, and War," in Charles F. Hermann, Charles Kegley, Jr., and James N. Rosenau, eds., *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy* (Winchester, MA: Allen & Unwin, 1987), 366-83.

each side. Each step produces, in succession, a situation that encourages the adoption of foreign policy practices which set the stage for the involved parties' taking another step that is closer to war. This assumption suggests that those explanations that see war as a "rational" response to changes in power are, at best, incomplete; at times, they distort the nature of the underlying process by making it appear simpler and more deterministic than it is. Bueno de Mesquita, for example, argues that his rational expected-utility theory delineates only the necessary conditions of war, not the sufficient conditions.[31] While his theory tells something about last-minute calculations and who is likely to initiate and win wars, it does not tell us why actors resort to force and war in the first place. In a different way, many of the power-cycle theories, such as those of Organski/Kugler, Gilpin, and Modelski/Thompson simply state that fundamental shifts in power will result in war; they leave out the details.[32] It is in the presence of these theoretical hedgehogs that the empirical foxes of the Correlates of War project make their most important contribution. For it is precisely the details that they have patiently, over the years, tried to sniff out.

## The Rise of Security Issues

The beginnings of wars can be traced to those situations in which some leaders believe that their state's security is threatened and start to take measures to protect themselves. Contrary to realist assertions, however, not all actors, particularly states, are always engaged in a struggle for power. It seems more accurate to assume that security issues and the power-politics behavior associated with them only occur at certain stages in inter-state relationships and predominate only in certain periods of history.[33]

[31] Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, *The War Trap* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 4-5.

[32] A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, *The War Ledger* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); George Modelski, "The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation State," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 20 (April 1978), 214-35; William R. Thompson, "Succession Crises in the Global Political System: A Test of the Transition Model," in Albert Bergesen, ed., *Crises in the World System* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1983), 93-116. For an attempt to get at some of the details, see Charles F. Doran and Wes Parsons, "War and the Cycle of Relative Power," *American Political Science Review* 74 (December 1980), 947-65. For a thoughtful review of this type of explanation, see Jack S. Levy, "Theories of General War," *World Politics* 37 (April 1985), 344-74.

[33] War is a relatively rare event. Only 67 inter-state and 51 other wars (involving at least one nation-state against a nonrecognized state) were fought between 1816 and 1980 (Small and Singer, 1982, pp. 59-60). According to these data, war is even a rarer event in the history of specific inter-state relations. Peter Wallensteen shows that some periods of history—namely 1816-1848, 1871-1895, 1919-1932, 1963-1976—are devoid of major-power wars and

If realists have been generally too alarmist in their assumptions about the pervasiveness of war and threats to security, they have been more accurate in *describing* the kinds of behavior associated with the rise of security issues. Such issues are usually raised by one actor testing another's willingness to use his capability (diplomatic, economic, or military) to maintain a given distribution of political stakes. In such a situation, actors believe that victory is most likely to be associated with some demonstration of resolve; that is, making it credible that they are more willing than the other side to use force, and risk escalation and war, either to defend or to advance their position.[34]

It is logical to assume that only after such threats appear, and especially if they are perceived as long-term threats, will actors seek allies or build up their military. The research on this question and on the factors that precede alliance-making and military build-ups has been neither extensive nor conclusive, however.[35] Most research within the Correlates of War project has centered, instead, on the effects of alliances, capabilities, and arms races; it is in these areas that the project has made its contributions.

### Responding to Security Issues: Alliances

Research on alliances has produced two major conclusions. First, alliances do not prevent war or promote peace; instead, they are associated with war, although they are probably not a cause of war. Second, the major consequence of alliances is to expand the war once it has started; in this way, alliances are important in accounting for the magnitude and severity of war.

The major evidence that alliances do not prevent war, but are associated with it, is presented in an article by Jack Levy, who supplements his own data on alliances and war in the 16th through 18th centuries with Correlates of War data on the 19th and 20th.[36] The longer perspective

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have few military confrontations; see Wallensteen, "Universalism vs. Particularism: On the Limits of Major Power Order," *Journal of Peace Research* 21 (No. 3, 1984), 243-57, at 245-46.

[34] For evidence, see Maoz (fn. 23); Russell J. Leng, "Influence Strategies and Interstate Conflict," in Singer, 1980, pp. 124-57; Leng (fn. 25).

[35] Within the project, the work most relevant to these questions is by Michael Wallace (fn. 14). For the factors that lead actors to become involved in disputes, see Charles S. Gochman, "Status, Capabilities, and Major Power Conflict," in Singer, 1980, pp. 83-123; and Zeev Maoz, *Paths to Conflict: International Dispute Initiation, 1816-1976* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982), chaps. 4 and 5.

[36] Jack Levy, "Alliance Formation and War Behavior: An Analysis of the Great Powers, 1495-1975," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 25 (December 1981), 581-613. A similar conclusion had been reached earlier by Singer and Small on the basis of more limited tests; see "National Alliance Commitments and War Involvement, 1815-1945," *Peace Research Society (Interna-*

provides a critical insight: Levy finds that, except for the 19th century, the majority of alliances (56 to 100 percent, depending on type) have been followed, within five years of their formation, by war involving at least one of the allies. Moreover, *all* great-power alliances in the 16th, 17th, and 20th centuries have been followed, within five years, by a war involving a great power. These findings do not hold for the 19th century, during which only 44 percent of all alliances were followed by war (compared with 89 percent, 73 percent, and 81 percent in the 17th, 18th, and 20th centuries), and *none* of the great-power alliances were followed by a great-power war within five years of their initiation.[37]

The data on the 19th century show that wars do not always have to result from alliances, but that in the other centuries they often did. Levy also finds that alliances are not a necessary element in war, in that most wars occur without an alliance preceding them. (From the 16th to the 20th century, only 26 percent of the wars, on average, were preceded by an alliance involving one of the war participants).[38] Clearly, such evidence goes a long way in dispelling the notion that alliances promote peace; nevertheless, how much of a factor they play in causing war is difficult to discern, since actors may join alliances because they anticipate war.

Further evidence that alliances are associated with war is provided by Ostrom and Hoole. In a reformulation of some of the propositions on alliance aggregation and war examined by Singer and Small, they compare the number of dyads experiencing inter-state war with the number of dyads having defense alliances. They find that within the first three years of alliance formation, as the number of alliance dyads increases, so does the number of war dyads. After three years, this positive correlation is reversed, and the more alliance commitments, the fewer war dyads. After twelve years, there is no relationship. This suggests that soon after alliances are made, there is a danger of war, but four to twelve years later there is not. After twelve years, it is probably a new game in which old alliances are irrelevant to questions of war and peace.[39]

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*tional) Papers* 5 (1966), 109-40, and Singer and Small, "Foreign Policy Indicators: Predictors of War in History and in the State of the World Message," *Policy Sciences* 5 (September 1974), 271-96, reprinted in Singer, 1979, pp. 298-329, esp. 325-26.

[37] Levy (fn. 36), 597-98, esp. Table 7.

[38] But note that 60% of the wars of the 20th century were preceded by alliances, compared to 18%, 14%, 35%, and 25% of the wars in the 16th, 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries, respectively. Levy (fn. 36), 599, Table 8.

[39] Charles W. Ostrom, Jr., and Francis W. Hoole, "Alliances and War Revisited: A Research Note," *International Studies Quarterly* 22 (June 1978), 215-36; see pp. 228-29 for the findings reported here. On the earlier tests see Singer and Small, "Alliance Aggregation and the Onset of War, 1815-1945," in Singer 1968 (fn. 29), 247-86 (reprinted in Singer, 1979, pp. 225-64), and Singer and Small (fn. 36, 1966).

Since the making of alliances often does not produce the results that were desired, it is unlikely that those who enter alliances can accurately anticipate their consequences. For example, a major purpose of entering alliances is to increase relative military power; but this outcome often does not occur, because the making of an alliance usually leads to the creation of a counteralliance. This makes for greater insecurity, and usually greater uncertainty, because of the possibility that one or more allies will not honor their commitments.[40] More importantly, alliances not only fail to prevent wars, but make it likely that wars that do occur will expand.

Two major studies provide evidence that alliances expand wars. The more important one is by Randolph Siverson and Joel King, both of whom are outside the project.[41] The authors hypothesize that a war between two states that do not have allies has a much lower probability of spreading than a war between states that do have allies. Using Correlates of War data on inter-state wars from 1815 to 1965, they identify 188 instances in which an actor participated in war (note that 50 inter-state wars generated these 188 participations). In 112 of these incidents an actor fought in coalition with others, and in 76 it fought alone. What determines whether a war will involve a coalition and not just dyadic combat? Of the 112 participants who fought war in a coalition, 76 had prewar alliance bonds and 36 did not. Conversely, of the 76 participants who fought the war alone, 52 had made no prewar alliances and only 24 had. (Yule's $Q = .64$.) This means that when a war breaks out among states that have alliances with nonbelligerents, these nonbelligerents are likely to be drawn in. In this way, alliances act as a contagion mechanism by which war spreads and expands. Hence, it might be expected that a system with extensive alliances will tend to have wars with many participants, whereas a system with few alliances will tend to have small wars. Siverson and King found that in 19 (38 percent) of the 50 inter-state wars that took place between 1815 and 1965, neither party had a prewar alliance. These wars tended to have few participants, with all but three being dyadic, and those three involving only three parties. Alliances, then, not

[40] Alan Ned Sabrosky, "Interstate Alliances: Their Reliability and the Expansion of War," in Singer, 1980, pp. 161-98, shows that even at the most fundamental level—whether an ally will fight on your side in a war—expectations are not fulfilled. More often than not, allies remain neutral (p. 176). In addition, some alliances, like neutrality pacts (especially those between major and minor powers) are more likely to be violated than honored; i.e., if one party (especially a major power) enters the war, it will enter against its ally (particularly if the ally is a minor power) (p. 196).

[41] Siverson and King, "Alliances and the Expansion of War," in Singer and Wallace, 1979, pp. 37-49, esp. 45. See also Siverson and King, "Attributes of National Alliance Membership and War Participation, 1815-1965," *American Journal of Political Science* 24 (February 1980), 1-15.

only fail to prevent wars, but by making wars spread, they encourage more dangerous, complex (multilateral) wars. Siverson and King point out that in 1870, France had no alliances and fought alone, but in 1914 it had plenty of allies.[42]

Indirect support for the hypothesis that alliances are associated with the expansion of war is provided by Yamamoto and Bremer, who examine three probability models to see which best explains (fits) the decision of a major power to enter an ongoing war.[43] The three models they examine are an independent choice model, which assumes that the decision of one actor has no effect on the decision of another; a one-way conditional choice model, which assumes that a decision to enter the war has a great impact on what others do, but that a decision to remain neutral has no effect; and a two-way conditional choice model, which assumes that whatever an actor decides encourages the other actors to make the same decision. Of the fifty inter-state wars between 1816 and 1965, only eight involve major-power intervention, so the sample is small. Nevertheless, the authors are able to show that the two-way conditional choice model fits the data better than the one-way conditional choice model, and much better than the independent choice model, which does not fit at all. This means that if a state intervenes in an ongoing war, it increases the probability of others intervening; if it remains neutral, it increases the probability of others being neutral.[44] Yamamoto and Bremer do not investigate the role of alliances, but simply find that, when faced with an ongoing war, major powers will do what other major powers do. Thus, once there is an intervention, the probability of other major powers intervening will increase. In light of Siverson and King's findings, one may infer that the presence of alliance bonds increases the likelihood of an initial intervention; once this occurs, other major powers eventually follow suit, whether they have alliance bonds or not.

All the above suggests that alliances are a key factor in the expansion of wars, but that they are not the only factor. Siverson and King point out that the three largest wars in terms of participants (the two World Wars and the Korean War) contain intervening participants who do not have previous alliances—two in World War I, eight in World War II, and six

[42] Siverson and King (fn. 41, 1979), 48.

[43] Yoshinobu Yamamoto and Stuart A. Bremer, "Wider Wars and Restless Nights: Major Power Intervention in Ongoing War," in Singer, 1980, pp. 199-229; see pp. 216-17 for the findings reported here.

[44] Although the two-way conditional model holds for both the 19th and 20th centuries, the finding is stronger for the 20th. Major powers in the 20th century were more likely to intervene in ongoing wars, and were more affected by what others did. *Ibid.*, 218-21. While this inference is based on a very small number of cases, it suggests that alliances in the 20th century were more dangerous than in the 19th.

in Korea. Very large wars may involve other contagion factors.[45] One of these factors is contiguous territory. For example, Most and Starr show that a state with a warring nation on its border has an increased probability of becoming involved in a war in the next five years.[46] Contiguity certainly was a contagion factor in World War I, World War II, and the Korean War.

As a war spreads, especially through alliances, it is likely to become longer and more severe to the extent that intervention makes each side equal to the other.[47] In this way, alliances are probably more responsible for the severity, magnitude, and duration of war than for its onset. Since there is often an interval between the alliance and the outbreak of war, it is a legitimate inference that alliances do not directly cause war, but help to aggravate a situation that makes war more likely. They may do this in two ways: by promoting an atmosphere that polarizes the system and by encouraging arms races.

## The Effect of Alliances on Polarization and Power

The work on polarity has been extensive, with the findings exceedingly complicated and sometimes inconsistent.[48] The reason is that different definitions of polarity have been employed: some studies are based on the number of blocs (sometimes called polarization or cluster polarity), some on the distribution of power, and some—most notably that of Wallace—on a combination of the two.[49] Differences in definitions have been further aggravated by differences in the measurement of both the independent and dependent variables and by differences in research design. Some, like Bueno de Mesquita, examine the entire system, while others, like Frank Wayman and Jack Levy, look only at major powers.[50] Although it

[45] Siverson and King (fn. 41, 1979), 46-47.

[46] Benjamin A. Most and Harvey Starr, "Diffusion, Reinforcement, Geopolitics, and the Spread of War," *American Political Science Review* 74 (December 1980), 941-44.

[47] Yamamoto and Bremer (fn. 43, p. 226) find that, when only one side is joined by major powers, the war is usually brought to a rapid close (the chief exception being the Crimean War); but when major powers join opposite sides, as has often happened in the 20th century, the war is more severe.

[48] See Singer (fn. 20, 1981), 8-9.

[49] Frank Whelon Wayman, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity and the Threat of War," in Sabrosky, 1985, pp. 128-31, shows that polarity based on the number of blocs and polarity based on the distribution of power are two uncorrelated and empirically separate dimensions (.01 for 1816-1965). See also his extended review of the various measures in "Bipolarity and War," *Journal of Peace Research* 21 (No. 1, 1984), 74-75. For Wallace's argument in favor of combining the two dimensions, see his "Polarization" in Sabrosky, 1985.

[50] Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "Systemic Polarization and the Occurrence and Duration of War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 22 (June 1978), 241-67, reprinted in Singer and Associates,

these findings show that alliances, at least in the 20th century, do not prevent war, but are a way of preparing for war, and in that manner bring states one step closer to war.

The other major effect of a change in polarization is that it encourages each side to make better preparations for war—so that, when a war comes, it is longer. Bueno de Mesquita finds that in the 19th and 20th centuries a change (increase) in the number of poles is associated with longer wars involving major powers (but not related to longer wars in general). He infers that an increase in poles produces uncertainty and encourages nations to be prepared for war. This probably results, in my view, in arms races and attempts to secure commitments from allies, thereby also producing greater tightness and discreteness (i.e., more polarization). Although Bueno de Mesquita does not examine the effects of an increase in poles on changes in tightness and discreteness of blocs, he does find that, in the 20th century, increases in systemic tightness and discreteness do produce longer wars (both interstate wars and wars involving major powers). Since increasing discreteness (few bonds across blocs) means little cross-cutting, this finding is consistent with Wallace's that the absence of cross-cutting is associated with severe wars.[57]

Increasing tightness probably produces longer wars because it reflects each side's ability to get its own house in order by firming up commitments and pooling resources, which means that alliances that work result in longer wars. Since Stephen Rosen has shown that the outcome (and probably the length) of war is a function of the comparative amount of revenue available and the percentage of population loss, allies that can effectively pool resources will have a "larger aggregate of capabilities" to sustain longer wars than they would if they fought dyadically.[58] Also, the pooling of resources permits wealthier allies to sustain weaker allies who do not have the revenues for longer wars.[59]

Finally, Bueno de Mesquita concludes that increasing tightness is a fac-

[57] See Bueno de Mesquita (fn. 50), 134-35, for the idea that an increase in poles encourages nations to prepare for war, and for his findings on discreteness and duration of war. On the importance of cross-cutting (*per se*) for reducing conflict, see Deutsch and Singer (fn. 51); P. Dale Dean and John A. Vasquez, "From Power Politics to Issue Politics," *Western Political Quarterly* 29 (March 1976), 24-27; and Levy (fn. 36), 608.

[58] Steven Rosen, "War Power and the Willingness to Suffer," in Bruce M. Russett (fn. 24), 167-83. Frank W. Wayman, J. David Singer, and Gary Goertz, in "Capabilities, Allocations, and Success in Militarized Disputes and Wars, 1816-1976," *International Studies Quarterly* 27 (December 1983), 506-11, show that the single best capability predictor of an initiator's prospects for winning a war is its industrial capability rather than its military or demographic capability.

[59] Paul Kennedy, in "The First World War and the International Power System," *International Security* 9 (Summer 1984), 7-40, gives a graphic description of how allies prolong wars by providing additional resources, particular economic staying power, at critical junctures.

tor in making wars spread, since no multilateral (complex) wars occ following a decline in systemic tightness at any time between 1815 an 1965, and nearly 80 percent of the complex wars occur in periods of risi tightness.[60] This is another piece of evidence that alliances are associat with the expansion of war.

Sabrosky uncovers some additional details on the kinds of wars th are likely to enlarge, and the role alliances play in that process.[61] He fin that of the 50 inter-state wars between 1816 and 1965, 40 remained loca ized. None of the wars that initially involved major powers on each si expanded; they remained dyadic. Major powers that were neutral at t beginning of these wars remained neutral. The probability of other wa expanding was also not very high (only 5 out of 24 wars between a maj and a minor power, and 5 out of 22 wars between minor powers, e panded).

However, *if* major-minor wars expanded, it was highly likely that th would be enlarged in such a way that there would be a major power each side. Of the five major-minor wars that expanded, four were e larged in this manner; of the five minor-minor wars that expanded, on one was enlarged to include a major power on each side. Although t number of cases is small, the major-minor wars that enlarged were t Crimean War, the War of Italian Unification, World War I, and Wor War II; this indicates that the main complex wars among major powe began through intervention to help a minor power. Sabrosky is unable retrodict which wars remained localized; but by analyzing whether the was a high concentration of military capabilities in the major powers, high level of alliance aggregation in the system, and an increase in bo these factors during the preceding five years, he has some success in cla sifying the wars that expanded and enlarged.

The findings of Wallace, Bueno de Mesquita, and Sabrosky sugge that alliance-making that leads to polarization produces wars of the hig est magnitude, severity, and duration—i.e., complex and total wars The reason for this is not fully explained in the literature, but it seen plausible that in a protracted conflict between equals that becomes a valry, the making of an alliance by one side will lead to the making a counter-alliance as well as a competition for allies. This will polarize t

[60] Bueno de Mesquita (fn. 50), 131-32.

[61] Alan Ned Sabrosky, "Alliance Aggregation, Capability Distribution, and the Expans of Interstate War," in Sabrosky, 1985, pp. 148, 151, 181.

[62] For an elaboration of these distinctions, see John A. Vasquez, "Capability, Types of W Peace," *Western Political Quarterly* 38 (June 1986), 313-27, where wars are classified on basis of three dimensions: capability (wars between equals vs. wars between unequals), number of participants (dyadic vs. complex), and the goals and means (limited vs. total wa

system and produce a number of effects which increase the perceived threat and lead to behavior that is more conflictual. First, polarization increases the perceived threat by increasing the power of each side and enlarging the possible theater of war. This leads each side to prepare for a worst-case scenario and to increase its military expenditures. Second, polarization focuses the attention of both sides on the main issues that divide them and reduces the salience of crosscutting issues. This promotes persistent disagreement; makes all minor stakes symbolic of larger ones (thereby collapsing all issues between the main rivals into one overarching issue); and greatly accentuates rivalry and hostility. Third, complete polarization removes the possibility of any major powers' acting as mediators; it also reflects the fact that no one is committed to rules and norms (from the last peace) to resolve disputes, but all are relying on measures of self-help—therefore indicating that violence is a legitimate and perhaps the only effective means for resolving the fundamental issues at hand.[61] Further, the bringing in of allies along with their particular issues makes it more difficult to reach any compromise; it prevents the war from being limited and encourages total war. The reason is that the war becomes an opportunity to resolve all major differences between all major parties. The increase in military expenditures and the competition for allies is also likely to make each side relatively equal; therefore, once it comes, the war is severe, long, and widespread.

One may conclude that the making of alliances has two different effects. First, it leads to a polarization, which is a step to war in that it produces behavior that increases the probability of war. Second, the increasing tightness of blocs indicates that each side is making last-minute preparations for war, which are usually successful, leading wars to be longer and probably of greater magnitude and severity.

Another area in which alliances are seen as having important consequences is the distribution of power, which has traditionally been seen as crucial for preserving peace. Although there has been little research on mapping the actual impact that alliances have on the distribution of power, a great deal of effort has been expended on examining the effect of the distribution of power on war. The thrust of this research, like other work on alliances, suggests that the distribution of power is unrelated to the preservation of peace, but associated with the types of war that are fought.

In the major study on this question, Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey un-

[61] On the relationship between norms justifying violence and the use of force, see Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 170; Maoz (fn. 35), 96, 98-100.

cover an important anomaly.[64] They find that a balance-of-power system (parity) is associated with less war in the 19th century but with more war in the 20th, while a preponderance of power is associated with more war in the 19th and less war in the 20th. Because the dependent variable in this study is based on nation-months of war rather than on war/no war the findings are relevant primarily for explaining the magnitude of war rather than its onset. In this sense, the finding does not mean that peace is associated in one century with a balance and in the next with a preponderance of power, as is sometimes implied; instead, preponderance of power is associated with one type of war in the 19th century, and balance of power with another type in the 20th. As I have shown in detail elsewhere, this interpretation best fits the evidence.[65] The wars of the 19th century after 1815 were simply different from the wars of the 20th. In the former, a preponderance of power was associated with the Crimean War and the state-building wars of Germany and Italy and, to a lesser extent with imperial wars of conquest. All of these wars were limited in magnitude, severity, and duration, compared to the major wars of the 20th century, which were associated with a relative balance of power. This means that, although neither a balance of power nor a preponderance of power will prevent or give rise to a war, *if* a war occurs, the distribution of power will have a major (but probably not the only) influence on the kind of war that is fought. Evidence to support the first part of this conclusion is provided by Bueno de Mesquita: in a re-analysis of the Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey study, he employs war/no war as the dependent variable and finds no relationship between the distribution of capability and the onset of war in either century, thereby eliminating the anomaly.[66]

The finding that the major wars of the 20th century are associated with a relative balance of power is consistent with the hypothesis that, when war occurs between two sides that are relatively equal, war will be severe and long. But it is not clear that such wars need to be widespread and of high magnitude. Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey may have found the latter relationship because they do not attempt to separate the effects of capability from those of coalition-making. In view of the earlier findings on polarization, one might hypothesize that alliances are associated with the

[64] J. David Singer, Stuart A. Bremer, and John Stuckey, "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965," in Russett (fn. 24), 19-48; reprinted in Singer, 1979 pp. 265-97, and in Singer and Associates, 1979, 159-88.

[65] Vasquez (fn. 62).

[66] Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "Risk, Power Distributions, and the Likelihood of War," *International Studies Quarterly* 25 (December 1981), 541-68. Likewise, Wayman et al. (fn. 58) 506, 509 show that, among major powers, the stronger are as likely as the comparatively weaker to initiate wars and disputes; compare Tables 3 and 5.

expansion and magnitude of war, while equal capability is associated with severity, with duration increasing when an increase in the tightness of blocs just prior to the war makes both sides equal and highly committed to their allies.

Any association between national capability and the severity and duration of a war will be affected by the objectives of the war and the extent to which one or both sides commit their resources; that is, whether participants see themselves as fighting a limited or a total war. Total wars will always be more severe than limited wars; but within this context, one may hypothesize that when two sides are relatively equal in capability, any given (limited *or* total) war will be longer and more severe for both sides than when the sides are not equal.

The fact that severe and long wars did not occur in the 19th century when there was a relative balance of power provides an opportunity for determining why and how such wars were avoided even though the capability for them existed. As we shall see, the reason this type of war did not occur in the 19th century may be that those periods of balance of power coincided with periods in which norms and rules were more widely accepted as constraints than they were in the 20th century. That would also explain why Bueno de Mesquita finds no relationship between change in tightness and war in the 19th century, but does find this relationship in the 20th.[67]

Further and more recent evidence that the structural distribution of capability is associated with the type of war is provided by Jack Levy and by Frank Wayman. Levy's analysis is useful primarily because it extends the purview of inquiry from two centuries to five.[68] His major finding is that periods of bipolar distributions of power are more stable than multipolar periods. Bipolar periods have more frequent wars, but these are less severe and of lower magnitude than the wars of multipolar periods. That is the exact opposite of what had earlier been believed to be the case.

According to Levy, unipolar periods are very unstable; they have the wars of the highest magnitude and duration. Unipolar periods also have most of the general or hegemonic wars that involve the leading powers, while bipolar periods have none of these. Multipolar periods are associated with extremely severe wars. Since war occurs frequently in all periods, none can be credited with producing peace and avoiding war, but unipolar periods are by far the most war-prone.

While these findings are suggestive, the classification of periods as unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar is based on historical judgment rather than

[67] Bueno de Mesquita (fn. 50), Table 4, p. 132.
[68] Levy (fn. 50), esp. 50-59.

on precise and replicable measures.[69] That is not to say that the clas cations are wrong or arbitrary—only that one must proceed cautio until there is more evidence. In this context, Frank Wayman's st proves to be very interesting.[70]

Wayman's analysis is the most thorough to date employing meas of polarity based on both the distribution of power (power polarity) the number of blocs (cluster polarity, or polarization). Utilizing a va tion of Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey's capabilities index, Wayman amines the percentage of system capabilities of the two most powe states for each half-decade from 1815 to 1965. With a cut-off point of c 50 percent for bipolarity, he finds (like Levy, but contrary to Rosecra and Michael Haas)[71] that a bipolar distribution of capability has wars lower magnitude (fewer nation-months) than a multipolar distributio capability, which is associated with the great world wars. Seventy- percent of the *high*-magnitude wars occur in power multipolarity; 73 cent of the *low*-magnitude wars occur in power bipolarity.

This makes sense in that multiple nations will draw in more part pants; and, if they are fairly equal in capability, their pooled resou should make the war not only longer, but more severe. In this sense, could expect the most disastrous wars to occur when a multipolar dis bution of power produces a fairly equal distribution of capability betw two polarized blocs. We know from the Singer, Bremer, and Stuc study that relative equality of capability in the 20th century is associa with severe wars of great magnitude. Now Wayman shows that in 20th century, alliance patterns prior to wars were also becoming m (bi)polarized; he thereby adds an important piece to help solve this p zle. He finds that an increase in polarization among major powers in 20th century is associated with an increase in the subsequent magnit of war ($r = -.48$ between many blocs and nation-months of war). T is compatible with and extends Bueno de Mesquita's finding that incr ing systemic tightness in the 20th century is associated with the durat of war.[72]

[69] For example, Wayman measures shifts in polarity within the 19th and 20th centu while Levy codes the entire 1815-1945 period as multipolar. Compare Levy (fn. 50), Tabl p. 49, with Wayman (fn. 49, 1985), Table 7.2, p. 127. Nevertheless, Levy can make a plau argument that the 1815-1945 period is relatively multipolar when compared to other pe between 1495 and 1975. Levy's classification of unipolar periods is more controversial; chael Wallace, in the same volume, takes sharp exception to it. See Wallace, "Polarizati in Sabrosky, 1985, pp. 108-9.

[70] See Wayman (fn. 49, 1985), at 126-27, 131-33 for the findings discussed below.

[71] Richard Rosecrance, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity and the Future," *Journal of Conflict olution* 10 (September 1966), 317-27; Michael Haas, "International Subsystems: Stability Polarity," *American Political Science Review* 64 (March 1970), 98-123.

[72] Wayman (fn. 49, 1985), 133-35; Bueno de Mesquita (fn. 50), 135.

A close inspection of Wayman's data shows how this occurs. He measures cluster polarity by the ratio of actual poles to potential poles among major powers; his scale ranges from 1.00 for no blocs or complete depolarization and the absence of major power alliances to scores that would approach 0.00 when there is cluster bipolarity or complete polarization. Beginning in 1870 (which has no blocs; score of 1.00), the system gradually develops more alliances until it is polarized at .50 in 1905, where it remains until the end of World War I. The system then experiences a rapid disintegration of blocs (score of .80 for 1920, 1.00 from 1925 to 1935); they build up again just before the war (with a score of .86 in 1938) and disintegrate at the end of the war (score of 1.00). Although there is a movement toward polarization just before World War I and World War II (as well as the Korean War), the score of .86 for 1938 is too high.[73]

In part, this score reflects Hitler's initial success in neutralizing the Soviet Union and then avoiding war with the United States. This success fell apart in 1941, when Hitler and Japan polarized the system by attacking the U.S.S.R. and the U.S., respectively. These two expansions of the war account for much of its magnitude, severity, and duration. By examining the alliance structure between 1939 and 1942, then, the evidence becomes more consistent with that for World War I.

In terms of the previous analyses we can now hypothesize as follows: an increase in polarization as measured by tightness is associated with an increase in the duration of wars (Bueno de Mesquita); and a multipolar distribution of power is associated with wars of greater magnitude (Wayman). If that distribution is polarized into two blocs, as was the case in World Wars I and II (Wayman), and there is a relative equality of power between the belligerents (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey), the war will also be severe. All other factors being equal, we can conclude that increasing polarization of blocs makes for longer wars, multipolar distribution of power makes for wars of a greater magnitude, and equal capability between blocs increases the severity of wars. Because alliance-making can affect each of these variables, it has the peculiar consequence of bringing all of these factors together in their most disastrous and explosive combination, so that a war that occurs in this context is most likely to become a general war, eventually encompassing all leading states. We know from Sabrosky that the situation that is most likely to trigger such a general war is a war between a major power and a minor power, in which another major power intervenes to come to the aid of the minor power.[74]

[73] Wayman (fn. 49, 1985), 129.

[74] Sabrosky (fn. 61), 181. Further evidence of the importance of minor powers in the occur-

### Differences between the 19th and the 20th Century: Alliances and Arms Races

One reason why Correlates of War findings differ for the 19th and 20th centuries is that in the 19th century after 1815, there are no general wars. It may be that these general wars are absent in the so-called 100 years of peace (1815-1913) because alliance-making did not produce the explosive mixture of polarization of blocs, multipolar distribution of power, and equal distribution of power between blocs. This absence may help to explain why the 19th-century wars between major powers—the Crimean, Seven Weeks', and Franco-Prussian wars—were comparatively limited. In addition, general wars may have been avoided because 19th-century alliances, unlike those of the 20th century, did not fuel arms races. Michael Wallace, trying to account for his previous research, which found a strong relationship between polarization and the magnitude and severity of war in the 20th century, but only a weak relationship in the 19th, notes that after 1903, major power alliances that were aimed at another major power always produced a sharp increase in the rate of growth of the target's military expenditures. Prior to 1903, this effect did not occur;[75] Wallace speculates that, in the 20th century, alliances were formed to build winning coalitions, whereas in the 19th century they were equilibrium mechanisms in the classic balance-of-power fashion.[76]

The kinds of alliances that are formed will make a big difference in whether wars will be limited or become general wars. For research to progress, there is a need to create more theoretical typologies of alliances.

rence of world wars is provided by Manus Midlarsky, who is outside the project. He finds that such systemic wars occur when serious disputes in the system begin to accumulate and are no longer stable (i.e., they are no longer randomly distributed in the sense that there is a balance in the number of disputes that are begun and ended in a given period). He finds that if only the disputes between major powers are examined, the periods prior to the two World Wars, 1893-1914 and 1919-1939, are stable. However, if the disputes involving "mid-range powers" (like Serbia, Rumania, or Belgium) are included, the system becomes very unstable. Midlarsky, "Preventing Systemic War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 28 (December 1984), 563-84, and "A Hierarchical Equilibrium Theory of Systemic War," *International Studies Quarterly* 30 (March 1986), 77-105.

[75] Wallace, "Polarization," in Sabrosky, 1985, pp. 110-11. Also see Singer and Small, "Foreign Policy Indicators," in Singer, 1979, pp. 322-23, for evidence of the different effects of alliances in the two centuries.

[76] In my view, it is not the balance-of-power aspect that is the significant difference: in the 19th century, alliances more frequently aimed to prevent war by coming to an understanding about how to deal with major issues; failing that, they aimed to keep any war that did occur limited. Bismarck was particularly adept at using alliances in this manner. After his departure, the approach of Kaiser Wilhelm II made alliances more threatening and therefore more likely to give rise to counter-alliances and arms races. The notion that a balance of power in and of itself can prevent war appears to be incorrect; see Levy (fn. 36), 608, esp. n. 19, and Vasquez (fn. 62). On the differences in alliances in different centuries, see Levy (fn. 36), 604-07.

Despite the variety of purposes served by alliances in different historica contexts, the critical distinction in terms of a comparative analysis of th causes of war seems to be whether an alliance was aimed at forming winning coalition.

The immediate effect of alliances that seek to form a winning coalitio is to intensify military expenditures and to embroil actors in arms races It is through the creation of these arms races that alliances are linked t the onset of war. Direct evidence to support this argument comes fron an early path analysis of Wallace's in which he finds that alliance aggre gation in the system leads to arms expenditures, but not the reverse: arm expenditures do not lead to alliances.[77] He maintains that major powe alliances after 1903 *always* led those who were targeted by the alliance t increase the rate of growth of their armed forces; in turn, this *always* pro duced a counter-response which led to an arms race.[78] This suggests tha alliances that do not produce arms races will not lead to war, explainin why Levy and Wayman find that, while many alliances are associate with war, not *all* are, and especially not those in the 19th century. Wal lace's research also suggests part of what might be going on during th typical three-year (or so) time lag between the formation of alliances an the onset of war.

This raises the question why some alliances do not lead to arms races The answer may lie with the level of hostility between rivals precedin and following the formation of an alliance. Alliances that attempt to buil a winning coalition are born in a hostile environment and pose a nev threat that increases the level of hostility and the sense of insecurity. Al liances that do not seek a winning coalition pose less of a threat, and thu do not add to existing hostility. Alliances and arms races may thus be crit ical intervening variables that increase the level of hostility until it is suf ficient to generate the kinds of disputes that escalate to war. On the basi of this analysis, we can hypothesize that hostility is produced by dramati changes in relations between actors, and that the presence of hostility pro duces a step-level effect in subsequent behavior, making states more sen sitive to negative acts and leading them to discount positive ones.[79] If thi hypothesis were confirmed, it would identify the operating force that get actors from one step to war to the next: it shows that the taking of on

[77] Wallace (fn. 24), 64.

[78] Wallace, "Polarization," in Sabrosky, 1985, pp. 110-11.

[79] Testing a complex interaction model originally offered by Richard W. Mansbach an John A. Vasquez, *In Search of Theory: A New Paradigm for Global Politics* (New York: Colum bia University Press, 1981), chap. 7, Wayman finds considerable support for this hypothesi explaining up to 88% of the variance; see Frank Whelon Wayman, "Voices Prophesying War Events and Perceptions as Indicators of Conflict Potential in the Middle East," in Singer an Stoll, 1984, pp. 180-82.

step, instead of reducing threat, leads to a permanent increase in hostility, which leads to the taking of more threatening steps by the other side, which in turn are matched by the first. Such a hypothesis helps to explain how alliances lead to arms races and underlines the fact that alliances, like most practices associated with war, are important as part of a dynamic reciprocal process.

## Responding to Security Issues: Arms Races

Most of the threads of an explanation of why arms races begin have long been part of the literature.[80] There is a consensus that arms races presuppose rivalry, at least at some level, and intensify that rivalry once they are under way. In terms of the steps outlined here, the key motivation for arms races is the insecurity resulting from perceived threat and hostility. This general insecurity, which is awakened whenever a situation occurs that might portend force, becomes a specific fear whenever a rival state is perceived as having a larger military capacity, as building arms, or as increasing its capability by making an alliance.[81]

While such factors may lead decision makers to seek a military buildup, decision makers are unlikely to get domestic support without some concrete manifestation of the threat posed by the rival. This usually comes in the form of an international crisis, although the formation of an alliance itself can so alarm leaders that it may be seen (by them and the public) as a crisis. One can hypothesize that the greater the number of crises between two rivals, the harder it is to avoid an arms race.

In order to generate the necessary domestic mobilization for arms races, such as increased taxes, a shift in resources and spending, and the adoption of some form of conscription, leaders often exaggerate the external threat.[82] In turn, this increases the fear in the other side, extends the influence of hard-liners in both camps, and helps to produce an arms-race spiral.[83]

[80] Lewis Fry Richardson, *Arms and Insecurity* (Pittsburgh: Boxwood Press, 1960); J. David Singer, "Threat-Perception and the Armament-Tension Dilemma," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 2 (March 1958), 90-105, and Singer, "The Outcome of Arms Races: A Policy Problem and a Research Approach," *Proceedings of the International Peace Research Association* 2 (1970), 137-46, both reprinted in Singer, 1979, pp. 27-47, 145-54, respectively; also see Singer, 1984, chap. 7.

[81] See Singer, "Threat Perception" (fn. 80), 33-34.

[82] Singer, "Escalation and Control in International Conflict: A Simple Feedback Model," *General Systems Yearbook* 15 (1970), 163-73, reprinted in Singer, 1979, p. 73. Also see Singer, "Threat Perception" (fn. 80), 36-37; Theodore J. Lowi, "Making Democracy Safe for the World," in James Rosenau, ed., *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy* (New York: Free Press, 1967), 320-23; Wayman et al. (fn. 58), 498.

[83] For Singer's views on the role of the military and other bureaucratic and domestic groups in sustaining arms races, see his "Escalation and Control," in Singer, 1979, pp. 77-78; "Out-

In such an atmosphere, war is likely but not inevitable. The trigger that is needed to explode the various elements that have been put in place is an international crisis, and the mere presence of an ongoing arms race makes it more probable that such a crisis is the kind that will escalate to war. The first systematic evidence that arms races are, in themselves, a major factor in the onset of war was published in 1979 by Michael Wallace.[84] He examines 99 serious disputes between 1816 and 1965, which he divides into those that escalated to war and those that did not. He then asks whether the presence of an ongoing arms race is what distinguishes the relatively few serious disputes that escalate from the many that do not. Of the 28 serious disputes that occurred in the presence of an ongoing arms race, 23 escalated to war; of the 71 serious disputes that occurred where there was no arms race, only 3 escalated to war. This is impressive evidence that arms races are a crucial factor in determining whether serious disputes will escalate to war; it is confirmed by Yule's *Q* of .96.[85]

A challenge to these findings comes from the "peace-through-strength" counter-hypothesis, which maintains that it is not the *presence*

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come of Arms Races" (fn. 80), 151-52; Singer, 1984, pp. 259-60; and Singer, "The Responsibilities of Competence in the Global Village" (presidential address to International Studies Association), *International Studies Quarterly* 29 (September, 1985), 247-48, 254, 257-59.

[84] Wallace (fn. 26), in Singer and Associates, 1979, esp. 251-52.

[85] Erich Weede, in "Arms Races and Escalation: Some Persisting Doubts," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 24 (June 1980), 285-87, has criticized Wallace for treating *each* arms race and serious dispute as a dyadic case rather than counting all disputes and wars involving the same set of participants as a single case, regardless of the number of dyads. This is particularly important for World War I and World War II, both of which Wallace treats as several discrete cases. Wallace has re-analyzed the data and eliminated all cases in which two or more allies simultaneously entered the war against a common foe, thereby reducing the 28 cases of serious disputes having arms races to 15. Nevertheless, the relationship still holds; 11 of the 15 serious disputes escalate to war while only 4 do not. Conversely, only 2 of the 65 serious disputes escalate when there is no ongoing arms race. See Michael D. Wallace, "Armaments and Escalation," *International Studies Quarterly* 26 (March 1982), 37-56, at 46.

Paul F. Diehl, in "Arms Races and Escalation: A Closer Look," *Journal of Peace Research* 20 (No. 3, 1983), 205-12, manages to eliminate most of the relationship Wallace establishes but to do so, he must remove 17 cases from the sample. Ten cases are eliminated because they are connected with ongoing wars and 7 more are deleted because they are connected with the First and Second World Wars (p. 210). In addition, some new cases are added and changes are made in the arms-race index. These manipulations are too extensive to support a conclusion that arms races are unrelated to the escalation of serious disputes. Diehl's main contribution is to suggest that much of Wallace's finding depends on the presence of ongoing wars and on World War I and World War II. (On the latter, see Henk W. Houweling and Jan Siccama, "The Arms Race–War Relationship: Why Serious Disputes Matter," *Arms Control* 2, September 1981, p. 161, n. 13.) This suggests that, while arms races may escalate disputes between rivals (relative equals), they may not be a factor in other types of wars. This hypothesis would also help to account for Diehl's finding (p. 209) that 77% of the wars that occur are not preceded by an arms race, since many of these wars are wars between unequals. Finally the connection between arms races, escalation of disputes, and ongoing wars may provide a clue about how wars spread to become world wars. The presence of a series of disputes that might escalate to war may encourage others to arm because of the threatening environment and thereby encourage war, when it comes, to enlarge.

of arms race but who *is winning* the arms race that is the key factor. If this logic were coupled with Organski's distinction between satisfied and dissatisfied states (or revisionist and status quo actors),[86] then it could be expected that serious disputes would be likely to escalate to war only if revisionist states were winning the arms race. Wallace examines this claim by comparing the relative adequacy of this "peace-through-strength" approach with his own and Singer's "armament-tension spiral" approach; he produces several interesting results.[87]

In a number of tests, Wallace finds no statistically significant relationship (and hardly any strength of association) between whether arms races favor (or are won by) revisionist actors and whether serious disputes escalate. It can be concluded that spending more on arms than one's rival is not related to the escalation of serious disputes—which means that strength of arms neither prevents war nor leads to war. Wallace goes on to demonstrate that the peace-through-strength hypothesis has nowhere near the accuracy of the armament-tension spiral hypothesis by showing that, whether a revisionist state is "superior" or "weaker," arms races still lead to escalation. Of the 10 serious disputes that occur when there is an ongoing arms race while the revisionist state is "superior," 8 escalate and 2 do not. Conversely, of the 18 disputes that occur when there is *no* arms race and the revisionist state is "superior," only one dispute escalates, and 17 do not. The cases involving "weaker" revisionist states exhibit the same pattern. In the 18 disputes that occur when there is an ongoing arms race while the revisionist state is "weaker," 15 escalate to war and only three do not. Conversely, of the 53 disputes that occur when there is *no* arms race and the revisionist state is "weaker," only 2 escalate, and 51 do not. In light of such consistent findings, it must be concluded that arms races or military build-ups do in fact, by their mere presence, make it more likely that a serious dispute will escalate to war.[88]

[86] A.F.K. Organski, *World Politics* (New York: Knopf, 1958), 325-33.

[87] See Wallace, "Armaments and Escalation" (fn. 85), at 42-45, 47-51, for the findings reported here.

[88] Also relevant to evaluating the peace-through-strength argument are two studies by Stuart Bremer which show that stronger nations tend to be involved in wars more often; see his "The Trials of Nations: An Improbable Application of Probability Theory" and "National Capabilities and War Proneness," both in Singer 1980, pp. 3-35 and 57-82. In a related study, Wolf-Dieter Eberwein finds that the more powerful a nation, the more likely it is to initiate or join a(n ongoing) serious dispute; see "The Seduction of Power: Serious International Disputes and the Power of Nations, 1900-1976," *International Interactions* 9 (No. 1, 1982), 57-74.

Paul Diehl (fn. 24), 343, also finds the peace-through-strength hypothesis deficient. Although Diehl questions the importance of arms races, *per se*, in the escalation of disputes, he does show that both arms races and military build-ups can be critical *indirect* factors in the escalation of disputes between states that have become rivals (i.e., have already experienced two disputes). His reservations about Wallace's finding on arms races, however, stem prima-

These findings imply that, in the absence of serious disputes, war can still be avoided during an arms race. Although this inference is plausible, there has been no test of whether this factor distinguishes arms races that lead to war from those that do not.[89] It is more difficult to discern whether arms races encourage actors to become involved in the kinds of serious disputes that are apt to escalate. The mere *presence* of arms races may not be what leads disputes to escalate; it may just be that arms races introduce greater insecurity and hostility in political relationships and therefore make it likely that actors will become involved in the *kinds* of serious disputes that are likely to escalate. The research on crisis escalation has identified a number of characteristics besides arms racing which distinguish serious disputes that escalate to war from those that do not.

## Crisis Escalation

While arms races could be regarded as a critical background factor, most of the other characteristics related to crisis escalation are internal to the crisis itself. One set of factors that has received a great deal of attention consists of the bargaining tactics and strategy employed by the participants, especially the initiators. Another set is the perceptual response of leaders to the tactics employed, especially the effect of these perceptions on hostility. A third set consists of the personal characteristics of leaders and the domestic political context in which they operate. Finally, the characteristics of the issues at stake in the dispute and the overall foreign policy of the actor that provoked the crisis in the first place must be considered.

Within the Correlates of War project, the work of Russell Leng has been devoted to analyzing the role of bargaining in the escalation of serious disputes. In a series of studies, which usually employ a small random or representative sample, he has uncovered a number of suggestive

rily from the fact that he has removed a number of cases associated with the two World Wars and has included 42 (out of 104) cases involving rivalries where at least one party has nuclear capacity (Table 1, p. 335). Among the latter are a large number of cases that have not resulted in the escalation of disputes to war; this should not be interpreted as undercutting Wallace's finding, which is primarily a product of the prenuclear era. On the whole, the Correlates of War project has not treated the post-1945 period in a way that permits an assessment of the impact of nuclear weapons; for an initial attempt by someone outside the project, see Michael Altgeld, "Nuclear Weapons and War-Choice Decisions," in Sabrosky, 1985, pp. 191-207.

[89] See Singer, "The Outcome of Arms Races" (fn. 80), esp. 147, 153. What is known is that many wars grow out of serious disputes and that it is difficult to avoid war when there is a pattern of repeated military confrontations. Peter Wallensteen, in "Incompatibility, Confrontation, and War: Four Models and Three Historical Systems, 1816-1976," *Journal of Peace Research*, 18 (No. 1, 1981), 74-75, 84, a study of major power pairs, found that 75% (12 of 16) of the pairs of nations that had repeated confrontations also experienced war. See also Houweling and Siccama (fn. 85), 157-97.

findings. At the most basic level, Leng, with Hugh Wheeler, found that a bullying strategy is usually associated with disputes escalating to war, and that a reciprocating strategy provides the best overall outcome while avoiding war.[90] More significantly, in a later study on realpolitik tactics he finds that threats—especially negative inducements that are highly credible—are apt to produce extreme responses, either outright compliance or defiance (in terms of counterthreats or punishments). Defiant responses, however, are most likely to occur when the disputants are relatively equal in capability. There is also some indirect evidence that defiant responses are associated with war. These results suggest that, while decision makers may behave in crises in ways that conform to the description of realists like Morgenthau and conflict strategists like Schelling, this behavior often leads (among equals) to war, rather than to diplomatic success.[91]

Apparently, the key to understanding how realpolitik tactics lead to the escalation of disputes lies in the way in which leaders change their behavior toward a rival from one dispute to the next. In a review of six pairs of evenly matched states that were involved in three successive disputes, Leng uncovers a definite learning pattern. He finds that the loser of the previous dispute attributes the loss to a failure to demonstrate sufficient resolve (i.e., commitment to force), and is likely to initiate the second dispute. As a result, both participants tend to escalate the level of coercion in each successive crisis (a finding that holds true for 17 of 24 cases), with war becoming increasingly likely by the third dispute, if it has not occurred earlier. This suggests that, as the underlying issue fails to be resolved, bargaining techniques in successive disputes will become more coercive and more likely to escalate.[92]

Charles Gochman and Russell Leng[93] find that disputes between equals that pose a physical threat to vital issues are more apt to escalate than disputes involving other issues or triggered by other events.[94] They

[90] Russel J. Leng and Hugh B. Wheeler, "Influence Strategies, Success and War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 23 (December 1979), 655-84. See also Russell J. Leng with Robert A. Goodsell, "Behavioral Indicators of War Proneness in Bilateral Conflicts," in Patrick J. McGowan, ed., *Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies* 2 (1974), 191-226, reprinted in Singer and Associates, 1979, pp. 208-39.

[91] Leng, in Singer, 1980, pp. 143-56. For an attempt to create a model that predicts which disputes will escalate on the basis of interstate interactions, see Zeev Maoz, "A Behavioral Model of Dispute Escalation: The Major Powers, 1816-1976," *International Interactions* 10 (Nos. 3-4, 1984), 373-99.

[92] Leng, "When Will They Ever Learn?" (fn. 25), esp. 398-99, 412-15; Leng, "Reagan and the Russians: Crisis Bargaining Beliefs and the Historical Record," *American Political Science Review* 78 (September 1984), 338-55, reprinted in Small and Singer 1985, pp. 207-29.

[93] Gochman and Leng (fn. 27).

[94] The hypothesis that crises initiated by physical threats escalate to war is also supported

define vital issues as involving questions of political independence or control of one's own or contiguous territory.[95] It might be hypothesized that because such issues are difficult to resolve, actors employ increasingly coercive tactics to get the other side to give in. Among equals, these tactics meet with defiant responses and lead to successive crises. By the third crisis, if not before, all the characteristics associated with escalation (initiation by physical threat, vital issues, previous learning, and more coercive tactics) are in place, and war breaks out. In addition, the presence of arms races probably increases the likelihood that disputes with these explosive characteristics will emerge.

It is encouraging to note that Leng's findings are compatible with the earlier findings of Richard Barringer, who is outside the project.[96] Barringer employs a cluster analysis of 300 characteristics of 18 disputes. He finds that one of the main distinctions between non-military and military disputes is the way the issues at stake are perceived. Barringer also suggests that domestic mobilization is associated with the militarization of disputes. He finds that both sides tend to equalize their military manpower just prior to the war, whereas they had earlier been unequal.[97] Often any shift in the military balance is seized upon to gain an immediate advantage. Attitudes among the public of each side are more supportive of hostilities, and ideological differences which had been previously mild are now extreme. Finally, Barringer finds that military hostilities tend to erupt after a crisis and a change in the leadership of one side.

Barringer's analysis suggests that, to get a sense of why leaders take the actions they do, a complete understanding of escalation must go beyond the bargaining factors that arise within a crisis and examine the nature of the leadership (and the domestic political context within which it oper-

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by Patrick James and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, "Structural Factors and International Crisis Behavior," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 7 (Spring 1984), 33-53, employing an independent data base.

[95] It is probably the territorial aspect of issues that is particularly explosive. See Most and Starr (fn. 46); Singer, "Confrontational Behavior and Escalation to War, 1816-1980: A Research Plan," *Journal of Peace Research* 19 (No. 1, 1982), 40; and Paul F. Diehl, "Contiguity and Military Escalation in Major Power Rivalries, 1816-1980," *Journal of Politics* 47 (No. 4, 1985), 1203-11. However, it seems that issues that involve several parties are also explosive, since an intervention by a third party into an ongoing dyadic dispute will increase the likelihood of escalation to war. See Thomas Cusack and Wolf-Dieter Eberwein, "Prelude to War: Incidence, Escalation and Intervention in International Disputes, 1900-1976," *International Interactions* 9 (No. 1 1982), 9-28.

[96] Barringer, *War: Patterns of Conflict* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1972); see pp. 102-12 for the findings reported here.

[97] Singer (fn. 95), 40, hypothesizes that the more equal the protagonists are militarily, the more likely an escalation to war.

ates).[98] Singer recognized long ago that there is an interaction between the international and domestic political contexts that encourages leaders to take escalatory actions and makes it difficult to initiate conciliatory moves within a dispute. Domestically, in the attempt to mobilize the public and gain support for military expenditures, leaders paint a picture of a hostile enemy and create a climate that is responsive to hard-line and jingoistic appeals. This tendency is reinforced by traditional realist notions that one must show firmness (and resolve) in the struggle for power. Both domestic and global factors interact to produce self-aggravating propensities that increase hostility and make compromise more difficult.[99]

Such factors affect decision makers' perceptions, encouraging both sides to develop not only mirror-images, but a shared intellectual context that sees power politics as a legitimate and useful means for dealing with the adversary.[100] In this climate it is not surprising that perceived hostility is correlated with violent behavior, and that crisis interactions generate a hostile interaction spiral in which each side overreacts to the other while thinking its own policy is less hostile than that of the other.[101] The development of a hostile spiral is the final step to war. If the spiraling effect can be avoided through diplomatic skill and bold leadership, the crisis can be successfully managed and war averted.[102] This is difficult, however, because of the weight of all the previous decisions (steps) that have been taken and have brought the parties to where they now stand.

This suggests that, while the decisions taken in crises are crucial, they are not the fundamental causes of war. Psychological stress, selective inattention, and poor decision making may make it hard to avoid war at the last minute; but, even if a particular crisis is successfully managed, another will inevitably come along (and will be more intense and more difficult to manage) if there is no fundamental change in policy (goals and means). It is not the dynamics of decision making that produce war, but a set of foreign policy goals and a sequence of practices which create a political relationship and an atmosphere that is apt to result in war given the right set of triggers.

[98] Little quantitative work has been conducted on the effect of the domestic political context, and especially the role of hard-liners, on the decision of leaders to go to war or use force. For a set of hypotheses that seek to identify general patterns, see Vasquez (fn. 30).

[99] Singer, "Escalation and Control" (fn. 82), 72-78, and Singer (fn. 95), 40.

[100] Vasquez (fn. 30).

[101] Holsti et al. (fn. 29), 146, 148, 152-57.

[102] For an attempt to model different hostile spirals so as to distinguish those that will escalate to war from those that will not, see Dina A. Zinnes and Robert G. Muncaster, "The Dynamics of Hostile Activity and the Prediction of War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 28 (June 1984), 187-229.

## Conclusion: Conditions of Peace

Although much of the research supports realist descriptions of what actors are likely to do when faced with threats, the adoption of common realist practices, such as alliance-making, military build-ups, balancing of power, and realpolitik tactics do not produce peace, but lead to war.[103] Elsewhere, I have argued that power politics is not so much an explanation of behavior as it is a type of behavior found in the global political system that must itself be explained.[104] A more comprehensive nonrealist analysis would explain when decision makers exhibit power-politics behavior and when they do not, and how a system that is dominated by power-politics images and behavior could be transformed into one that is not. Only the hints of a broader nonrealist analysis that draws on the insight of social psychology are present in the work of the Correlates of War project, and these are mainly, though not exclusively, in the more policy-oriented analyses of Singer.[105]

Throughout Singer's work one finds a steadfast commitment to develop a scientific analysis of war that is motivated by a normative concern for building a more peaceful world. This concern is reflected not only in his policy essays, but also in his efforts to encourage other scholars to develop policy-relevant, quantitative indicators that can be used to improve understanding and to provide warnings of harmful trends.[106] Eschewing conspiratorial or highly rational explanations of elite behavior, Singer has long maintained that most foreign policy decisions are made in ignorance, and that even modest improvements in the scientific cumulation of knowledge can be policy-relevant.[107]

The idea that the correlates of war can be explained as a series of steps certainly fulfills this expectation and belies the early criticism that quantitative analysis could succeed in discovering only the obvious and the trivial. Although the steps to war must be seen as a working outline of a scientific explanation of war that needs to be further tested, refined, and

[103] Singer would probably find this statement too strong; but see his "Confrontational Behavior" (fn. 95), 42-43. It should also be kept in mind that this statement does not mean that those who have advocated such realist practices are necessarily in favor of war. No one familiar with the political life of Hans Morgenthau or Reinhold Niebuhr would make such an assertion.

[104] Vasquez (fn. 12, 1983), 215-23.

[105] See in particular the essays reprinted in Singer, 1979, chaps. 2, 4, 6, 7, 15, and Singer, 1984, epilogue (also reprinted as "Nuclear Strategies and Peace," in Small and Singer, 1985, pp. 377-92).

[106] See Singer, 1984, p. 299, and his two edited books on quantitative indicators: Singer and Wallace, 1979, and Singer and Stoll, 1984.

[107] See Singer, 1979, pp. 131-32; Singer, *The Scientific Study of Politics: An Approach to Foreign Policy Analysis* (Morristown, NJ: General Learning Corporation, 1972), excerpted in Singer, 1979, pp. 133-44, see esp. 136-37, 143; Singer and Small, "Foreign Policy Indicators," in Singer, 1979, 328-29.

fitted to specific historical cases, its propositions provide the kind of precision and nonobvious findings that make scholarly work policy relevant. The findings of the Correlates of War project suggest that the implementation of common realist practices against equals produces neither peace nor victory (as realists imply by their prescriptions), but increased insecurity, coercion, and entanglement in a process that may lead to war. Each step leads decision makers further and further into a trap (both globally and domestically) where they have little choice but to fight. The relevancy of delineating these steps is that it highlights what must be done to avoid the next step, and warns leaders of the negative and unanticipated consequences of taking the steps. Although a discussion of the policy implications of each step would take a separate paper of its own, suffice it to say that, in the early 20th century, decision makers did not understand, nor really anticipate, how alliance formation could lead to world war. The findings suggest that alliances formed in response to threats can lead to polarization. If complete enough, and in a world where power is equally distributed around more than two poles, such polarization can produce world wars. If the initial step had not been taken, the issues might have been resolved dyadically through limited war.

In this way the findings suggest how war might be mitigated and controlled. Can it ever be avoided, or is humankind condemned, as realists would have us believe, to a history of war and a struggle for power? Although the project has not been directly concerned with the correlates of *peace*, there are some interesting findings that suggest that the frequency of war varies in different periods and systems; there are cases where actors do not always exhibit the kind of power-politics behavior involved in the steps to war.

Peter Wallensteen marshals evidence to show that when major powers make concerted efforts to work out a set of rules to guide their relations (what he calls "universalist policies"), no wars among major powers are fought, military confrontations are drastically reduced, and even wars and confrontations between major and minor powers are somewhat attenuated.[108] Conversely, when major powers do not (or are unable to) make an effort to create an order based on acceptable rules, but fall back on "particularist policies" based on unilateral actions, wars break out among them, and confrontations increase two-fold. A full understanding of the conditions of peace requires discovering the factors that encourage states (and other political actors) to create rules.

In a series of articles, Charles Kegley and Gregory Raymond have provided evidence that when states accept norms, the incidence of war is re-

[108] Wallensteen (fn. 33), especially Table 2, p. 246.

duced. They find that, when global cultural norms consider alliance commitments binding and regard the unilateral abrogation of commitments and treaties as illegitimate, then war (particularly in the major power system) is less frequent and of less severity, magnitude, and intensity.[109] A similar relationship is found when all serious disputes are examined.[110] While alliance norms may be important, it is unlikely that, in and of themselves, they would have such an impact on the onset of war; rather, the presence of such norms is an indicator of a much broader consensus (on rules of the game) that prevents unilateral actions.[111]

Since war and force can be regarded as a way of making political decisions under conditions of anarchy, the creation of a system of rules by which to make political decisions can serve as the functional equivalent of war. It does this when rules provide for an allocation mechanism[112] other than force for resolving issues, and actors accept the outcomes of using those mechanisms, even if it means they will lose a particular contest. This acceptance, in turn, is probably a function of their ability to avoid raising fundamental issues that are questions of life and death.

If we assume that war avoidance at the domestic, regional, or global level involves the creation of a political system or regime capable of making decisions, then how long the peaces that end major wars will last depends upon their success in creating an order that institutionalizes procedures for the resolution of political demands. How successful a peace will be depends on its ability to set the agenda so that certain issues are avoided, and to assimilate new and/or recovered major powers[113] so that they do not take actions outside the system.[114]

[109] Specifically, they find that war occurs in every half-decade (from 1820-1914) among great powers when commitments are not considered binding (*clausa rebus sic stantibus*) in the international legal culture, but only in 50% of the half-decades when they are considered binding (*pacta sunt servanda*). See Kegley and Raymond (fn. 52), 586.

[110] Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Gregory A. Raymond, "Alliance Norms and the Management of Interstate Disputes," in Singer and Stoll, 1984, 199-220.

[111] Because serious disputes (including wars) also decrease when there is a moderate degree of alliance flexibility (as opposed to rigid, polarized, or extremely fluid alliance structure), these findings (fn. 110, esp. p. 210) can also be explained by a deterrence logic. The deterrence explanation seems less compelling than the one offered here because the explanation that the creation of a consensus on the rules of the game is an independent factor producing peace is consistent not only with the evidence presented by Kegley and Raymond, but also with the other evidence presented in this section. In addition, Kegley and Raymond, in "Normative Constraints on the Use of Force Short of War," *Journal of Peace Research* 23 (No. 3, 1986), 213-27, esp. pp. 217-24, use the notion of rules to account in detail for actual historical practices.

[112] An allocation mechanism is a set of rules and procedures, no matter how informal, for making and implementing political decisions, thereby providing a way for the disposition of stakes. See Mansbach and Vasquez (fn. 79), 282-87.

[113] Charles F. Doran, *The Politics of Assimilation* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971).

[114] A stable peace also reduces the number of major-minor wars and confrontations (see Wallensteen, fn. 33, p. 246); but such a peace does not imply justice, since it may be used by

Such an explanation will need to be more fully elaborated and tested; it is consistent, however, with the early finding by Singer and Wallace that war produces an increase in the number of intergovernmental organizations.[115] It is also consistent with Wallace's intriguing finding that the absence of status inconsistency in the system is associated with formation of (and presumably the effectiveness of) intergovernmental organizations. Formation of intergovernmental organizations, in turn, is negatively associated with arms build-ups (which have a strong correlation with the onset of war).[116] All this suggests not only that power-politics behavior has been avoided at certain times of global history, but also that, when actors have taken a more Grotian approach, they have succeeded in avoiding war among themselves.

Through the careful collection of scientific data and the systematic analysis of wars since 1815, the Correlates of War project has provided a body of findings that are beginning to cumulate into a number of insights. These suggest what factors are, and are not, associated with war, what factors are associated with the severity, magnitude, and duration of war, and what actions may have produced past periods of peace. Much remains to be done, but it is heartening, as Singer states, that after literally centuries of inconclusive theorizing and philosophizing on the causes of war, real progress in our knowledge is beginning to be made.[117]

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major states to divide or control minor states or other territories, as was done in the 19th century.

[115] J. David Singer and Michael D. Wallace, "Intergovernmental Organization and the Preservation of Peace, 1816-1965: Some Bivariate Relationships, *International Organization* 24 (Summer 1970), 520-47.

[116] Wallace (fn. 24), 65-66. Kjell Skjelsbaek's finding, in "Shared Membership in Intergovernmental Organizations and Dyadic War, 1865-1964," in Edward H. Fedder, ed., *The United Nations: Problems and Prospects* (St. Louis: Center for International Studies, University of Missouri, 1971), 31-61, that shared membership in intergovernmental organizations decreases prior to the outbreak of war is consistent with Wallace's findings. So, too, is the elaboration and re-test of the Singer and Wallace study (fn. 115) by J. Faber and R. Weaver, "Participation in Conferences, Treaties, and Warfare in the European System, 1816 1915," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 28 (September 1984), 522-34, which provides evidence for the notion that the presence of effective rules of the game reduces the need to go to war. For an interpretation of Wallace's findings along these lines, see Mansbach and Vasquez (fn. 79), 304-13. This evidence is also consistent with much of what Gilpin (fn. 32) has to say about the outcome of hegemonic struggles.

[117] Singer, "Accounting for International War" (fn. 20), 14.

# SOCIAL REVOLUTIONS AND MASS MILITARY MOBILIZATION

By THEDA SKOCPOL*

"THE changes in the state order which a revolution produces are no less important than the changes in the social order."[1] Franz Borkenau's insight, published in 1937, has become the central theme of more recent comparative studies. "A complete revolution," writes Samuel P. Huntington in *Political Order in Changing Societies*, "involves ... the creation and institutionalization of a new political order," into which an "explosion" of popular participation in national affairs is channeled.[2] Similarly, in my *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China*, I argue that in "each New Regime, there was much greater popular incorporation into the state-run affairs of the nation. And the new state organizations forged during the Revolutions were more centralized and rationalized than those of the Old Regime."[3]

Huntington has developed his arguments about revolutionary accomplishments in critical dialogue with liberal-minded modernization theorists, while I have developed mine in critical dialogue with Marxian class analysts. Modernization theorists and Marxians both analyze revolutionary transformations primarily in relation to long-term socioeconomic change. These scholars also highlight the contributions of certain revolutions to liberalism or to democratic socialism—that is, to "democracy" understood *in opposition to* authoritarian state power.

The classical Marxist vision on revolutionary accomplishments was unblinkingly optimistic. According to this view, "bourgeois revolutions"

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[1] Borkenau, "State and Revolution in the Paris Commune, the Russian Revolution, and the Spanish Civil War," *Sociological Review* 29 (January 1937), 41-75, at 41.

[2] Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 266. Chapter 5 in its entirety is also relevant.

[3] See Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China* (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 161.

clear away obstacles to capitalist economic development and lay the basis for historically progressive but socially limited forms of liberal democracy. "Proletarian revolutions," in turn, create the conditions for classless economies and for universal social and political democracy, accompanied by the progressive "withering away of the state." The first modern social revolution to be accomplished in the name of Marxism, the Russian Revolution of 1917, obviously belied this vision, however, for it established a communist dictatorship that ruled in the name of the proletariat while actually exploiting workers for purposes of crash industrialization, and imposing a brutal "internal colonialism" on the peasant majority.[4]

Reacting to the Stalinist denouement of the Russian Revolution, liberal-minded theorists operating within the broad framework of modernization theory have offered their own view of the accomplishments of revolutions. Theorists as disparate as S. N. Eisenstadt and Michael Walzer agree that the only salutary revolutions have been the mildest ones—the least violent and the least suddenly transformative of preexisting social and political relations.[5] In contrast to such supposedly liberal revolutions as the French and the English, the more severe and thoroughgoing revolutions boomeranged to produce totalitarian dictatorships—more penetrating authoritarian regimes—rather than democratization as these modernization theorists understand it.

Modernization theorists, moreover, tend to view the political aspects of the revolutions as inefficient and probably temporary aberrations in the course of socioeconomic development. An ideologically committed vanguard may rise to central-state power—and perhaps stay there—through the mobilization and manipulation of grass roots political organizations such as militias, workplace councils, or neighborhood surveillance committees. From the perspective of modernization theorists, however, this kind of revolutionary political mobilization—known either as "the terror" or as totalitarianism, depending on whether it is a phase or an institutionalized outcome in any given revolution—is both morally reprehensible and technically inefficient for dealing with the practical tasks that modern governments must face.

Converging on what might be called a realist perspective, analysts like Huntington and myself have reached different conclusions about the political accomplishments of revolutions. In the realist view, a special sort of democratization—understood not as an extension of political liberalism

[4] This characterization comes from Alvin Gouldner, "Stalinism: A Study of Internal Colonialism," in *Political Power and Social Theory* (research annual edited by Maurice Zeitlin) 1 (1980) (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press), 209-59.

[5] Eisenstadt, *Revolution and the Transformation of Societies* (New York: Free Press, 1978); Walzer, "A Theory of Revolution," *Marxist Perspectives*, No. 5 (Spring 1979), 30-44.

or the realization of democratic socialism, but as an enhancement of popular involvement in national political life—*accompanies* the revolutionary strengthening of centralized national states directed by authoritarian executives or political parties.

Briefly put, this happens because during revolutionary interregnums competition among elites for coercive and authoritative control spurs certain leadership groups to mobilize previously politically excluded popular forces by means of both material and ideological incentives. Popular participation is especially sought in the forging of organizations that can be used to subdue less "radical" contenders. New state organizations—armies, administrations, committees of surveillance, and so forth—are at once authoritarian and unprecedentedly mass-mobilizing. In some revolutions, especially those involving prolonged guerrilla wars, this process works itself out prior to the formal seizure of national-state power; in others, especially those in which inter-elite struggles are fought out in urban street battles, it tends to occur during and after that seizure. Either way, the logic of state-building through which social revolutions are successfully accomplished promotes both authoritarianism and popular mobilization.

In the realist view, moreover, the strengthened political and state orders that emerge from social-revolutionary transformations may perform some kinds of tasks very effectively—certainly more effectively than did the old regimes they displaced. But which tasks? Perhaps because we have argued with the modernization and Marxian theorists, Huntington and I tend to explore the accomplishments of revolutionary regimes in such areas as maintaining political order during the course of socioeconomic transformation, enforcing individual or collective property rights, and promoting state-led industrialization. Yet I would argue that the task which revolutionized regimes in the modern world have performed best is the mobilization of citizen support across class lines for protracted international warfare.

There is a straightforward reason why this should be true: the types of organizations formed and the political ties forged between revolutionary vanguards and supporters (in the course of defeating other elites and consolidating the new regime's state controls) can readily be converted to the tasks of mobilizing resources, including dedicated officers and soldiers, for international warfare. Guerrilla armies and their support systems are an obvious case in point. So are urban militias and committees of surveillance, which seem to have served as splendid agencies for military recruitment from the French Revolution to the Iranian. Moreover, if revolutionary leaders can find ways to link a war against foreigners to

domestic power struggles, they may be able to tap into broad nationalist feelings—as well as exploit class and political divisions—in order to motivate supporters to fight and die on behalf of the new regime. Talented members of families that supported the old regime can often be recruited to the revolutionary-nationalist cause, along with enthusiasts from among those who had previously been excluded from national politics.

Whether we in the liberal-democratic West like to acknowledge it or not, the authoritarian regimes brought to power through revolutionary transformations—from the French Revolution of the late 18th century to the Iranian Revolution of the present—have been democratizing in the mass-mobilizing sense. The best evidence of this has been the enhanced ability of such revolutionized regimes to conduct humanly costly wars with a special fusion of popular zeal, meritocratic professionalism, and central coordination. Whatever the capacities of revolutionary regimes to cope with tasks of economic development (and the historical record suggests that those capacities are questionable), they seem to excel at motivating their populations to make supreme sacrifices for the nation in war. That is no mean accomplishment in view of the fact that the prerevolutionary polities in question excluded most of the people from symbolic or practical participation in national politics.

In the remainder of this brief essay, I will illustrate the plausibility of these arguments by surveying two groups of social revolutions in modern world history. First, I will examine the classic social revolutions that transformed the imperial-monarchical states of Bourbon France, Romanov Russia, and Manchu China, probing their accomplishments in relation to the expectations of the liberal, Marxian, and realist perspectives just outlined. Then I will discuss a number of the nation-building social revolutions that have transformed postcolonial and neocolonial countries in the 20th century. I shall pay special attention to the ways in which the geopolitical contexts of particular revolutions have facilitated or discouraged the channeling of popular political participation into defensive and aggressive wars. Whether "communist" or not, I argue, revolutionary elites have been able to build the strongest states in those countries whose geopolitical circumstances allowed or required the emerging new regimes to become engaged in protracted and labor-intensive international warfare.

Can one make rigorous statements about the geopolitical circumstances that affect revolutions in progress, and that are in turn affected by them? Revolutionary outbreaks do seem to make wars more likely because domestic conflicts tend to spill over to involve foreign partners, and because revolutions create perceived threats and opportunities for other

states. Beyond this, however, no glib generalizations are possible; for example, more sweeping revolutions do not automatically generate greater wars or stronger efforts at foreign intervention. As we are about to see, the geopolitical contexts of social revolutions in the modern world have varied greatly; so have the intersections of domestic state-building struggles with international threats or conflicts. At this point in the development of knowledge about these matters, the best way to proceed is through exploratory analyses and comparisons of a wide range of historical cases.

## Social Revolutions and War-Making in France, Russia, and China

The word "revolution" did not take on its modern connotation of a fundamental sociopolitical change accompanied by violent upheavals from below until the French Revolution of the late 18th century.[6] This etymological fact appropriately signals the reality that the French Revolution (unlike the English, Dutch, and American) was a *social* revolution, in which class-based revolts from below, especially peasant revolts against landlords, propelled sudden transformations in the class structure along with permanently centralizing changes in the structures of state power. In *States and Social Revolutions*, I group the French Revolution for comparative analysis with the Russian Revolution from 1917 to the 1930s and with the Chinese Revolution from 1911 to the 1960s. The French Revolution, I argue, was neither primarily "bourgeois" in the Marxist sense nor "liberal" in the modernization sense. Nor was the Russian Revolution "proletarian" in the Marxist sense. Rather, the French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions, despite important variations, displayed striking similarities of context, cause, process, and outcomes.

All three classic social revolutions occurred in large, previously independent, predominantly agrarian monarchical states that found themselves pressured militarily by economically more developed competitors on the international scene. Social revolutions were sufficiently caused when (a) the centralized, semi-bureaucratic administrative and military organizations of the old regimes disintegrated due to combinations of international pressures and disputes between monarchs and landed commercial upper classes, and (b) widespread peasant revolts took place against landlords. After more or less protracted struggles by political forces trying to consolidate new state organizations, all three revolutions

[6] Karl Griewank, "The Emergence of the Concept of Revolution," in Bruce Mazlish, Arthur D. Kaledin, and David B. Ralston, eds., *Revolution: A Reader* (New York: Macmillan, 1971), 13-17.

resulted in more centralized and mass-mobilizing national states, more powerful in relation to all domestic social groups, and also more powerful than the prerevolutionary regimes had been in relation to foreign competitors. In particular, all three social revolutions markedly raised their nations' capacities to wage humanly costly wars.[7]

The differences in the outcomes and accomplishments of the French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions are not well explained by referring, as a Marxist analyst would do, to the greater role of bourgeois class forces in the French case or to the unique contributions of proletarian revolts to the urban struggles of 1917 in Russia. Nor can one explain the different outcomes, as the modernization theorists do, by suggesting that the milder, less violent, and less thoroughgoing the revolutionary conflicts and changes, and the briefer the rule of an ideological vanguard, the more efficient and liberal-democratic the revolutionary outcome. None of these revolutions had a liberal-democratic outcome, and none of them resulted in a socialist democracy. Instead, the differences in the essentially mass-mobilizing and authoritarian outcomes and accomplishments of the French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions are in large part attributable to the international geopolitical contexts in which the conflicts of these revolutions played themselves out. They are also attributable to the political relationships established, during and immediately after the revolutionary interregnums, between state-building leaderships and rebellious lower classes. One feature that these three social revolutions have in common is that all of them enhanced national capacities to wage humanly costly foreign wars.

The French Revolution has typically been characterized as a modernizing liberal-democratic revolution or as a bourgeois, capitalist revolution. In terms of economics, it is difficult if not impossible to show that the French Revolution was necessary for the "economic modernization" or "capitalist development" of France: the absolutist old regime had been facilitating commercialization and petty industry just as much as postrevolutionary regimes did.[8] Politically, moreover, analysts tend to forget that the end result of the French Revolution was not any form of liberalism, but Napoleon's nationalist dictatorship, which left the enduring legacy of a highly centralized and bureaucratic French state with a recurrent tendency to seek national glory through military exploits.

[7] Thorough elaboration and documentation of this conclusion appears in Jonathan R. Adelman, *Revolution, Armies, and War: A Political History* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1985), chaps. 3-11.

[8] For fuller discussion and references, see Skocpol (fn. 3), 174-77.

The political phases of the French Revolution from 1789 through 1800 certainly included attempts to institutionalize civil liberties and electoral democracy, as well as the important legalization of undivided private property rights for peasants and bourgeois alike. Moreover, the fact that the French Revolution created a private-propertied society rather than a party-state that aspired to manage the national economy directly left open space for the eventual emergence of liberal-democratic political arrangements in France. At the time of the Revolution itself, however, democratization was more emphatically and enduringly furthered through "careers open to talent" in the military officer corps, through mass military conscription, and through the more efficient pressing of the state's fiscal demands on all citizens.

From a European continental perspective, the most striking and consequential accomplishment of the French Revolution was its ability to launch highly mobile armies of motivated citizen-soldiers, coordinated with enhanced deployment of artillery forces. The Jacobins from 1792 to 1794 began the process of amalgamating political commissioners and *sans-culotte* militias with the remnants of the royal standing armies.[9] Even though they did not find a way to stabilize their "Republic of Virtue," the Montagnard Jacobins fended off the most pressing domestic and international counterrevolutionary threats. Yet their fall was not the end of military mass-mobilization in France. Napoleon consolidated a conservative bureaucratic regime and came to terms with private property holders (including the peasant smallholders) and with the Church (including the local priests so influential with the peasantry). Then he expanded the process of French military mobilization, deploying citizen armies of an unprecedented size and a capacity for rapid maneuver.[10] The enhanced popular political participation and the messianic sense of French nationalism and democratic mission unleashed by the Revolution were thus directed outward. Before their eventual exhaustion in the unconquerable vastness of Russia, French citizen armies redrew the political map of modern Europe in irreversible ways and inspired the emergence of other European nationalisms in response.

Russia and China both experienced thoroughgoing social revolutionary transformations that resulted in the rule of communist-directed

[9] S. F. Scott, "The Regeneration of the Line Army During the French Revolution," *Journal of Modern History* 42 (September 1970), 307-30.

[10] Adelman (fn. 7), chap. 3; Theodore Ropp, *War in the Modern World*, rev. ed. (New York: Collier Books, 1962), chap. 4; Alfred Vagts, *A History of Militarism*, rev. ed. (New York: Free Press, 1959), chap. 4; John Ellis, *Armies in Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), chap. 4.

party-states. These social revolutions occurred under Leninist party leaderships in the modern industrial era, when the model of a state-managed economy was available; and both occurred in countries more hard-pressed geopolitically than late 18th-century France had been. The authoritarian and mass-mobilizing energies of the immediate postrevolutionary regimes, both in Soviet Russia and Communist China, were mainly directed not to *imperial* military conquests as in France, but to the promotion of national economic development, which was deemed to be the key to national independence in a world dominated by major industrial powers. Even so, in due course both of the new regimes demonstrated greatly enhanced capacities (compared to the prerevolutionary era) for successfully waging international war.

From the modernization perspective, the Russian and the Chinese revolutions were tyrannical and antidemocratic: they were more violent and transformative than the French Revolution, and ideological vanguards stayed in power both in Russia and in China. (By contrast, the Montagnard perpetrators of the Terror fell from power in France.) The Soviet regime, however, through the Stalinist "revolution from above," became more coercive and inegalitarian than did the Chinese Communist regime after 1949. Modernization theory cannot explain the contrasts between the Russian and Chinese new regimes. The civil war interregnum of the Chinese Revolution, stretching from 1911 to 1949, was much more protracted than the brief Russian revolutionary civil war of 1917-1921; and in practice, the Soviet regime probably built directly upon more structures and policies from Russia's tsarist past than the Chinese Communist regime did on China's Confucian-imperial past. Nor do the contrasting revolutionary outcomes make sense from a Marxian perspective: the Russian Revolution was politically based on the urban industrial proletariat, and thus should have resulted in practices closer to socialist ideals than the peasant-based Chinese Revolution.

The somewhat less murderous and less authoritarian features of the Chinese Communist state after 1949—at least from the point of view of local peasant communities—can be attributed to the guerrilla mode by which the Chinese Communist Party came to power. The party could not achieve national state power directly in the cities; instead, it found itself faced with the necessity of waging rural guerrilla warfare against both the Japanese invaders and its Kuomintang competitors for domestic political control. Nationalist appeals helped the Chinese communists in the early 1940s to attract educated middle-class citizens to their cause. Attention to the pressing material and self-defense needs of the peasantry in North China also allowed the communists to gain sufficient access to the

villages to reorganize poor and middle-class peasants into associations that would support the Red Armies economically and militarily.[11]

After 1949, the Chinese communists were able, by building upon their preexisting political relations with much of the peasantry, to carry out agricultural collectivization with less brutality than the Bolsheviks.[12] Simultaneously, the relatively favorable geopolitical context of postrevolutionary China, situated in a world of nuclear superpower balance between the Soviet Union and the United States, allowed the Chinese communists to place less emphasis upon creating a heavy industrial capacity for mechanized military forces than they might otherwise have done. Their limited resources sufficed, however, to establish an independent Chinese nuclear capacity, symbol of major-power status in the post-World War II era.[13]

Communist China was able to pursue economic development policies that stressed light industries and rural development as well as some heavy industries. Meanwhile, the party could also infuse peasant-based, guerrilla-style military practices inherited from the revolutionary civil war into standing forces that could intervene effectively in the Korean War and make limited forays against India and Vietnam. As Jonathan Adelman has argued, performance of the People's Liberation Army in the Korean War battles of 1950-51 was "simply outstanding" compared to the "disastrous" Kuomintang military performance against the Japanese in the 1930s and 1940s.[14] The Revolution, Adelman concludes, had "created a whole new Chinese army."[15]

By contrast, the Soviet regime consolidated under Stalin's auspices took a much more brutal stance toward the peasant majority. Essentially, it substituted an autocratic dictatorship for a mass-mobilizing revolutionary regime. The Bolsheviks originally claimed state power in 1917 through political and very limited military maneuverings in the cities and towns of Russia, and they initially abstained from efforts at nationalist military mobilization. Most of the Russian populace acquiesced in their rule simply because of the exhaustion brought by Imperial Russia's defeat in World War I. The Russian revolutionary civil war of 1917 to 1921 was

[11] Mark Selden, *The Yenan Way in Revolutionary China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971); Ellis (fn. 10), chap. 4.

[12] Thomas P. Bernstein, "Leadership and Mass Mobilisation in the Soviet and Chinese Collectivisation Campaigns of 1929-30 and 1955-56: A Comparison," *China Quarterly* 31 (July-September 1967), 1-47. Bernstein characterizes Chinese collectivization techniques as "persuasive" in contrast to the more "coercive" Soviet practices. Subsequent to collectivization, however, the Chinese "Great Leap Forward" did devolve into considerable coercion by cadres against peasants.

[13] Franz Schurmann, *The Logic of World Power* (New York: Pantheon, 1974), part II.

[14] Adelman (fn. 7), 139.

[15] *Ibid.*, 144.

won by the deployment of urban guards and conventionally structured standing armies. Peasants were involved only as reluctantly coerced conscripts.[16] The one major foreign adventure of the fledgling Bolshevik regime, the invasion of Poland in 1920, ended in military defeat. In fact, the new Russian regime was fortunate that World War I had defeated or exhausted its major foreign opponents. For new-born Soviet Russia did not conform to the pattern of most other social revolutions: its central authorities were not in a good position to channel mass political participation into international warfare. Instead, they turned toward deepening internal warfare—against the peasantry and among elites.

After 1921, the Bolshevik regime lacked organized political ties to the peasant villages, which had made their own autonomous local revolutions against landlords in 1917 and 1918. Stalin rose to power in the 1920s and 1930s by convincing many cadres in the Soviet party-state that Russian "socialism" would have to be built "in one country" that was isolated and threatened economically and militarily by Western industrial powers. The crash program of heavy industrialization was alleged to be necessary not only to build Marxian socialism, but also to prepare Russia for land-based military warfare. The peasantry became a domestic obstacle to Stalinist policies when it refused to provide economic surpluses at exploitative rates. Stalin's subsequent bureaucratic and terroristic drive to force peasant communities into centrally controlled agricultural collectives succeeded only at a terrible cost in human lives and agricultural productivity; the political reverberations in urban and official Russia helped to spur his purges of the Soviet elite in the 1930s. The Stalinist consolidation of the new regime was thus initially a product of conflicts between an urban-based party-state and the peasantry, played out in a geopolitically threatening environment—though *not* in an environment in which direct national mobilization for international war was either necessary or possible.[17]

It is significant that Stalinism evolved into a *popular* mass-mobilizing regime as a result of the travails of World War II.[18] When the invading Nazis conducted themselves with great brutality against the Slav populations they conquered, Stalinist Russia finally had to mobilize for a total international war. Despite the setbacks of the first few months, the Soviet

[16] Ellis (fn. 10), chap. 5.

[17] Background for this analysis of Stalin's "revolution from above" comes especially from Bernstein (fn. 12); Stephen F. Cohen, *Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution* (New York: Knopf, 1973); and Moshe Lewin, *Russian Peasants and Soviet Power*, trans. Irene Nove (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968).

[18] An insightful discussion of the different phases of nationalist mobilization in Russia and China appears in William G. Rosenberg and Marilyn Young, *Transforming Russia and China: Revolutionary Struggle in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982).

Union met the military challenges of World War II much more effectively than tsarist Russia had met the exigencies of World War I.[19] The Soviet people and armed forces fought back with considerable efficiency and amazing zeal in the face of terrible casualties. For the first time since 1917, Soviet rulers were able to use Russian nationalism to bolster their leadership. Stalin did not hesitate to revive many symbols of Russian national identity from prerevolutionary times, and he also restored prerogatives of rank and expertise in the military.[20] It is therefore not surprising that, when World War II ended in victory for the U.S.S.R. and the Allies, the Soviet rulers' domestic legitimacy—as well as the country's global great-power status—had been enhanced significantly.

## Social Revolutions in Dependent Countries: Geopolitical Contexts and the Possibilities for Militarization

In the classic social revolutions of France, Russia, and China, long-established monarchical states were transformed into mass-mobilizing national regimes; most other social revolutions in the modern era, however, have occurred in smaller, dependent countries.[21] In some, such as Vietnam and the Portuguese colonies of Africa, which had been colonized by foreign imperial powers, social-revolutionary transformations were part of the process of national liberation from colonialism. In others, such as Cuba, Mexico, Iran, and Nicaragua, neopatrimonial dictatorships were caught in webs of great-power rivalries within the capitalist world economy and the global geopolitical system. Social revolutions in these countries have forged stronger states that are markedly more nationalist and mass-incorporating than the previous regimes and other countries in their respective regions. Still, the new regimes have remained minor powers on the world scene.

With the exception of the Iranian Revolution of 1977-1979, which was primarily carried out through urban demonstrations and strikes, all third-world social revolutions have depended on at least a modicum of peasant support for their success. In most instances, both peasants and city dwellers were mobilized for guerrilla warfare by nationalist revolutionary elites; only in the Mexican and Bolivian revolutions were peasant

[19] Adelman (fn. 7), chaps. 4-7.

[20] Alf Edeen, "The Civil Service: Its Composition and Status," in Cyril E. Black, ed., *The Transformation of Russian Society* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), 274-91; see esp. 286-87.

[21] For useful overviews, see Eric R. Wolf, *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century* (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), chaps. 1, 4-6; John Dunn, *Modern Revolutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), chaps. 2, 4-8.

communities able to rebel on their own as did the French and Russian peasant communities.[22] Most third-world social revolutions have been played out as military struggles among leaderships contending to create or redefine the missions of national states. And these revolutions have happened in settings so penetrated by foreign influences—economic, military, and cultural—that social-revolutionary transformations have been as much about the definition of autonomous identities on the international scene as they have been about the forging of new political ties between indigenous revolutionaries and their mass constituents.

Consequently, the various international contexts in which third-world revolutions have occurred become crucial in conditioning the new regimes that have emerged from them. One basic aspect of the international situation is the relationship between a country undergoing revolution and the great powers, whatever they may be in a given phase of world history. Military, economic, and cultural aspects of such relations all need to be considered in our analysis. The regional context of each revolution also matters: What have been the possibilities for military conflicts with immediate neighbors? Have revolutionized third-world nations faced invasions by third-world neighbors, or have they been able to invade their neighbors without automatically involving great powers in the conflict? As I will illustrate in the remainder of this section, attention to international contexts can help us to explain at least as much about the structures and orientations of social-revolutionary new regimes in the third world as analyses of their class basis or propositions about the inherent logic of modernization and the violence and disruptiveness of various revolutions.

### Social Revolutions in the Shadow of a Great Power

A great power can use actual or threatenend military intervention to prevent revolutionary transformations near its borders, as the Soviet Union has done in postwar Eastern Europe and as the United States used to do in Central America. Short of that, major political transformations of any kind that proceed in a great power's sphere of military dominance are invariably profoundly influenced by possibilities for rebellion or accommodation. Throughout the 20th century, social revolutions in Central and Latin America, if they happened at all, have been affected by the actions and inactions of the United States as the hegemonic power in the hemisphere. These revolutions have also been affected by the global

[22] Alternative modes of peasant involvement in social revolutions are analyzed in Theda Skocpol, "What Makes Peasants Revolutionary?" *Comparative Politics* 14 (April 1982), 351-75.

power balances of their day. The cases of Mexico, Cuba, Bolivia, and the still-unfolding revolution in Nicaragua suggest a number of ways in which the great powers have influenced the shape of the new regimes that emerged from social-revolutionary interregnums.

In one sense, the most "benign" example of U.S. influence is demonstrated in relation to Mexico: the social revolution there was originally allowed to proceed, and was eventually consolidated into a regime that is a unique hybrid between a Western-style electoral democracy and a single-party authoritarian regime.[23] Still, we should note that unlike most other social-revolutionary regimes in the modern world, that of Mexico has never been able to engage in mass mobilization for international warfare. Nationalist self-assertion has been restricted to state-led economic development, particularly in periods such as the 1930s and 1940s, when the United States was distracted by larger domestic or world crises. Popular political participation has been managed by a corporatist, patronage-oriented party-state that preserves order in economically inefficient ways.

Originally, the anti-imperialist thrust of the Mexican Revolution was directed primarily against the European powers that were heavily involved in the economic and military affairs of the prerevolutionary regime of Porfirio Díaz; yet relations with the United States increasingly figured in successive phases of the revolution.[24] The Mexican Revolution could not have broken out at all in 1910-1911 had not the northern forces opposed to Porfirio Díaz been able to move back and forth across the U.S. border, counting on tacit American support in an era when the European great powers were the prime targets of Mexican nationalists. In addition, if the United States had been able and willing to launch sustained antirevolutionary interventions, the Revolution could not have continued after the defeats of Francisco Madero and General Victoriano Huerta made it potentially socially radical. Some scattered U.S. interventions were launched, but they were so minor that their only consequence was to provoke Mexican resentment. World War I and the presidency of Woodrow Wilson brought these American counterrevolutionary efforts to an end and gave the Mexicans space to begin the process of consolidat-

[23] Huntington (fn. 2), 315-24, discusses the postrevolutionary Mexican regime. See also Nora Hamilton, *The Limits of State Autonomy: Post-Revolutionary Mexico* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), and Roger D. Hansen, *The Politics of Mexican Development* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971).

[24] On the Mexican Revolution and its relations with foreign states, see Wolf (fn. 21), chap. 1; Dunn (fn. 21), chap. 2; Friedrich Katz, *The Secret War in Mexico: Europe, the United States, and the Mexican Revolution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981); Walter Goldfrank, "World System, State Structure, and the Onset of the Mexican Revolution," *Politics and Society* 5 (No. 4, 1975), 417-39; and John Womack, Jr., *Zapata and the Mexican Revolution* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969).

ing a new regime under populist and nationalist auspices. During the 1930s and World War II, U.S. abstention from unusual levels of meddling in Mexican affairs was again important in allowing Lazaro Cárdenas to complete construction of a populist, single-party "democracy" with sufficient nationalist clout to expropriate U.S. oil companies.[25]

Due to the basic geopolitical context, there was never any question of a new regime devoted to mass mobilization for military purposes at any point during the Mexican Revolution. Full-scale war with the United States would obviously have been fatal to any revolutionary leadership, and attempts to export revolution to the south would probably have provoked the ire of the northern colossus. Given some breathing space by the United States, Mexican revolutionary nationalists chose instead to ritualize mass mobilization into the subordinate incorporation of peasant communes and workers' unions into the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party. They produced what is perhaps the most nonmartial nationalist regime ever to emerge from a social-revolutionary transformation in the modern world. They also produced a patronage-oriented party-state that has become steadily more economically inefficient over the years, requiring a constant flow of graft to buy off elite factions and to co-opt popular leaders.[26]

The other major social revolution right on America's doorstep, the Cuban Revolution of 1959, culminated in a new regime remarkably adept at mobilizing human resources for military adventures across the globe. The failure of the United States to prevent or overthrow Fidel Castro's triumph over the Batista dictatorship helped to account for this outcome. But the global superpower rivalry of the United States and the Soviet Union was also a crucial ingredient, for Soviet willingness to protect and bankroll the new regime gave Cuban "anti-imperialists" a leverage against the United States that would have been unimaginable to the earlier Mexican revolutionaries.

Once established in power, Castro could assert Cuban national autonomy against the overwhelming U.S. economic and cultural presence. Having done so, he could then protect his rule from U.S.-sponsored overthrow only by allying himself domestically with the Cuban Communist Party and internationally with the Soviet Union. Subsequently, Cuba has become economically and militarily so dependent on Moscow that it finds itself serving Soviet interests throughout the third world.[27] Cubans are

[25] Hamilton (fn. 23), chaps. 4-7.

[26] Hansen (fn. 23); Susan Eckstein, *The Poverty of Revolution: The State and the Urban Poor in Mexico* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977).

[27] Kosmos Tsokhas, "The Political Economy of Cuban Dependence on the Soviet Union," *Theory and Society* 9 (March 1980), 319-62.

trained and mobilized for foreign service both as military advisors and as educated civilian technicians, which is a way in which Castro can partially repay the Soviets. In addition, it is an opportunity for a small, dependent revolutionary nation to create enhanced mobility for trained citizens.[28] It also allows Cuba to exert considerable military and ideological influence on the world scene—an amazing feat for such a tiny country located only ninety miles from a hostile superpower.

The weakest and poorest southern neighbors of the United States to experience social revolutions have been Bolivia in 1952-1964 and Nicaragua since 1979. These two cases demonstrate opposite effects of U.S. determination to counter radical change in contexts where the Soviet Union could not or would not do as much as it did for Castro's Cuba.

In Bolivia, spontaneous popular revolts by peasant communities and tin miners initially expropriated major owners, both domestic and foreign, and threatened to create a nationalist new regime that was not under the influence of the United States.[29] After international tin prices collapsed, however, the new Bolivian authorities accepted international aid, including help from the United States, to rebuild a professional military apparatus. In due course, the refurbished military took over, establishing Bolivian governments which, while not attempting to reverse the peasant land expropriations of 1952, have followed both domestic-economic and foreign policies that are amenable to American interests. In essence, the United States used a combination of benign neglect and cleverly targeted foreign aid to deradicalize the Bolivian Revolution. A number of circumstances facilitated American containment policies. Bolivian revolutionaries in 1952 had no foreign wars to fight, and popular radicalism (led by Trotskyist cadres) remained focused on internal class struggles. What is more, Bolivian revolutionaries were not reacting to—or capitalizing upon—a bitter prior history of direct Yankee military interventions, which was the case in Cuba and Nicaragua.

In Nicaragua as in Cuba, U.S. authorities initially acquiesced in the overthrow of a corrupt and domestically weakened patrimonial dictator even though he had originally been installed under U.S. sponsorship. Then, again as in Cuba, a dialectic got underway between a revolutionary radicalization couched in anti-American rhetoric and increasing efforts

[28] Susan Eckstein, "Structural and Ideological Bases of Cuba's Overseas Programs," *Politics and Society* 11 (No. 1, 1982), 95-121.

[29] My account of the Bolivian case draws upon Huntington (fn. 2), 325-34; Robert J. Alexander, *The Bolivian National Revolution* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1958); Bert Useem, "The Bolivian Revolution and Workers' Control," *Politics and Society* 9 (No. 4, 1980), 447-69; and Jonathan Kelley and Lawrence Klein, *Revolution and the Rebirth of Inequality* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1981).

by U.S. authorities to roll back or overthrow the revolution.[30] American counterrevolutionary efforts became more determined and sustained after Ronald Reagan was elected President in 1980. At first, they seemed to make some headway when economic shortages and domestic unrest in the face of an unpopular military draft tended to undercut the Sandinistas' legitimacy as leaders of a popular guerrilla movement against the Somoza regime. Because of domestic political constraints, however, the United States has been unable to invade Sandinista Nicaragua, having to rely instead on economic pressures and the financing of Nicaraguan counterrevolutionary fighters; but the latter have proved to be neither militarily efficient nor politically adept.

Predictably—in the light of the history of foreign efforts to subvert emerging revolutionary regimes in such ways—these U.S. measures have simply provided the Sandinistas with excuses for economic shortages. More importantly, the U.S. efforts have nourished sustained but not overwhelming counterrevolutionary military threats, which have actually helped the Sandinistas to consolidate a mass-mobilizing authoritarian regime through nationalist appeals and an unprecedented military buildup. In short, U.S. policies since 1980, declaredly aimed at "democratizing" Nicaragua, have had the opposite effect; they have undermined elements of pluralism in a postrevolutionary regime and enhanced the nationalist credentials of the more authoritarian Nicaraguan Leninists. Still, as of this writing in 1987, it remains possible that shifts in American policy may stop this process of militarization short of full-scale war in Central America.

## Militarized Third-World Revolutions under Communism and Islam

Far removed from the areas of the New World that are close to the United States, the Vietnamese and Iranian revolutions are two instances in which great-power rivalries, along with geographical distance, have made it possible for revolutionary regimes to take a stand against "American imperialism" without being overthrown by U.S. military intervention. What is more, Vietnam and Iran in the mid-20th century, like France in the late 18th, are examples of the awesome power of social-revolutionary regimes to wage humanly costly wars and to transform regional political patterns and international balances of power. Both revo-

[30] My account of Nicaragua draws upon Walter LaFeber, *Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1983); Shirley Christian, *Nicaragua: Revolution in the Family* (New York: Vintage Books, 1986); and Lawrence Shaefer, "Nicaraguan-United States Bilateral Relations: The Problems within Revolution and Reconstruction" (Senior honors thesis, University of Chicago, 1984).

lutions demonstrate this, even though one is a "communist" revolution and the other "Islamic" and thus militantly anticommunist.

Analysts of agrarian class struggles have stressed that the Vietnamese Revolution was grounded in peasant support in both the northern and southern parts of the country.[31] But attempts to explain the overall logic of this revolution in terms of the social conditions of either the northern or the southern peasantry have inevitably missed the other main ingredient in the revolution's success. From the French colonial period on, educated Vietnamese found the Communist Party of Vietnam and the various movements associated with it to be the most effective and persistent instruments of resistance to foreign domination—first by the French colonialists, then by the Japanese occupiers during World War II, then by the returning French, and finally by the United States. The Vietnamese communists were their country's most uncompromising nationalists; they were willing, when conditions required or allowed, to wage guerrilla warfare through peasant mobilization.[32] By contrast, foreign occupiers and their Vietnamese collaborators worked from the cities outward, especially in the south, which had been the center of French colonial control.

Geopolitically, the Vietnamese communists benefited from the distance the French and American forces had to traverse to confront them, from the availability of sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia, and (after the partial victory in the north) from their ability to receive supplies through China from both China and the Soviet Union. Had the United States been able or willing to use nuclear weapons in the Southeast Asian theatre, or had the Soviet Union and China not temporarily cooperated to help the Vietnamese, it seems doubtful that the Vietnamese Revolution could have reunified the country, notwithstanding the extraordinary willingness of northern and many southern Vietnamese to die fighting the U.S. forces.

Since the defeat of the United States in southern Vietnam, the Hanoi regime has faced difficult economic conditions; it seems to tackle such problems with much less efficiency and zeal than it tackled the anti-imperialist wars from the 1940s to the 1970s. As the unquestionably dominant military power in its region, the Vietnamese state has invaded and occupied Cambodia and engaged in occasional battles with a now-hostile China. Vietnam continues to rely on Soviet help to counterbalance U.S.

[31] See, for instance, Wolf (fn. 21), chap. 4. For a discussion of alternative perspectives on the Vietnamese peasantry, see Skocpol (fn. 22).

[32] Dunn (fn. 21), chap. 5; Huynh Kim Khanh, *Vietnamese Communism, 1925-1945* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982); John T. McAlister, Jr., *Vietnam: The Origins of Revolution* (New York: Knopf, 1969).

hostility and the armed power of China. But, what is perhaps more important now that Vietnam is indeed "the Prussia of Southeast Asia," the Vietnamese communists still find it possible to legitimate their leadership through never-ending mobilization of their people for national military efforts. The Chinese threat, Cambodian resistance, and American opposition to the normalization of Vietnam's gains have provided just the kind of internationally threatening context that the Vietnamese communists, after so many years of warfare, find most congenial to their domestic political style.

The militant Shi'a clerics of Iran, who seem to be so different from the Vietnamese communists, are another mass-mobilizing and state-building revolutionary elite that has been helped immensely by a facilitating geopolitical context and protracted international warfare.[31] The Iranian Revolution is still in progress, and it is therefore too early to characterize its outcome in any definitive way. Nevertheless, the process of this remarkable upheaval has already dramatized the appropriateness of viewing contemporary social revolutions as promoting ideologically reconstructed national identities involving the sudden incorporation of formerly excluded popular groups into state-directed projects. Moreover, this revolution shows that mass mobilization for war, aggressive as well as defensive, is an especially congenial state-directed project for revolutionary leaders.

From both Marxian and modernization perspectives, the Iranian Revolution, especially the consolidation of state power by the Ayatollah Khomeini and the Islamic Republican Party since the overthrow of the Shah in 1979, has been a puzzle. Marxist analysts have been reluctant to call this a "social revolution" because class conflicts and transformations of economic property rights have not defined the main terms of struggle or the patterns of sociopolitical change. Modernization theorists, meanwhile, have been surprised at the capacity of the untrained and traditionist Islamic clerics to consolidate their rule; these theorists expected that, after a brief "terror," such noncommunist and ideologically fanatical leaders would give way to technically trained bureaucrats if not to liberal-democratic politicians.

In fact, from 1979 through 1982, the Islamic Republican Party in Iran systematically reconstructed state organizations to embody direct controls by Shi'a clerics. Step by step, all other leading political forces—liberal

[31] The following discussion draws on Theda Skocpol, "Rentier State and Shi'a Islam in the Iranian Revolution," *Theory and Society* 11 (No. 3, 1982), 265-84. It also relies heavily on R. K. Ramazani, *Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in the Middle East* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), and Shaul Bakhash, *The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution* (New York: Basic Books), 1984.

Westernizers, the Mujhahedeen, the Tudeh Party, and technocrats and professional military officers loyal to Abolhassan Bani-Sadr—were eliminated from what had once been the all-encompassing revolutionary alliance. The party did this by deploying and combining the classic ingredients for successful revolutionary state building.

For one thing, the Islamic Republican clerics shared a commitment to a political ideology that gave them unlimited warrant to rule exclusively in the name of all the Shi'a believers. Khomeini had developed a militant-traditionalist reading of Shi'a beliefs, calling on the clerics themselves to govern in place of secular Iranian rulers corrupted by Western cultural imperialism. The Islamic Republican Constitution for Iran officially enshrined such clerical supervision over all affairs of state; concrete political organizations, including the Islamic Republican Party that dominated the Majlis (parliament), also embodied this orientation.

Moreover, the Islamic Republican clerics and their devout nonclerical associates did not hesitate to organize, mobilize, and manipulate mass popular support, including the unemployed as well as workers and lower-middle-class people in Teheran and other cities. Islamic judges supervised neighborhood surveillance bodies; Islamic militants organized revolutionary guards for police and military duties; and consumer rations and welfare benefits for the needy were dispensed through neighborhood mosques. Iranians never before involved in national political life became directly energized through such organization; those with doubts were subjected to peer controls as well as to elite supervision. With these means of mass-based power at their disposal, the Islamic Republican Party had little trouble eliminating liberal and leftist competitors from public political life.

Right after the Shah's overthrow, ideologically committed Islamic cadres, backed by mass organizations, reconstructed major public institutions in Iranian national life. Not only special committees of revolutionary justice, but also traditionally educated clerical judges took over the criminal and civil legal system, reorienting it to procedural and substantive norms in line with their understanding of the Koran. The next targets were Western-oriented cultural institutions, particularly schools and universities. These were first closed and then purged, turned into bastions of Islamic education and revolutionary propaganda. Civil state bureaucracies were similarly purged and transformed; and so, in due course, were the remnants of the Shah's military forces, particularly the army.

The kinds of transformations I have just summarized took place not automatically but through hard-fought political, bureaucratic, and street

struggles that pitted other elites—alternative would-be consolidators of the Iranian Revolution—against the militant clerics and their supporters. As these struggles within Iran unfolded, the emerging clerical authoritarianism repeatedly benefited from international conditions and happenings that allowed them to deploy their ideological and organizational resources to maximum advantage.

Overall, the version of the Iranian Revolution that the clerics sought to institutionalize has been virulently anti-Western, and defined especially in opposition to "U.S. imperialism." Opposition to Soviet imperialism has also been a consistent theme. Fortunately for the clerics, the fiscal basis of the Iranian state after as well as before the revolution lies in the export of oil, for which an international market has continued to exist.[34] A geopolitical given is coterminous with this economic given: neither the Soviet Union nor the United States has been in a position to intervene militarily against the Iranian Revolution, in part because Iran lies between their two spheres of direct control. It is also fortunate for Iran's radical clerics that the United States has acted in ways that were symbolically provocative while not being materially or militarily powerful enough to control events in Iran. The admission of the deposed Shah to the United States, the subsequent seizure of the American embassy by pro-Khomeini youths, and the ensuing unsuccessful efforts of the U.S. authorities to free the American hostages, all created an excellent political matrix within Iran for the clerics to discredit as pro-American a whole series of their secular competitors for state power.

Then, in the autumn of 1980, the secularist-Islamic regime of Saddam Hussein in neighboring Iraq attacked revolutionary Iran; since the Iraqis perceived Khomeini's regime as weak and internally disorganized, they expected it to fall. What happened with the Jacobins in 18th-century revolutionary France then repeated itself in revolutionary Iran. At first, the foreign invaders made headway, for the remnants of the Shah's military, particularly the army, were indeed disorganized at the command level. But revolutionary Islamic guards poured out to the fronts, and the Iraqi offensives began to come up against fanatically dogged resistance. Islamic fundamentalists and Iranian secular nationalists pulled together, however grudgingly, to resist the common enemy.

Domestic Iranian power struggles have not stopped during the war with Iraq. During the final months of his attempt to survive within the Khomeini regime, President Bani-Sadr tried to use the newly essential

[34] Ramazani (fn. 33), chaps. 13-14; Shaul Bakhash, *The Politics of Oil and Revolution in Iran* (Washington, DC: Staff Paper, The Brookings Institution, 1982); and "Oil Revenue Lifts Iranian Economy," *The New York Times*, Friday, July 9, 1982, pp. D1, D4.

regular army to build up secular-technocratic leverage against clerical rule. But he and his followers, along with many army officers, were defeated and removed. Thereafter, during 1981 and into 1982, despite setbacks in the war due to the initial lack of coordination between revolutionary guards and regular army forces, a new Islamic military loyal to the clerical regime was gradually synthesized for Iran.[35] It was able to combine regular strategic planning for battles with the use of such unconventional tactics as human waves of martyrs willing to clear Iraqi mine fields with their bodies. By early 1982, the Iranians had succeeded in driving the Iraqis out of their country; the latter have been on the defensive ever since, as the consolidated clerical regime in Iran has doggedly pursued the war in the name of its transnationalist ideological vision.

In the end, the Iranian Revolution will probably settle down into some sort of Islamic-nationalist authoritarianism that coexists, however uneasily, with its neighbors. The Iranian armies are unlikely to overrun the Middle East the way the French revolutionary armies temporarily overran much of continental Europe. Iran is still a third-world nation; on the global scene, it faces superpowers who can inhibit its wildest aspirations. Nevertheless, Iran's military accomplishments have already disproved the expectation of modernization theorists that a regime run by anti-Western Shi'a clerics would not be viable in the contemporary world. By consolidating and reconstructing state power through ideologically coordinated mass mobilization, and by directing popular zeal against a faraway superpower and channeling it into a war against a less populous neighboring state, the Islamic Republicans of Iran have proven once again that social revolutions are less about class struggles or "modernization" than about state building and the forging of newly assertive national identities in a modern world that remains culturally pluralistic even as it inexorably becomes economically more interdependent.

## Conclusion

If, as Franz Borkenau argued, students of revolutions must attend to "changes in the state order," much remains to be understood about the kinds of political transformation that revolutions have accomplished and the activities to which their enhanced state capacities have been directed with varying degrees of success. In this essay, which is suggestive rather than conclusive, I have speculated that many social-revolutionary regimes have excelled at channeling enhanced popular participation into pro-

[35] Ramazani (fn. 33), chap. 5; William F. Hickman, *Ravaged and Reborn: The Iranian Army, 1982* (Washington, DC: Staff Paper, The Brookings Institution, 1982).

tracted international warfare. Because of the ways revolutionary leaders mobilize popular support in the course of struggles for state power, the emerging regimes can tackle mobilization for war better than any other task, including the promotion of national economic development. The full realization of this revolutionary potential for building strong states depends on threatening but not overwhelming geopolitical circumstances.

The full exploration of these notions will require more precise theorizing and more systematic comparative research, going well beyond the historical illustrations offered here. Yet further investigations of war-making as a proclivity of social-revolutionary regimes could hardly be more timely. The image of teen-age Iranians blowing themselves up on Iraqi land mines as a way to heaven should remind us that the passions of 16th- to 18th-century Europe have yet to play themselves out fully in the third world of the 20th century. These passions will not often embody themselves in social-revolutionary transformations, but when they do—and when geopolitical circumstances unleash international conflicts and do not proscribe the outbreak of war—we can expect aspirations for equality and dignity, both within nations and on the international stage, to flow again and again into military mass mobilization. Arguably, this is the mission that revolutionized regimes perform best. In the face of serious (but not overwhelming) foreign threats, they excel at motivating the formerly excluded to die for the glory of their national states.

# SCIENCE AND SOVIETOLOGY: Bridging the Methods Gap in Soviet Foreign Policy Studies

By JACK SNYDER*

EVERYONE is in favor of greater scholarly rigor, but people define rigor in seemingly antithetical ways. Two methodological cultures, positivism and holism, coexist uneasily in the social sciences. For "logical positivists," rigor means deducing an "if, then" hypothesis from a general theory, and testing whether the predicted relationship holds true over a set of cases in which the influence of extraneous factors is held constant. Holism is more eclectic in its methods; for most holists, rigor means reconstructing the meaning of an action in the subject's own terms, and interpreting it in light of a richly detailed cultural, social, and historical context. Thus, positivists usually seek objective causes; holists typically explain behavior through the prism of the actor's subjective understanding. Positivists trace patterns across many cases, setting context aside by holding it constant; holists trace patterns within cases, exploring connections between context and action.[1]

Underlying these different approaches to scholarly method are different assumptions about the nature of reality. Holists see a world of great complexity and interrelatedness. In any situation, many independent elements interact in complex ways to shape the ideas and actions of actors. Artificial attempts to focus on some small number of factors and relationships, which could be compared across cases, only hinder understanding.

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[1] These are ideal types. Real scholars often use both approaches in varying combinations or proportions. For example, some positivist scholars, like Kenneth Waltz, look at whole systems or, like Robert Jervis, try to explain the subjective understandings of actors. Despite these qualifications, I would contend that the above distinctions capture the most important lines of epistemological cleavage. The term "holism" is unsatisfactory, but alternatives like "traditionalism" or "non-positivism" are even more problematic. For further discussion, see Paul Diesing, *Patterns of Discovery in the Social Sciences* (New York: Aldine, 1971), and Donald Polkinghorne, *Methodology for the Human Sciences* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983).

Emphasis is placed on the unique aspects of each situation, not on superficial or partial similarities across situations. Consequently, theories designed to illuminate more than one case must be rich, open-ended check lists, not deductive, narrow-beam searchlights. Some holists even take the position that objective reality is so complex, diverse, and unknowable that only subjective (or "intersubjective") dialogues about reality can be profitably studied.

Positivists, on the other hand, believe that the analytical convenience of simplification is legitimate because it can be shown empirically that some factors are more important than others. Complex interactions between some important variables may occur, but everything is not inextricably related to everything else. Even "unique" situations are not considered to be *sui generis*, but rare types whose differences from other cases can be described in general terms. Moreover, when positivists look at whole systems, they assume that relationships among the parts can be explained in terms of some relatively simple and regular structural effects.

The relationship between positivism and holism is especially important for Soviet foreign policy studies. In that field, as in area studies more generally, a scholar's regionalist culture pulls him toward holism, while his disciplinary culture of political science pulls him toward positivism. In this conflict of cultural and institutional cross-pressures, it is important to find some firm intellectual ground on which methodological choices can be based.

The distance between positivism and holism is not as great as it appears. Each captures a valuable truth, and the two work best in conjunction. Positivism—and in particular its driving engine, deductive theory—poses questions in a way that clarifies arguments, facilitates testing, and directs research to ripe, important questions. Holism, on the other hand, reminds us that in the Soviet field causal generalizations that hold true 60 percent of the time are not the ultimate goal of research. Rather, such generalizations must contribute to understanding in full contextual detail the one particular case that we care most about—the present. Moreover, reconstructing the Soviets' thinking may sometimes be easier than understanding the underlying causes of their behavior, and just as valuable in guiding policy choices.

The benefits of positivism and holism can often be captured simultaneously by recasting holist interpretations in deductive, causal terms. A holist's "context" can in most cases be translated into the positivist's "causal variables." Even when holist explanations deal with ends and means rather than with causes, they can often be sharpened by expressing them in deductive terms.

Most Sovietologists are already using a method that combines the reconstruction of Soviet thinking with a complex causal explanation of behavior. In executing this method, however, positivist rules for stating and testing causal arguments are often ignored. As a result, debates go in circles and irrelevant evidence piles up. The most urgent need in the field of Soviet foreign policy today is to reformulate research questions in terms of deductive arguments, but without sacrificing the sound holist traditions of the discipline.

In an earlier article on a similar theme, I laid out the logic of positivist testing procedures, paying only brief attention to the central role of deductive theory in the positivist approach; I was similarly brief on the compatibility of positivism and holism.[2] The present essay will focus on these more basic questions as they relate to Soviet foreign policy studies. Its sections will focus on (1) what positivism is, and the role of deductive theory in it; (2) what holism is, and its relation to positivism; (3) the shortcomings of holism; (4) the use of deductive theory to repair holism's shortcomings and, more generally, to set a research agenda for the field; (5) the shortcomings of positivism; and (6) the use of hybrid methods to repair the shortcomings of positivism. Illustrations will show the value of deductive theory in addressing some of the major questions of the field, including Soviet views on the political implications of military imbalances and the domestic sources of Soviet expansionism. These and other illustrations will be drawn from some of the best secondary works in the field.

## I. Positivism

Explanation and testing in the positivist framework can be summarized in terms of five elements, the most central one being deductive theory.[3]

### A. Causal Generalization

Positivists state their hypotheses in the form of "if, then" generalizations. They seek to explain individual events by identifying "if, then" generalizations, or covering laws, that match the patterns of those events. For example, a hypothesis in the literature of international politics posits that, if offense becomes easier, then international conflict will increase.[4] Thus, one explanation for the origins of the cold war could be that the

[2] Jack Snyder, "Richness, Rigor, and Relevance in the Study of Soviet Foreign Policy," *International Security* 9 (Winter 1984-85), 89-108.

[3] For elaboration and qualifications, see Snyder (fn. 2) and Diesing (fn. 1).

[4] Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30 (January 1978), 167-214.

fluid political situation in Europe after Germany's defeat made offensive tactics advantageous, both for opportunistic and security purposes. The converse suggests that if offense becomes more difficult, then conflict will diminish. Thus, one explanation for the rise of detente in Europe is that the Berlin crisis of 1958-1961 showed it was easier to defend the status quo than to change it.

### B. Operational Definitions of Variables

The terms of the hypothesis, including causes and consequences, must be clearly defined to minimize disagreements about the classification of particular cases. For example, definitions of offensive advantage and defensive advantage must be clear enough so that a researcher can decide into which category his case falls.[5]

### C. Covariation

Testing must show that offensive advantage correlates with increased conflict, and that defensive advantage correlates with decreased conflict.

### D. Controlled Comparison

Testing focuses on cases in which competing hypotheses make opposite predictions. For example, it might be argued that international conflict is caused not by offensive advantage but by domestic political pathologies that promote expansionism. If so, offensive advantage might be spuriously related to increased conflict, because domestically motivated expansionists work to create offensive capabilities. In order to disentangle the effects of the two putative causes, the researcher looks for cases where there is an offensive advantage but no domestic motivation to expand, and for causes where there is a defensive advantage but high domestic motivation to expand.[6]

### E. Deductive Theory

Just as "if, then" generalizations at a low level of abstraction act as covering laws that explain individual events, so too generalizations at higher levels of abstraction explain the covering laws. For example, the hypothesis that offensive advantage causes conflict even among status quo powers is just one application of the more general Prisoners' Dilemma theorem in game theory.[7] According to a strictly mathematical proof, rational

[5] Jack S. Levy, "The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology: A Theoretical and Historical Analysis," *International Studies Quarterly* 28 (Summer 1984), 219-38.

[6] Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), chap. 6, illustrates how to detect spurious causal inferences.

[7] Jervis (fn. 4).

players in a single-play Prisoners' Dilemma, by the logic of their situation, are constrained to compete even though they end up worse off than if they had cooperated. Offensive advantage increases the incentive for competitive play by magnifying the gains that arise from exploiting one-sided cooperation in a single play of the game, and by magnifying the losses that arise from being exploited. If international politics is like a Prisoners' Dilemma, and if offensive advantage makes it resemble a single-play contest, then, by logical deduction, offensive advantage should promote conflict.

Deductive theory is the predictive engine that drives the positivist method as a whole. It generates "if, then" hypotheses, which in turn generate testable predictions in specific cases. As a result, the implications of arguments are made clearer when they are expressed as theoretical deductions, and tests for them are easier to think up.

## II. Holism

In a study of Soviet views on the role of military power in international politics, Robert Legvold has reiterated the main tenets of the holistic position: understanding behavior in terms of the actor's own frame of reference, and explaining it by placing it in a rich context. Thus, "the student of politics who looks only at patterns of behavior but leaves out the meanings that actors give to their own and to each other's conduct turns into a specialist of shadows."[8] Analyzing another culture's approach to strategic thought in terms of one's own theories (in this case, Thomas Schelling's ideas about the "diplomacy of violence") introduces an ethnocentric bias that hinders understanding. Moreover, "Soviet thoughts about semiabstractions, like the functioning of force in contemporary international politics, are but a fragment of the larger issue." They must be understood in the larger context of Soviet goals and fears, the broader Soviet worldview, and the international environment in which the Soviets calculate. Understanding also requires distinguishing among different contexts in which the question arises: using force, deterring the use of force, indirectly influencing diplomatic trends, and so forth.[9] Empathy and context-dependent nuances of meaning are the watchwords of this approach.

[8] Robert Legvold, "Military Power in International Politics: Soviet Doctrine on Its Centrality and Instrumentality," in Uwe Nerlich, ed., *Soviet Power and Western Negotiating Strategies* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1983), 124, quoting Stanley Hoffmann, "Perception, Reality, and the Franco-American Conflict," *Journal of International Affairs* 21 (No. 1, 1967), 57.

[9] Legvold (fn. 8), 125, 123, and passim. I will return to Legvold's study in order to suggest how it might be recast in positivist terms.

Though the general epistemological stance of holism is quite clearly articulated, its methodological prescriptions rarely are. In part, this reflects a conscious choice to avoid imposing *a priori* concepts and approaches, and a preference to be guided *ad hoc* by the data of the particular case. Still, Sovietologists, like anthropologists setting out to do fieldwork, like to bring along a checklist of questions to think about. These initial concepts or theories are usually designed to be flexible and nondeductive so that they adjust to fit the case rather than force it into a Procrustean bed.[10]

In the Soviet field, the clearest exposition of this method is the framework that Marshall Shulman used in his study of Stalin's foreign policy and his attempt to think through contemporary Soviet arms-control policy while he served in the Carter administration.[11] The method is roughly as follows: prepare a chart arraying the major domestic and international developments impinging on Soviet calculations; track these developments over the period to be studied, along with the development of Soviet statements and actions; and reconstruct a plausible line of Soviet reasoning that could have led to those actions, using a background knowledge of Soviet history and politics for guidance. The objective international setting and the peculiarly Soviet way of looking at it are both included.

In this style of analysis, positivist and holist elements are mixed. At one level, situational constraints and deep structural effects of history and the social system are treated like *causes*, in a basically positivist fashion. Thus, the Soviets behave a certain way "because of" the effects of these variables. However, these causal inputs are integrated through an analysis of the Soviets' *reasons* for pursuing certain ends with certain means, in a holist fashion. Thus, the Soviets' subjective perspective leads them to behave in a particular way "in order to" achieve certain goals.

There is nothing in this method that bars the development of a general thesis from which testable hypotheses can be derived. When this occurs, it comes close to replicating the positivist method. In *Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised*, for example, Shulman adopted what amounts to a rational-choice theory of Soviet international behavior, arguing for "the largely rational responsiveness of Soviet policy to changes in the world environment, and particularly to changes in power relationships." According to this case study, the Soviet leadership by 1949 began to recognize the counterproductive effects of its confrontational policies, decided that adverse trends in both the socialist and capitalist camp dictated the

[10] Diesing (fn. 1.)

[11] Marshall Shulman, *Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised* (New York: Atheneum, 1969); Strobe Talbott, *Endgame* (New York: Harper Colophon, 1980), 80.

need for a breathing spell, and consequently moved toward a policy of peaceful coexistence in order to demobilize the opposing bloc.[12]

From this rational-choice theory, Shulman deduced testable "if, then" hypotheses—some explicit and some implicit. One is that the Soviets are less confrontational when the balance of power is against them in the short run and favors them in the long run. Another is that the Soviets are more confrontational in situations of offensive advantage (e.g., when the status quo is fluid) than in situations of defensive advantage (e.g., when militancy is seen to unify opponents, when peace propaganda sells better than revolutionary appeals).[13]

Because of the emphasis on the interaction of multiple factors in chronological context, however, effects of the individual variables, such as the balance of power, are not fully tested as separate hypotheses.[14] From a positivist standpoint, this leads to some puzzles in the course of the narrative. Weakness and fear sometimes appear as motives for restraint; at other times they serve as rationalizations for militancy—as in Zhdanov's response to the Marshall Plan and in Molotov's reasons for retaining the confrontational line even after the Berlin crisis.[15] Likewise, the strength of socialism sometimes appears as an argument for militancy, sometimes as an argument for the feasibility of peaceful coexistence.[16] These apparent anomalies do not stand out in the chronological narrative because they are plausibly integrated into reconstructions of how a whole range of incentives came together to shape Soviet thinking.

This might lead a positivist to question whether the balance of power really was the key factor in Soviet policy—or indeed, whether it had any systematic effect at all. Perhaps the relative advantages of offense and defense determined Soviet policy, and not the current or prospective balance of power. Or perhaps the effect of these two factors varies, depending on the aggressiveness of the opponent. To test this, the positivist might want to set up a chart with eight boxes, think through the logic of all the permutations, and look for cases to test each one.

To the holist, such testing might seem beside the point, since the main thing is to demonstrate the validity of the general thesis about the rational responsiveness of Soviet policy, not to produce law-like statements about the effects of separate variables. Once he knows that the Soviets are ra-

[12] Shulman (fn. 11), 3, 50, 259, and passim.

[13] *Ibid.*, 8, 14, 123, and passim.

[14] *Ibid.*, 8, comes close to doing this, citing a few instances of Soviet attempts to buy time during periods of weakness.

[15] On Zhdanov and Molotov, see *ibid.*, 14-15, 117-18. Suslov's militancy, however, is linked to the argument that the correlation of forces was turning in favor of socialism; see *ibid.*, 119.

[16] See especially the discussion of Malenkov, *ibid.*, 111-17.

tionally responsive to their environment, he can interpret their moves in specific contexts *ad hoc*. In this view, to be valid, laws would have to be so complex, qualified, and cumbersome that they would offer no advantage over *ad hoc* reconstruction.

To the positivist, the basis for the larger generalization is shaky without the separate testing of the effects of individual variables. Unless a close connection between specific incentives and specific policies is shown, there is a possibility that Soviet policy is not based on rational calculations, but on a rote response to the failure of the previous policy. It makes a great deal of difference whether the Soviets are rationally reacting to specific geopolitical incentives or whether they are cybernetically alternating between stereotyped policies of militancy and lulling.[17] Indeed, Shulman identifies two patterns of Soviet learning: a cyclical alternation between confrontational "left" and nonconfrontational "right" tactics, which seems to be cybernetic, and a secular shift to the right which may be a rational response to a secular decline in revolutionary opportunities.[18] It might also be caused, however, by factors such as the evolution of the Soviet political system. A recasting of these questions in terms of explicitly competing theories and deducing testable "if, then" hypotheses from them could open up a fresh line of research, building on Shulman's ideas and leading to practical conclusions about how the Soviets learn in response to U.S. behavior.

In short, some forms of holism are not far from positivism in their implicit use of deductive theory and "if, then" hypotheses. In such cases, it may be quite easy to recast the holist argument in terms of explicit, deductive theory. Holism may be farther from positivism, however, in its reluctance to test the effects of individual variables in controlled contexts. Problems arise when the deductive links in a theory are left implicit and when multiple causes are examined all at once.

## III. Some Shortcomings of Holism

The lax attitude of holism toward deductive logic leads to two errors. The first is that its predictions tend to be logically underdetermined. Causal assertions are made without showing why the same stimulus could not just as easily have led to the opposite consequences. The second error is that holistic explanations after the fact tend to be logically overdetermined. Several independent factors are indiscriminately listed as the

[17] On cybernetic decision making and how it differs from analytic rationality, see John Steinbruner, *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).
[18] Shulman (fn. 11), 3-9, 263-71.

joint causes of an action, even though any one of them might have been sufficient to cause it. This shortcoming is serious in cases where different causes might have different policy implications for the West. Closer attention to the deductive logic of arguments can help to avoid these problems.

### A. Predictive Underdetermination

Harry Gelman's argument about the role of Soviet leadership politics in promoting an opportunistic, expansionist approach to detente illustrates the problem of logical underdetermination.[19] Gelman's book is a good example of eclectic holism, integrating causal explanations with the reconstruction of Soviet ends/means calculations. Despite some logical loose strands, it offers the best available account of the domestic politics of foreign policy in the Brezhnev period; if reinterpreted in the light of rational-choice theories of logrolling, it constitutes a significant theoretical advance as well.

Gelman offers three kinds of causal factors to account for the Soviet Union's tendency toward opportunistic expansion and for variations in its intensity. The first—not an argument that is distinctive to Gelman—focuses on the balance of costs, risks, and opportunities present in the international environment. The second is an endemic "attacking compulsion" rooted in the deep structure of the Leninist political culture and operational code. Gelman does not advance direct evidence for this proposition aside from its general plausibility in light of the obvious facts of Soviet expansionism. As such, it functions as a kind of residual, explaining what cannot be explained in any other way.

The third line of explanation rests on consensus building and leadership politics. Though the narrative sounds persuasive, Gelman never makes clear why consensus building produces an expansionist result rather than the opposite. His historical reconstruction holds that,

> since Brezhnev was confronted simultaneously with temptation (Podgornyy's assumption of a vulnerable political stance [in favor of restraint on defense spending]), positive incentives (the political rewards waiting in the form of support from the military and Suslov), and competition (the extreme rhetoric Shelepin offered the military and the ideologues), his reaction was a foregone conclusion.[20]

[19] Gelman, *The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Detente* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984). On the problem of *a priori* underdetermination and *a posteriori* overdetermination, see James Kurth, "United States Foreign Policy and Latin American Military Rule," in Phillippe Schmitter, ed., *Military Rule in Latin America* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1973), 244-322.

[20] *Ibid.*, 83.

But why was it a *foregone conclusion? Couldn't this whole formulation* be turned on its head: temptation in the form of the vulnerability of Shelepin and the military, due to their reckless rhetoric and opposition to obviously beneficial arms restraint; positive incentives in the form of Podgornyy's support; competition in the form of Kosygin's budgetary alliance with Podgornyy—leading to international retrenchment? It didn't work out this way, but why?

The simplest explanation would be that elite groups and institutions with an interest in expansion (Gelman cites the military and the Central Committee's International Department) became disproportionately powerful in the Brezhnev years. That, however, begs the questions of where their power came from, and why it increased in this period. Moreover, Gelman's own account emphasizes that the rising power of these groups was as much a result or a concomitant of the expansionist consensus as a cause of it. The basic levers of power, Gelman argues, remained in the hands of the Politburo, above the level of institutional interests.[21]

Another explanation (which Gelman does not explicitly advance) would argue, along with George Breslauer, that the process of logrolling and consensus building in itself tends to produce "taut," overcommitted policies.[22] Gelman's evidence, reinterpreted in light of this theory, suggests that Brezhnev succeeded politically because he devised a policy of expansionist detente that promised to reconcile an arms build-up for the military, expansion into the third world for the ideologues, and increased technology transfer to co-opt Kosygin's domestic economic issue. For this line of argument, it need not be true that expansionist interests were more powerful than anti-expansionist interests. Rather, in a system where each interest gets what it wants most, expansion will result as long as *any* veto groups have an interest in it. That is a straightforward deduction from rational-choice theories of logrolling.[23]

Lacking this theoretical element, however, Gelman is unable to explain the expansionist character of the coalition in terms of domestic political dynamics alone. Consequently, he resorts to the notion of an "attacking compulsion": for reasons rooted in the deep cognitive structures of Leninists, it is political death to be considered, as Podgornyy was, "unacceptably 'soft.' "[24] If that is true, an entirely different research design is indicated. Domestic politics, the area in which Gelman carried out most

[21] *Ibid.*, 46, 52-58.

[22] George Breslauer, *Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1982), conclusion, esp. 280, 284-90.

[23] William H. Riker and Steven J. Brams, "The Paradox of Vote Trading," *American Political Science Review* 67 (December 1973), 1235-47.

[24] Gelman (fn. 19), 73; also 79, 90, 114.

of his original research, "becomes all product and is not at all productive."[25] If the "attacking compulsion" is really the key to the explanation, then it would have been better to look for propositions and tests focusing on the origin, structure, and evolution of belief systems. Alternatively, Gelman could have stayed with the domestic focus while recasting and sharpening his hypothesis with the help of rational-choice logrolling theory.

### B. Explanatory Overdetermination

As if to compensate for arguments that are loose enough to predict any outcome and its opposite, holists tend toward explanatory overkill, piling up any number of logically unrelated or logically contradictory reasons for an occurrence. It is true that a variety of unrelated factors may sometimes come together to produce an outcome or a decision, but psychologists tell us that decisions are often taken on the basis of one salient consideration, and that multiple rationales are invented later.[26] When each of several candidate explanations implies a different policy prescription, it is especially important to distinguish which of them are really operating and which are spurious.

An example is provided by explanations that consider aggressiveness in Soviet foreign policy to be rooted in the totalitarian origins of the political system. This argument is often invoked without supplying any logical connection at all, relying on the analogy to Nazi Germany for persuasiveness. At other times, a whole list of reasons is supplied: (1) totalitarians take their ideology seriously; (2) their political style requires either total control or total conflict; (3) they manufacture foreign threats and successes abroad to shore up their tenuous legitimacy; and, more subtly, (4) real pressures of international competition force the leader of a backward state to use domestic repression and militant appeals to mobilize his inefficient society.[27]

Each of these explanations is logically distinct. There is no reason to believe that if one of them is true, the rest are true also. Moreover, each of them seems to imply a different strategy for the opponent: (1) firm deterrence while waiting for the totalitarians' ideology to atrophy; (2) sub-

[25] Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 50, used this phrase to characterize earlier systems theories.

[26] Jervis (fn. 6), 128-42.

[27] The last hypothesis, omitted in most accounts of the links between totalitarianism and foreign policy, is based on Alexander Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1962). For other arguments, see Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), and Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics* (New York: Praeger, 1962).

version to change their political system; (3) symbolic international agreements to replace symbolic conflict as the basis for their domestic legitimacy; and (4) an easing of external pressure to reduce the need for internal repression. Since some of these policies are opposites, lumping these explanations together indiscriminately, in typical holist fashion, would destroy their practical value. Logically independent explanations need to be disentangled and tested separately, in positivist fashion.

In short, holist studies of Soviet foreign policy often include causal arguments as part of their interpretation. Typically, these arguments suffer from the errors of predictive underdetermination and explanatory overdetermination. Such problems can be corrected by recasting the arguments in terms of deductive theory and by adopting positivist testing procedures. In the examples cited above, this could be accomplished through relatively small adjustments to the original holist argument. The intervention of deductive theory can also transform a holist debate in a more fundamental way, refocusing its arguments and establishing an entirely new research agenda.

## IV. Transforming a Research Agenda by Means of Deductive Theory

Deductive theory can do much more than just clean up the loose ends of holist arguments. At its best, it can reformulate the questions asked in academic and policy debates, clarify the branchpoints where contending arguments diverge, and reorient research toward more decisive tests. Beyond this, a deductive theory can turn diverse, narrowly focused studies into contributions toward a unified research program. Historians of science have found that the take-off point for most disciplines comes when work is focused on a stable core of explanatory goals that are expressed as a set of deductively interrelated puzzles.[38] One of the main barriers to progress in the field of Soviet foreign policy is the absence of this kind of research program that would provide direction to its work.

In recent years, the discipline of international politics has been making considerable progress toward defining a coherent, productive, yet flexible and relatively pluralistic research program. Though this field is hardly a perfect model for emulation, it is normal in science for the more applied fields to borrow ideas and approaches from the more basic, more theoretical field that is most closely related to it. Thus, it is natural for Soviet

[38] See Stephen Toulmin, *Human Understanding* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972).

foreign policy studies to look to the discipline of international politics for guidance in setting an agenda for research.

One of the core aspirations of the field of international politics is to explain outcomes on the two game-theory dimensions of cooperation/conflict and win/lose—especially counterintuitive outcomes produced by the perverse effects of international anarchy. From this core explanatory goal and rational-choice base, puzzle-solving activity radiates outward in a variety of directions toward systems theory, deterrence theory, bargaining theory, regime theory, theories about the effects of anarchical competition on domestic structure, and theories about adjustments needed in rational-choice models to take into account systematic psychological biases.[29] This is a rich and diverse agenda, which unites the security and political economy subfields and even accommodates nonpositivist offshoots.[30] Despite this diversity, the research program hangs together because of its core puzzles and common intellectual style, much of which can be traced back to Thomas Schelling.

If this research agenda is applied to the Soviet field, it offers some advantages and some potential disadvantages. To demonstrate the advantages, an extended example will show how Schelling's theoretical insights can be used to restructure the Garthoff-Pipes debate on Soviet attitudes regarding nuclear deterrence by clarifying the opposing arguments, proposing new empirical tests, and pointing toward a broad agenda for further research. In a subsequent section, I will discuss the potential disadvantages of importing a deductive research program of this kind into the Soviet field: its ethnocentrism, its monolithic character, and the questionable applicability of the special skills of Sovietologists to the research program it proposes.

The disagreement between Raymond Garthoff and Richard Pipes over Soviet attitudes on the nature of nuclear deterrence has been one of the most lively and consequential debates in research on Soviet military strategy.[31] In essence, Garthoff contends that the Soviets accept the inexorability of a deterrent relationship based on mutual assured destruction, though they retain the vestiges of a war-fighting doctrine and force posture in case deterrence fails. Pipes avers that the Soviets seek a war-

[29] A recent example of work done in this tradition is the special issue of *World Politics* 38 (October 1985), also published as *Cooperation under Anarchy*, Kenneth A. Oye, ed. (Princeton Princeton University Press, 1985).

[30] See, for example, Friedrich Kratochwil and John Ruggie, "International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State," *International Organization* 40 (Fall 1986).

[31] "A Garthoff-Pipes Debate on Soviet Strategic Doctrine," *Strategic Review* 10 (Fall 1982) 36-63.

winning capability, though they are resigned temporarily to its infeasibility. When the debate is formulated in this way, it is unclear what evidence might constitute a test of the two views. Garthoff could explain the war-fighting capability of the SS-18 as a hedge against the failure of deterrence, while Pipes could explain the ABM Treaty as a temporary expedient. War-fighting statements in the military press could be explained as reflecting only the military-technical level of doctrine, while politicians' renunciation of nuclear first-use and the possibility of victory in nuclear war could be explained as eyewash for the West.

As a result of this impasse, empirical research has moved on to narrower, more concrete questions such as Soviet force posture and doctrine for a major conventional war in Europe. The Garthoff-Pipes debate is hard to escape, however, because the question of what deters nuclear escalation is central to interpreting Soviet conventional strategy. Do the Soviets believe that mutual vulnerability will deter both sides from nuclear use regardless of the nuclear balance, or do they believe that superiority in nuclear war-fighting capability is needed to prevent NATO from escalating? The answer to this question has profound implications for the choice of forces to deter a Soviet conventional offensive, the strength of Soviet inclinations to preempt, and the interpretation of Soviet diplomatic and arms-control motivations.

Because the Garthoff-Pipes debate, in one guise or another, cannot be avoided, perhaps it can be reformulated in ways that make it more amenable to testing. To produce findings that cannot be easily explained away, the testing strategy should focus on evidence that is unambiguously at the political level of doctrine, and on behavior that is too important to be used for the purposes of disinformation. Only Soviet crisis diplomacy and coercive bargaining meet these criteria. But exactly what predictions should follow from the views of Garthoff and Pipes in such circumstances? Here is where Schelling's help is essential in clarifying arguments and deducing empirical hypotheses.

Schelling and other game theorists have argued that, under conditions of mutual assured destruction, the outcome of coercive diplomacy depends not on who is stronger (since the ability to punish is absolute), but on who is more willing to run risks and who bears the onus of the last clear chance to avoid disastrous escalation.[12] From this logic of the game of Chicken, Robert Jervis has deduced the corollary that, in most situations, nuclear weapons give a double advantage to the defender of the sta-

[12] Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), chaps. 2 and 3; Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), chap. 2.

tus quo.[33] First, defenders will be more willing to run risks, since people usually value what they have more than what they covet. Second, the onus of the last clear chance to avoid the risk of uncontrolled escalation normally weighs more heavily on the side trying to change the status quo. That is why Schelling found deterrence to be easier than compellence. He added, however, that this is less true when there is uncertainty about who has the last clear chance, or when clever tactics can shift it to the opponent.

These deductions help to clarify the Garthoff-Pipes dispute and to devise tests that would determine which side is right. If the view that the Soviets accept the implications of the mutual deterrent relationship means anything, it should mean that Soviet coercive bargaining behavior fits Schelling's pattern. That is, the Soviets are predicted to stand firm when the balance of motivation favors them (in particular when defending the status quo), and to be extremely cautious in trying to change the status quo by force. Nonetheless, we would expect them to try to manipulate the last clear chance and to take advantage of ambiguities in the status quo in order to make limited gains. Assuming that both sides have at least minimum assured destruction capabilities, the balance of nuclear capabilities should *not* correlate strongly with Soviet behavior. Moreover, the more strongly the Soviets share Schelling's view that the function of conventional combat is to generate the risk of escalation,[34] the less strongly Soviet behavior will be shaped by the local balance of conventional forces.

Pipes should make the opposite predictions. He believes that Soviet strategic calculation "always involves matters of relative not absolute advantage."[35] Even if both players are Chicken, to use Schelling's categories, relative war-fighting disparities make some players more Chicken than others. Following this logic, Soviet coercive diplomacy should not be decisively driven by the balance of motivations in a particular case, nor should it distinguish strongly between defending the status quo and changing it, or between deterrence and compellence. Rather, the Soviets are predicted to stand firm when they enjoy dominance in nuclear war-fighting capabilities and/or a local conventional preponderance, and to give in when their war-fighting capabilities are weaker than those of their opponents. Rather than manipulating the last clear chance, the Soviets' coercive bargaining tactics are predicted to focus on demonstrating their ability to deploy or alert a superior war-fighting force.

[33] Jervis, "Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn't Matter," *Political Science Quarterly* 94 (Winter 1979-80), 617-33.

[34] Schelling (fn. 32, 1966), 106.

[35] *Strategic Review* (fn. 31), 57.

With these deductions in hand, tests bearing on the Garthoff-Pipes debate are easy to devise and to carry out. In fact, an existing analysis of Soviet naval diplomacy by James McConnell comes close to being a test of Schelling's theory, and thus of the Garthoff-Pipes debate, though he did not conceive of it as such.[36] McConnell's tests illustrate many of the procedures used in positivist comparative methods, but they also reveal some of positivism's pitfalls.

A. Covariation

McConnell tests for covariation between the defense of the status quo and the achievement of one's aims in coercive diplomacy. He finds that the two correlate in the vast majority of his cases; but this result is marred by his *ad hoc* approach to determining what the status quo is and who is defending it. In a few cases, the judgment of who was the defender in a showdown seems to be influenced by who was the winner.[37]

B. Alternative Explanations

McConnell also tests for covariation between the military balance and success in coercive diplomacy—a relationship that Pipes would predict to be a strong one. McConnell does not explicitly discuss the nuclear balance; if he had, he would have found no correlation over the 1967-1976 period that he examined.[38] Instead, he focuses on the local naval balance, finding little correlation between it and the outcome. In most cases of naval confrontation on the high seas, the superpowers simply matched each other's deployment, each carrier task force calling forth a comparable anti-carrier force.[39] Regardless of the ships available for further reinforcement, deployment races to achieve local superiority failed to occur, implying that the superpowers viewed the purpose of the forces not as warfighting, but as a token of commitment and risk-taking.

C. Crucial Cases

McConnell looks for crucial cases that stack up all other alleged explanations against the status quo explanation. Enclaves within the oppo-

[36] James M. McConnell, "The 'Rules of the Game': A Theory on the Practice of Superpower Naval Diplomacy," in Bradford Dismukes and James McConnell, eds., *Soviet Naval Diplomacy* (New York: Pergamon, 1979).

[37] For example, the argument (*ibid.*, 265-66) that the United States was the defender in the mining of Haiphong Harbor, though not unreasonable, makes use of *ad hoc* criteria that place more weight on American statements linking the action to the defense of South Vietnam than on the *prima facie* offensive character of U.S. behavior.

[38] See also Barry Blechman and Stephen Kaplan, *Force without War* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1978), 127-29.

[39] For this point, and qualifications to it, see McConnell (fn. 36), 244.

nent's sphere of interest, such as Berlin and Cuba, are cases of this type, in which the balance of local capability and the balance of strategic interests (apart from the reputational interest in defending the status quo) work against the survival of such enclaves.[40] The fact that they do survive against challenges means that McConnell and Schelling pass a hard test.

D. Process Tracing

Schelling's predictions concern not only outcomes, but also tactics and process; so these too can be the basis for corroborative tests. Schelling expects that players will try to manipulate the status quo and the "last clear chance" to their advantage. McConnell offers some illustrations of the Soviets' use of such tactics. For example, during the Angolan civil war, there was no stable status quo, so outsiders were relatively free to jockey for advantage. In doing so, the Soviets counted on using the freedom of the seas (a kind of normative status quo or, for Schelling, an escalation threshold) to protect the movement of Cuban troops through seas dominated by the U.S. Navy.[41]

E. Deviant Cases

McConnell seeks out deviant cases in order to refine his hypothesis. The Middle East wars, for example, show that the bargaining advantage of the defender extends only to the protection of a client's core areas and not to peripheral aspects of the status quo, such as desert frontiers.[42] This raises the question of how to distinguish progressive refinements of a theory from *ad hoc* rationalizations to excuse its degeneration. The general rule is that refinements are progressive if they help explain many cases rather than just one, and if they suggest ways to apply the theory to new questions.

To sum up, the Schelling/McConnell example shows that recasting holist debates in positivist terms can help to clarify arguments and make them more amenable to testing. It also sets in motion a self-sustaining program of research, involving the analysis of deviant cases, the refinement of the original hypothesis, and the tracing of the implications of the theory into new areas. In this case, for example, an important extension of the theory might examine what happens under conditions in which conflict is predicted to be greatest—in cases where the status quo is am-

[40] *Ibid.*, 247-48.
[41] *Ibid.*, 265.
[42] McConnell's own conclusions from these cases are somewhat more complex. See *ibid.*, 246, 267-76.

*biguous or where both sides believe they are defending it.*[43] *Research might address the causes and consequences of such situations, how the Soviets behave in them, and what tactics have proved safe and effective in confronting such dilemmas.*

This theory-driven research program can also suggest questions for holist scholars engaged in the detailed reconstruction of Soviet perceptions and calculations in individual cases. Direct evidence of Soviet thinking could be important for corroborating or refuting McConnell's interpretation of his cases, for example. Schelling himself uses a number of Khrushchev quotations to illustrate his tactical theories. In one partially apocryphal example, Khrushchev is said to have remarked that Berlin was not worth a war, but his Western interlocutor reminded him that this shared risk was a two-edged sword. Khrushchev, as if coached by Schelling, replied that "you are the ones that have to cross a frontier"—thereby showing that he did think in terms of the manipulation of shared risk as well as the manipulation of the status quo as a means to pass the onus of the last clear chance to the opponent.[44] Sovietological scholarship producing this kind of evidence would nicely complement multi-case analyses of overt behavior by specialists in international relations.

More generally, the game-theoretic perspective opens up a variety of questions for the area-studies scholar. Though simplified versions of game theory assume a generic rational player, the character and tactical style of the player can be treated as a variable in the theory. In Chicken games, for example, Schelling argued for surrendering the initiative by means of irrevocable preemptive defection, but Nathan Leites's Bolshevik chooses to probe cautiously and to retain the last clear chance to avoid disaster.[45] The work of Sovietologists on such questions is likely to be bet-

[43] Richard K. Betts, "Elusive Equivalence: The Political and Military Meaning of the Nuclear Balance," in Samuel P. Huntington, *The Strategic Imperative* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1982), 108, draws attention to this question. See also Richard Betts, *Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1987), which carries out detailed, sophisticated tests similar to those described above.

[44] Schelling (fn. 32, 1966), 46-47. This vignette seems to be a conflation of several Khrushchev remarks. For an example of the invocation of uncontrollable risk, see Robert Slusser, *The Berlin Crisis of 1961* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 98-99; for asymmetry in motivation, Hannes Adomeit, *Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1982), 207, and Jack Schick, *The Berlin Crisis, 1958-1962* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), 178; for the onus of the last clear chance, Strobe Talbott, ed., *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament* (New York: Bantam, 1974), 575. For more examples and for some qualifications to this view, see Hope Harrison, "Was Khrushchev a Student of Thomas Schelling?: Khrushchev's Coercive Diplomacy in the 1958-1961 Berlin Crisis," unpub. (Harriman Institute, Columbia University, 1987).

[45] Nathan Leites, *A Study of Bolshevism* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1953); Alexander George, "The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making," in Erik Hoffmann and Frederic Fleron, eds., *The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy*, 2d ed. (New York: Aldine, 1980), 191-212.

ter focused and more useful if they use game theory to shape the questions they ask.

In short, deductive theory can undoubtedly be used to reformulate holist debates and direct the work of holist scholars. Certain obvious benefits would result, but at what cost? Because of some of the shortcomings and limitations of positivism, caution must be exercised against completely subsuming holist research under a monistic program of positivist research.

## V. Shortcomings and Limitations of Positivism

Three objections may be raised to the use of positivist international relations theory to reformulate the research agenda of the field of Soviet foreign policy: the question of ethnocentrism, inherent problems of implementing the positivist method in the social sphere, and the danger of adopting any single approach.

### A. Ethnocentrism

In order to minimize the danger of ethnocentrism, holists suggest analyzing the Soviets' behavior in terms of the Soviets' own categories and concepts. Certainly one way of testing an interpretation of Soviet behavior is to find out whether the Soviets share it. That has its limits, however. Robert Legvold, in his study of Soviet attitudes toward military power, starts with the Soviet literature, but then adds distinctions and concepts that are entirely his own. The question, then, is not whether Western ideas are admissible, but when and with what safeguards they are introduced.

In view of these criteria, does the imposition of Schelling's categories on Soviet behavior constitute unchecked, unvarnished ethnocentrism? Schelling's ideas, like those of Clausewitz, were produced by particular historical experiences in a particular social setting. Both transcend that setting, however, by virtue of their high degree of abstraction, their deductive clarity, and their susceptibility to empirical refutation. Using Western concepts like "escalation dominance" in an *ad hoc* manner to describe Soviet thinking is surely ethnocentrism, but using Schelling's theory self-consciously as a guide for careful testing is not. How could a science make any headway if it were forbidden to use ideas that it had thought up itself?

### B. Inherent Flaws in Positivist Testing Procedures

A more fundamental objection is that positivism, at least in the social sciences, is unable to fulfill its promise to carry out conclusive tests.

McConnell's tests, for example, are not fully satisfying because he doe not offer a reliable definition of the status quo, such that any two re searchers would always agree on who was defending it and who wa challenging it in a given case. As a consequence, deciding whether a cas supports or contradicts his hypothesis involves a partly subjective, *ad ho* judgment.

Though it is possible that more precise measures could have reducec arbitrariness, nonpositivist philosophers of science contend that th underlying problem is inherent: in their view, the variables in social theories do not closely correspond to hard observables in nature. The variables exist only as conventions, either as a linguistic custom of the peopl under study or as a category imposed by the scientist. Several consequences thus undermine the positivist method. First, most of the phenomena that social scientists find interesting will be difficult to measure Second, measurements must either be subjective or rely on highly artificial protocols that measure a variable only indirectly. Third, the scientis is allowed a degree of arbitrariness in deciding whether cases fit his theory and, if they do not, whether the theory or the measurement procedures are at fault. Under these conditions, "objectivity" can at best mear agreement among subjective observers, each of whom brings biases and preconceptions to the task of observation.[46]

William Zimmerman and Robert Axelrod's quantitative study of th lessons that Soviet commentators drew from the Vietnam War illustrate some of these difficulties.[47] In testing the hypothesis that different Soviet press organs serve as forums for the articulation of "left" and "right" opinions in foreign policy debates, these authors first classify press statements on the lessons of Vietnam as either left or right, using well-articulated criteria and requiring agreement among multiple coders. They then show that press organs vary on the left/right spectrum, with differences across various newspapers and journals that were, for the most part, just barely significant by conventional statistical standards. Despite the extreme care taken in measuring left and right lessons, residual ambiguities in the research design make it difficult to judge whether the results support or contradict the hypothesis.

One view might be that these results impressively confirm the existence of pluralistic press debates, on the grounds that the findings would have been even stronger if sharper concepts and better measures had been used. Because the operational definitions of left and right failed to capture

[46] Polkinghorne (fn. 1), 107 and passim.

[47] William Zimmerman and Robert Axelrod, "The 'Lessons' of Vietnam and Soviet Foreign Policy," *World Politics* 34 (October 1981), 1-24.

logically coherent and mutually exclusive belief systems, correlations were watered down by extraneous, random data. On some of the dimensions measured, the left/right dichotomy is clear: for example, the sharp contrast between the left assertion that "the aggressive essence of imperialism is unchanged" with the right view that "realistically thinking circles of the capitalist states have become increasingly conscious of the necessity for peaceful coexistence." But the connection between this and dichotomies that are less stark seems problematic. Compare, for example, the allegedly left statement that "the patriots of South Vietnam will surmount all the obstacles in the path to the complete triumph of their just cause" with the allegedly right statement that "there is no force that could turn back developments in South Vietnam."[48] In short, debate on the general left/right dimension surfaces in the data even though some murky conceptual distinctions and operational measures tend to blur it.

In an opposite view, the findings tend to refute the hypothesis, since the small variations across different press organs could easily have been caused by differences in propaganda strategy or institutional function. For example, Zimmerman and Axelrod note,

> We treated as leftist those statements that emphasized the role of military aid to Vietnam and the significance of military and political doctrine in the North Vietnamese victory; as rightist those statements that stressed economic and material support.[49]

By this coding rule, a military newspaper could be expected to wind up on "the left" simply by devoting disproportionate space to issues within its own functional purview or by targeting "lessons" considered appropriate for its distinctive readership.

In short, all the inherent difficulties of positivism seem to show up in this example. In order to test a hypothesis whose variables do not closely correspond to hard facts in nature, cases must be classified either by partially subjective judgments or by indirect, artificial measures. When subjectivity is permitted, researchers tend to see what they want to see; when indirect measures are concocted, there is a tendency to get weak correlations. And when that happens, it is unclear whether the fault lies with the measures or with the theory.

Defenders of positivism, however, could argue that the solution lies in tightening up the sources of ambiguity: control for alternative explanations, develop logically tighter ideal types for the left and right syndromes, and throw out ambiguous dimensions that water down the findings. Only then—if the hypothesis continued to produce weak

[48] *Ibid.*, 10-11.

[49] *Ibid.*, 8.

*correlations across a shrinking range of successful applications*—*would we know that the research program based on that theory was degenerating.* Although an evaluation of the results of any particular test may involve subjective judgments, objective criteria can be applied to appraising the long-run outcome of a whole research program.[50]

Though positivism can answer its critics in principle, in practice there are limitations to what can be expected from the use of positivist methods in the social sciences. Positivism is like democracy—the worst system except for all the rest. Because of its limitations, however, it makes sense to use other methods to cross-check its findings and to provide alternative guides when it falters.

### C. The Danger of Monolithic Dogmatism

Academic strategy, like military strategy, must avoid the equal dangers of dogmatic attachment to a single doctrine and of aimless activity in the absence of any doctrine at all. Though the game-theoretic, rational-choice traditions of the field of international politics are flexible enough to encompass a variety of opinions and approaches, the exclusive adoption of any theoretical stance will tend to focus attention on some new ideas and blinker it toward others. For this reason, it is healthy for some proportion of the research to be conducted outside the dominant paradigm. In the Soviet field, research driven by international relations theory should be supplemented by research on ideas that emerge more directly from the data. Even in the latter case, however, positivism can play a role in increasing the payoff from the work.

## VI. Hybrid Methods

Some holist arguments are causal, staying close to the Soviets' categories and tending toward complex, case-specific explanations. Other holist arguments are reconstructions of Soviet ends/means calculations, interpreting Soviet behavior in terms of what it was trying to achieve. In arguments of both types, positivist methods and deductive thinking can be usefully applied without undercutting the distinctive character of the holistic approach.

### A. Recasting Causal Arguments

In the study cited earlier, Robert Legvold argues that the Soviets evaluate the utility of military power according to different criteria in differ-

[50] Polkinghorne (fn. 1), 117-18; Imre Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes," in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge: Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science, London, 1965*, Vol. IV (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

ent contexts. He quotes Vasilii Kulish as saying that the effectiveness of military power is "determined not only by the forces themselves," but "depends upon the specific international-political situation." Kulish then goes on to muse about the "complicated interlacing" of national interests, political constraints on the use of force, the strength of the national liberation movement, and so forth.[51] In testing whether the Soviets actually behave in accordance with these notions, however, the "complicated interlacing" of putative causes can only be the final step in a systematic process. The first step is to make a list of "contexts" or characteristics of "international-political situations." Such a list might include Legvold's own distinction among peace, crisis, and war situations, as well as items from Kulish's list. These are the independent variables. The next step is to offer a hypothesis about how the Soviets view the utility of military superiority in each of these contexts. For example, one hypothesis might be that superiority is useful in preventing NATO escalation in the context of an ongoing war, but that it has no value for supporting progressive change in peacetime. What counts in that context is whether strong national liberation movements can achieve gains on their own initiative—which strategic parity will suffice to defend. Subsequent steps would carry out the usual kinds of positivist testing across a varied range of behavioral and verbal evidence. Only at the final stage could there be complicated interlacing of the hypotheses—for example, by specifying which conditions were necessary or sufficient conditions for certain outcomes, how the interaction of two variables might change their effects, and so forth.

If a large number of variables must be considered simultaneously, this procedure will become too cumbersome. In that event, it may be necessary to step back and look for a few "taproot" causes, like bipolarity or nuclear weapons technology, which exert their effects simultaneously and systematically on a lot of seemingly independent variables.

B. Deductive Reconstruction of Soviet Ends/Means Calculations

Michael MccGwire's analysis of Soviet military policy in terms of a changing set of military objectives shows how a Sovietologist can use deductive logic and positivist testing procedures to reconstruct Soviet aims and strategies.[52] MccGwire argues that around December 1966, a decision was taken to change the objective of Soviet military strategy in a world war from "do not lose the war" to "avoid the nuclear devastation of Russia,"—a shift that reflected the new belief that a war might be kept lim-

[51] Legvold (fn. 8), 131.

[52] Michael MccGwire, *Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1987).

ited. He proceeds to deduce a set of specific missions, doctrines, force structures, and organizational structures that would logically follow from those general objectives.

At this point, MccGwire is ready to carry out a number of tests based on the predictions that flow from his deductive model and his tentative identification of a decision period in late 1966. In the jargon of social science, he is carrying out cross-sectional and lagged time-series tests of covariation. The cross-sectional tests involve checking whether his predictions are borne out—not only, say, in the area of doctrinal writings, but also in the areas of force posture and arms control. The time-series test is a before-and-after check to show that the hypothesized changes in higher-level objectives correspond to observed changes in doctrine and force posture, with adjustment for necessary lead times. In carrying out these before-and-after tests, MccGwire tries to hold constant as many perturbing factors as he can. Therefore, in reading the Soviet press to establish the date of the decision to pursue a conventional option in Europe, he compares relevant passages in back-to-back editions of the same authoritative book, one signed to press just before the presumed decision, the other after.

In short, MccGwire's theory is holistic in the sense that it explains various parts of Soviet policy in terms of their relation to a larger whole that gives them meaning. It is also holistic in paying more attention to reconstructing Soviet perspectives and calculations than to discovering their underlying causes. Nonetheless, he constructs and tests his deductive argument according to standard positivist procedures.

## Conclusion

Both positivism and holism can make valuable contributions to the study of Soviet foreign policy. Positivist theories, borrowed in part from the field of international politics, can provide sharp, testable arguments and a fertile research agenda. Holism can provide the means to harness positivist generalizations in a detailed understanding of particular cases, including the present.

Far from being incompatible, holism and positivism can often work synergistically. Holists, while taking up questions appropriate to their particular skills, can use positivist theories to shape their research agenda. Even when they pursue research questions suggested mainly by their own data, holists can use deductive logic and positivist methods to help structure their work.

Despite this complementarity, some irreducible disagreements be-

tween the practitioners of holist and positivist methods are likely to persist. Differing attitudes about such issues as simplification, generalization, and empathy are rooted in different views of the nature of reality and of the purposes that knowledge is meant to serve. However, because the implicit stance of most Sovietologists lies not at the extremes of this dichotomy but in the middle, the complementary use of both approaches will be compatible with these scholars' assumptions about the natural order of social life.

In the past, the positivist side of Soviet foreign policy studies has remained underdeveloped. In the present, therefore, the most pressing task is to use the opportunity presented by recent developments in international-relations theory to correct that weakness, and to do this in a way that leaves the old virtues of the field's nonpositivist traditions intact. Together, these complementary research strategies can sharpen old debates, spark new ones, and generally put scholarly discourse in the Soviet field on a livelier, sounder footing.

# LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTIES: Explaining Innovation in Competitive Party Systems

By HERBERT P. KITSCHELT*

IN contemporary democracies, political stability and change are intimately linked to developments in the party systems. For at least two generations prior to the 1970s, most democratic party systems were structured along stable patterns of societal cleavages such as class, religion, ethnicity, and center/periphery relations.[1] Since the 1960s, however, electoral dealignment and realignment have undermined this continuity.[2] It is particularly significant that political parties, mostly of recent origin, have developed programs and attracted electoral constituencies that cut across the established cleavage structures.

Probably the most significant cohort of new political parties in advanced democracies are "left-libertarian" parties. These parties appeared first in Scandinavia, France, and the Netherlands under "New Left" labels and competed with the established communist and social democratic parties. More recently, in Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, and West Germany, new "ecology" or "green" parties have attracted considerable electoral support. By now, New Left and ecology parties have converging

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[1] For European party systems, this argument was made by Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction," in Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds., *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* (New York: Free Press, 1967). Lipset and Rokkan are concerned with the societal nature of cleavages that are represented on the level of party competition, not with the relative strength of particular parties. Critics and supporters of their argument are mistaken when they test the persistence of cleavages by the electoral stability of individual parties. See Richard Rose and Derek Urwin, "Persistence and Change in Western Party Systems Since 1945," *Political Studies* 18 (No. 3, 1970), 287-319; Maria Maguire, "Is There Still Persistence? Electoral Change in Western Europe, 1948-1979," in Hans Daalder and Peter Mair, eds., *Western European Party Systems: Continuity and Change* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage 1983); and Michal Shamir, "Are Western Party Systems 'Frozen'? A Comparative Dynamic Analysis," *Comparative Political Studies* 12 (No. 1, 1984), 35-79.

[2] As a survey on contemporary debates about the dealignment and realignment of party systems, see Russell J. Dalton, Scott C. Flanagan, and Paul Allen Beck, eds., *Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985).

programmatic outlooks and electoral constituencies. All left-libertarian parties are critical of the logic of societal development and the institutions that underlie the postwar compromise between capital and labor in industrial societies. They oppose the priority that economic growth has on the political agenda, the patterns of policy making that restrict democratic participation to elite bargaining among centralized interest groups and party leaders, and the bureaucratic welfare state. Their political alternatives conform neither to traditional conservative nor to socialist programs, but link libertarian commitments to individual autonomy and popular participation, with a leftist concern for equality.

This essay will explore why left-libertarian parties have been able to attract significant groups of new voters in some Western democracies. In particular, it will examine whether the rise of left-libertarian parties is traceable to structural and institutional conditions in advanced democracies or to transitory grievances and deprivations in societies and party systems that are essentially stable. Conditions that explain the rise of political parties may not necessarily explain their persistence. Nevertheless, if structural factors are responsible for the emergence of left-libertarian parties, these parties are likely to signal lasting changes in the cleavage structure of party systems. If, on the other hand, conjunctural factors—such as short-term economic fluctuations and single issues—explain the rise of left-libertarian parties, the new parties may well be passing fads or "flash parties."

Research on the supporters, organization, and strategy of left-libertarian parties should demonstrate which explanation is correct. The parties become a more interesting object of study if they are indeed grounded in the structural and institutional developments of modern democracies. In that case, their bases of support and patterns of mobilization may have lasting consequences for political participation and public policy making. A comparative study of eighteen democracies, some of which have sizable left-libertarian parties, will demonstrate that these new parties mark the rise of a new political cleavage and represent a significant challenge to the dominant forms of interest intermediation between state and civil society in a distinctive subset of advanced democracies.

## I. Theoretical Models of Political Mobilization and the Restructuring of Party Systems

The mobilization of new political demands, whether by social movements, interest groups, or political parties, has been explained by means

of three different theoretical models: breakdown, structural change, and resource mobilization.[3] Advocates of the breakdown model see political mobilization as a response to societal strains and relative deprivation. Crises occur when societies generate popular loyalty based on institutionalized norms and values, but fail to attain their own standards of institutional stability and legitimation. For instance, modern welfare states promise economic security and opportunity for upward mobility through enhanced education and training. In the view of many of their citizens, however—particularly the younger generation—the economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s have shattered these hopes. The experience of a widening gap between expected and realized benefits triggers collective protest when the existing social order is held to be responsible for this discrepancy.

Proponents of structural change models argue that societies are well able to meet the demands and aspirations on which their legitimacy is based. But, because the societies are involved in continuous change and transformation, this very "success" may generate new preferences which cannot be satisfied by the existing institutions and thus become new sources of dissatisfaction. Societal transformation provokes collective mobilization around new issues and new lines of conflict. Breakdown models bear a close affinity to Marxist and functionalist theories, which predict collective mobilization when capitalist societies experience economic crisis; structural change models are closer to Weber's and Schumpeter's view that capitalism and liberal representative democracy will be victims of their own success.

Adherents of resource mobilization theories maintain that neither crises nor structural change by themselves explain the organization of new collective political demands. Grievances and institutional change are endemic in most societies, but they rarely translate into collective political action. Instead, the actors' skills and resources and the broader institutional opportunity structures determine when individuals are able to engage in collective mobilization. In particular, the choice of a specific ve-

[3] Among a growing body of literature on social movements and political protest, see Gary T. Marx and James L. Wood, "Strands of Theory and Research in Collective Behavior," *Annual Review of Sociology* 1 (1975), 363-428; John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory," *American Journal of Sociology* 82 (No. 6, 1977), 1212-41; Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1978); Craig J. Jenkins, "Sociopolitical Movements," in Samuel I. Long, ed., *Handbook of Political Behavior* Vol. IV (New York: Plenum Press, 1981); Alain Touraine, *The Voice and the Eye* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Claus Offe, "New Social Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics," *Social Research* 52 (No. 4, 1985), 817-68. A fourth theoretical model stands in the Weberian sociological tradition and emphasizes the change of world views and definitions of collective identities. I incorporate this perspective in a broadly interpreted structural theory of movements and party formation.

hicle of mobilization, such as a political party, can be explained only in terms of actors' resources and opportunities.

I will argue that a combination of structural change and resource mobilization theories explains the emergence of left-libertarian parties better than breakdown theories do. Theories of structural change highlight the necessary background conditions for the rise of left-libertarian parties; but the sufficient conditions are provided only by favorable political opportunity structures. Breakdown theories as such do not help us to identify necessary or sufficient conditions of party formation. The competing explanations will be tested in a macrocomparison of eighteen advanced democracies.

## II. The Cases

Common ideological and programmatic convictions, similar compositions of electoral constituencies, and a minimum level of voter support determine which parties qualify as significant left-libertarian parties. The formal party labels (left-socialist, ecological, or libertarian), the age, and the political origin of left-libertarian parties are not relevant for these criteria. With respect to political ideology, left-libertarian parties grow out of the sentiment that the realms of instrumental action in modern society—the market place and bureaucratic organization—dominate too much of social life and have displaced relations of solidarity (in the private sphere of interpersonal communication) and participatory political deliberation (in the public sphere of collective decision making). Left-libertarians mistrust markets because the latter orient human preferences toward the pursuit of material commodities, devalue social community, and endanger the supply and protection of many nonmarketable collective goods—not the least of which is an intact environment. Simultaneously, left-libertarians oppose the centralized bureaucratic welfare state and the hegemony of professional expertise in public policy and society. In their view, the formal rationalities of markets and bureaucracies expropriate the citizens' capacity to determine their own lives and must be checked by institutions that impose substantive standards of rationality on their boundless expansive dynamic.

Consistent with the socialist legacy, left-libertarians are "left"; they oppose the market place and insist on solidarity and equality. They are also "libertarian" in that they reject centralized bureaucracies and call for individual autonomy, participation, and the self-governance of decentralized communities.

Left-libertarian parties not only have common programmatic orienta-

tions, but also similar socioeconomic profiles of electoral support. There is no systematic study of left-libertarian electorates that covers all countries with significant parties, but existing surveys show that all of these parties overproportionally draw voters from the ranks of the younger, well-educated middle class; they are employed in human services (teaching, health care, social work), have left-of-center political convictions, subscribe to "postmaterialist" values, and sympathize with environmental, feminist, and peace movements.[4]

Left-libertarian parties can obviously make a difference in advanced industrial democracies only if they receive a minimum level of electoral support. Why do some countries have electorally significant left-libertarian parties, but others not? It is difficult to choose a single and universally applicable measure of electoral support as the criterion for distinguishing "significant" from "insignificant" left-libertarian parties. Since these parties vary in age, one cannot average their electoral performance over a long period of time, and since the competition between party blocs in a number of European countries is very close and often determined by marginal changes in electoral support, the criterion of significance should not be too stringent. In some instances, a share of 2 or 3 percent of the vote may place a left-libertarian party in a position to affect the formation of governmental majorities.

I have classified left-libertarian parties as significant if they have received about 4 percent or more of the vote in a national parliamentary or presidential election at least once in the 1980s. Alliances among left-libertarian parties are permitted to count toward the 4-percent threshold. The dependent variable is thus a dummy with two values indicating whether a country has (= 1) or does not have (= 0) significant left-libertarian parties.

Table 1 shows that parties in eight West European democracies easily meet this criterion. Luxemburg and Iceland are too small to be included in the present comparative analysis. In three of the six remaining cases,

[4] Electoral analysis of Scandinavian New Left parties are provided in John Logue, *Socialism and Abundance* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), chaps. 6 and 8; Alastair H. Thomas, "Social Democracy in Scandinavia: Can Dominance Be Regained?" in William E. Paterson and Alastair H. Thomas, eds., *The Future of Social Democracy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986). For France, see Daniel Boy, "Le vote ecologiste en 1978" [The ecological vote in 1978], *Revue française de science politique* 31 (No. 2, 1981), 394-416. For West Germany, compare Hans Joachim Veen, "Wer wählt grün? Zum Profil der Neuen Linken in der Wohlstandsgesellschaft" [Who votes Green? On the profile of the New Left in the affluent society], *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 34 (September 1984), 3-17; and Wilhelm P. Bürklin, "The Greens: Ecology and the New Left," in H. G. Wallach and George K. Romoser, eds., *West German Politics in the Mid-Eighties: Crisis and Continuity* (New York: Praeger 1985). For other countries, see Ferdinand Müller-Rommel, "The Greens in Western Europe: Similar but Different," *International Political Science Review* 6 (No. 4, 1985), 483-99.

(Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway), the left-libertarian parties may be classified as New Left or left-socialist. They originated in the late 1950s and 1960s and languished in the 1970s, but in recent years they have developed a profile of voter support and a programmatic outlook that qualifies them as left-libertarians. The three other unambiguous cases are the Austrian, Belgian, and West German ecology parties. They are less than ten years old and started from environmentalist visions that always involved a genuinely left-libertarian commitment.

Three additional countries have borderline left-libertarian parties. In Switzerland, the New Left and ecology parties coexist side by side and cooperate with each other. In Sweden, two established parties—the Center Party and the Communist Party—have moved toward the left-libertarian agenda and preempted the successful formation of either New Left or ecology parties. Since they have not entirely renounced their traditional clienteles and ideological affinities, they must be treated as borderline cases. Norway and the Netherlands also have centrist or liberal parties that have moved toward the left-libertarian agenda. They are not included in my list because their outlook is more ambiguous than that of those that are included.[5]

In France, which is the most difficult case to classify, left-socialist parties played some role in the 1960s and 1970s, but have now virtually disappeared from the political scene. France was actually the first country in which the ecologists enjoyed some modest success in local and regional elections in the 1970s, but their performance at the national level has been inconsistent and disappointing. Although the ecology candidate received almost 4 percent of the vote in the first round of the 1981 presidential election, the ecologists have fared badly in all elections to the French national assembly.

A total of nine countries may be considered either clear or borderline cases with significant left-libertarian parties. My classification does not predetermine the findings of the comparative analysis, however; it is itself subject to test. If some of the borderline cases do not conform to a pattern of determination that explains the rise of left-libertarian parties in most other cases, we will have to reclassify the countries. France is most likely not a case of true, significant left-libertarian parties. In the empirical analysis, I will therefore count France alternatively as a case with a significant

[5] The Norwegian party, unlike its Swedish counterpart, barely cleared the 3% threshold in the 1980s, and finally lost its parliamentary representation in 1985. See John Modeley, "Norway's 1985 Election: A Pro-Welfare Backlash," *West European Politics* 9 (No. 2, 1986), 289-92. For an analysis of the Swedish and Norwegian centrist libertarian parties, see Neil Elder and Rolf Gooderham, "The Centre Parties of Norway and Sweden," *Government and Opposition* 13 (No. 2, 1978), 218-35.

TABLE 1
LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTIES IN WESTERN DEMOCRACIES:
BEST PERFORMANCE 1980–1986

I. COUNTRIES WITH SIGNIFICANT LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTIES

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **A. "Clear" Cases** | | | |
| Austria (A) | The Greens | 4.6% | (national elections 1986) |
| Belgium (B) | AGALEV/ECOLO | 6.2% | (national elections 1985) |
| Denmark (DK) | Socialist People's Party | 11.5% | (national elections 1984) |
| | Left Socialist Party | 2.7% | (national elections 1984) |
| Netherlands (NL) | PPR/PSP/CPN (Green Progressive Accord) | 5.7% | (national elections 1982) |
| Norway (N) | Socialist People's Party | 5.4% | (national elections 1985) |
| West Germany (FRG) | The Greens | 5.6% | (national elections 1983) |
| Iceland | Women's Party | 5.0% | (national elections 1983) |
| Luxemburg | The Green Alternative | 5.2% | (national elections 1984) |
| **B. "Borderline" Cases** | | | |
| France (F) | Ecologists | 3.9% | (presidential elections 1981) |
| | Les Verts | 1.2% | (parliamentary elections 1986) |
| Sweden (S) | Left Communist Party | 5.4% | (national elections 1985) |
| | Center Party | 12.4% | (national elections 1985) |
| Switzerland (CH) | Greens | 2.9% | (national elections 1983) |
| | Progressive Organizations | 2.7% | (national elections 1983) |

II. Countries without Significant Left-Libertarian Parties

| Country | Party | Vote | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
| **A. Marginal Parties Exist** | | | |
| Canada (CND) | Green Party of Canada | | (no contest in national elections) |
| New Zealand (NZ) | Values Party | 0.2% | (national elections 1984) |
| United Kingdom (UK) | Ecology/Green Party | 1.1% | (in districts contested in the 1983 national elections) |
| **B. Proto-Parties or Loose Electoral Coalitions Exist** | | | |
| Finland (FI) | Greens | 1.4% | (national elections 1983) |
| Ireland (IRE) | Comhaontas Glas/Greens | | (no contest in national elections) |
| Italy (I) | Radical Party | 2.2% | (national elections 1983) |
| | Various local Green lists | | (no contest in national elections) |
| Japan (J) | Green Party | | (declared only) |
| Spain | Green Party | | (declared only, no independent participation in national elections) |
| United States (US) | Citizens' Party | 0.1% | (presidential elections 1984) |
| | New World Alliance | | (no contest in national elections) |
| **C. No Parties Declared** | | | |
| Australia (AUS) | | | |
| Greece | | | |
| Portugal | | | |

left-libertarian party (France = 1) and without it (France = 0). If France is a true case of left-libertarian party formation, variables that predict the presence of these parties in the other countries should do the same for France. If, however, the addition of the French case to the countries with left-libertarian parties weakens the correlation between various independent variables and left-libertarian party formation, France should be excluded from this group.

In twelve other Western democracies, significant left-libertarian parties do not exist. Many of them have very small ecology or left-socialist splinter parties (which are not necessarily listed in the table); but these parties are electorally insignificant by my criteria. Closest to the threshold of political significance are Italy, where the Radical Party managed to surpass 3 percent in one national election during the 1970s, and Finland, where a small ecology party is actually represented in the national parliament. Whether I have classified these two cases correctly can be validated by checking if the absence of left-libertarian parties is explained by the same factors in these cases as in the other countries without such parties.

Nine of the twelve countries without significant left-libertarian parties are included in the comparative analysis. Greece, Portugal, and Spain were dropped because their transition to democracy is too recent. An initial exploration, moreover, showed that they have none of the attributes that facilitate the rise of left-libertarian parties in other countries. Adding these countries would thus confirm my analysis.

The development of left-libertarian parties cannot be reviewed individually and by country in this paper.[6] In general, New Left parties are the oldest subgroup; they have attracted electoral support in Scandinavia, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. The newer left-libertarian parties appeared in the late 1970s; they are the ecology or "green" parties of Austria, Belgium, France, Switzerland, and West Germany. Despite their names, these parties are not narrow environmentalist pressure groups, but address the entire range of left-libertarian demands. In addition to

[6] Case materials for a comparative study of left-libertarian parties in general, and ecology parties in particular, can be found in Jürgen Baumgarten, ed., *Linkssozialisten in Europa: Alternative zu Sozialdemokratie und kommunistischen Parteien* [Left socialists in Europe: Alternatives to social democracy and communist parties] (Hamburg: Junius, 1982); Frank De Roose, "De Groene Golf: Over de nationale diversiteit van een international fenomeen" [The Green wave: On the national diversity of an international phenomenon], *De Groene Schriften* 7, pp. 33-61; Patrick Florizoone, *De Groenen: Idee, bewegingen en partijen* [The Greens: Ideas, movements, and parties] (Deurne: Kluver, 1985); Ferdinand Müller-Rommel, "'Parteien neuen Typs' in Westeuropa: Eine vergleichende Analyse" ['Parties of a new type' in Western Europe: A comparative analysis], *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen* 13 (No. 3, 1982), 369-90, and "New Social Movements and Smaller Parties: A Comparative Perspective," *West European Politics* 8 (No. 1, 1985), 41-54; Wolfgang Rudig, "The Greens in Europe. Ecological Parties and the European Elections of 1984," *Parliamentary Affairs* 38 (No. 1, 1985), 56-72.

these two main subgroups, there are a few center-left parties with a left-libertarian agenda in Sweden, Norway, and the Netherlands.

## III. Methodology of Comparison

The small number of cases, the definition of the dependent variable as a dummy, and the collinearity among the independent variables preempt a sophisticated multivariate statistical analysis and causal modeling of the paths that lead to left-libertarian parties. In view of these limitations, I will use some less powerful quantitative and semi-quantitative measures and techniques to draw inferences about the association of variables. The analysis is theory-driven and its conclusions go beyond what the statistical analysis alone would warrant.

My main analytic technique is the cross-tabulation of dichotomized independent and dependent variables. I dichotomize ordinal- or interval-scaled variables around the median. Because the eighteen countries in my comparison are evenly distributed over each of the two values that independent and dependent variables can assume, we can calculate by how much the actual distribution of countries over the cells of the resulting two-by-two tables diverges from random probability. If a hypothesis predicts that all cases may be found in two of the four cells, while random probability would lead us to expect 50 percent of the cases in these cells, the difference between the actual number of cases and the 50-percent mark indicates the explanatory power of that hypothesis. For each table, a "coefficient of reproducibility" calculates the percentage of cases that are correctly classified according to the hypothesis being tested.

In addition, if independent variables are metric or interval-scaled, we can compare whether countries with left-libertarian parties have different mean values on these variables from countries where these parties are absent. In such cases, I have used regression analysis. Because the dependent variable is a dummy, I have used a loglinear regression model (LOGIT) to test the statistical significance of the association between independent variables and left-libertarian parties. In addition, I provide Pearson linear correlation coefficients to measure the strength of the association between the variables.

All empirical indicators are at the macro level. They presuppose micro-foundations that cannot be explicitly tested in this paper. There are no sufficient comparative data to determine how and why individual supporters of left-libertarian parties differ from the overall electorates in the eighteen democracies.

## IV. Structural Change and Left-Libertarian Parties

Most contemporary theories of structural change adopt the Schumpeterian perspective that the success of capitalist institutions and values will ultimately bring about the demise of capitalism's organizational and moral foundations.[7] These theories identify the spread of markets and bureaucracies as the source of new dissatisfaction. They interpret the programmatic concerns of left-libertarian parties as a protest against the emerging bureaucratic and meritocratic postindustrial society.

According to these theories, modern welfare capitalism was made possible by an unprecedented period of economic growth, affluence, and institutional stability. The new social movements and left-libertarian parties are mobilizing against certain consequences of this process and articulating new preferences for social change. They respond to tendencies in postindustrial societies that (1) produce unacceptable risks to human life and the environment, (2) restrain the autonomy of the individual citizen, and (3) undercut a democratic governance of social change. Although these societies promote sophisticated education, they simultaneously frustrate demands for more political participation and centralize control in hierarchies of experts and bureaucracies. They foster individualism and mobility, but deny a more autonomous definition of individual lifestyles and collective identities at the local level. Theories of postindustrial society suggest that the growing tension between citizens' demands for autonomy and participation on the one hand, and the increasingly comprehensive and complex hierarchies of social control on the other, is what leads to the formation of left-libertarian parties.

A simple way to explore the link between societal transformation and left-libertarian parties is to compare the per capita incomes of the Western democracies. The more affluent countries should create stronger preferences and individual capacities to pursue left and libertarian goals. At the same time, these countries tend to regulate social life more tightly through market exchange relations and organizational hierarchies. Table 2 shows that levels of economic affluence correctly predict the presence or absence of left-libertarian parties in sixteen out of eighteen cases. The average income in countries with relevant left-libertarian parties is noticeably higher than in those without, and the coefficient of reproducibility is much higher than chance. The LOGIT analysis shows that the association

[7] Macrostructural theories are especially influenced by the work of Jürgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975), and Habermas, *Communication and the Evolution of Society* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979); Alain Touraine, *The Self-Production of Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977); and Claus Offe, *Contradictions of the Welfare State* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984).

TABLE 2
LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTIES AND PER CAPITA INCOME
(1980)

| | Income Greater than $11,000 per Capita | | Income Smaller than $11,000 per Capita | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Significant Left-Libertarian Parties Exist* (Average = $13,001) | B | (11,816) | A | (10,251) |
| | DK | (12,952) | | |
| | F | (12,136) | | |
| | FRG | (13,305) | | |
| | N | (14,019) | | |
| | NL | (11,851) | | |
| | S | (14,761) | | |
| | CH | (15,922) | | |
| *No Significant Left-Libertarian Parties Exist* (Average = $8,972) | US | (11,364) | AUS | (10,129) |
| | | | FI | (10,440) |
| | | | I | ( 6,906) |
| | | | IRE | ( 5,193) |
| | | | J | ( 8,873) |
| | | | NZ | ( 7,441) |
| | | | UK | ( 9,335) |
| | | | CND | (10,582) |

Source: OECD, *Historical Statistics 1960–1980* (Paris: OECD, 1982).

STATISTICAL INTERPRETATION

| | *France with Left-Libertarian Party (France = 1)* | *France without Left-Libertarian Party (France = 0)* |
|---|---|---|
| *Coefficient of Reproducibility (CR)** | .89 | .83 |
| *r* | .75 | .71 |
| *Significance Level (LOGIT Regression)* | .055 | .04 |

$$*CR = 1 - \frac{N \text{ of mistakes}}{N \text{ of cases}}$$

of income and party formation is close to the commonly accepted level of statistical significance, and the correlation coefficient is quite strong. Nevertheless, the link is not perfect: Austria and the United States are anomalies not explained by the theory. France strengthens the correlation if it is counted as a case with left-libertarian parties.

Within West Germany, the relationship between affluence and left-

libertarian party strength holds true at an even more disaggregate level. If we regress the electoral support for the West German Greens in state and national elections from 1981 to 1985 on the per capita income of the West German states, there is a strong and significant correlation between income levels and electoral support.[8] Figure 1 illustrates this link. Other variables, such as the industrial structure or the competitive position of different parties in each state, may explain the remaining variance. We will return to these variables in the cross-national analysis.

Postindustrial societies are said to be characterized by a high percentage of the economically active population working in the service sector and by increasing levels of education in the population. But in the eighteen democracies in the sample, no association between the sectoral structure of the economy and left-libertarian parties can be found (see Table 3). Similarly, the relative size of the student population in advanced education shows no link to party formation.[9] These negative findings suggest that sociological theories of postindustrialism offer only limited explanations at best for the rise of new parties.

This conclusion is reinforced when we analyze the link of postmaterialist values in affluent democracies to the formation of left-libertarian parties. Surveys show that most left-libertarian voters do prefer postmaterialist values. But the reverse does not hold true: not all postmaterialists support left-libertarian parties. Although we do not have data on the entire set of eighteen democracies to substantiate this assertion, data exist on six European countries with and without left-libertarian parties. In the countries with left-libertarian parties (West Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and France as a borderline case), the percentage of citizens with postmaterialist values is not unambiguously greater than in the countries that do not have such parties (Britain and Italy).[10]

[8] Autocorrelation between the values of Green electoral support within each German state may make the correlation look stronger than it is. But in view of the small number of cases and the limited purpose of this analysis, I have settled for a simple bivariate analysis.

[9] The number of college students per 100,000 inhabitants is taken as a measure of educational advancement. Data are provided by UNESCO, *Statistical Digest 1984* (Paris: UNESCO, 1984).

[10] Data on the distribution of materialists and postmaterialists in these countries are provided by Paul R. Abrahamson and Ronald Inglehart, "Generational Replacement and Value Change in Six West European Societies," paper prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, August 30-September 2, 1984. If we average the postmaterialism scores for 1976-1980 in Belgium, the Netherlands, and West Germany, they are only slightly higher than the average in France, Britain, or Italy. West Germany's score is smaller than that of France or Britain. Belgium, which was more postmaterialist in 1976-1980, is much less postmaterialist than are all other countries in the 1980s. Finally, the postmaterialism measure is heavily influenced by the actual inflation rates of a country. If this variable was held constant, the association between national postmaterialism scores and left-libertarian parties would probably disappear entirely.

FIGURE 1
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PER CAPITA INCOME
IN THE WEST GERMAN STATES (1980)
AND THE GREEN VOTE IN STATE AND NATIONAL ELECTIONS (1981–1985)

PERCENT OF VOTES CAST FOR THE GREEN PARTY IN THE WEST GERMAN STATES

GREEN VOTE = 1.37 + .000166 (GNP)
adjusted $r^2$ = .3445
$t$ = 3.618

PER CAPITA INCOME (IN DM) IN THE WEST GERMAN STATES

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, *Statistisches Jahrbuch der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1984).

Key: S-H = Schleswig-Holstein; SAAR = Saarland; NS = Niedersachsen (Lower Saxony); R-P = Rheinland-Pfalz (Rhineland-Palatinate) [same result in two elections]; BAY = Bayern (Bavaria); NR-W = Nordrhein-Westfalen (Northrhine-Westfalia); B-W = Baden-Württemberg; HES = Hessen (Hesse); WB = West Berlin; BRE = Bremen; HAM = Hamburg.

TABLE 3
LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTIES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SERVICE SECTOR
(Percentage of the employed labor force)

| | *Percentage Greater than 57.5%* | *Percentage Lower than 57.5%* |
|---|---|---|
| *Significant Left-Libertarian Parties Exist* (Average = 57.9%) | B (62.3%)<br>DK (63.3%)<br>NL (62.1%)<br>N (61.8%)<br>S (62.2%) | A (51.5%)<br>CH (52.3%)<br>F (55.3%)<br>FRG (49.2%) |
| *No Significant Left-Libertarian Parties Exist* (Average = 57.1%) | AUS (62.4%)<br>CND (66.0%)<br>UK (59.2%)<br>US (65.9%) | FI (54.0%)<br>I (48.0%)<br>IRE (48.4%)<br>J (54.2%)<br>NZ (55.2%) |

Source: OECD, *Historical Statistics, 1960–80* (Paris: OECD, 1982), Table 2.11, p. 35.

STATISTICAL INTERPRETATION

| | *France = 1* | *France = 0* |
|---|---|---|
| *CR* | .56 | .61 |
| *t* | .06 | .1 |
| *p* (LOGIT) | .79 (n.s.) | .67 (n.s.) |

Inglehart and Dalton argue that value change does not instantly translate into electoral realignments.[11] Still, this does not explain why the apparent "lags" between value change and party realignments differ from country to country. Theories of postmaterialism either do not use reliable and valid measures of value change or they underrate the importance of changing cognitive capabilities and of institutional opportunities and constraints as determinants of collective political action.

Thus, theories of postindustrialist society and value change at best account for changing individual orientations, preferences, and capabilities to engage in collective protest. But they do not sufficiently predict the conditions and opportunities under which these values and preferences lead to the formation of left-libertarian parties.

[11] See Ronald Inglehart, "The Changing Structure of Political Cleavages in Western Societies," in Dalton et al. (fn. 2), 62, and Russell J. Dalton, "Environmentalism and Value Change in Western Democracies," paper prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, August 30-September 2, 1984.

## V. Political Opportunities for and Constraints on the Development of Left-Libertarian Parties

Although socioeconomic theories of party formation remain unsatisfactory, we can explore the significance of political institutions and power relations in the development of left-libertarian parties. The socioeconomic transformation of modern democracy explains *why* there is pressure to represent left-libertarian interests in the political arena, but political institutions and power relations explain *whether* these pressures are represented by specific political parties, *when* these parties appear, and *what* label they adopt.

The formation of political parties can be examined from the perspective of rational actors who have postindustrial political demands and are searching for the most effective strategies to place them on the political agenda. Forming new parties in order to press for new political demands requires more effort than using existing political channels, such as established parties and interest groups. Rational actors will attempt to build new vehicles of interest representation only if traditional organizations fail to respond to postindustrial demands. Moreover, these actors must be able to take advantage of opportunities and acquire resources to build a new party. Thus, new political parties will form only when the *unresponsiveness* of existing political institutions coincides with favorable *political opportunities* to displace existing parties.

Four conditions shape the opportunities and constraints of left-libertarian party formation. Comprehensive welfare states increase the financial resources and the motivational dispositions of important groups to shift their political attention from economic to postindustrial policy issues. In advanced welfare states, strong labor corporatism and the participation of left parties in government constrain the pursuit of postindustrial demands through established political channels, and thus render the development of new political vehicles for these demands more probable. The likelihood of the formation of left-libertarian parties increases further when highly visible conflicts about postindustrial policy issues (such as nuclear power) mobilize social movements and polarize society.

The welfare state protects the material well-being of many citizens from the effects of the business cycle and capitalist labor markets on their behavior and aspirations. Social insurance systems, public employment, educational institutions, and retraining programs provide a "safety net" and a subjective sense of security that is essential to the reorientation of people's political agenda. Such arrangements encourage them to discount the negative impact of low economic growth on their individual lives and increase their willingness to support policies that restrain private business

and the bureaucratic management of economic growth. This type of logic presumes a certain myopia among the actors because, after all, the welfare state itself is dependent on economic performance. Nevertheless, actual perceptions of opportunities and constraints may be reconstructed by such policies.

Welfare states encourage left-libertarian mobilization in another sense. They organize many social services (education, social welfare, health, etc.) in bureaucratic institutions. Nonmarket services in general, and the bureaucratic provision of social services in particular, may thus give rise to intense consumer dissatisfaction, which in turn fuels left-libertarian demands for a decentralized, consumer-controlled reorganization of public services.[12]

If this reasoning is valid, comprehensive welfare states should be most likely to generate left-libertarian parties. Table 4 shows that the existence of left-libertarian parties is strongly linked to public social expenditure as a percentage of gross domestic product. The coefficient of reproducibility as well as the correlation coefficient indicate a firm association between these variables. The mean social expenditures are much higher in countries with relevant left-libertarian parties, and the LOGIT analysis demonstrates that this association is statistically significant. The welfare state explains the "anomalies" we find when examining the association between left-libertarian parties and economic development. Austria and the United States are now classified correctly. France, again, contributes more to the association if it is classified as a country with left-libertarian parties. The association between the welfare state and left-libertarian parties, however, yields some new anomalies: Ireland and Switzerland. Plausible *ad hoc* arguments explain at least the Swiss case.[13]

The strength of welfare states is the result of economic development and peculiar political forces and institutions.[14] The most comprehensive welfare states are associated with strong, centralized labor unions and the frequent participation of social democratic and socialist parties in government. But while the welfare state creates *opportunities* for the mobiliza-

[12] See Albert O. Hirschman, *Shifting Involvements* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 39-41.

[13] The figures understate the exceptional social and economic security Swiss citizens enjoy due to Switzerland's unique position in the world economy. See Manfred Schmidt, *Der schweizerische Weg zur Vollbeschäftigung* [The Swiss path to full employment] (Frankfurt/Main: Campus Verlag, 1985).

[14] See Peter Flora and Arnold J. Heidenheimer, eds., *The Development of Welfare States in Western Europe and North America* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1981), and Francis G. Castles, *The Impact of Parties* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1982). Compare, as a recent analytic survey of studies on the determinants of the welfare state, Hannu Uusitalo, "Comparative Research on the Determinants of the Welfare State: The State of the Art," *European Journal of Political Research* 12 (No. 4, 1984), 403-24.

TABLE 4
LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTIES AND SOCIAL SECURITY EXPENDITURE
(1979–1980) (Percentage of GNP)

| | *Expenditure Greater than 19%* | *Expenditure Smaller than 19%* |
|---|---|---|
| *Significant Left-Libertarian Parties Exist*<br>(Average = 23.6%) | A (21.4%)<br>B (24.5%)<br>DK (26.2%)<br>F (25.5%)<br>FRG (23.0%)<br>N (19.8%)<br>NL (27.6%)<br>S (31.2%) | CH (12.8%) |
| *No Significant Left-Libertarian Parties Exist*<br>(Average = 14.9%) | IRE (20.6%) | AUS (11.6%)<br>CND (14.8%)<br>FI (18.0%)<br>I (16.3%)<br>J ( 9.8%)<br>NZ (14.1%)<br>UK (16.9%)<br>US (12.2%) |
| (Overall Average = 19.2%) | | |

Source: International Labor Office, *The Cost of Social Security. Eleventh International Inquiry 1978–80* (Geneva: ILO, 1985).

STATISTICAL INTERPRETATION

| | *France = 1* | *France = 0* |
|---|---|---|
| *CR* | .89 | .83 |
| *r* | .72 | .61 |
| *p* (LOGIT) | .02 | .03 |

tion of left-libertarian demands, labor-interest organizations and government participation by the socialists provide *constraints* that prevent these demands from being articulated through established political channels. Labor corporatism and left party governments increase the *rigidity* and *unresponsiveness* of political systems to left-libertarian policy demands, and thereby speed the formation of new parties.

In capitalist democracies, labor can gain power only if it is well organized. It must represent a large share of a country's wage earners and it

must centralize organizational decision making. This form of mobilization increases labor's capacity to engage in elite bargaining with business and political parties.[15] Each participant has the resources to do damage to the others, but it also has capacities to enter into and enforce compromises.

Corporatist interest intermediation constrains left-libertarian demands in at least two ways. Because of the very centralist, formal organization of the participants in corporatist policy-making arenas, it is comparatively more difficult for new, less well-organized interests to be heard in the political system. In particular, existing political parties will discount new demands if no organization is behind them. Moreover, business and labor have a common interest as economic producers in preserving the logic of industrial growth and bureaucratic regulation—precisely the institutions that left-libertarian forces attack. When producer interests dominate the political agenda, left-libertarians can hope to disrupt this policy-making system only by establishing new vehicles of interest representation.

Since business interests and conservative parties as a rule are inimical to most left-libertarian demands for more egalitarian, participatory, and ecological economic or political institutions, the inclusion of labor in corporatist interest intermediation is vital to understanding why corporatism enhances pressures to create left-libertarian parties. Unions, labor parties, and left-libertarians have a common mistrust of the market and prefer greater equality and political redistribution. As labor organizations are drawn into corporatist interest intermediation, they sacrifice their anticapitalist spirit in favor of tangible short-term benefits for their constituencies (e.g., in the areas of social policy and employment). They move away from potential alliances with left-libertarian forces and lose their capacity to include left-libertarian demands in their own political platforms.

Only in a few of the noncorporatist countries have labor unions shown sympathy toward left-libertarian positions, such as opposition to nuclear power. Most notably, the French and Japanese socialist unions voiced concern about nuclear power in the 1970s. Some dissent from nuclear policies also developed in the British Trade Union Congress and in some U.S. unions. In corporatist systems, on the other hand, unions have always supported national nuclear policies, even if some union activists or

[15] In the burgeoning literature on labor corporatism, see in particular Philippe C. Schmitter and Gerhard Lehmbruch, eds., *Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1979); Gerhard Lehmbruch and Philippe C. Schmitter, eds., *Patterns of Corporatist Policy-Making* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1982); and Suzanne Berger, ed., *Organizing Interests in Western Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

suborganizations opposed this position. For this reason, the formation of left-libertarian parties should increase parallel to the firmness of labor-corporatist arrangements.

I use Schmitter's combined index of organizational centralization and associational monopoly of unions to measure labor corporatism.[16] Table 5 shows a very high association between labor corporatism and the development of left-libertarian parties. Three anomalies remain: Finland, France, and Switzerland. In the Swiss case, Schmitter's index may not appropriately tap the corporatist patterns of interest intermediation that are common in that country.

TABLE 5
LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTIES AND LABOR CORPORATISM*
(Combined rank order of organizational centralization and associational monopoly of unions, 1965–1980)

| | *High Labor Corporatism* | *Low Labor Corporatism* |
|---|---|---|
| *Significant Left-Libertarian Parties Exist* | A NL<br>B S<br>DK FRG<br>N | F<br>CH |
| *No Significant Left-Libertarian Parties Exist* | FI | AUS J<br>CND UK<br>IRE US<br>I |

* No Data on New Zealand

Sources: The measure was developed by Schmitter (fn. 16), 294. Japan and Australia were added to Schmitter's sample as cases of low labor corporatism, based on data reported in David Cameron, "Social Democracy, Corporatism, Labour Quiescence, and the Representation of Economic Interest in Advanced Capitalist Society," in John H. Goldthorpe, ed., *Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism* (London: Oxford University Press, 1984), 143-78, at 165.

*CR* = .82 (France = 1)
*CR* = .88 (France = 0)

In view of the difficulty of quantifying corporatism, I have chosen the level of strike activity in the countries as an indirect measure of economic interest intermediation. Because it facilitates compromise between capital and labor, labor corporatism is inversely related to strike activity. Table 6 shows that the association between strike activity and left-libertarian

[16] Philippe C. Schmitter, "Interest Intermediation and Regime Governability in Contemporary Western Europe and North America," in Berger (fn. 15), 287-330.

TABLE 6
LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTIES AND STRIKE ACTIVITY*
(Working days lost per 1000 employees in the labor force, 1965–1981)

| | *Loss Less than 260 Days per Year* | *Loss More than 260 Days per Year* |
|---|---|---|
| *Significant Left-Libertarian Parties Exist*<br>(Average = 85.1%) | A (10)<br>B (156)<br>CH (1)<br>DK (148)<br>FRG (28)<br>N (28)<br>NL (22)<br>S (95) | F (278) |
| *No Significant Left-Libertarian Parties Exist*<br>(Average = 458.3%) | J (71) | AUS (427)<br>CND (707)<br>FI (358)<br>I (840)<br>IRE (484)<br>UK (375)<br>US (411) |

* No Data on New Zealand

Source: International Labor Office, *Yearbook of Labor Statistics* (Geneva: ILO, 1983), quoted in Cameron (see sources, Table 5).

STATISTICAL INTERPRETATION

| | *France = 1* | *France = 0* |
|---|---|---|
| *CR* | .88 | .94 |
| *r* | −.77 | −.78 |
| *p* (LOGIT) | .02 | .05 |

parties is strongly negative. The coefficient of reproducibility is high; only France—if counted as a country with a significant left-libertarian party—and Japan remain as anomalies. The mean strike activity among countries with left-libertarian parties is much lower than in the other eight countries, and the LOGIT analysis confirms that the bivariate association is significant. Because France has an intermediate level of strike activity, its classification does not affect the level and significance of the associations much.

Labor corporatism is linked to two other variables that I have not ex-

plicitly modeled in the present analysis. Countries with labor corporatism tend to be small and to develop political cultures based on bargaining, compromise, and the depoliticization of conflict. Some authors have related this "northern European polity model" to the low level of autonomy that small countries enjoy in the world economy. If they want to respond flexibly to external challenges, they cannot afford high levels of domestic conflict.[17] The price of domestic consensus, however, is centralized elite bargaining and the absence of popular participation in policy making. Left-libertarians evidently support a view of politics that is diametrically opposed to these patterns. They are a force that is bound to challenge and disrupt consensualist policy making.

In examining the role that political parties play in the emergence of left-libertarian competitors, we must pursue the same logic as we did with respect to labor corporatism: independent left-libertarian parties are more likely to develop when the traditional left is unavailable as a vehicle of protest against the dominant model of societal development. Whether this is actually the case depends on national structures of party competition.

The initial premise is that voters with left-libertarian sympathies are most likely to support traditional left parties in situations where they can choose *only* between socialist/social democratic and conservative parties.[18] Even if there is a left-libertarian alternative, voters will still tend to support the traditional left when the socialist and conservative parties are of roughly equal electoral strength because they fear that defection from the socialists will indirectly help the conservatives. For this reason, established left parties have often advertised themselves to left-libertarian constituencies as the "lesser evil." Moreover, as long as the traditional left is in the opposition, it can invoke both pro-labor and left-libertarian programs to gloss over the tensions that an alliance between these two forces would create.

Three different competitive configurations in party systems favor the development of left-libertarian parties. First, when the traditional left governs hegemonically, a conservative government is not a real threat;

[17] See Peter Katzenstein, "The Small European States in the International Economy. Economic Dependence and Corporatist Politics," in John Gerard Ruggie, ed., *The Antinomies of Interdependence* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983); Katzenstein, *Small States in World Markets* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984); Michael Wallerstein, "The Microfoundations of Corporatism: Formal Theory and Comparative Analysis," paper prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, August 30-September 2, 1984.

[18] In two instances, left-libertarian centrist parties in Sweden (the Center Party) and in the Netherlands (Democrats '66) actually supported conservative governments. In both instances, the voters disapproved of these alliances and the parties lost votes in subsequent elections.

label. This rationale explains the cases of Austria, Belgium, and West Germany.

In the same way, we can interpret the finding that New Left or center-left libertarian parties emerged in party systems characterized by long-term rising electoral volatility, while ecology parties proved successful in systems with declining volatility (Table 8). It is true that the rise of left-libertarian parties itself affects the regression line of party system volatility, but high volatility usually indicates that many parties win and lose voters simultaneously. Such systems offer a good opportunity for the early formation of left-libertarian parties, a situation that prevails in countries with unstable bourgeois party blocs. When volatility declines, bourgeois party blocs are generally stable and make the formation of new left-libertarian parties more difficult.

Only Switzerland has generated both New Left and ecology parties that have sustained electoral significance (in part because they have strongholds in different Swiss cantons). The case of France is an interesting outlier. In the late 1950s and 1960s, the New Left *Parti Socialiste Unifié* flourished in an environment of high electoral volatility, but faltered as the French party system became intensely polarized in the 1970s.[21] Left-libertarian forces tried to make a new start with ecology par-

Table 8
Electoral Volatility and "New Left" or "Ecological" Left-Libertarians

| | *Rising Volatility (1948–1977)* | *Declining Volatility (1948–1977)* |
|---|---|---|
| *Countries with "Green" or Ecology Parties* | CH | A<br>B<br>F<br>FRG |
| *Countries with Left-Socialist or "New Left" Parties* | DK<br>NL<br>N<br>S<br>CH | F |

Source: Calculations of the regression slopes for electoral volatility are taken from Mogens Pederson, "Changing Patterns of Electoral Volatility in European Party Systems, 1948–1977: Explorations in Explanation," in Hans Daalder and Peter Mair, eds., *Western European Party Systems* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1984), 29-66.

[21] See Charles Hauss, *The New Left in France: The Unified Socialist Party* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978), chap. 2.

ties in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but made little headway in an environment inhospitable to the formation of a left-libertarian party (no labor corporatism, brief left tenure in government).

The trade-off between New Left and ecology parties suggests that the two are political equivalents and members of the same family of parties. Where New Left parties have won significant electoral support, ecology parties have not been successful even when they appealed to voters who were ideologically more moderate. Moreover, in the cases of Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands, these moderate libertarians are already served by center-left liberal parties that are complementary to the New Left. Conversely, most successful ecology parties have appeared in countries without successful New Left or center left-libertarian parties. While the New Left has embraced the "ecology" agenda, most ecology parties have accepted the libertarian and anticapitalist spirit of the New Left.

To complete this analysis, we must consider a final catalyst that has triggered the rise of contemporary left-libertarian parties and the convergence of ecologism and the New Left: the nuclear power controversy. Antinuclear activists first attempted to work through the established parties, but neither conservative nor socialist parties were willing to represent and support them, particularly in countries with high labor corporatism and left party governments. In these countries, a high level of alienation from the established political institutions encouraged left-libertarians to resort to the mobilization of antinuclear movements in order to advance their agenda. Although the struggle against nuclear power originated in the pragmatic concerns of scientists and citizens for their health and safety, nuclear power rapidly became a symbol for the technocratic domination of society by government agencies, private enterprise, and unions who defend economic growth and bureaucratic welfare states against the left-libertarian challenge.

The strength or weakness of the nuclear controversy is difficult to determine because cross-national data on the mobilization of opponents to nuclear power are confined to inventories of case studies.[22] Ideally, opinion polls, the incidence of mass demonstrations against nuclear facilities, and politically motivated delays in the construction and licensing of nuclear facilities would be valuable measures of the strength of antinuclear movements. In practice, we must rely on informed judgment about the intensity of conflicts in each country (see Table 9).

[22] See Anna Gyorgy, ed., *No Nukes: Everyone's Guide to Nuclear Power* (Boston: Southend Press, 1979), and Lutz Mez, ed., *Der Atomkonflikt: Atomindustrie, Atompolitik und Anti-Atombewegung im internationalen Vergleich* [Nuclear conflict: Nuclear industry, nuclear policy, and the antinuclear movement in international comparison] (Berlin: Olle & Wolter, 1979).

TABLE 9
LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTIES AND THE NUCLEAR POWER CONTROVERSY (1975-1980)

| | *Intense Nuclear Controversy* | *No Intense Nuclear Controversy* |
|---|---|---|
| *Significant Left-Libertarian Parties Exist* | A<br>DK<br>NL<br>S<br>CH<br>FRG | B<br>F<br>N |
| *No Significant Left-Libertarian Parties Exist* | US | AUS<br>CND<br>FI<br>IRE<br>I<br>J<br>NZ<br>UK |

*CR* = .78 (France = 1)
*CR* = .83 (France = 0)

Among the countries without relevant left-libertarian parties, only the United States sustained a fairly intense nuclear power controversy throughout the early 1970s, even though Britain, Canada, Finland, Italy, and Japan also developed extensive nuclear power programs. From about 1975 on, most countries with left-libertarian parties have experienced intense nuclear power controversies. Belgium, Norway, and France are exceptions. Belgium was already far advanced with its nuclear power program before antinuclear protests reached their peak in the mid-1970s. Norway did not have any nuclear plants and only briefly pondered construction of such facilities. France is difficult to classify: an initially intense antinuclear mobilization in the mid-1970s triggered the participation of ecologists in local and regional elections. After that, government repression, the oppositional Socialist Party's attempts to co-opt antinuclear activists, and the movement's complete lack of policy impact quelled the mobilization of collective protest.[23] These factors probably

[23] The interaction between state and challenging anti-nuclear movements is analyzed in comparative perspective in Herbert Kitschelt, "Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest. Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies," *British Journal of Politial Science* 16 (No. 1, 1986), 57-85.

also lessened the electoral chances of the French ecologists in the early 1980s.

There is some evidence that the nuclear power controversy was particularly intense in countries in which the social democrats participated in the government. In these cases, the large left parties supported the nuclear programs unambiguously. Since the conservative parties were also committed to nuclear power, no significant political force in the arena of parliamentary politics stood up against nuclear power. In Sweden, this configuration precipitated the move of the moderate-libertarian Center Party to an antinuclear position and pushed the Swedish communists further toward left-libertarian demands. In numerous other countries, it created or reinforced electoral support for new left-libertarian parties.

However, the link between the left's participation in government and the intensity of the nuclear power controversy as a precipitating condition of left-libertarian party formation is far from perfect. The United States is an obvious outlier: the conflict was fairly intense even though many Democrats and even a significant number of northeastern Republicans opposed nuclear power. Belgium and Finland implemented ambitious nuclear power programs during periods of socialist participation in government, but did not witness strong conflicts over nuclear power. To sum up, nuclear power controversies in the 1970s contributed to the emergence or strengthening of left-libertarian parties, but were certainly not the prime determinants of innovation in Western party systems.

## VI. Social Structure and Political Opportunities: A Synthesis

After having considered structural, institutional, and precipitating conditions for the emergence of left-libertarian parties, we can combine the five strongest predictors of party formation. Since the relatively high collinearity among the five independent variables rules out a meaningful multivariate analysis of their contribution, a weaker analytical technique is required. The dichotomized values on the five independent variables yield a summary "bet" of how likely left-libertarian party formation is in each of the eighteen countries. Table 10 provides this information. In four countries, all variables correctly predict party formation; in four other countries, four out of five variables make the correct prediction; and in eight cases, the variables predict the absence of left-libertarian parties. Only two ambiguous cases remain: the United States and France.

Individual macrosocietal and political variables reveal serious "anomalies" in a number of countries. The explanatory model of five variables

| | Per Capita GNP | | Social Security Expenditure | | Strike Activity 1965–1981 | | Left Parties in Government | | Intensity of Nuclear Controversy | | Odds for the Emergence of Left-Libertarian Parties |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | High | Low | High | Low | High | Low | High | Low | High | Low | |
| Denmark | X | | X | | | X | X | | X | | 5 : 0 |
| Netherlands | X | | X | | | X | X | | X | | 5 : 0 |
| Sweden | X | | X | | | X | X | | X | | 5 : 0 |
| West Germany | X | | X | | | X | X | | X | | 5 : 0 |
| Austria | | X | X | | | X | X | | X | | 4 : 1 |
| Belgium | X | | X | | | X | X | | | X | 4 : 1 |
| Norway | X | | X | | | X | X | | | X | 4 : 1 |
| Switzerland | X | | | X | | X | X | | X | | 4 : 1 |
| France | X | | X | | X | | | X | | X | 2 : 3 |
| United States | X | | | X | X | | | X | X | | 2 : 3 |
| Finland | | X | | X | X | | X | | | X | 1 : 4 |
| Ireland | | X | X | | X | | | X | | X | 1 : 4 |
| Japan | | X | | X | | X | | X | | X | 1 : 4 |
| United Kingdom | | X | | X | X | | X | | | X | 1 : 4 |
| Australia | | X | | X | X | | | X | | X | 0 : 5 |
| Canada | | X | | X | X | | | X | | X | 0 : 5 |
| Italy | | X | | X | X | | | X | | X | 0 : 5 |
| New Zealand | | X | | X | X | | | X | | X | 0 : 5 |

removes most of these anomalies. A combination of the five variables correctly predicts the presence or absence of significant left-libertarian parties in almost all countries. In the two ambiguous cases, the socioeconomic variables strongly predict the presence of significant left-libertarian parties, but the political variables do not. Because I may have overrated the nuclear controversy in the United States, the U.S. case is quite close to that of countries without left-libertarian parties. France remains the most ambiguous case. Economic affluence and the development of the welfare state favor the emergence of left-libertarian parties, and the nuclear power controversy must be placed somewhere between the "strong" and the "weak" antinuclear movements. Yet in France, as in the United States, the relevant institutional and conjunctural political preconditions of left-libertarian party formation are clearly absent. France has a societal potential to generate left-libertarian parties, but it also has an unfavorable concrete political opportunity structure.

In view of the causal patterns that underlie the formation of left-libertarian parties in each of the eighteen democracies, France should be reclassified as a country *without* significant left-libertarian parties. Conversely, Sweden and Switzerland, which were originally introduced as "borderline" cases along with France, clearly show the same causal pattern encountered in countries with left-libertarian parties; they should be classified accordingly.

Overall, the model's link between macro-societal and political variables makes theoretical sense.[24] Societal changes drive the transformation of citizens' wants, but these lead to the emergence of political parties only if political opportunities and constraints make it rational for actors to step outside the established channels of political communication, and if polarizing conflicts of high symbolic importance create the initial conditions that establish a consensus among actors about the nature and outlook of the new left-libertarian parties.

If we are looking for theoretical parsimony of the explanatory model only, the least ambiguous predictor of left-libertarian parties in the sample of the eighteen democracies is the level of strike activity. (This variable—improperly—predicts only a single case: Japan.) Theoretical parsi-

[24] For the general study of collective social mobilization, an approach that combines social transformation, political opportunity structures, and precipitating conditions was outlined by Neil Smelser, *The Theory of Collective Behavior* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1963). To explain party formation, Smelser's framework has been elaborated by Pinard (fn. 19); Charles Hauss and David Rayside, "The Development of New Parties," in Louis Maisel and Joseph Cooper, eds., *Political Parties: Development and Decay* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage); and Frank L. Wilson, "Sources of Party Transformation: The Case of France," in Peter Merkl, ed., *Western European Party Systems* (New York: Free Press, 1980).

mony, however, would be bought at the cost of ignoring the complex web of interacting conditions that cumulatively make the emergence of left-libertarian parties more likely. Strike activity is only one indicator in the syndrome that includes economic development, social policy, corporatism, and left-party governments and is responsible for the rise of left-libertarian parties.

Conversely, one could argue that the analysis of political opportunity structures developed above is too narrow because it focuses almost exclusively on the political organization of class cleavage in advanced capitalist democracies. While a number of variables commonly employed to characterize modern party systems do not shed new light on the rise of left-libertarian parties,[25] there is some evidence that electoral rules influence the number and formation of new parties.[26] Indeed, none of the five countries with plurality voting systems (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States) has a relevant left-libertarian party. On the other hand, countries with qualified proportional electoral rules in which political forces must join alliances to overcome minimum thresholds of parliamentary representation (e.g., 4 or 5 percent of the vote) do in many cases have relevant left-libertarian parties.

All of our cases with plurality voting systems, however, are heavily "overdetermined" by one or several of the structural and institutional variables (affluence, the welfare state, labor corporatism, and left party governments). There is no "hard" test for the significance of electoral laws (e.g., a configuration in which electoral rules are unfavorable to new parties), but most other variables suggest the rise of left-libertarian parties. We find, however, that in countries with majority rule, such as Britain, Canada, New Zealand, and even the United States, third-party challenges around other than left-libertarian issues and cleavages do occur and sometimes gain electoral support far stronger than that received by left-libertarian parties in countries with the most favorable structural conditions. This observation suggests that electoral laws do not have the overriding importance that some studies of party systems attribute to them. Even where a majority voting system prevents a new party from winning any seats, rational voters may support it because they believe the

[25] The fractionalization and the number of cleavages incorporated in party systems, for instance, show little association with the rise of left-libertarian parties. These common measures of party systems apparently do not capture relevant political opportunity structures to explain the new left-libertarian cohort of parties.

[26] Cf. Arend Lijphart, *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), chap. 9; Robert Harmel and John D. Robertson, "Formation and Success of New Parties: A Cross-National Analysis," *International Political Science Review* 6 (No. 4, 1985), 501-23.

new party has long-term prospects of displacing one of the established parties or can at least force them to listen to new political demands.

## VII. Breakdown Theories and Left-Libertarian Parties

We are now in a position to examine the competing breakdown theories of party formation. According to functionalist breakdown theories, collective mobilization is rooted in conjunctural discrepancies between the prevailing expectations in a society and its capacity to attain them. Collective protest will subside when this gap closes. Marxist breakdown theories are less optimistic about the restoration of an equilibrium between expectations and societal performance. For our purposes, however, functionalist and Marxist breakdown theories have the same empirical content: they predict the formation of left-libertarian parties when relative deprivation is rising. Furthermore, the new parties may be expected to decrease when societies improve their performance and attain the values that legitimize the existing social order.

Breakdown models of party formation build on economic variables; political and cultural conditions also play a role. Boy, Bürklin, and Alber have interpreted the rise of ecology parties as a crisis response of the educated younger generation to the frustrations of tight labor markets and the fierce competition for scarce positions in the political elite.[27] The promise of rapid upward social mobility that accompanied the widening of educational opportunities for the young was broken by the economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s and the demands of labor markets. Breakdown theorists interpret the support of the educated young for ecology parties and their postmaterialist antigrowth program as sour-grapes logic: because society does not provide the *means* for rapid upward mobility, the young army of the overeducated and under employed also rejects the *ends* of social success that are associated with this society: affluence, power, and social status, as well as the system of economic growth and bureaucratic politics that supports these values. The young counter-elites thus propose an alternative model of societal organization and use left-libertarian parties to realize it.

[27] See Boy (fn. 4), 414-15; Wilhelm P. Bürklin, "Value Change and Partisan Realignment in West Germany 1970-1983: Recent Findings and some Political Interpretations," paper prepared for delivery at the American Political Science Association Convention, Washington, DC, August 30 to September 2, 1984; Bürklin (fn. 4); Jens Alber, "Modernisierung, neue Spannungslinien und die politischen Chancen der Grünen" [Modernization, new cleavages, and the political chances of the Greens], *Politische Vierteljahresschriften* 26 (No. 3, 1985), 211-26.

Empirically, economic and political breakdown theorists expect th: improving chances of upward mobility—or a resumption of econom growth—and a readjustment of expectations will erode the left-liberta ian electorate. Alber, for instance, predicts that the West German Greeı will falter when the "intellectual proletariat" disappears with econom recovery and greater realism among young academics.[28]

Some authors link cultural conditions to the economic and politic: breakdown theories of party formation.[29] Frustrated expectations coir cide with the coming-of-age of a third political generation of West Geı mans that does not share the political commitments of the "founding generation of the Republic or of its conformist offspring, and that ider tifies only weakly with the established parties. This generational chang feeds into the general disillusionment with the performance of industri: societies and triggers a shift of values toward a romantic anti-industri: "idealism." The Greens represent such a convergence of generation: change and political-economic decline.

Other cultural breakdown arguments have gained popularity amon American intellectuals who see the Greens and the peace movement : the natural consequence of persisting predemocratic, authoritarian, rc mantic, and nationalist traditions in German society that reject industri: technology, liberalism, and competitive political systems.[30] Economic cr sis and declining U.S. world leadership are seen to have brought th long-standing current to the surface again.

Breakdown theories of left-libertarian party formation must face number of criticisms. They draw questionable inferences about indivic ual motivations and values from an insufficient basis of empirical evı dence. Moreover, they fail to consider the breadth of support for left-lit

[28] See Alber, *ibid.* To be fair, Bürklin combines breakdown theory and structural chanş and is more inclined to believe that the West German Greens are here to stay. It is not clea however, whether breakdown and structural change arguments are compatible with eac other in Bürklin's work. See Wilhlem P. Bürklin, "The German Greens: The Post-Industri Non-Established and the Party System," *International Political Science Review* 6 (No. 4, 1985 463-81.

[29] See Wilhelm P. Bürklin, *Grüne Politik. Ideologische Zyklen, Wähler und Parteiensyste* [Green politics: Ideological cycles, voters, and party system] (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verla 1984).

[30] This view is popular in liberal and conservative editorial opinion, as well as in the wor of some recognized historians. See Gordon Craig, *The Germans* (New York: Meridian, 1982 210-11, and Walter Laqueur, *Germany Today: A Personal Report* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1985 162-74. For a critique of the West German peace movement, see especially Russel Bermaı "Opposition to Rearmament and West German Culture," *Telos* (No. 56, 1983), 141-47. more balanced assessment of the peace movement and nationalism in German politics is prc vided by Andrei S. Markovits, "On Anti-Americanism in West Germany," *New German Cri tique* (No. 34, 1985), 3-27.

ertarian parties, and they lack a systematic comparative framework to test their arguments.

Breakdown theories rely on the same demographic data about voters and sympathizers of left-libertarian parties as structural change theories, but they attribute a sour-grapes logic to the young and educated who are still in the early stages of their professional careers or who are still in the educational system. In the absence of empirical evidence, these data warrant other motivational interpretations as well. For instance, young people may reject the present economic and political institutions, and *therefore* choose educational tracks that rarely lead to high-status professional careers, but possibly to personal growth and a convivial lifestyle. The social-structure attributes of left-libertarian voters as such do not reveal which of these competing motivational interpretations is correct. The psychological assumptions of breakdown theories thus rest on shaky empirical ground.

There are empirical data to refute one specific variant of the cultural breakdown theory—the characterization of the West German Greens as successors to earlier predemocratic traditions. According to surveys taken in the 1970s, supporters of left-libertarian social movements strongly approve of democratic institutions and procedures, but criticize the unresponsiveness of the existing political elites to the new issues.[31] Also, Green sympathizers were found to express a radical-democratic and not an antidemocratic or nationalist spirit.[32] The approval of democratic institutions coincides with rejection of the existing political elites.[33] National identification is lower among Green supporters than among any other group in the German population.

Breakdown theorists also encounter problems with the quantitative calibration of their arguments. The individuals to whom breakdown theorists attribute a sour-grapes logic represent only a small segment of left-libertarian sympathizers. Again, data on the most closely researched case, that of the West German Greens, are instructive. In the first half of 1984, surveys found that 13 percent of the unemployed supported the Greens. Among unemployed academics, no less than 41 percent said they would vote for the Greens in a general election.[34] These figures must be put into

[31] See Samuel H. Barnes and Max Kaase, eds., *Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1979).

[32] Bürklin (fn. 4), p. 206.

[33] Bürklin (fn. 29), p. 199.

[34] Ursula Feist, Dieter Fröhlich, and Hubert Krieger, "Die politischen Einstellungen von Arbeitslosen" [The political attitudes of the unemployed], *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 34 (No. 45, 1984), 3-17.

perspective, however. After a short-time high in 1984, support for th Greens among the unemployed fell back to a level that differs little fron support in the overall population. In early 1985, only about 8 percent o 2.5 million unemployed, or 0.2 million voters, supported the Greens.[35] That is less than 10 percent of the 2.1 million Green votes cast in the 198 federal election. The subgroup of unemployed academics amounts t fewer than 5 percent of the Green voters. Moreover, it is inconsistent wit breakdown theories that the Greens enjoy considerable support amon educated members of the middle class who are in their thirties, work i occupations with relatively high prestige, and display a fairly high leve of economic "saturation."

Like economic and cultural breakdown theories, political breakdow arguments lack empirical support. There is no evidence that signals a rel ative or an absolute decline in the circulation of the West German polit ical elite during the 1970s and 1980s.[36] To the contrary, elite circulatio has probably been higher in recent decades than in the 1950s and 1960s because the generation of political leaders who had remained in powe since the immediate post-World War II years finally had to step aside. I may be true that more young university graduates avoid the "sweatshop" of parties, bureaucracies, and corporations to make a professional career but this trend would say more about changing preferences than about re duced opportunities to rise in the ranks of political and economic elites.

The greatest weakness of all breakdown theories is their lack of com parative analysis and empirical confirmation. If the peculiar predemo cratic German political tradition is essential to the rise of the left-libertar ian Greens and the peace movement, why is it that countries with more fortunate democratic histories have developed similar movements and parties? And is it true that countries with a poor record of economic per formance in the 1970s were more likely to spawn left-libertarian parties than countries with a better record?

If breakdown theories were correct, we could expect left-libertarian parties in countries with above-average rates of inflation and high levels of unemployment. An even better measure of relative deprivation and breakdown is the rate of *change* in economic performance within coun tries over time. Those countries that have experienced the most precipi tous economic decline in the 1970s should also be the ones most likely to

[35] Hubert Krieger, "Arbeitsmarktsituation und politische Stabilität: Reaktionsformen abhängig Beschäftigter auf die Arbeitsmarktentwicklung 1975-1985" [Labor market situation and political stability: Patterns of reaction among employees to labor market developments], *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 36 (No. 17, 1986), 3-15.

[36] Bürklin (fns. 27 and 29) emphasizes declining elite circulation as a cause of left-libertarian party support.

develop strong left-libertarian parties. In Table 11, the decline of average economic growth rates and the increase of average unemployment rates from the period 1967-1973 to the period 1974-1980 measures the intensity of relative deprivation within the countries.

Columns 1 and 2 provide the mean values for the four economic "misery indices" in the eighteen democracies with or without significant left-libertarian parties. They do not reveal any positive association between party formation and economic misery. In fact, the coefficients of reproducibility, correlation coefficients, and significance levels of the associations in a LOGIT least squares regression show that, if there are any statistical relationships, they are the reverse of those predicted by breakdown theories: countries with significant left-libertarian parties have lower levels of unemployment and consumer price increases than countries without these parties. A similar, though weaker and statistically insignificant association applies to the two other measures of economic change.

Only one socioeconomic indicator tends to support the breakdown theory. In countries with rapidly growing student populations, the income advantages and the job security of people with a higher education diminish.[17] Due to the deterioration of their market position, young academics in these countries may constitute a large pool of frustrated and politically restless people willing to support new political parties. And that, indeed, is quite strongly associated with the presence of significant left-libertarian parties, as coefficients of reproducibility, LOGIT analysis, and correlation coefficients reveal (see Table 12).

Even this finding must be interpreted cautiously. We must presuppose the validity of the sour-grapes logic in order to count the impact of educational opportunities on left-libertarian parties as support for the breakdown theories. Moreover, only a limited percentage of left-libertarian voters is exposed to the potential frustrations of a contemporary university education. Comparative information is missing, but the point can be illustrated with West German data. Surveys show that postmaterialist value inclinations are a stronger predictor of the Green vote than educational accomplishment.[18] In one representative sample, only 22.4 percent of Green sympathizers in the early 1980s were under thirty years old *and* held a secondary-school diploma that enabled them to attend university.[19]

On the whole, the evidence supporting breakdown theories is thus very limited and not empirically solid. There can be little doubt that

[17] See Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Hugh Heclo, and Carolyn Teich-Adams, *Comparative Public Policy*, 2d ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), 49-51.
[18] Bürklin (fn. 27), Tables 7 and 8.
[19] *Ibid.*

TABLE 11

INDICATORS OF ECONOMIC MISERY AND LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTIES*

| | *Significant Left-Libertarian Parties Exist* | *No Significant Left-Libertarian Parties Exist* | *CR for the Association of Economic Indicators and Parties* | *r* | *p* (LOGIT) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Average level of unemployment (1974–1980)*[a] | 3.2% | 5.0% | .22 | −.43 | .08 |
| *Average increase of the consumer price index (1973–1980)*[b] | 8.0% | 12.6% | .28 | −.70 | .05 |
| *Decline in real per capita GDP growth (average 1974–80 vs. 1967–73)*[c] | −2.0% | −2.4% | .50 | .21 | .4 |
| *Rise of unemployment as percent of labor force (1974–1980)*[d] | 1.5% | 2.3% | .33 | −.25 | .3 |

* France = 0

Sources: [a] OECD, *Historical Statistics, 1960–80* (Paris: OECD, 1982), Table 2-14.
[b] *Ibid.*, Table 2-13.
[c] *Ibid.*, Table 3-2.
[d] *Ibid.*, Table 2-14.

TABLE 12
LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTIES AND THE INCREASE IN THE STUDENT POPULATION
(Student increase per 100,000 inhabitants, 1975–1980)

| | *Increase Greater Than 210 Students* | *Increase Smaller Than 210 Students* |
|---|---|---|
| *Significant Left-Libertarian Parties Exist* (Average 298.1%) | A (542)<br>B (380)<br>FRG (324)<br>N (277)<br>NL (440)<br>S (477)<br>CH (306) | DK (−105)<br>F (42) |
| *No Significant Left-Libertarian Parties Exist* (Average 150.6%) | I (214)<br>AUS (218) | CND (79)<br>FI (108)<br>IRE (179)<br>J (53)<br>NZ (201)<br>UK (172)<br>US (181) |
| (Overall Average 196.5) | | |

Source: UNESCO, *Statistical Digest 1984* (Paris: UNESCO, 1984)

STATISTICAL INTERPRETATION

| | *France = 1* | *France = 0* |
|---|---|---|
| *CR* | .78 | .83 |
| *r* | .44 | .57 |
| *p* (LOGIT) | .09 | .04 |

macrostructural and resource-mobilization approaches provide much firmer evidence to explain the rise of left-libertarian parties.

## CONCLUSION: THE PROSPECTS OF LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTIES

Left-libertarian parties are likely to emerge in economically advanced and (usually) small corporatist welfare states. These countries provide a structural and institutional setting that is conducive to a change in popular preference toward left-libertarian politics. Simultaneously, they

severely restrict the chances that new demands can be articu through established parties and interest groups. Electoral laws, par larly qualified proportional representation, may affect the chances of libertarian party formation; but, by themselves, they appear to be o secondary factor. Two precipitating conditions increase the chanc left-libertarian party formation. First, extended periods of left party ticipation in government dispel hopes among left-libertarian voters *their demands are compatible with the traditional left redistributiv* litical agenda. Second, the nuclear power controversies of the 1970s 1980s aggravate the tensions between the old redistributive and the libertarian left and accentuate the left-libertarians' disaffection wit traditional parties.

Macrostructural and resource-mobilization approaches thus of rather sophisticated interpretation of the phenomenon of the left-l tarian party. They lead us to the conclusion that left-libertarian pa are more than short-term "flash" parties, and result from a comple teraction of institutional and conjunctural factors. They do not repr merely another competitor in electoral politics; rather, they result and attack a comprehensive network of interest intermediation bet state and civil society of which parties are only one element.

Breakdown theories, on the other hand, predict the demise of libertarian parties when temporary societal strains disappear. Is it ranted, then, to infer from macrostructural and resource-mobiliz theories that left-libertarian parties are about to establish themselves manently in advanced welfare state democracies? Even if we rejec breakdown argument, the competing economic and political interp tion of the left-libertarian phenomenon adds some caveats about th ture of the new party cohort. Explaining the *emergence* of political pa is one thing; explaining their long-term *persistence* is another. though left-libertarian issues apparently constitute a new *cleavage di sion* in modern politics, this cleavage will not necessarily spawn pe nent independent political parties.

The structural and political changes on which left-libertarian elec support is based are far from being permanent and irreversible. The fare state has recently come under attack in Europe; labor corpora has noticeably declined in the 1980s; and a renewed discipline of the ketplace may challenge the foundations of economic security and a ence on which left-libertarian parties rest. Under such circumstances dominant political agenda of Western democracies would most li shift away from the highly publicized left-libertarian issues so promi in the 1970s and 1980s—ecology, energy, feminism, and nuclear a

ient—and reestablish an exclusive hegemony of economic-distributive ruggles.

In a sense, left-libertarian parties pursue a political agenda that could ·ode the institutional underpinnings on which they have thrived. They ght against the bureaucratic welfare state, labor corporatism, and the ructural rigidities of elite bargaining in "consensual" democracies. Al-iough their vision of social change differs radically from that of conser-ıtive free-market ideologies, their attack on the post-World War II po-ıical and economic class compromise could unintentionally play into the ands of conservative political forces; if it undermines the organized ɔwer of labor, it may recenter the political conflict on distributive issues.

The outlook for left-libertarian parties also depends on the strategic ioves of their competitors. Conservative parties would hardly become a ıreat to the electoral support of left libertarian parties; but in a number f countries, socialist and social democratic parties have been ousted from ›vernment office in the 1980s. As opposition parties, they have greater ıcentives and opportunities to blur the issues that separate their work-ıg-class supporters from left-libertarian constituencies and to present ıemselves as politically more effective representatives of left-libertarian ıuses than the left-libertarian parties themselves. Because their support-·s show little party loyalty, this social democratic strategy may become a ·rious threat for left-libertarian parties. Most left-libertarians are edu-ıted, highly sophisticated individuals who are more likely to vote stra-·gically than on the basis of stable party identifications.

Once back in power, however, left parties that have successfully rein-grated the left-libertarian electorate will inevitably display strains and ›nflicts among their different electoral constituencies. The West Ger-ıan Social Democrats, for instance, absorbed left-libertarian sentiments ı the early 1970s, but paid a high price for this success in terms of inter-al organizational disruption, factionalism, and endemic conflicts—'hich eventually contributed to their electoral decline in the 1980s.[40] In ıis sense, traditional social democratic or socialist parties may only tem-orarily halt the rise of left-libertarian parties.

Finally, the future of left-libertarian parties does not depend only on ›nditions and competitors in their environment, but also on their own rategic capabilities. In this respect, left-libertarian parties face a difficult ısk. On the one hand, they must preserve the fluid, open organizational ›rm and the obstructionist quality of their political strategies that chal-

[40] See Gerard Braunthal, *The West German Social Democrats, 1969-1982: Profile of a Party in ɔwer* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982).

lenge the highly institutionalized corporatist welfare state and maintai
the loyalty of the left-libertarian core constituencies. On the other han
left-libertarian parties must become effective political players both
terms of electoral appeal and of impact on public policy. In parliamenta
multiparty systems, this usually presupposes a cohesive, disciplined par
organization with a consistent, moderate political strategy that appeals
marginal voters. Left-libertarian parties must resolve the conflict betwe
a logic of representing a constituency that is oriented toward the visio
of the core party militants and activists in left-libertarian movements a
a logic of party competition that upholds standards of electoral succ
and external strategic effectiveness in the pursuit of policy gains.[41]

[41] For a close analysis of the internal dynamic of left-libertarian parties, see Herbert K
schelt, "Logics of Party Formation. Structure and Strategy of the Belgian and West Gern
Ecology Parties" (mimeo), Duke University, 1986 (forthcoming, 1988).

# *Review Articles*

# NEOREALISM AND NEOLIBERALISM

By JOSEPH S. NYE, JR.*

Robert O. Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and Its Critics*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986. 378 pp.
Richard Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State*. New York: Basic Books, 1986. 268 pp.

INTERNATIONAL relations theory is constrained by the fact that history provides a poor substitute for a laboratory. In world politics, a relatively small number of states play major roles, along with many other entities that seek to influence events. Even if one focuses on state behavior, one is confronted by few independent events and by multiple causes of behavior at different levels of analysis. Furthermore, strategic interaction is inherently indeterminate, and states often have incentives to deceive observers. To use an analogy from another social science, multiple causality makes some aspects of international relations more like macroeconomics than like microeconomics, and strategic indeterminacy means that the relevant analogy in microeconomics would be the troubled area of oligopoly theory.

Moreover, most theorists of international relations suffer from being in the middle of events, rather than viewing them from a distance. Thus it is not surprising that international relations theory has always been strongly affected by current political concerns. This is true even for the Realists with their parsimonious efforts to state eternal truths. Thucydides, the founding father of Realism, presented a structural account of the origins of the Peloponnesian War in part because of the lessons he wished to teach his fellow citizens.[1] When Hans J. Morgenthau wrote his postwar classic, *Politics Among Nations*, he was clearly intent on instructing *his* fellow citizens about the importance of avoiding the idealist and iso-

* I am grateful to Robert Beschel, Sean Lynn-Jones, Andrew Moravcsik, and David Welch for comments.

[1] Donald Kagan, *The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1969).

lationist fantasies of the interwar period. Even the neorealist structu theories of Kenneth Waltz can best be read as exhortations to policyma ers and fellow citizens about how they *ought* to respond to the structu of power rather than as accurate accounts of how the two superpow behave.

## The Changing Context of Theory

In the early 1970s, many theorists, reflecting current concerns, ov reacted to the traditional theories of Realism. There was widespread pugnance to the Vietnam War, and detente seemed to reduce the imp tance of the nuclear competition. At the same time, international tra grew more rapidly than world product. Transnational corporations r only developed patterns of international production, but in some i stances played dramatic political roles as well. All this occurred agains backdrop of declining U.S. economic predominance—from one-third less than one-quarter of world product. President Nixon and Secretary State Kissinger spoke of the development of a five-power world, and turologists such as Herman Kahn predicted the imminent arrival o multipolar international system.[2]

On top of all this came the oil crisis of 1973. Some very weak sta extracted enormous resources from the strong. Even Hans Morgenth described what he called an unprecedented divorce of military and e nomic power based on the control of raw materials.[3] The vulnerability the Western societies at a period of high commodity prices encourag many of the less developed countries to believe that a greater transf mation of power had occurred than was actually the case. A number theorists reflected these concerns. Among the modernist writers of 1970s, a representative view was that

> the forces now ascendant appear to be leaning toward a global society with out a dominant structure of cooperation and conflict—a *polyarchy* in whic nation-states, subnational groups, and transnational special interests an communities would all be vying for the support and loyalty of individuals and conflicts would have to be resolved primarily on the basis of ad ho bargaining in a shifting context of power relationships.[4]

[2] Herman Kahn and B. Bruce-Briggs, *Things to Come* (New York: Macmillan, 1972).
[3] Hans J. Morgenthau, "The New Diplomacy of Movement," *Encounter* 43 (August 19 52-57, at 56.
[4] Seyom Brown, *New Forces in World Politics* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 19 186.

By the late 1970s the mood began to change both in the United States and in the United Nations. East-West concerns started to supplant North-South issues at the top of foreign policy agendas. The experience of the Carter administration reflects the changes in American opinion: while campaigning in 1976, Jimmy Carter promised to reduce the defense budget, but by 1980 his position was closer to that of his rival, Reagan, than to his own previous position. The election of Ronald Reagan to the American presidency accentuated these trends. American policy focused on East-West confrontation and scaled down North-South issues and the role of multilateral institutions. The defense budget increased in real terms for five straight years, and the United States became more willing to use military force, albeit against extremely weak states such as Grenada and Libya. Arms control was downgraded and the modernization of nuclear forces was seen as restoring an "edge" for additional utility of military force. This shifting agenda of world politics saw a resurgence of Realist analysis, for history seemed to have vindicated the Realist model.

While some analysts in the 1970s tended to overstate the obsolescence of the nation-state, the decline of force, and the irrelevance of security concerns, some in the early 1980s unduly neglected the role of transnational actors and economic interdependence. Contrary to the tone of much political rhetoric and some political analyses, the world of the 1980s is not a return to the world of the 1950s. Just as the decline of American power was exaggerated in the 1970s, so was the restoration of American power in the 1980s. Looking carefully at military and economic indices of power resources, one notes that there has been a far greater change in psychology and mood than in these indicators of power resources. The diffusion of power, as measured by shares in world trade or world product, continues. Economic interdependence, as measured by vulnerability to supply shocks, has eased in a period of slack commodity markets, but this could change if markets tighten again and growth of economic transactions continues. Sensitivity to exchange-rate fluctuations has remained high. The costs of the great powers' use of force seem higher than in the 1950s—measured, for instance, by the ease with which the U.S. overthrew governments in Central America and Iran then as contrasted with the 1980s. Moreover, despite rhetoric, relations between the superpowers do not show a return to the Cold War period. Not only are alliances looser, but transactions are higher, and relations between the superpowers reflect a fair degree of "learning" in the nuclear area.[5]

[5] Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Nuclear Learning and U.S.-Soviet Security Regimes," *International Organization* 41 (Summer 1987), 371-402.

## Realism and Liberalism

In a sense, the contrast between the 1970s and the 1980s is merely the latest instance of a recurring dialectic between the two main strands in what has been called the classical tradition of international relations theory. Realism has been the dominant strand;[6] the second is the Liberal or Grotian tradition that tends to stress the impact of domestic and international society, interdependence, and international institutions. In their simplest forms, Liberal theories have been easily discredited. The proposition that the gains from commercial transactions would overcome the problems inherent in the security dilemma and make war too expensive were belied in 1914. Hopes that a system of international law and organization could provide collective security, which would replace the need for self-help inherent in the security dilemma, were disappointed by 1939. Nonetheless, the sharp disagreement between Realism and Liberal theories is overstated. In fact, the two approaches can be complementary. Sophisticated versions of Liberal theory address the manner in which interactions among states and the development of international norms interact with domestic politics of the states in an international system so as to transform the way in which states define their interests. Transnational and interstate interactions and norms lead to new definitions of interests, as well as to new coalition possibilities for different interests within states.

How states define their interests, and how their interests change, has always been a weak area in Realist theory. One of the most thought-provoking questions in international relations is how states learn. How do national interests become defined, and how do those definitions change? Can cooperation be learned? Realist theories maintain that states learn by responding to structural changes in their environment; to put it in game-theory terms, they adjust their behavior to changes in the payoff matrix. When mutual interests or a long shadow of the future suggest that rewards for cooperation are great, states may adopt new strategies in pursuit of their interests. In that case, Realists admit that cooperation can be learned. Although this is sometimes a satisfactory and parsimonious explanation of changing state behavior, it is often incomplete because it says little about how interests themselves are formulated or redefined. It does not show why the same situation may be perceived in totally different ways by successive governments or different leaders. A Bismarck, a Kaiser, and a Hitler can formulate different answers to similar geopolitical situations. Nor does Realist theory note how groups within societies

[6] K. J. Holsti, *The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory* (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985).

can use partners in transnational coalitions or transnational norms and institutions to advance or retard the learning of new interests by their own governments.

Realist theory is better at explaining interactions than interests. A theory of interests defined solely in terms of power is an impoverished theory of interests. Here Liberalism can help. The more sophisticated variants of Liberal theory provide a useful supplement to Realism by directing attention to the ways in which domestic and international factors interact to change states' definitions of their interests. To say that states act in their self-interest is merely tautological (or "change" is reduced to merely a change in means) unless we have a reasonable account of how such interests are perceived and redefined. Both Realism and Liberalism can contribute to such an account.

The major developments in the Liberal tradition of international relations theory in the post-1945 period occurred in studies of regional integration. These studies did not explicitly refer to classical Liberalism; they were generally called "neofunctionalist." Nevertheless, their focus was clearly on issues emphasized in the Liberal tradition. Karl Deutsch concentrated on the development of pluralistic security communities—groups of states that developed reliable expectations of peaceful relations and thereby overcame the security dilemma that Realists see as characterizing international politics. Ernst Haas focused on the uniting of Europe and the transformation of the Franco-German hostility into a postwar economic and political community. Subsequent scholars extended these perspectives on economic, social, and political interdependence and integration to other regions.[7] What these studies had in common was a focus on the ways in which increased transactions and contacts changed attitudes and transnational coalition opportunities, and the ways in which institutions helped to foster such interaction. In short, they emphasized the political processes of learning and of redefining national interests, as encouraged by institutional frameworks and regimes.

In a sense, the development of regional integration theory outstripped the development of regional communities. Predicted changes materialized more slowly than had been expected, which may account for the declining academic interest in the subject during the 1970s. The transformation of Western Europe into a pluralistic security community is real, however, and many of the insights from integration theory were transferred in the early 1970s to the growing and broader dimensions of inter-

[7] Karl Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); Ernst Haas, *The Uniting of Europe* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1958); Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Peace in Parts* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).

national economic interdependence. Studies in transnational relations and interdependence broadened conceptions of how national interests are learned and changed. Some studies explicitly addressed the conditions under which assumptions of Realism were sufficient, or needed to be supplemented by a more complex model of change.[8] Rather than focusing primarily on formal and universalistic organizations such as the United Nations, they devoted much attention to the role of international institutions. The concept of regime was borrowed from international law and broadened to incorporate the whole range of norms, rules, and procedures that constrain states' behavior and around which the actors' expectations converge within a given issue.[9] A rich set of studies applied the concept of regimes to a broad range of behavior in international political economy. But in the climate of the early 1980s, it seemed that the Liberal legacy was relevant only to the peripheral literature on political economy and had little to contribute to the central theory of the field. Kenneth Waltz's *Theory of International Politics*, published in 1979, was a well-timed and elegant restatement of Realism that explicitly cast doubt on the relevance of the writings on interdependence.[10]

The two books reviewed here provide a good opportunity to look at the latest turns in the classic dialectic between Realism and Liberalism. Richard Rosecrance's *The Rise of the Trading State* is clearly in the Liberal tradition. Rosecrance argues that an open trading system offers states ways to transform their positions through economic growth rather than through military conquest. All states can benefit from the enhanced growth. "The basic thrust of trade today is entirely different from what it was in the 1830s, the 1880s, and the 1930s" (p. 227). What is different in the world since 1945 "is that a peaceful trading is enjoying much greater efficacy than ever before. . . ." The main thesis of this book is that a new "trading world of international relations offers the possibility of escaping . . . a vicious cycle and finding new patterns of cooperation among national states" (p. ix).

Robert O. Keohane, in *Neorealism and Its Critics*, features four core chapters of Waltz's influential book and four criticisms of that work. In addition, he includes Waltz's first published reply to his critics. It is rare to have such clear intellectual dialogue in a single volume, and the whole issue is nicely framed by the editor's introductory essay.

[8] Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Power and Interdependence* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977).

[9] Stephen Krasner, ed., *International Regimes* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983).

[10] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979).

## Neorealist Theory

As Keohane points out, the significance of Waltz's work is not in elab-
›rating a new line of theory, but in the systematization of Realism, which
Robert W. Cox (one of the critics) has termed "neorealism." While Hans
. Morgenthau may be the most influential of the postwar Realists, his as-
›irations to create a science of international politics were marred by in-
onsistency in his use of the concepts of power and balance. Moreover, by
›asing international politics on human nature's drive for power, Morgen-
hau explained too little by explaining too much. Human nature does not
dequately account for variation.

Waltz provides a more elegant theoretical basis for Realism. He avoids
eferences to humans pursuing power as an end; pursuit of power as a
neans is sufficient for his theory. Balance-of-power behavior by states is
›redicted from the structure of the international system. A system is a set
f interacting units having behavioral regularities and identity over time.
ts structure defines the ordering of its parts. Structure involves an order-
ıg principle, specification of the functions of different parts, and the dis-
ribution of capabilities. In international politics, the ordering principle is
narchy, interpreted as the absence of a higher government above states.
'he specification of differentiation drops out because states perform sim-
ar functions. Thus, the distribution of capabilities (multipolarity, bipo-
ırity) predicts variations in states' balance-of-power behavior. Waltz
rovides not merely a systemic theory to predict the behavior of the units
states), but a parsimonious *structural* systemic theory.

In a sense, Waltz did for the classical Realists what they never did for
ıemselves. His structural theory provides a simple deductive basis for
/hat was hitherto a heterogeneous set of views about the importance of
ower politics. In the eyes of the critics, however, Waltz's virtues and
ıults are two sides of the same coin. Parsimony has been purchased at
›o high a price. Robert Cox and Richard K. Ashley complain that
Valtz's neorealism has sacrificed the interpretive richness of classical
.ealism as a critical theory in order to transform it into a positivistic
roblem-solving theory. Although that may be true, neither essay pro-
ides a compelling alternative, and Waltz in his reply is quite happy to
:t their remarks roll off his back.

Keohane and John G. Ruggie launch more telling criticisms. Keohane
oints out that Waltz's spare structural definition of system ignores in-
:rnational economic processes and institutions that can also have strong
ffects on states' behavior. Ruggie argues that Waltz has not only ignored
ıanges in the density of interactions in systems, but has been too quick

in assuming that the differentiation in units can be dropped as a characteristic of the structure of the international system. In the short term, states may be the dominant units and play a similar functional role, but over long periods other units may grow in importance, and roles may alter. Ruggie points to the evolution of the concept of territoriality at the end of the feudal era to illustrate such generative changes, and argues that Waltz's theory is too static to explain such changes.

Waltz replies that "a structural theory of international politics can fix ranges of outcomes and identify general tendencies.... We cannot hope to predict specific outcomes" (p. 344). He would not deny the importance of change at the unit level. "Realist theory by itself can handle some, but not all, of the problems that concern us.... Yet some successful predictions can be made without paying attention to states" (p. 331). Structural analyses "tell us a small number of big and important things" (p. 329). If we add more variables, theoretical acuity gives way to rich and dense description. Many unit-level factors, such as density of interactions, demographic trends, resource constraints, national ideologies, and political systems, can affect systemic outcomes. Indeed, in the case of nuclear weapons, "a unit-level change has much diminished a structural effect" (p. 327). But it is a mistake to mingle structural and unit levels. Just as "economists get along quite well with separate theories of markets and firms" (p. 340), we shall have to get along with separate theories of international politics and of states.

Waltz has a valid point about the selectivity of theory and the costs of mixing unit and structural characteristics. But his reply to his critics is not entirely satisfactory. First, as Keohane points out in his Introduction, many economists are unhappy about the disjunction between the assumptions of microeconomics and what is known about the behavior of firms. Moreover, oligopoly theory tends to be indeterminate, and efforts to establish a rational-expectations micro-basis for macroeconomics have been problematic. In the words of one economist, the danger for a clinical profession is that "the models become more real than more explicitly descriptive reality."[11]

Second, Waltz accuses Ruggie of reductionism—the explanation of the whole by explaining the behavior of the parts. That is neither good nor bad *per se*. In a parsimonious systemic explanation, the behavior of the parts is handled by assumptions of rationality and the constraining conditions produced by the structure of the system. "Socialization and com-

[11] Francis M. Bator, *The State of Macroeconomics* (Kennedy School Discussion Paper 1520, Cambridge, MA: 1986), 19.

petition are two aspects of a process by which the variety of behavior and outcomes is reduced." Systems theories explain why different units behave similarly; unit theories explain why different units behave differently despite similar placement in a system. But Waltz's own assignment of characteristics to the systemic and unit levels seems odd. It is easy to understand why characteristics of a particular leader or political culture or domestic regime fit at the unit level. In his words, "a theory about foreign policy is a theory at the national level."[12] But why are demographic trends, transnational flows, and military technology that affect all (or many) states assigned to the unit level? It is particularly odd to see nuclear technology described as a unit characteristic that has had "system-wide" pacific effects (p. 327). Waltz has no way of knowing whether the vaunted stability of the bipolar system is caused by a structural or a unit-level characteristic. Moreover, by assigning everything except the distribution of capabilities to the unit level, that category becomes a dumping ground hindering theory building at anything but the structural level. The result may be theoretical parsimony, but parsimony is not the only way by which one judges good theory. Good theory also requires a good explanatory fit.

A third problem with Waltz's reply to his critics relates to his handling of false predictions. Waltz correctly states that a few false predictions do not falsify a theory. He admits that he will often need to supplement his sparse neorealist theory with foreign policy explanations in order to account for anomalous cases. But sometimes his handling of anomalies runs the risk of being retrogressive in Lakatos's terms—i.e., it explains less and directs researchers away from new information.[13] In response to Keohane's evidence that Canada, a weak state, has often prevailed over the United States, Waltz introduces a power-activation hypothesis: "I suspect that American officials hardly cared about the outcomes or even noticed what they might be" (p. 333). But aside from the danger of tautology, such a reply ignores the evidence that the cases Keohane cites were at the presidential level, and that some, such as oil trade in 1974, were highly visible and politicized.

Some anomalies are forgiven for any theory that has a broad explanatory power and that points to the discovery of new empirical information. But Waltz's theory does not score well on those criteria: it describes a system as stable if it remains anarchic and there is no consequential change

[12] Waltz (fn. 10), 77, 72.

[13] Imre Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes," in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds., *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

in the number of political units. By this definition, the multipolar system was stable for 300 years until World War II reduced it to the current bipolar system, which has been stable because no third state has been able to develop capabilities comparable to those of the United States and the Soviet Union.[14] But this portrayal of history by the theory leaves an enormous number of important changes unaccounted for, and lends credence to the charge that it is too static. There are so few strands in the web of Waltz's theoretical net that even very big fish slip through it. The change from a flexible alliance system to two rigid alliances before 1914 is not a shift from multipolarity to bipolarity for Waltz. Only the strength of single units counts in measuring bipolarity under his definitions. Thus, his theory tells us little about the onset of World War I. Instead, it disclaims any intent to predict particular wars. Neither is it clear that Waltz's theory tells us about what causes stability in the current world. There has been only one bipolar system as defined in Waltz's theory. Thus he has to test his conclusions about stability against evidence drawn from a sample of *one*. Waltz cannot determine which behavior is caused by structure and which by nuclear weapons (assigned by him to the unit level).

Moreover, Waltz's theory leads him to conclusions that seem to bury rather than uncover new information about the behavior of states. For example, he argues that "in a bipolar world, military interdependence declines even more sharply than economic interdependence. Russia and America depend militarily mainly on themselves."[15] But it is an odd definition of military interdependence that blurs the change from the 1930s to a world in which the U.S. and U.S.S.R. can each destroy the other in thirty minutes. Even if Waltz means his statement to refer only to the formation of alliances, he has a hard time explaining the enormous efforts which both sides devote to their "unnecessary" alliance structures. Waltz may be right that "a five percent growth rate sustained for three years increases the American gross national product by an amount exceeding one-half of West Germany's GNP, and all of Great Britain's," but that alleged evidence for low military interdependence leaves the anomaly of actual U.S. behavior unexplained. In extolling the virtues of economic growth as a path to power, Waltz sounds a bit like Rosecrance; but, unlike the latter, he uses a restricted definition of interdependence to argue that economic interdependence is declining in the modern world.[16] Once

[14] Waltz (fn. 10), 162.

[15] *Ibid*., 168.

[16] Waltz ignored the criticism of narrow definitions of interdependence in terms of vulnerability alone that was published in *Power and Interdependence* (fn. 8). Had he considered a more complex treatment of interdependence, he might have come to different conclusions about its decline.

again, Waltz's theoretical lens focuses so tightly on bipolarity that it tends to generate anomalies and to direct attention away from the discovery of new information.

It is not true that Waltz's theory is completely static, for changes in the structure predict changes in unit behavior. But change at the structural level seems to have occurred only once in three hundred years for Waltz. That leaves an awful lot of the stuff of international politics to be explained at the unit level. Waltz would admit as much, but he is then left with a theory that is so spare that nothing seems to move. The charge that Waltz has explained less about more of what concerned traditional Realists seems justified. It is ironic that Robert Gilpin appears in the Keohane volume in a cameo role as the author of a brief reply to Ashley's scattergun criticism of neorealism. Gilpin's own work represents an updating of Thucydides' classical Realist theory of hegemonic transition, which has disappeared in Waltz's nearly static neorealist world. Like Thucydides, Gilpin focuses on the ways in which uneven growth leads to cycles of rising and declining hegemonic states and the onset of great systemic wars.[17] Whatever its own problems, Gilpin's version of Realism is dynamic and focused on explaining the major changes in world politics that slip through the coarse net of Waltz's neorealist theory. Gilpin achieves this, however, by eschewing a purely structural theory and reaching deep into the unit level of analysis.

## The Revival of Liberal Theories

Partly in reaction to the inadequacies of neorealism, a number of theorists have begun to resurrect Liberal theory. While admitting the diversity of Liberal theories, they argue that the core of Liberalism is a concern for liberty. That philosophical perspective is often correlated with such features as an interest in limited government, institutional restraints, and open contacts (including trade) across borders.[18] Michael Doyle has pointed out different historical strands of Liberal thought in Schumpeter's economic theories of pacifism, Machiavelli's republican theories of imperialism, and Kant's liberal international confederation based on republican governments and transnational contacts.[19] Robert Keohane has

[17] Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

[18] Stanley Hoffmann, "Liberalism and International Affairs," in *Janus and Minerva* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987). Hoffmann points out a terminological difficulty: many Realists are liberal in their domestic political preferences.

[19] Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," *American Political Science Review* 80 (December 1986), 1151-69.

identified three major causal strands of classical Liberal theory: (1) commercial Liberalism, which asserts the pacific effects of trade; (2) democratic Liberalism, which asserts the pacific effects of republican government (at the unit level of analysis); and (3) regulatory Liberalism, which asserts the importance of rules and institutions in affecting relations between countries.[20] One might add a fourth: sociological Liberalism, which asserts the transformative effect of transnational contacts and coalitions on national attitudes and definitions of interests. Many of these Liberal causal theories were central to the neofunctionalist theories of regional integration developed in the 1950s and 1960s.

By and large, Rosecrance's *The Rise of the Trading State* fits mainly in the category of commercial Liberalism. His argument rests more upon the beneficial effects of trade than on the other three potential components of a neoliberal theory. Rosecrance's view (p. 218) that "if nuclear war can be ruled out, economic processes will progressively act to reshape the international world" bears a strong family resemblance to Richard Cobden's (1846) belief that "if we can keep the world from actual war, and I trust Trade will do that, a great impulse will from this time be given to social reforms."[21]

Rosecrance does not share all of the illusions of the classical free trade Liberals. He is fully aware that high levels of trade and other transactions did not prevent the outbreak of World War I, and that trade was often associated with conflict in earlier eras. But he argues that the world was different then: "the nineteenth and early twentieth century represent the apex of the military political system" (p. 88). In Rosecrance's view, "it was not until after 1945 that large-scale territorial expansion began to evolve as too costly—too dangerous and too uncertain as a general strategy of national advancement." As that lesson dawned, "one would have reached 'the Japanese period' in world politics . . ." (p. 20).

Even if Rosecrance proves to be correct in his projections, it is unclear to what extent the causation is due to factors stressed by Liberal or by Realist theories. Perhaps what happened after 1945 is that nuclear technology transformed a balance-of-power system into a balance of terror that encourages prudence about any territorial expansion that could raise nuclear risks. In this situation, Japan has found a more successful path to become the second-most-powerful economy in the world than it did in the 1930s. But it has done so while sheltered under the American nuclear

[20] Robert O. Keohane, "Economic Limits of Modern Politics: International Liberalism Reconsidered," unpub., 1986.

[21] Cobden, quoted in Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State, and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), 104.

umbrella and spending only one percent of its GNP on defense. Rosecrance admits that hegemonic stability theory may have some relevance, but he argues that it does not explain "why there has not *already* been a marked decline in international economic cooperation . . . well after the onset of decline in American economic and military power" (p. 57). The answer may lie in the success of economic regimes (which Rosecrance discusses only briefly); or in the exaggeration of the decline of American power; or in Waltz's theory of the stability of bipolarity; or in the paralysis of the territorial conquest system caused by nuclear risk.[22] Causation remains unclear in Rosecrance's account.

Because Rosecrance is cautious, there are really two versions of his argument—a strong form and a weak form. The strong form is close to classic commerical liberalism. "Since 1945, the world has been poised between . . . [a] territorial system . . . composed of states that view power in terms of land mass . . . and [a] trading system . . . based on states which recognize that self-sufficiency is an illusion," Rosecrance writes (p. 16). "A major crossroads is now approaching. . . . In the past the military-political world was efficient. It was cheaper to seize another state's territory by force than to develop the sophisticated economic and trading apparatus needed to derive benefit from commercial exchange with it" (p. 160). "The current equipoise . . . can scarcely be maintained," Rosecrance argues (p. 165). "The worst aspects of the Westphalian system with its emphasis on territoriality, sovereignty, and a spurious independence, are likely to be mitigated in the years ahead" (p. 211). "The increasing deconsolidation of traditional states and the decline of national loyalty as they seek to serve such purposes gradually undermines the military-political system" (p. 214).

But this strong liberal theory is eroded by the more cautious form of the argument. Dualism is proffered as "the minimum possible approach to an international theory" (p. 60).[23] Which strategy will be dominant cannot be predicted at present. One can commend Rosecrance for his cautious judgments when faced with a confusing reality, but such caution

[22] For alternative explanations, see Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), and Bruce Russett, "The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony: or Is Mark Twain Really Dead?" *International Organization* 39 (Spring 1985), 207-31.

[23] Rosecrance mistakes the argument in *Power and Interdependence* as being similar to his own. Keohane and I did not establish "dualistic categories: power and interdependence . . . power is the preeminent goal of a state-centric universe, but interdependence is a characteristic that only applies when states as entities have lost control" (p. 62). On the contrary, we argued the need to see asymmetrical interdependence as a source of power. Rosecrance seems to confuse the ideal type of complex interdependence developed in chapter 2 of our work with our larger argument about interdependence.

does not enhance theoretical development. One wishes Rosecrance had gone further in specifying the relationship between the Liberal and Realist components of the dualistic theory he suggests in the weak form of his argument. Perhaps if he had gone beyond commercial liberalism and explored more deeply the effects of transnational contacts on domestic political coalitions, or looked more carefully at the effects of regimes on learning (even in the security area where he discounts regimes), he might have begun to suggest such connections. Since he did not, we are left with a suggestive work, but one that hardly provides the neoliberal theory needed to accompany Waltz's neorealism.

## Directions for Future Research

What do these works suggest for future research programs in international relations? Taken on its own terms, Waltz's theory is too static to provide a rich agenda of research questions. But it may be more fruitful when coupled with the rational-actor approach that has received increasing attention in recent years.[24] Neither game theory nor expected utility are really theories of international politics because they need to import theoretical assumptions about context.[25] Here Waltz's structural theory can be helpful, but only if handled with care.

Rational-choice theories can be parsimonious and powerful, but as research strategies, they run risks that are reinforced by the sparse structure of neorealism. How preferences are formulated and how learning occurs may be more important than the actual choice, yet both rational choice and neorealism are weak in this dimension and tend to turn attention in other directions. Moreover, while there is no *a priori* reason why game theory cannot be applied to transnational actors as well as to unitary state actors, such analyses are rare. The benefit of marrying rational choice with neorealist approaches is a double parsimony. The danger is that each already has a negative heuristic that directs attention away from preference formation and transnational interactions. Theorists who would make the marriage must be alert to such costs and open to the insights to be gained from other variants of Realist as well as Liberal theory.

Rosecrance's work suggests a number of interesting avenues for those who wish to develop neoliberal theory. Many of the questions he raises in

[24] See Bruno Bueno de Mesquita, *The War Trap* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), and the special issue of *World Politics* 38 (October 1985), *Cooperation under Anarchy*, Kenneth A. Oye, ed. (also published under that title by Princeton University Press, 1986).

[25] Note the assertion by Duncan Snidal, "The Game *Theory* of International Politics," *ibid.*, 25-57.

the area of commercial Liberalism suggest both historical and contemporary research about the interconnection between power and nonpower incentives with which states are confronted. But the indeterminacy of his work also suggests the limits of commercial liberalism alone. Much more attention needs to be paid to the effects of norms and institutions, both in the economic and in the security area. More can be done with the ways in which transnational contacts and coalitions affect attitudes, learning, and formulation of preferences. A careful rereading of neofunctionalist integration theory can suggest numerous hypotheses. Finally, neoliberal theory should not neglect the unit level of analysis. Michael Doyle's work on the possible causal relationship between democratic governments and foreign policy choices is highly suggestive.[26]

Above all, it is important to pay more attention to the ways in which Liberalism and Realism relate to each other. One way is to be less restrictive in the basic assumption of anarchy. Alker attacks the metaphor of "anarchy" and argues for Hedley Bull's concept of an "anarchic society," which admits the absence of any formal government above states, but does not define anarchy as the absence of communication, cooperation, and governance.[27] In *Power and Interdependence*, Robert Keohane and I suggested that systemic theory could be enriched without (or before) retreating to the particularisms of the unit level of analysis by adding the concept of systemic process.

Systems have two dimensions: structure and process. We used the term "structure" in the neorealist sense to refer principally to the distribution of capabilities among units. "Process" refers to the ways in which the units relate to each other. In the metaphor of a poker game, the structure refers to the players' cards and chips, while the process refers both to the formal rules and the informal customs or conventions that affect interactions among the players. Variations in the ability of the players to calculate odds, infer the strength of opponents' hands, or bluff are at the unit, or actor, level.[28]

Factors such as the intensity of international interdependence and the degree of institutionalization of international rules do not vary from one state to another on the basis of their internal characteristics. Therefore, they should not be termed unit-level factors according to Waltz's own def-

[26] Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12 (Summer 1983), 205-35.

[27] Hayward R. Alker, Jr. "The Presumption of Anarchy in World Politics," unpub., 1986. See also Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society* (London: Macmillan, 1977).

[28] See Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Power and Interdependence Revisited," *International Organization* 41 (Autumn 1987), 725-53, for a fuller discussion of the concepts that are introduced here.

inition. Making the unit level a grab bag for all unexplained variance is an impediment to the development of theory. Not only does it complicate the task of analysis by confusing unit-level factors referring to domestic political and economic arrangements with factors at the level of the international system; it also leads neorealist analysts to forgo the opportunity to theorize at a systemic level about nonstructural determinants of state behavior.

At the systemic level, in addition to the distribution of power, states experience constraints and opportunities because of changes in levels of world economic activity, technological innovation, shifts in patterns of transnational interactions, and alterations in international norms and institutions. These systemic processes affecting state choices can be categorized as non-power incentives and the ability to communicate and cooperate. Nonstructural incentives alter calculations of national interest without necessarily affecting the distribution of power among actors. For instance, the destructiveness of nuclear weaponry, which Waltz assigned to the unit level, is better portrayed as a feature of systemic process that produces incentives not to engage in warfare regardless of whether the structure is bipolar or multipolar. Similarly, reduced costs of communications and transportation may increase the benefits of transnational business and encourage state policies of greater economic openness, without any changes in the structure of power.

The ability to communicate and cooperate can provide opportunities for the redefinition of interests and for the pursuit of strategies that would not be feasible in a world where the only information available to states was about other states' preferences and the power resources at their disposal. Just as allowing players in Prisoners' Dilemma games to communicate with one another alters the nature of the game, so a systemic process that increases the capability of states to communicate and to reach mutually beneficial agreements can add to the repertoire of state strategies and thus alter political outcomes.

These two aspects of systemic process—non-power incentives and variations in the capacity to communicate and cooperate—have traditionally been emphasized by Liberal theory. Liberal theorists often stress the ways in which trade and economic incentives may alter states' behavior. Similarly, Liberal theorists often stress the effects of increased transnational (and transgovernmental) contacts on attitudes and abilities to communicate. Institutions and norms have always played a role in Liberal theory.

This is not to say that Liberal theory has addressed all processes at the systemic level. For example, most Realists have been concerned about

technological changes even when they do not alter the distribution of power. And there is much in Liberal theory about the effect of domestic politics that does not belong at the systemic level. However, the addition of the process level to the concept of structure in defining international systems provides an opportunity to develop a "neoliberal" systemic theory that moves toward a synthesis rather than a radical disjunction between Realism and Liberalism. Neorealism would be most appropriate at the structural level of systemic theory; neoliberalism would more often be fruitful at the process level.

The time has come to transcend the classical dialectic between Realist and Liberal theories of international politics. Each has something to contribute to a research program that increases our understanding of international behavior. Perhaps work in the 1990s will be able to synthesize rather than repeat the dialectic of the 1970s and the 1980s.

# STATE, SOCIAL ELITES, AND GOVERNMENT CAPACITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

By DONALD K. CRONE

Harold Crouch, *Domestic Political Structures and Regional Economic Co-operation*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1984, 101 pp.
Richard Higgot and Richard Robison, eds., *Southeast Asia: Essays in the Political Economy of Structural Change*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985, 340 pp.
David Jenkins, *Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics 1975-1983*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1984, 280 pp.
R. J. May and Francisco Nemenzo, eds., *The Philippines After Marcos*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985, 239 pp.
Ross Prizzia, *Thailand in Transition: The Role of Oppositional Forces*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985, 122 pp.
Robert Scalapino, Seizaburo Sato, and Jusuf Wanandi, eds., *Asian Political Institutionalization*. Berkeley, CA: Institute of East Asian Studies, 1986, 312 pp.

DUE largely to their rapid economic growth and general appearance of political stability, the major industrializing countries of Southeast Asia have emerged as important models of development during the past decade. Explanations of this phenomenon have generally stressed cultural and policy factors—particularly strong, positive attitudes toward authority and relatively liberal, market-oriented economic policies.[1] Some recent studies of East Asian states, however, have concluded that the role of relatively strong and interventionist governments has been underestimated as a cause of their similar development experiences.[2] A

[1] See, for example, Bela Belassa, *The Newly Industrializing Countries of the World Economy* (New York: Pergamon, 1981); Roy Hofheinz, Jr., and Kent Calder, *The Eastasia Edge* (New York: Basic Books, 1982); Ross Garnaut, ed., *ASEAN in a Changing Pacific and World Economy* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1980); Mancur Olson, *The Rise and Decline of Nations* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), chap. 6. For a partial exception, see John Wong, *ASEAN Economies in Perspective* (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1979).

[2] Examples are Colin Bradford, Jr., "East Asian 'Models': Myths and Lessons," in John P. Lewis and Valeriana Kallab, eds., *Development Strategies Reconsidered* (Washington: Overseas Development Council, 1986), 115-28; Alice Amsden, "The State and Taiwan's Economic Development," in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Bruce Cummings, "The Origins and Development of the Northeast Asian Political Economy," *International Organization* 38 (Spring 1984), 2-40; Stephan Haggard, "The Newly Industrializing Countries in the International System," *World Politics* 38 (January 1986), 343-70. More generally, see the anal-

fuller understanding of development in the Southeast Asian region may therefore also require the inclusion of the role of the state, used here in the sense of the apparatus of political power.[3]

The burgeoning literature concerned with such issues as the development and form of state structures, their capacity and autonomy in particular contexts, and the interaction of the state with social organizations makes an argument for the unique role of the state.[4] In the areas of economic management and political stability, the literature accords the state a significant range of potential capacities.[5] Although the influence of the state is not exclusive in these areas, its role cannot be ignored.

A number of recent contributions to the literature focus on evaluating the capacity and performance of Southeast Asian states, and on the forms of their interaction with domestic groups. The volume edited by Scalapino, Sato, and Wanandi examines the degree to which legalized, predictable political foundations—foundations that would allow peaceful transfers of power and effective development of policies—have emerged

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ysis of the World Bank, *World Development Report, 1983* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), Part II.

[3] For discussions of the different usages of the term "state" and the recent focus of this literature, see Roger Benjamin and Raymond Duvall, "The Capitalist State in Context," in Roger Benjamin and Stephen Elkin, eds., *The Democratic State* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1985); Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research," in Evans et al. (fn. 2), 3-43.

[4] Among the many studies in this area, see the following major works and the literature cited therein: Gianfranco Poggi, *The Development of the Modern State* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1978); Charles Tilly, ed., *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); Evans et al. (fn. 2); Eric Nordlinger, *On the Autonomy of the Democratic State* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981); Alfred Stepan, *The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); Martin Carnoy, *The State and Political Theory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Ralph Miliband, *The State in Capitalist Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1969).

[5] In economic management, these capacities include the process of capital formation and accumulation; business entrepreneurship; the setting of domestic prices; the control of labor; the distribution of welfare; the brokering of foreign financial flows; the regulation of foreign capital; and the structuring of patterns of trade and investment partners. See Rueschemeyer and Evans, "The State and Economic Transformation," in Evans et al. (fn. 2); Haggard (fn. 2); Dennis Encarnation and Louis Wells, Jr., "Sovereignty en garde: Negotiating with Foreign Investors," *International Organization* 39 (Winter 1985), 47-77; James Caparoso, "The State's Role in Third World Economic Growth," *Annals of the American Academy of Political Science* 459 (January 1982); Peter Katzenstein, ed., *Between Power and Plenty: The Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978). In managing social conflict, the state's roles include fostering particular ideological and institutional bases of nationalism; shaping patterns of ethnic identity, communal conflict, and political mobilization; and building central political structures. See Paul Brass, ed., *Ethnic Groups and the State* (London: Croom Helm, 1985); David Laitin, "Hegemony and Religious Conflict," in Evans et al. (fn. 2); Michael Hector and Margaret Levi, "The Comparative Analysis of Ethnoregional Movements," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 2 (July 1979), 260-74; Crawford Young, "The Temple of Ethnicity," *World Politics* 35 (July 1983), 652-62; Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Revival* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Joseph Rothschild, *Ethnopolitics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981); Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 1983).

across the region.[6] Harold Crouch analyzes the potential capacity of th ASEAN governments to implement regional policies by focusing on th degree to which the governments are insulated from pressures "from be low" (mass-based) and "from above" (elite-based); he relates higher ca pacity to greater insulation. The essays in the volume edited by Higgo and Robison, focusing on the consequences of the "new international di vision of labor" in the region, argue that strong, bureaucratic, authorita ian governments have been the instruments used by governing elites i their drive for economic development (p. 20).[7] Each of these works take the state in Southeast Asia seriously, but little consensus has emerged s far on the role that state intervention has played in the development c the region. It is difficult, for example, to reconcile Higgott and Robison' view of powerful, centralized regimes (p. 3) with Crouch's depiction c the capability of these states as generally limited by domestic pressure (passim) and Scalapino's pessimism concerning effective political institu tionalization (p. 16). Part of this divergence is, of course, due to differen approaches, but some is also an indication that state-focused work is onl starting to infuse Southeast Asia research.

How have Southeast Asian states shaped their countries' economi management and political stability? More importantly, how do we ex plain different capacities for constructive intervention? Building on th base of state research, I suggest that the capacities of states vary with th structure of political support and the means of political control availabl to a state's elites. Narrow, authoritarian regimes tend to be coercive an controlled by powerful interests, which detracts from their states' capac ities to promote economic and political goals. Moderately broad-based re gimes, by contrast, provide a greater degree of flexibility and political ca pacity with which state elites can manage economic and politica challenges. The argument relies on a structural analysis of the state's re lations with social groups, and not primarily on the formal open or close nature of regimes over time. This approach accounts for significant varia tions in the Southeast Asian states' capacity to foster growth and stability

## State Autonomy and Capacity

The statist literature characterizes states as partially independent ac tors, engaged in a struggle for power with various social forces.[8] In dif

[6] The volume covers Asia generally; only the Southeast Asia portion is considered here.

[7] Compare Herbert Feith, "Repressive-Developmentalist Regimes in Asia," *Alternatives* (Spring 1982), 491-506.

[8] For a discussion of the characteristics of the statist literature, see Stephen Krasner, "Ap proaches to the State," *Comparative Politics* 16 (January 1984), 223-46.

ferent periods, states have varying degrees of autonomy relative to these social forces.[9] This balance of state versus social power assumes a crudely dialectical form over time, with past encounters setting the context for present struggles; it is not necessarily, however, a smooth and evolutionary process, as crises may sometimes result in dramatic shifts.[10]

The history of social conflict is one determinant of state autonomy.[11] The issue of "relative autonomy" of the state can be discussed with reference to the role of both elite and non-elite social groups. Powerful socioeconomic groups generally monopolize regular, continuous access to the state and shape the general outlines of public policy without necessarily occupying state offices themselves.[12] For clarity of discussion, I will use the terms "dominant groups" or "socioeconomic elites" to refer to these powerful social and economic actors. These are distinguishable from "state" elites, who do occupy office. State elites may simply follow the preferences of dominant groups, but they may also act independently—by collaborating with some segments of the socioeconomic elite against other segments, by exercising the state's coercive power, or by otherwise manipulating social pressures.[13] The social base of elites is also important for understanding state autonomy. Powerful social elites may derive their strength from large social groups (unions, parties) that are relatively deeply rooted in society, or they may have a shallow and limited mass base (technocrats, financiers). In the former case, the state interacts with a wide social base, while in the latter it may be quite independent of society at large. Two forms of state autonomy thus derive from the pattern of social relations—one providing varying degrees of independence from

[9] See Peter Evans, "Transnational Linkages and the Role of the State," in Evans et al. (fn. 2), and Evans, *Dependent Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); Fernando Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, *Dependency and Development in Latin America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979); Bill Warren, *Imperialism* (London: New Left Books, 1980); Carnoy (fn. 4), chap. 7; Nordlinger (fn. 4); Stephen Krasner, *Defending the National Interest* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).

[10] Frederic Deyo, in "Social Bases of Development Strategy," paper presented at the conference on The Contemporary State in Southeast Asia (Ann Arbor, MI, April 1986), views crisis as a key to a state's "strategic capacity."

[11] Skocpol in Evans et al. (fn. 2), 14-19.

[12] Nicos Poulantzas, in *State, Power, Socialism* (London: New Left Books, 1980), 127, refers to a "power bloc."

[13] Marx recognized the potential for independent state action that extends beyond the limits generally posited as the "executive committee of the bourgeoisie," especially where the process of class development was historically incomplete and the social base therefore more diverse. See "The German Ideology," in Robert C. Tucker, ed., *The Marx-Engels Reader*, 2d ed. (New York: Norton, 1978), 187. Rueschemeyer and Evans (fn. 5), 63, discuss class alliances with the state. Nordlinger (fn. 4), chaps. 3, 4, 5, examines a wide array of conditions under which democratic states attain a degree of autonomy from societal actors, and the variety of tactics used. Krasner (fn. 9), posits conditions for "insulation" of democratic states from social pressures. David Collier, ed., *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), covers aspects of coercion.

the social elite, and another providing varying degrees of independence from the wider social base.[14]

The statist literature is ambiguous on the issue of the relationship between a state's autonomy and its capacity. Sometimes it equates capacity with autonomy; sometimes it examines them separately; and sometimes it focuses on administrative ability and resource extraction.[15] Crouch's approach, for example, equates autonomy (insulation from elites or from the masses) directly with capacity. Autonomy, however, though necessary to capacity, is not sufficient to ensure that once goals are selected, they are accomplished. The neocolonialism and "soft state" arguments affirm this.[16] State capacity is a pressing issue, one that also informs the general concern of Scalapino et al. for effective policy development through institutionalization. Donald Emmerson (pp. 138-56) defines it as adaptability in problem solving. That is a useful definition of state capacity, but it does little to explain its origin or relate it to autonomy.

If the flexibility of state elites in formulating and implementing policy determines capacity, some degree of insulation from particularistic demands and some degree of social cooperation are required. If they are lacking, political resources are wasted on designing ineffective policies that, regardless of their technical merits, will meet with resistance when they are enforced. A state's capacity is influenced by the degree of the state's autonomy—a consequence of social control techniques and the structure of elite support.

The development of state capacity is influenced by the manner in which power is aggregated and exercised.[17] State elites pursue goals through a combination of techniques, drawing on ideological, legal, and material resources.[18] These social control techniques can be divided analytically into those that are essentially collaborative and those that are essentially coercive in form.[19] Both coercive and collaborative techniques may get some things done,[20] but coercion induces little cooperation. Al-

[14] Nordlinger (fn. 4), discusses different "types" of state autonomy, but these are all the same form, gained under different assumptions about the congruence of state and social preferences.

[15] Skocpol (fn. 3), 16.

[16] Gunnar Myrdal, *Asian Drama* (New York: Pantheon, 1968).

[17] W. Howard Wriggins, *The Ruler's Imperative* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), 4.

[18] See *ibid.*, 91ff.; Nordlinger (fn. 4), 92-94, 111-12, 130-32.

[19] In Gramsci's distinction between consensus and coercion as means of state domination, "hegemony" relies primarily on consensual means (chiefly ideology), with coercion in the background. I use the term collaboration to include a state's alliance tactics with other forms of consensus. See Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from Prison Notebooks* (New York: International Publishers, 1971); Martin Carnoy (fn. 4), 65-88.

[20] Charles Tilly has emphasized the coercive roles of police, armies, and tax collection in the growth of strong European states: see his "War Making and State Making as Organized

though recent studies have inquired into everyday forms of peasant resistance that constrain and shape policy implementation,[21] such behavior, and its consequences, is hardly limited to peasants. Noncooperative behavior throughout a society may passively and significantly undermine capacity by requiring a greater expenditure of coercive resources to attain given ends. Thus, while coercion may be as effective as collaboration for establishing order, it is not as efficient. Collaboration fosters more legitimacy for state policy than does coercion, and therefore increases capacity.[22]

The choice of social control strategies, and especially the balance between coercion and collaboration, is constrained by the composition of the dominant elite. Social elites representing broad groups provide channels to state elites for collaborative techniques such as coalition, bargaining, or co-opting (but not necessarily excluding coercion). A narrow elite structure with a shallow social base precludes these techniques, forcing state elites to substitute more coercive means. Thus, authoritarian states can coerce both social elites and the masses; but because coercive means of social control are more expensive than collaborative ones, they require greater state autonomy. With the same resource expenditure, a representative state that utilizes collaborative social control techniques yields more capacity than a narrow one that relies on coercion. The nature of a state's support influences the political resources the state controls, affecting its flexibility and capacity.

The structure of the dominant groups also affects the policy flexibility and capacity of state managers. In the context of a small range of important social elites, the demands for special consideration may be impossible to resist, resulting in constrained policy options, "policies" that simply legitimate the behavior of particular elites, or policies that are applied only in the breach. Narrow authoritarian states are therefore less able to design and implement policies independently of elite pressures; their independence from society may be considerable, but their independence from dominant groups is restricted, thus limiting their capacity. When state support is based on a range of socially important groups, state managers may balance such elements against each other in order to pursue their own preferred policies, insulating the state more effectively from control

Crime," in Evans et al. (fn. 2); and Tilly (fn. 4). Other authors posit superior performance to more democratic, collaborative states: see Atul Kohli, "Democracy and Development," in Lewis and Kallab (fn. 2); Robert Jackman, *Politics and Social Equality* (New York: John Wiley, 1975).

[21] James Scott and Benedict Kerkvliet, eds., *Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance in Southeast Asia* (London: Frank Cass, 1986).

[22] Katzenstein (fn. 5), 19, also links policy implementation to organized social support.

by particular interests. They thereby increase their independence from dominant groups, giving the state greater capacity. A broader structure of dominant groups maximizes the state elites' capacity to design and implement policy, while a narrower structure is more likely to limit state capacity.

My argument may be summarized as follows. If state autonomy is defined as partial independence from some specified social group, and state capacity as the ability to formulate and implement policy along predictable lines, it follows that (1) the dominant means of social control vary with the nature of a state's social support. States with a deeper and broader social base can utilize collaborative means of social control; states with shallow bases will be constrained to adopt coercive social control. (2) Forms of social control affect capacity. Collaborative control is more efficient in resource expenditures than is coercive control, providing more capacity for states with constrained resources. (3) State capacity also varies with the structure of the elite coalitions underlying the state. Predictable, flexible capacity is characteristic of a broader coalition; contrived, limited capacity is characteristic of states with a narrower base. The pattern of social relations between the state and society helps to explain variations in capacity. State autonomy can be converted into state capacity, which in turn can be applied, among other goals, toward effective economic performance and political stability.

## The Southeast Asian States

The industrializing Southeast Asian countries have experienced comparatively rapid economic change and substantial political stability for the past several decades, but the variations within this group are as significant as their variance from the general third-world experience. Growth in real terms has been strong and resilient in Singapore and Malaysia, somewhat less strong in Thailand, but slower and more fragile in Indonesia and especially in the Philippines, which recently suffered economic collapse;[23] equity performances have also varied substantially.[24] Positive performance does not correspond with laissez-faire economic policies or with government intervention, which is high in each country. It does follow state capacity rather closely, however.

[23] For overviews of economic performance, see Brian Wawn, *The Economies of the ASEAN Countries* (New York: St. Martin's, 1982); Ryokici Hirono, "Asian and Pacific Developing Economies: Performance and Issues," *Asian Development Review* 4 (No. 1, 1986), 1-26.

[24] For a survey, see Donald Crone, "The Growth and Equity Experience of Southeast Asia," Occasional Paper No. 8 (East Lansing, MI: Center for the Advanced Study of International Development, 1985), and the references cited there.

The more difficult test of state capacity lies in maintaining stability. Social tensions have accompanied economic change in both urban and rural areas.[25] Each of the countries have had to deal with revolutionary movements in the past, and some still do.[26] Social diversity provides almost continuous, sometimes armed, communal challenges to their central governments.[27] While the political cultures of these countries have not provided stability, their political structures have generated different capacities to manage these pressures.

Southeast Asian political structures are partly historical products, but they are also heavily molded by state elites. The following necessarily schematic discussion draws attention to the most significant of these variations, relating characteristics of elite structures to economic and political capacity. The point is not to exaggerate state causation, but to draw out correspondences between political structure and state capacity.

Singapore and Malaysia are states that rest on broad-based coalitions and generally collaborative means of social control. Singapore has been firmly under the control of the People's Action Party (PAP) since independence; despite its strong, paternalistic demeanor, the state has maintained significant support from its social base largely through collaborative and co-optive means. The PAP and the national bureaucracy are based on the increasingly dominant middle class (Lee, in Scalapino et al., 212) to the extent that until recently it has been difficult for political opposition groups to find suitable candidates.[28] Consequently, the PAP has had large majorities in electoral returns since 1959 and enjoyed total control of Parliament until 1981 (Lee, in Scalapino et al., 205). The ruling elite was originally drawn from the Republic's union base, control of which was captured from the more radical socialist opposition by means of a combination of coercion and manuevering in the early 1960s.[29] The state has since incorporated and subordinated labor through what Deyo characterizes as a paternalistic, corporatist structure of collaborative but

[25] See Philip Hauser et al., eds., *Urbanization and Migration in ASEAN Development* (Tokyo: National Institute for Research Advancement, 1985); Carol Warren, "Class and Change in Rural Southeast Asia" (Higgott and Robison, 128-45).

[26] See Joo-Jock Lim and S. Vani, eds., *Armed Communist Movements in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1984).

[27] See Joo-Jock Lim and S. Vani, eds., *Armed Separatism in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1984).

[28] Poon Kim Shee, "Political Leadership and Succession in Singapore," in Peter Chen, ed., *Singapore Development Policies and Trends* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1983), 173-96; Eng Fong Pang, "Growth, Inequality and Race in Singapore," *International Labor Review* 111 (January 1975), 15-28.

[29] See Thomas Bellows, *The People's Action Party of Singapore: Emergence of a Dominant Party System* (New Haven: Yale University South-East Asian Studies Monographs, 1970); Heng Chee Chan, *The Dynamics of One Party Dominance: The PAP at the Grassroots* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1976).

authoritarian management with joint mechanisms, exemplified since 1972 by the National Wages Council.[30] After 1965, control over labor was central to Singapore's drive to attract and maintain a diverse base of foreign capital for industrialization (Rodan, in Higgott and Robison, 179-81). Because foreign capital has also virtually been incorporated into the regime through the International Chamber of Commerce, a precarious balance must be maintained between conflicting interests;[31] however, foreign capital adds to the diversity of dominant groups that has been exploited by state elites. Local capitalists, who have been gradually marginalized by foreign capital, are a minor element in Singapore's dominant elite.[32] This wide coalitional base with deep social roots protects the state from interference by any one specific group, including particular sources of foreign investment.[33] It provides the state with considerable capacity for paternalistic but generally noncoercive control.

Malaysia's elite coalition is similar to the Singaporean in breadth, but quite different in structure. Based on a multicommunal political "directorate" (Zakaria, in Scalapino et al., 229-31), the National Front (Alliance prior to 1974) has held power with little difficulty since independence in 1957 by means of fairly open electoral competition and thoroughly cooptive tactics. Brennan (in Higgott and Robison, 93-127) points to the intersection of race and class in the composition of the ruling elite, which includes Malay aristocrats and landlords, higher bureaucrats (mostly Malay), capitalists (mostly Chinese and Indian), and the urban petite bourgeoisie; race and class have become increasingly blurred in the past decade.[34] The ideology of "bumiputraism" (high salience of ethnic origin) may be, as Brennan argues, an element in the control strategy of the dominant class; but others point to the centrality of the multiethnic social base in determining issues (Zakaria, in Scalapino et al., 223).[35] The government's substantial support among each ethnic group derives from patronage and policy measures channelled through political party structures

[30] Frederic Deyo, *Dependent Development and Industrial Order* (New York: Praeger, 1981).

[31] Noeleen Heyzer, "International Production and Social Change: An Analysis of the State, Employment and Trade Unions in Singapore," in Chen (fn. 28), 105-28.

[32] Hafiz Mirza, *Multinationals and the Growth of the Singapore Economy* (London: Croom Helm, 1986), 104-9; Kunio Yoshihara, *Foreign Investment and Domestic Response* (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 1976).

[33] Donald Crone, *The ASEAN States: Coping with Dependence* (New York: Praeger, 1983), 110-12.

[34] For a class analysis, see Kwame Sundaram Jomo, *A Question of Class: Capital, the State, and Uneven Development in Malaya* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1986).

[35] Also see Judith Nagata, *Malaysian Mosaic* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1979); R. S. Milne, *Politics in Ethnically Bipolar States* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1981); James Ongkili, *Nation-building in Malaysia, 1946-1974* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985).

rather than from inclusion of groups such as unions and peasant associations in the dominant elite.[36] The necessity of simultaneously maintaining support among economically predominant groups (mostly Chinese) and politically predominant Malays mutes opposition to policies presented as necessary to national stability; it also increases the state's autonomy and flexibility. Since 1970 the government has been somewhat more authoritarian (Crouch, 27), increasingly relying on its hegemonic Malay base and exercising coercion more frequently.[37] Still, the basic mechanisms of control are co-optation and collaboration. The transition from the Alliance to the National Front (1970-1974) combined coercion (banning issues central to some party platforms) with co-optation (negotiating entry into the central political coalition for all willing parties).[38] At the same time, prominent opponents have regularly been co-opted into the highest levels of government.[39] The state's considerable autonomy derives from the breadth of the underlying elite support, as well as from structured mass support.

This autonomy has resulted in administrative independence and high state capacity in both Singapore and Malaysia. For example, it makes Singapore, by various accounts, the epitome of the "hard state,"[40] or an "administrative state,"[41] with great policy autonomy. State enterprises and statutory boards stimulate growth and manage capital formation (Rodan, in Higgott and Robison, 175),[42] build social infrastructure,[43] and mold a multiracial, multilingual national identity (Lee, in Scalapino, 203).[44] State-controlled firms and boards are managed by the same pool of indi-

[36] R. S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, *Politics and Government in Malaysia* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1978), 222ff.

[37] John Lent, "Human Rights in Malaysia: A 1986 Update," unpub., Association for Asian Studies, March 1986.

[38] See Milne and Mauzy (fn. 36), 177-91.

[39] Simon Barraclough, "Political Participation and Its Regulation in Malaysia: Opposition to the Societies (Amendment) Act of 1981," *Pacific Affairs* 57 (Fall 1984), 450-61; Diane Mauzy and R. S. Milne, "The Mahathir Administration in Malaysia: Discipline through Islam," *Pacific Affairs* 56 (Winter 1983-84), 617-48.

[40] Mirza (fn. 32), 49.

[41] Heng Chee Chan, "Politics in an Administrative State: Where Has the Politics Gone?" in Chee Meow Seah, ed., *Trends in Singapore* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1975), 51-68.

[42] Mirza (fn. 32), 110, cites figures estimating the contribution of state enterprise at one-third of Singapore's GNP; also see Linda Seah, "Public Enterprise and Economic Development," and Jon Quah, "Public Bureaucracy, Social Change and National Development," in Chen (fn. 28).

[43] Sheng Yi Lee, "Income Distribution, Taxation, and Social Benefits in Singapore," *Journal of the Developing Areas* 14 (October 1979), 71-98; V. V. Rao and M. K. Ramakrishnan, "Economic Growth, Structural Change and Income Inequality, Singapore, 1966-1975," *Malayan Economic Review* 22 (April 1977), 92-122.

[44] Seen Kong Chiew, "Ethnicity and National Integration: The Evolution of a Multiethnic Society," in Chen (fn. 28), 29-64.

viduals who occupy high bureaucratic and political positions; they apply the same governmental criteria of control and efficiency to these quasi-governmental activities. A flexible, predictable policy-making style predominates; discussions are mostly confined to various state elites who take sectional interests into account selectively (Crouch, 10-19).

Malaysia has, especially since 1970, constructed a similarly strong, interventionist state (Brennan, in Higgott and Robinson, 111) that has extensively utilized public enterprise to accumulate and redistribute wealth.[45] The operational state ideology, intended to forge a new basis of national unity, is committed to raising living standards and income levels through managed growth. Results have been mixed, but generally positive.[46] The bureaucracy plays a central and effective role; some assert that it controls a state-dominated society,[47] supervising and "closely administering" state policy (Zakaria, in Scalapino et al., 224-25). This policy is generally flexible and responsive to pressures articulated through political channels (Crouch, 24-28). Although neither Singapore nor Malaysia have particularly "open" regimes, both have achieved substantial state capacity for economic management and political stability, built on the state's independence from one segment of the socioeconomic elite or another, and on a mix of collaborative and coercive means of control.

By contrast, the Thai and Indonesian states are ruled by narrowly based regimes with substantial degrees of coercion, although there have been significant changes in Thailand over the last decade. Since 1932, Thailand's "bureaucratic polity" has rested on the base of the military, particularly the army, in collaboration with the civilian bureaucracy.[48] Early attempts to control the largely ethnic Chinese economic elite through exclusion[49] were replaced in the 1950s by subordinate incorporation through "partnerships" that negotiated political protection for business in return for patronage resources for political elites.[50] Other social groups were simply excluded from politics and controlled through

[45] See Bruce Gale, *Politics and Public Enterprize in Malaysia* (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 1981); Loong-Hoe Tan, *The State and Economic Distribution in Malaysia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982); Milne and Mauzy (fn. 36), 321-52.

[46] Donald Snodgrass, *Inequality and Economic Development in Malaysia* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1980); Kevin Young et al., eds., *Malaysia: Growth and Equity in a Multiracial Society* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980).

[47] Milton Esman, *Administration and Development in Malaysia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1972), 62. Milne and Mauzy (fn. 36), 276, maintain that political institutions predominate over bureaucratic ones.

[48] Fred Riggs, *Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity* (Honolulu: East-West Center, 1966).

[49] Eliezer Ayal, "Thailand," in Frank Golay et al., *Underdevelopment and Economic Nationalism in Southeast Asia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1969).

[50] See John Girling, *Thailand: Society and Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981), 76-81; William Skinner, *Leadership and Power in the Chinese Community of Thailand* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1958).

coercion, with all significant political change resulting from intraregime coups. Serious internal divisions in the military regime provided an opening for a variety of excluded groups in the aftermath of the 1973 "revolution," and resulted in a broadened regime after the reassertion of military authority in 1976.[51] In *Thailand in Transition*, Prizzia surveys these emerging forces—particularly students, unions, parliamentary parties, and the Communist Party—and their struggle to play a permanent, significant role in the Thai regime; he concludes that, despite their substantial repression since 1976, the base of the regime has been permanently broadened, albeit within an authoritarian structure (p. 5). The major regime change has been the partial inclusion of political parties with links to growing Thai business groups but little mass base (Hewison, in Higgot and Robison);[52] but Prizzia points out that parliament has only a limited influence on policy (p. 87). Internal military divisions also allowed an "open arms" policy toward the Communist Party; combined with fortuitous reductions in external support, this reduced the strength of the armed opposition (Prizzia, 7-25). A shift toward collaborative control and policies aimed at satisfying mass demands have accompanied the present quasi-democracy. However, the state is still dependent on a narrow coalition dominated by military factions, and the role of civilians is limited (Crouch, 64-66).

Indonesia's "bureaucratic polity" has restricted power and participation to a small elite situated in the army officer corps and the administration since 1957, with the army assuming full power after 1965.[53] Robison (in Higgott and Robison, 295-335) attributes the military's dominance of the state to the weakness of social classes, particularly the national bourgeoisie,[54] while Anderson sees the creation of an autonomous state as a continous, major goal of the military,[55] achieved through forging internal coherence in the early 1960s while other political groups were fragmented or were being eliminated.[56] The army legitimates military control

[51] See Samudavanija Chai-Anan and Bunbongkarn Suchit, "Thailand," in Haji Ahmad Zakaria and Harold Crouch, eds., *Military-Civilian Relations in South-East Asia* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985); Samudavanija Chai-Anan, *The Thai Young Turks* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982).

[52] Also see Kevin Hewison, "The Financial Bourgeoisie in Thailand," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 11 (No. 4, 1981), 395-412.

[53] Karl Jackson, "Bureaucratic Polity: A Theoretical Framework for the Analysis of Power and Communications in Indonesia," in Karl Jackson and Lucian Pye, eds., *Political Power and Communications in Indonesia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).

[54] See also Richard Robison, "Toward a Class Analysis of the Indonesian Military Bureaucratic State," *Indonesia* 25 (April 1978), 17-39.

[55] Benedict Anderson, "Old State, New Society: Indonesia's New Order in Comparative Historical Perspective," *Journal of Asian Studies* 43 (May 1983), 477-96.

[56] See Dwight King, *Interest Groups and Political Linkage in Indonesia, 1800-1965* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1982).

of critical national economic resources and policies, progressively gained after the late 1950s,[57] by its central role in the nationalist revolution[58] and its dual military and sociopolitical functions.[59] Jenkins's fascinating study, *Suharto and His Generals* (ill-received by current military leaders), documents that policy debate is confined to a small number of current and past officeholders, almost all within the military. Wanandi (in Scalapino et al., 195) points to government plans to make GOLKAR, the government's political vehicle, into a more independent center of power; the army stood aside somewhat more in the recent national elections. This change could widen the regime by increasing the role of bureaucrats. The control of the dominant groups over political resources is at present so complete, however, that challengers have few options, as illustrated by the 1976 "phantom coup," which relied primarily on mysticism as a vehicle to power.[60] The result is an extremely narrow elite, composed primarily of a small number of military officers; its dependent supporters are Chinese Indonesian business partners[61] and members of the administrative corps, but there is no extensive mass base.[62]

Social control in Indonesia relies heavily on coercion. Emmerson asserts that coercion is frequently the starting point for control exercised through the bureaucracy.[63] Crouch contends that the social base of the state is so narrow that there are really no non-authoritarian options for control (p. 79). At the same time, co-optation, patronage, and traditional consensus practices are also brought to bear. Among the dominant groups, patronage—much of it derived from external sources channelled directly to state elites—cements patrimonial authority and normally quiets dissent (Jenkins, 169). These external resources also reduce the necessity of relying on the general population for revenues (Robison, in Higgott and Robison, 326), and thus increase the state's independence

[57] Martin Rudner, "The Indonesian Military and Economic Policy," *Modern Asian Studies* 10 (April 1976), 249-84.

[58] For the diversity of the actual experience, however, see Audrey Kahin, ed., *Regional Dynamics of the Indonesian Revolution* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985).

[59] For political analyses of the Indonesian military, see Ulf Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1982), and Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978).

[60] David Bourchier, *Dynamics of Dissent in Indonesia: Sawito and the Phantom Coup* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1984).

[61] Robison (Higgot and Robison, 324) argues that major business groups are becoming less dependent on military partnership for success as they accumulate capital; on the army's economic interests, see also Crouch (fn. 59), 273-303.

[62] Harold Crouch, "Indonesia," in Zakaria and Crouch (fn. 51), 60.

[63] Donald Emmerson, "The Bureaucracy in Political Context: Weakness in Strength," in Jackson and Pye (fn. 53), 82-136; see also Dwight King, "Human Rights Practices in Indonesia," paper presented to Association for Asian Studies, Chicago, 1986.

from the social base. Co-optation of social groups through governmental manipulation of leaders and ideologies, as illustrated by the adoption of Panca Sila (the official, nonsecular ideology) by the Moslem party grouping, helps to maintain a coercively depoliticized "floating mass."[64]

The result of narrow coalitions and coercive control in both Thailand and Indonesia is that the state is dominated by powerful groups, which limits state capacity. In Thailand, state capacity has consistently been channelled toward private interests by interlocked business and bureaucratic groups, a practice that severely limits policy flexibility (Crouch, 67-70). State enterprises and favored companies serve primarily as revenue sources and as patronage bases for factions (Chai-Anan, in Scalapino et al., 244-46) rather than as bases of growth, while the patrimonial structure of administration limits the state's ability to respond to groups outside that structure.[65] Policy incoherence is a continuous problem,[66] and legal changes frequently reflect the interests of those who promoted the latest coup rather than addressing themselves to social norms (Chai-Anan, in Scalapino et al., 247ff.). Political stability has often been contingent on the power calculations of contending coup groups, rather than on state action.

The effects of the coalitional structure are quite similar in Indonesia. Elite business linkages and patronage considerations control the government's policies, even when initiated by technocrats (Crouch, 82-85). Administrative structures are frequently ineffective in pursuing their nominal objectives (as the experiment with PERTAMINA attests)[67] or in substantially improving contexts for population groups that had been exploited under colonial rule.[68] Policies requiring cooperation of the masses fail because the isolation of state elites prevents them from mobilizing wide support.[69] The state has been plagued with secession attempts and regional challenges aimed at displacing existing state elites.[70] Wanandi (in Scalapino et al., 181-201) argues that the "New Order" has moved toward

[64] R. William Liddle, in "Suharto's Indonesia: Personal Rule and Political Institutions," *Pacific Affairs* 58 (Spring 1985), 68-90, calls it a "political desert"; see also Crouch, in Zakaria and Crouch (fn. 51), 65ff.

[65] Girling (fn. 50), 129ff.

[66] John Girling, "Thailand in Gramscian Perspective," *Pacific Affairs* 57 (Fall 1984), 399.

[67] See Khong Cho Oon, *The Politics of Oil in Indonesia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), for a recent review of that agency. Bruce Glassburner, "Indonesia's New Economic Policy and Its Sociopolitical Implications," in Jackson and Pye (fn. 53), 137-70, offers a wider review of implementation problems.

[68] Ann Laura Stoler, *Capitalism and Confrontation in Sumatra's Plantation Belt, 1870-1979* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985).

[69] Jackson, in Jackson and Pye (fn. 53), 8.

[70] Leo Suryadinata, "Ethnicity and National Integration in Indonesia: An Analysis," *Asia Quarterly* 3 (1976), 209-34; Lim and Vani (fn. 27).

greater institutionalization based on constitutionalism and the rule of law, and William Liddle considers the "New Order Pyramid" as stable enough to be seen as institutionalized.[71] If so, institutionalization has not had the positive effect on capacity that is generally assumed; nor has authoritarian rule. In both Indonesia and Thailand, state autonomy has been limited by the state's narrow elite base, and state capacity is constrained by its limited mass bases.

The case of the Philippine state is the most extreme one examined here, with a narrowing elite and increasing coercion during the course of the Marcos period bringing about the government's collapse in early 1986.[72] The declaration of martial law in 1972 signaled a decisive change from a regime based on democratic institutions which had been under political pressure,[73] including, as Stauffer points out, pressures to broaden and define a more nationalist path (Higgott and Robison, 248). One of Marcos's aims had been to break the power of the old landed "oligarchs"; however, many of the same families became the base of the commercial elite upon which the new dominant coalition was founded.[74] One theme of the May and Nemenzo volume is the continuous narrowing of the elite. First, economic control became concentrated in the hands of new oligarchs, cronies with close palace and foreign connections,[75] who alienated most business groups, old and new, from the regime.[76] A second aspect of the changing nature of the government was the transfer of authority from the old political elite, which had deep, patronage-based support, to technocrats—thus creating what Nemenzo terms a "Bonapartist state" (May and Nemenzo, 48-50) with little or no mass base. A new political party, the KBL (*Kilusang Bagong Lipunan*, or New Society Movement) was founded in 1978, but it was never institutionalized into the regime (Hernandez, in Scalapino et al., 269ff.).[77] In the end, the military, under direct presidential con-

[71] Liddle (fn. 64).

[72] For a survey of events prior to the "revolution," focusing on the role of the United States, see Gary Hawes, "United States Support for the Marcos Administration and the Pressures that Made for Change," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 8 (June 1986), 18-36.

[73] Kit Machado, "From Traditional Faction to Machine: Changing Patterns of Political Leadership and Organization in the Rural Philippines," *Journal of Asian Studies* 33 (August 1974), 523-47.

[74] See David Wurfel, "Elites of Wealth and Elites of Power," *Southeast Asian Affairs 1979* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1979).

[75] See Kunio Yoshihara, *Philippine Industrialization* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985); also Stauffer, in Higgott and Robison, 241-65.

[76] See also Robert Snow, "Export-Oriented Industrialization, the International Division of Labor, and the Rise of the Subcontract Bourgeoisie in the Philippines," in Norman Owen, ed., *The Philippine Economy and the United States: Studies in Past and Present Interactions* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies, 1983), 77-108.

[77] See also Wilfrido Villacorta, "Contending Political Forces in the Philippines Today," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 5 (September 1983), 185-204.

trol, became a primary member of the dominant coalition as well as the implementer of government policy and the local dispenser of patronage.[78] The Marcos state was extremely independent of Philippine society and increasingly exercised control through coercion.[79] Although some corporatist forms were also created (Stauffer, in Higgot and Robison, 252ff.), many were simply vehicles for Marcos's cronies.[80]

This high degree of insulation from a mass base did not result in increased state capacity because control by powerful interests sapped the state's autonomy. As Crouch (pp. 50-58) points out, technocrat-sponsored policy was consistently frustrated by Marcos's cronies. Authoritarian rule did not increase the consistency, cost-effectiveness, or development orientation of state policy in certain sectors, even though it was rationalized in these terms.[81] Hill and Jayasurina describe how the economy, which had started from a strong base, became a shambles (see May and Nemenzo, 130-51). Equity programs, including those supported by external sources, were disastrous.[82] The small insurgency that had "justified" martial law burgeoned into a firmly based, nationwide movement.[83] Even the coercive capacity of the Marcos state was insufficient to deflect popular protest against the assassination of Benigno Aquino, Marcos's "radical other" (Reynaldo Ileto, in May and Nemenzo, 7-16). Laudable rhetoric (even if one charitably assumes its sincerity) simply could not be converted into effective policy due to the role of powerful groups and a lack of ability to engage mass support. The narrow elite coalition and coercive control produced the wide-ranging incapacity of the Philippine state.

## Conclusion

It is increasingly recognized that the state has been an important actor in Southeast Asian development. I have suggested that this issue can be

[78] Carolina Hernandez, "The Philippines," in Zakaria and Crouch (fn. 51), 157-96.

[79] For a recent review, see *"Salvaging" Democracy: Human Rights in the Philippines* (New York: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 1985).

[80] See Robert Stauffer, "Philippine Corporatism: A Note on the New Society," *Asian Survey* (April 1977), 393-407. R. S. Milne, "Corporatism in the ASEAN Countries," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 5 (September 1983), 172-84, disputes the applicability of the term "corporatism" to these structures.

[81] Linda Richter, *Land Reform and Tourism Development. Policy-Making in the Philippines* (Cambridge, MA: Schenkman, 1982); James Anderson, "Rapid Rural 'Development': Performance and Consequences in the Philippines," in Colin MacAndrews and Chia Lin Sien, eds., *Too Rapid Rural Development* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1982).

[82] Waldon Bello, David Kinley, and Elaine Elinson, *Development Debacle: The World Bank in the Philippines* (San Francisco: Institute for Food and Development Policy, 1982); Edberto Villegas, *Studies in Philippine Political Economy* (Manila: Silangan, 1983).

[83] See F. A. Mediansky, "The New People's Army: A Nation-Wide Insurgency in the Philippines," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 8 (June 1986), 1-17.

›roductively investigated by examining the political structure of relations ›etween states and their social bases, looking to circumstances that facil- tate or constrain state capacity. This approach usefully synthesizes much ›f the recent literature on the region and facilitates comparative analysis ›f the role of states.

The focus here on the domestic determinants of state autonomy and 'apacity is not intended to deny the importance of external linkages. In- leed, each Southeast Asian country relies on external elements, especially rade and foreign investment, to a substantial degree.[84] This obviously af- ècts each state and social elite, but in too complex a manner to be ade- juately addressed here.

When the scope of analysis is limited to the domestic arena, the South- ast Asian cases suggest that some widely accepted views of the role of the tate in development should be challenged. First, the state in Southeast \sia has been vital to both economic growth and political stability. De- pite some liberal economic policies, the weight of state intervention has ›een heavy and consistent. In addition, state elites have had to struggle to onstruct and maintain political stability, which is not simply a derivative ›f found cultural values. The state has been a central and essential actor n economic and political arenas.

Each of the Southeast Asian states is to some degree authoritarian, bu- eaucratized, and repressive. A bureaucratic authoritarian model con- eals many significant variations of capacity, however. Authoritarian tates may maximize their independence from society, but they lose ca- ›acity due to their inability to mobilize public support (as suggested by he Philippine, Indonesian, and Thai cases) through overreliance on coer- ive means of control. When a narrow elite base reduces some public ›ressures, it does so at the risk of extensive control by powerful interests, ›hich severely constrains autonomy and capacity. This is particularly ev- lent in the Indonesian and Philippine cases. The cases of Singapore and Malaysia suggest that a broader social elite reduces penetration and in- reases state autonomy; Thailand may also be moving in this direction. Combined with more mass-based support, reduced penetration yields reater state capacity. Capacity is further increased by a balance of social ontrol that includes significant collaborative mechanisms. Bureaucratic uthoritarian states that insulate state elites from both social elites and nass pressures perform relatively poorly. It is an irony of the state that naximizing insulation saps capacity, while moderation in the pursuit of uthority increases the ability to achieve results.

[84] See Crone (fn. 33).

# A VIEW FROM ZAIRE

By PATRICK M. BOYLE*

Michael G. Schatzberg, *Politics and Class in Zaire: Bureaucracy, Business, and Beer in Lisala*. New York, Africana Publishing Company, 1980, 228 pp.
Thomas M. Callaghy, *The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective*. New York, Columbia University Press, 1984, 515 pp.
Crawford Young and Thomas Turner, *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State*. Madison, The University of Wisconsin Press, 1985, 500 pp.

TWENTY years ago Aristide Zolberg wrote in these pages that students of African politics often find the Congo to be a "unique case that requires special explanation." Challenging assertions that the Congo was somehow a "deviant case"—a view not wholly implausible because of that country's singularly traumatic initial experiences with independence—Zolberg suggested that the political system of the Congo be viewed as a "model or type" of African polity in which the processes of change at the "level of regime" raise "the most interesting and important political questions" for scholars.[1] He argued that

> the Congo [now Zaire] reminds us that "the more fundamental problem among the new states is not authoritarianism but authority; not the effectiveness of political systems in mobilizing the surrounding society to achieve rapid economic growth but the sheer possibility of minimal political order.[2]

Questions about authority and political order have lost none of their relevance when directed at contemporary Zaire. Its political experience, moreover, continues to suggest the outlines of many of sub-Saharan Africa's most perplexing problems. Corruption, an extensive but "weak" state structure, and deep-seated social conflict—common afflictions in African countries—typify the Zairian situation. In this essay, I examine the mode and extent of the institutionalization of authority and political order in Zaire by reviewing several recent works on Zairian politics. While making important contributions to an increased understanding of the ways in which Zaire has changed since the mid-1960s, these books explore the relationships among three key elements in this process of institutionalization: ethnicity, class, and the state.

* I am indebted to Marilyn McMorrow for critical comments that helped to improve this review article.
[1] Zolberg, "A View from the Congo," *World Politics* 19 (October 1966), 137-49, at 140, 144.
[2] *Ibid.*, 137.

Michael Schatzberg's analysis of the beer industry in northwestern Zaire utilizes his extensive field research to present an intelligent discussion of classes and class consciousness in Zaire. Thomas Callaghy, in probing the implications of the Mobutu regime's "attempted state formation," reveals the class-forming activities of local and national bureaucrats caught in a struggle of the state against society. Crawford Young and Thomas Turner offer a comprehensive political history of the Zairian state in an effort to demonstrate its crucial role in the country's contemporary problems.

These recent works also reflect changes in scholarly perceptions of Zaire over the years. Two important shifts in emphasis emerge when they are compared to books written during the decade immediately after independence. First, various forms of class analysis have, for the most part, replaced ethnic analyses of Zairian politics. As defined and limited by the authors under review, class analysis of Zairian society is a useful—and necessary—addition to the earlier emphasis on ethnic conflict and elite behavior in the literature on Zaire.[3] The emerging configuration of socioeconomic forces brought on by Mobutu's efforts at regime consolidation and designs for a Zairian version of African capitalism raises new questions for scholars. Has a capitalist class been taking shape in Zaire? Has it acquired control over the state? If so, how does it interact with other forces in Zairian society, and what has been the nature of its links to foreign capital? The volumes reviewed here incorporate critiques of "dependency" approaches; they also take account of exogenous determinants of change in Zaire while essentially pursuing domestic analyses of its politics. Within the framework of development studies, these works add support to the view "that class forces are critical for the fate of development in every African country, or that every development strategy has an inescapable class character."[4]

The attention these authors give to the question of the state reflects a related major shift in the literature. They share the view that the Zairian state has itself become the source and the locus of many of the country's problems. Schatzberg's and Callaghy's discussions of class consciousness and class formation suggest that in Zaire authority and political order have been institutionalized through increasingly visible patterns of in-

[3] For two schematic but helpful outlines of the changes in approaches to Zairian politics, see Wyatt MacGaffey, "The Policy of National Integration in Zaire," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 20 (March 1982), 87-105, at 88-89; Jean-Luc Vellut, "Développement et sous-développement au Zaïre," [Development and underdevelopment in Zaire], *Genève-Afrique* 17 (No. 1, 1979), 133-140, at 135.

[4] Colin Leys, "African Economic Development in Theory and Practice," *Daedalus* 111 (Spring 1982), 99-124, at 120.

equality, corruption, and conflict within a situation of declining social mobility. Young and Turner go further by concentrating on the implications of such patterns. Analyzing the complex set of institutions and practices that make up the state, they argue that after the fall of copper prices in 1974, the Zairian state—suffering from the effects of years of poor decision making and enmeshed in a political context fraught with increasing class conflict—began a process of pervasive state decline, even decay.

The authors present readers with a disturbing portrait of Zaire. Young and Turner, for example, question whether the Zairian state any longer possesses the capacity to be effective in carrying out even minimal tasks. To cite just two examples: the Zairian military lacks the pay, discipline, and training that would curb abuses or make it more than a strong arm to be used against the population; there are few teachers for rural school children in a country of large numbers of educated unemployed. In more general ways, notable characteristics of contemporary Zaire run counter to received expectations. Because of its vast mineral resources, Zaire had been predicted to become one of the region's principal economic forces; yet concerted efforts at industrialization and exploitation of mineral deposits have failed to place the country's economy on a firm footing and to generate any real increase in the prosperity of its population. The Mobutu regime's policies of expanding the state's apparatus and scope of control have offered the country meager results in terms of bureaucratic efficiency and political development. Indeed, the contemporary Zairian state barely functions, and the society suffers from growing economic inequality and social conflict.

After a brief examination of what the authors say about ethnicity and class—related topics that have long interested students of African politics—this review will consider a topic of perhaps broader interest: the disturbing characteristics of one of Africa's largest modern states.

The changing context of politics in Zaire after Mobutu's coup of 1965 and the reorientation of scholarly perspectives on the dynamics of social behavior in Africa explain the shift from ethnic analyses of elite behavior in the 1960s to studies of class formation in the 1980s. Mobutu's rise to control over the military and the state set the stage for authoritarian rule and the unequal distribution of the fruits of independence. For a time, the seeming maintenance of political authority and order that accompanied and fostered bureaucratic centralization permitted, first, investment on the basis of foreign loans, and second, attempts to appropriate the economic resources held by Europeans and non-Africans living in Zaire.

The struggle to appropriate resources combined with the growth of social stratification; both were evident in the widening gap between the urban and rural population in their relative access to employment, education, and the resources of the state. Thus, the period beginning with Mobutu's takeover raises important questions about how regimes—as processes or methods for ordering political relationships—can institutionalize patterns of social stratification.[5]

In his first (and now classic) work on the Congo, Crawford Young characterized the early years of independence as the slow emergence of an African political system out of "a decolonization which went awry."[6] Urban-based struggles of ethnic elites dominated Congolese politics between 1959 (starting with riots in Leopoldville that prompted Belgium to grant independence after seven months) and 1965 (when the Mobutu regime established itself). Ethnic groups and coalitions initially competed for control of national political offices and then for preeminence in an almost instantaneously Africanized state bureaucracy. Independence had turned political structures into battlefields of ethnic and regional conflict. Thus, the prospects of a young, educated person for employment or advancement often depended on his ethnic affiliations or links to a geographical region.

In this early period, the term "elite" generally referred to the "modern" status of those who mastered the language and some practices of the colonizer; it did not, in any strict sense, refer to traditional notions of social classes as conscious and organized structural elements in socioeconomic dynamics. It soon became evident, however, that elites who successfully used the colonizers' tools in the political sphere also prospered in the economic sphere. At the same time, Mobutu's patrimonial style of politics personalized ongoing struggles for the authority of the state and the control of its bureaucratic and local administrative structures. His "Zairianization" and "radicalization" policies of the 1970s sought to place control over the assets of commercial and agricultural concerns in the hands of favored local and regional leaders. This personalization of politics and attempted indigenization of economic resources tended to institutionalize patrimonial links and patronage networks; in effect, political elites were transformed into economic elites. Scholars consequently shifted their attention from elite analysis to social class analysis in the hope of better understanding nascent patterns of socioeconomic inequality.

[5] Zolberg (fn. 1), 144. Zolberg borrows this view of regimes from David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: Wiley, 1965), 191.

[6] Young, *Politics in the Congo* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 5.

The international intervention that followed independence raised questions about the degree to which foreign political and economic interests controlled Zaire. In the chaos of abrupt decolonization, the international system sought to assure Zaire's territorial integrity as a political community by sending U.N. forces to the Congo in the early 1960s. International pressure may indeed have succeeded in maintaining incumbents. But the international system, says Zolberg, is less able to control the regime as a process: "Endogenous tendencies are likely to persist relatively undisturbed." Finding in 1966 that some analyses of Congolese politics "assume a degree of institutionalization which does not exist" in this "probable state," Zolberg set the agenda for subsequent studies.[7]

The three works under consideration analyze patterns of social stratification which have been institutionalized by years of political struggle. The authors attempt to establish connections between patterns and processes of class formation and state decline. Current research benefits from a degree of institutionalization that did not exist in the early years of independence. Instead of the earlier questioning of the existence of institutionalization, present conditions demand study of the kind and consequences of the institutionalization that has already taken place in Zaire.

Zaire under Mobutu provides an excellent case for "seeing political institutions and economy as interacting agents."[8] When one considers the consequences of the *de facto* centralization of formal institutions under Mobutu, it is doubtful whether this interaction produced the sort of effective government that can be included under the rubric of "political development." Even the gradual establishment of efficient practices for appropriating domestic and foreign economic resources lacked mechanisms for the equitable and effective distribution and investment of those resources.

The scope and interest of Michael Schatzberg's study extend far beyond the political economy of beer in Lisala, a small administrative center on the Zaire river. He attempts to show how the patrimonialist patterns established in the 1960s have become the basis of class formation as a consequence of Mobutu's extraordinary centralization of the bureaucracy, his creation of a single party—the MPR (*Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution*)—and his failure to assure an equitable distribution of resources. Schatzberg's analysis of the political dynamics of class formation discusses Zairian political interaction principally in terms of its economic

[7] Zolberg (fn. 1), 144, 145, 141.

[8] Henry Bienen, "What Does Political Development Mean in Africa?" *World Politics* 20 (October 1967), 128-41, at 134.

*consequences.*[9] *He sees the bureaucracy, for example, as not much more than a tool for personal gain: at high levels of administration, "occasions often arise to translate politico-administrative authority into commercial opportunity" (p. 82).*

For Schatzberg, patrimonialism, patron-client networks, and appropriation of resources are evidence of a dynamic of class interaction prompted in part by the state's measures of 1973 to transfer foreign assets to domestic firms. These measures, called Zairianization, betray the extent to which the

> MPR—indeed the whole state apparatus—has been used to promote the interests of a small and restricted segment of the population. The result to date has been the increasing solidification of an indigenous politico-commercial bourgeoisie (p. 179).

In Schatzberg's view, the price paid by the population for at least apparent economic independence was a system of class domination.

But Schatzberg is critical of the rigidity imposed by earlier concepts of social class on social analysis for Zaire, including that of Nzongola-Ntalaja, whose study of the Zairian "national bourgeoisie" used Marx's social classes as an analytical framework.[10] Some classificatory schemes indiscriminately lump dissimilar groups together or mistakenly overestimate the importance of ownership of the means of production, when the real question concerns control of such means. Others resort to the mechanism of dichotomizing Zairian society into oppressors versus oppressed. Because the bureaucracy controls most of the means of production, distribution, and exchange, "and thus shapes the societal framework in which social relations occur" (p. 26), Schatzberg suggests that one should look principally to the bureaucracy for the signs of class formation and the development of class consciousness.

Schatzberg does not dispute Nzongola's assertion that a kind of national bourgeoisie, including top-level bureaucrats, businessmen, politi-

[9] By contrast, Jean-Claude Willame's description of the patrimonial politics of an emerging political class in the mid-1960s has a decidedly political emphasis. Willame focuses on the emergence of a political class of petty bureaucrats who, however unsuccessful in channeling resources because "decolonization left foreign resources unaccountable," did manage to concentrate the political resources available to them through the appropriation of offices according to a system of patrimonial links—starting with the highest posts. See Willame, *Patrimonialism and Political Change in the Congo* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1972), 86.

[10] Georges N. Nzongola(-Ntalaja), "Bourgeoisie and Revolution in the Congo," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 8 (No. 4, 1970), 511-30, at 511, 521. Nzongola-Ntalaja was among the first to develop a conceptual framework for class analysis in Zaire. Earlier classifications of social groups in Zaire include Christian Coméliau, *Fonctions économiques et pouvoir politique* [Economic functions and political power] (Kinshasa: Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales, 1965), and Jean Lacroix, *L'industrialisation au Congo* [Industrialization in the Congo] (Paris: Mouton, 1966).

ıns, and military officers, wields power in Zaire. He points out a fun-
ımental ambiguity, however, when the term "class" is applied to
arious elements of Zairian society. Zairian class analysis can only be con-
.extual, since specific situations strongly influence the class identification
a person adopts (p. 31). A shift from ethnic to class analysis in the case of
Zaire necessarily entails the "softening" of notions of class to fit African
societies.[11]

A lengthy literature attests to the fact that the formulation of useful conceptions of ethnicity, class, and their interrelationship is a difficult task, especially for African politics.[12] Still, the ethnic factor—although complex whenever efforts are made to pinpoint its impact on specific situations—seems initially more understandable in the African context than do concepts of class. Ethnicity usually refers to particular configurations of cultural, linguistic, religious, and sometimes racial dimensions of human identity; in certain political circumstances, these influence political behavior, often in the direction of forming political groups on the basis of conscious collective identity.[13] As a political factor, however, ethnicity has come to be seen as a preeminently contextual and situational notion whose salience in some instances depends as much on the identity a person claims for himself at a given moment as on that attributed to a group of individuals by competitors, enemies, or observers. An event such as the assassination of a minority group's leader, for instance, may heighten the whole group's ethnic awareness. Political opportunities, too, may play a role in actually creating an ethnic identity where only a diffuse cultural identity had existed before, or in encouraging a group with a strong ethnic identity to claim political prerogatives such as rights to representation or even to rule.[14]

Schatzberg integrates the strengths of ethnic analysis into his method of class analysis. "Class" becomes "contextual consciousness." Like the salience of one's ethnic identity, it "is very likely to depend on the sociopolitical context of the moment" (p. 173). "An exploitative merchant who arbitrarily raises prices in the market," writes Schatzberg, "might well

[11] For a different view on the question of classes in Africa, see Dennis L. Cohen, "Class and the Analysis of African Politics: Problems and Prospects," in Dennis L. Cohen and John Daniel, eds., *Political Economy of Africa* (London: Longmans, 1981), 85-111.

[12] For a fuller review of positions on the role and meaning of class analysis in Africa, see *Review of African Political Economy* 19 (September-December 1980), special issue on Consciousness and Class.

[13] For a discussion of the varying roles of ethnicity in politics, with specific reference to the Zairian situation, see Crawford Young, *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976), 163-215.

[14] Nelson Kasfir offers an interesting treatment of the political uses of ethnic identity in *The Shrinking Political Arena* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975).

find himself the victim of the exactions of the local school principal" (p. 161). Again, a local magistrate may privately admit the extent to which his salary places him with the privileged members of society, but in relation to the central administration he will clearly perceive himself as among the disadvantaged and abused. Thus, social context is essential for an understanding of the role of class in Zairian politics.

How does Schatzberg incorporate the ethnic factor into such dynamics? Although, like Nzongola, he places less emphasis on ethnic politics than some earlier authors, he does assert that it "seems to become particularly crucial when scarce resources are being allocated, appropriated, or competed for by members of the same class" (p. 182). While he does not advocate the removal of ethnicity from the analysis of Zairian politics, he suggests that "in the current context the explanatory power of social class is potentially greater" because the "success of patrimonial politics coupled with the failure of resources to trickle down to the villages actually tends to increase class consciousness" (p. 183). One merit of this contextual approach to class analysis is that it provides the reader with an explanation that goes beyond ethnicity. In Zaire, every person, given the appropriate situation, is potentially both an exploiter and a victim.

Schatzberg's suggestion that ethnicity sometimes determines distribution of resources among members of the same class offers clues about how centralization has modified the role of ethnicity and has encouraged practices contributing to class formation. Mobutu consolidated his power in the late 1960s by initially streamlining state structures and co-opting ethnic parties, unions, and student groups under the umbrella of the *Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution*. Crawford Young interpreted this thoroughgoing centralization by means of the "unitary legal framework of the colonial system" as a seeming eclipse and demobilization of cultural pluralism.[15] At the level of structures and public associations, the regime successfully eliminated formal societal mechanisms for collective ethnic mobilization. What it did not change was the long-established practice of political and economic clientelism in which ethnicity is a key factor enabling or preventing entrance into relationships that offer social and economic advancement. Because of centralization, open political conflict between ethnic groups was largely replaced by individual struggles for membership in powerful clientelist networks. Previous paths to social mobility—especially schools—still exist, but they have lost their effectiveness. Education alone no longer assures access to employment. In such a situation, ethnic distinctions do not disappear; rather, through the soli-

[15] Young (fn. 13), 211, 164.

darity they lend to clientelist networks, these distinctions become key factors in gaining and maintaining access to state structures.

Building on Schatzberg's notion of contextual class consciousness, Callaghy as well as Young and Turner develop their own views on class formation in Zaire while at the same time highlighting the question of the state in the wake of centralization efforts. Centralization allowed individuals and groups to turn political favors into economic privilege. Certain transethnic groups—for example, local and regional officials who benefited from the 1973 Zairianization measures—increasingly resembled economic classes. One of the notable class activities that had negative consequences for the state's capacity to formulate and implement policy in the second decade of independence was the corrupt diversion of capital from production and investment.

In the early 1970s, the Mobutu regime pursued an ambitious (if unrealistic) program of industrialization through foreign investment and the construction of public works with foreign loans. These projects, however, seriously neglected the needs of the agricultural sector; they also encouraged continued population shifts to urban areas, where they fostered the development of large unemployed groups and further isolated the rural population. They were not successful in creating new wealth.

In the realm of law, the Mobutu regime made a substantial effort to homogenize the legal system by eliminating the customary courts. MacGaffey sees these homogenization measures as favoring the gradual division of Zairian society.[16] Those who hold political power have benefited particularly from the control over land tenure; the new system has placed them in the same privileged relation to the law that the Belgians enjoyed under the colonial dual legal system. By the subsequent elimination of local customary law, the regime has placed at a distinct disadvantage those who must now abide by procedures relatively unfamiliar to them (and to all but the few whose political power has given them control over the legal process).

Although the early stages of centralization created momentary increases in productivity and political order, the more striking and lasting result was the formation of serious social and economic cleavages, further exacerbated by accompanying struggles for authority and order. Despite Mobutu's adoption of national integration as an early priority, Zaire made only formal progress in the direction of creating what might have become "an integrated national community from a multitude of ethnic

[16] MacGaffey (fn. 3), 104.

'selves.' "[17] The books by Callaghy and by Young and Turner show how these cleavages betray the regime's failure to penetrate all sectors, and reveal the limitations of its ability to maintain order. The evidence highlights problems in three related areas: first, the gap separating urban from rural; second, the lack of financial stability in the wake of the 1974 economic crisis; and third, the apparent division of Zairian society into two groups on the basis of their relation to political power. Callaghy defines these problems in terms of a struggle between state and society; Young and Turner expect them to result in a crisis of the state itself. Both analyses, while documenting distinctly Zairian patterns of institutionalized authority and political order, provide a suggestive glimpse at the politics of the state in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa.

In his laborious yet often enlightening search for the appropriate theoretical nomenclature to describe Zaire under Mobutu, Callaghy arrives at the conclusion that Zaire is an example of an authoritarian early modern state organized around a president who has adapted colonial structures and patrimonialized them, thereby creating an administrative monarchy (p. 5). He notes that "state formation efforts and class formation constitute the most salient characteristics of the contemporary African condition" (p. 32). Describing the regime's attempts to increase its power internally through a state-society struggle and externally through action in the international system, he tries to demonstrate the accuracy of this assertion in the case of the Zairian patrimonial state (p. 65).

Callaghy compares the administrative monarchy and patrimonial state created by Mobutu to absolutist France under Louis XIV—"a huge patron-client system with the king at the apex" (p. 125). This approach relates directly to the question of class formation and its relation, in turn, to the state. Callaghy finds Engels's notion of absolutism—used to describe "periods of history in which the dominant class does not control the state" (p. 20)—applicable to the case of Zaire. Because of Zaire's relatively undeveloped socioeconomic character and fluid class situation, Callaghy's emphasis is not on the inability of a dominant class to rule. Instead, he finds that the absolutism emerges from the simultaneous presence of a rising and consolidating (but not yet dominant) group that is protected and controlled by the state and the small (but growing) proletarian and bourgeois classes. In this situation, authoritarian rule results "from the tenuousness of authority and the search for it" (p. 32).

In Callaghy's view, three overlapping groups make up Zaire's "political aristocracy": upper-level administrative and military officers, territo-

[17] René Lemarchand, *Political Awakening in the Belgian Congo* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), 1.

rial prefects and middle-level military officers, and Mobutu's "brother hood" constitute a "consolidating but still relatively fluid class hel together by complex, partially interlocking, partially competitive patror client networks and factions" (p. 185). Callaghy insists that this "class does not constitute a bourgeoisie because it is nonproductive in characte He maintains that although ethnicity, region, education, politics, and pe sonal contacts are criteria for entry into the aristocracy, loyalty to Mobut is "the ultimate requirement for entry and continued membership" (*ibid.* Members of the political aristocracy pursue a precarious existence i which their struggles to find more secure positions in the state can tak priority over policy issues. In reacting to the challenge from other emer ing classes, this political aristocracy turns to what Callaghy sees as i principal objective: consolidating its position and identity through th privileged access it has to education, jobs, intermarriage, and person contacts "set up across ethnic boundaries" (p. 193).

Callaghy disputes the assertions of dependency-oriented scholars th Zaire's political and economic life is determined by foreign capitali domination linking Zaire's ruling class to external forces through a sy tem of corruption and irresponsibility.[18] He argues that the Mobutu r gime and its political aristocracy have maintained an amazing degree relative autonomy from external actors.

> This is possible because of the patrimonial nature of the Zairian state, the non-productive characteristics of its ruling class, the way various external actors define their interests, and their inability to coordinate their position sufficiently and over a long enough time span to make a real difference.[19]

Does Callaghy's evidence sustain this view of Zairian independen from foreign actors? In its struggle to assert itself in the international sy tem, the political aristocracy Callaghy describes as transethnic and lacking in unity and a sense of public purpose has managed—apparentl intentionally—to limit the international system's control over Zair Going to great lengths to avoid paying debts, Mobutu and the politic aristocracy "use their control of the state apparatus to sabotage chan while manipulating the external actors' partially competing interests an fears ... to fend off effective ... cooperation between them" (p. 19 Zaire's strategy is to gain time by obtaining debt rescheduling and b wearing down international financial teams (p. 200).

Callaghy would not deny David Gould's assertion that corruptic

[18] See David J. Gould, *Bureaucratic Corruption and Underdevelopment in the Third Wor The Case of Zaire* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980).

[19] Thomas Callaghy, "External Actors and the Relative Autonomy of the Political Aristc racy," *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 21 (November 1983), 61-83, at 62.

links the ruling class to external actors, but he assigns a different role to corruption. In his view, it has "blocked all efforts by international leaders to control [Zaire's] financial practices." He does not suggest, however, that the political aristocracy possesses any particular acumen in managing Zaire's financial affairs. Rather, both it and Mobutu maintain an ambivalent stance toward the economic realities of finance.[20] In addition, corruption diverts investment from productive projects and falsifies state budgets.[21] Callaghy's description of the corruption, irresponsibility, and ambivalence of the political aristocracy in Zaire lends support to Zolberg's earlier remarks about the limited capacity of the international system to control the endogenous processes that characterize regimes. For Callaghy, the behavior of the political aristocracy challenges Nzongola's thesis[22] that the "neocolonial" Zairian state serves the interests of an international bourgeoisie (p. 56). As Callaghy puts it, "internal processes do have a life of their own."[23]

Callaghy does not turn his assertion of the relative autonomy of the political aristocracy into an argument that it is successful in the internal struggle between state and society. Nor does he maintain that this aristocracy is an organized and self-conscious group. It is able only to maintain minimal order and to extract resources; despite the streamlining of political and economic structures, the political aristocracy has failed to make the state into anything more than a lame "early modern Leviathan" (p. 409). The state bureaucracy is replete with the beneficiaries of patrimonial favor who assume the status and wealth, but not the duties, of their administrative posts. Role performance is crippled and ritualistic (p. 188).

Although the local administration must submit to centralized decision making, local administrators enjoy much discretion in applying policy (p. 105). Limitations on the regime's efforts to expand the state's interest by using the administration against ethnic, religious, and regional groups have shown up in the difficulties the Mobutu regime has encountered in controlling the staff in the rural periphery. Local ethnic ties can disrupt activities that are intended to strengthen the identity and domination of the ruling class and to increase the regime's penetration of the periphery. The regime has yet to integrate the centralized bureaucratic structures it has extended over a multiplicity of earlier authority patterns (p. 149). In

[20] *Ibid*., 74, 73.

[21] Gould offers impressive statistics to document his thesis of corruption. See, for example, his allegation that in 1979 over half of the employees on the state's civil service payroll were fictitious (fn. 18), 71-72.

[22] Nzongola-Ntalaja, *Class Struggles and National Liberation* (Roxbury, MA: Omenana, 1982), 41, 71.

[23] Callaghy (fn. 19), 79.

rural areas especially, the state struggles for domination against powerful local forces. As Callaghy notes,

> The continuity of tradition remains powerful. The stubborn survival of traditional authority patterns and the deeply rooted local and regional particularisms are major obstacles for the centralizing absolutist state (p. 144).

Attempts to transfer local administrators from one region to another on a regular basis have further compounded the regime's problems in implementing a uniform policy; such transfers disrupt the local and regional ties upon which administrators usually depend. Callaghy's description of the strained relationship between the state and the rural areas shows the extent to which ethnicity can serve different purposes. Paradoxically, ethnic considerations are usually the basis for the patron-client linkages that "permeate all levels and all aspects of administration" (p. 250); on one hand, they seem to hold the state system together; on the other, they represent a powerful force that local populations can use in order to resist unwanted centralizing measures.

Callaghy's account of the regime's failures in the periphery indicates not only the presence of lively internal processes in Zaire, but also the probability that the regime (as well as the international system) is limited in its capacity to control those processes. It is not so much a matter of dividing Zairian society into oppressors versus oppressed, or of concluding that the country's ills derive from international capitalist exploitation; it is a matter of recognizing the price that the state's struggle against society exacts from all: ineffective government and the institutionalization of mechanisms for extracting resources for personal gain. Callaghy resists the temptation of dividing Zairian society into a highly coordinated class of exploiters against the rest.

Other observers do see the situation in Zaire as polarized—with conflicts that pit the center against the periphery, the privileged against the rest of the population. Benoît Verhaegen notes that a significant urban-rural gap, resulting both from the regime's failure to integrate its authority vertically in spite of repeated modification of structures and from its systematic withholding of substantial economic allocations for agricultural development, has divided Zairian society. He argues that a conflictual social structure has characterized Zaire ever since the military and technological imperialism of the ruling bourgeoisie (defined as those whose diplomas and business or ethnic ties give them places of privilege) established itself in the late 1970s.[24] The diffuse opposition that permeates

[24] Verhaegen, "Les mouvements de libération en Afrique: Le cas du Zaïre en 1978" [Liberation movements in Africa: The case of Zaire in 1978], *Genève-Afrique* 17 (No. 1, 1979), 173-81, at 176.

Zaire in the wake of failed insurrection movements in 1977 and 1978 (Shaba I and II) separates those who hold the power and privileges of the state from all the rest.[25]

Verhaegen finds that a person's ethnic group and political clientelist links determine his degree of privilege, but not his relationship to the means of production. He thus reestablishes ethnicity as an explanatory device for social stratification in Zaire while at the same time joining it to other considerations. In describing the precarious status of every Zairian under the domination of the privileged holders of state power, Verhaegen notes:

> Peasants, salaried workers, minor functionaries, mere soldiers, or even the unemployed can find themselves in the camp of the privileged if they belong to the right region, the right ethnic group, and if they have some kind of connection with those who have access to the prebends and the protection of the state. Their economic situation is less important than their relations with the sphere of political power.[26]

The same, he says, may be true for a professor, an army officer, or even a deputy in the legislature: the key to survival in Zaire has become maintaining oneself on the good side of the *ligne des privilèges*. As Willame describes it, in order to survive, one must find access to the pyramid of power in a society Mobutu himself depicted as one where "*tout se vend et tout s'achète*" (all can be sold and all can be bought).[27]

Crawford Young and Thomas Turner, in *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State*, analyze the current decay of that state, using a broad historical perspective that incorporates much previous research. Their comprehensive portrait of Zaire examines Mobutu's early efforts to patrimonialize the decomposing shell of the colonial state, his attempts to create something of a unified Leviathan state, and finally the most recent period characterized by ubiquitous corruption, economic disaster, and general decay. Like Callaghy, they believe that the key issues in Zaire are the state and, with the rise of a politico-commercial class, class conflict. Before presenting their central thesis, Young and Turner comment on three interacting processes: centralization, class, and ethnicity. They consider the last two to be the most persistent and salient cleavages in Zaire.

[25] *Ibid.*, 177. Jean-Claude Willame and others describe Zairian social stratification in similar terms. According to Willame, Mobutu is at the top of a patrimonial state governed by his "presidential clan." At the next level, there are the businessmen, bureaucrats, and courtesans who owe their privilege to their ethnicity, region, or directly to Mobutu. Just above the masses at the bottom of the pyramid is a large number of elites who are both applauded and abused. See Willame, "Zaire: Système de survie et fiction d'Etat" [Zaire: survival system and fiction of state], *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 18 (No. 1, 1984), 83-89.

[26] Verhaegen (fn. 24), 180. All translations are by the present author.

[27] Willame (fn. 25), 84.

Young and Turner hold that Mobutu's struggle to consolidate power in the late 1960s initially consisted of the streamlining of state structures and co-optation of parties, unions, and student groups under a patrimonial system headed by a personalistic ruler. "But over time the corrupt exchanges which were the essential lubricant of patrimonial power became increasingly pervasive and visible" (p. 183). Corruption had become, as Gould already noted, "the system."[28] Nevertheless, the regime pursued its expansion of the state's apparatus in the 1970s. It attempted to strengthen the New Leviathan's fragile political authority through increased control of the Zairian economy. With the abrupt measures of Zairianization in 1973, the state suddenly became "either the parastatal manager or the patrimonial dispenser of nearly all of the economic structures built up before 1969" (p. 66). During the economic crisis of 1974, the centralizing processes in Zaire clearly revealed their more damaging consequences for the country. Underneath the ubiquitous corruption of the patrimonial regime was a process of social stratification that played into the hands of a politico-commercial class, dependent on the state and the use of political power for economic expansion (p. 115). This group derived its wealth not only from the benefits of corruption and patron-client linkages, but also from the substantial assets it captured in the Zairianization measures of 1973.

Ethnicity, too, played an important role in the growing stratification of Zairian society, even though the Mobutu regime sought to suppress the means of collective ethnic mobilization in parties, groups, and regional assemblies (p. 149). By 1970, when the effectiveness of familiar paths to social mobility (especially education) had clearly declined, patterns of turning to patrons and sponsors as sources of employment had become well established (p. 135). Ethnicity offered a tie or affinity beyond that of mutual advantage. Because the principal links of patronage networks are between individuals, they provide vertical integration for the social system. This is essential in a political context in which "collective demands, be they ethnic or in the name of some other social principle, are not legitimate" (p. 159). If, in 1960, Zaire was indeed "a political environment saturated with ethnicity" (p. 145), the situation has changed greatly in twenty years. Despite general resentment of presidential favors for persons from the Equatorial Region, ethnicity is not an open political issue of conflict over formal political predominance of clearly defined ethnic groups in the 1980s. Rather, it is a key factor governing the employment and advancement of individuals. It has real but not readily identifiable benefits for particular groups.

[28] Gould (fn. 18), xiii.

Young and Turner do not underestimate, however, the importance of the regime's tendency toward ethno-regional favoritism or the degree to which popular perceptions of this tendency intensify notions of a Zaire divided into oppressor versus oppressed. Ethnicity, among other factors, has blocked, or at least constrained, development of class consciousness in all but a minority of Zairians; the majority, therefore, faced with their pauperization in the 1970s and the obvious privilege of the few, have developed a keen dislike for an unequal and dominating "they." Even though the identity of the opposing "we" is never fully articulated because it includes very dissimilar groups, most Zairians sense that they have been victims of a privileged group's self-aggrandizing use of the state.

Does this situation foreshadow a social explosion? Young and Turner do not discount the possibility that open political competition could well draw ethnic issues back into the center of conflict, or that the right configuration of circumstances could stimulate serious social disturbances. They suggest, however, that "three primary constraining factors have at least delayed its advent: the educational mobility myth, the perception that external forces guarantee the state, and the survival alternative through informal-sector activities" (p. 137). In their view, the problem of class conflict is best understood as an integral component of the more general dynamic or process they describe as a full-scale crisis of the state itself.

Young has elsewhere expressed his belief that the analytical dilemmas posed by Zaire are solved neither by Gould's dependency approach nor by Verhaegen's thesis about technological imperialism.[29] Twentieth-century political theory provides no help in studying the decline of the state, Zaire's most striking feature. Existing theoretical approaches fail to capture Zaire's pathology of decay as evidenced in "shrinkage in the competence, credibility, and probity of the state" (p. 45). The crucial question leading the authors' analysis, therefore, is the uneven corrosion of the state.

The state is no longer competent because of venality, demoralization, and lack of resources. It cannot "relate material means to policy ends."[30] The shrinkage of resources that caused the 1974 crisis brought to light the limitations of the regime and demonstrated how poor management and administrative corruption have disabled the very functioning of the state. The disparity between the resources available and the tasks required—within a system where functionaries enriched themselves while extract-

[29] Crawford Young, "Zaire: Is There a State?" *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 18 (No. 1, 1984), 80-83, at 80.
[30] *Ibid.*, 81.

ing taxes for the state—has hindered the state's effective political penetration of regional administration (p. 244). The limits on the state's competence are manifest in its instinctive turn to the "habits of force and coercion which characterized the Buli Matari state" (p. 244).[31] Not only are the resources extracted inadequate to the ends sought, but the means of extraction are faulty. The state thus "risks becoming an irrelevancy, as well as a mechanism of predatory accumulation by those associated with its eroding power" (p. 45).

Moreover, the regime has proved itself incapable of implementing policy. In a measure that apparently combined social welfare concerns with those of trying to increase agricultural productivity, the state began a village relocation program in 1971—inspired, perhaps, by the *ujamaa* efforts in neighboring Tanzania. But here, as in many other cases, the regime was defeated by its "short span of attention to policy" (p. 242). Orders were confused, hastily changed, eventually abandoned. The whole movement for villagization lost its momentum before it even got started.

The state's credibility and probity have been undermined by the kind of development projects it has pursued: barely completed industrial installations that have no discernible economic benefits, create little employment, and enrich only a few. Citizens simply no longer believe that the state can perform its functions. Attitudes of cynicism and demoralization, deepened by disappointment—especially in the peripheral areas where development needs have all but been ignored in spite of repeated promises—have come "to shape the basic assumptions and expectations of society."[32]

At present, Zaire is a country in which a decayed state does not disappear; it continues to consume, it occasionally makes payments on its debts, and it maintains an international image. The true victim of the crisis of the state, say Young and Turner, is civil society. Because of the state's incompetence, the ordinary citizen often has to struggle to find employment in the parallel or underground economy, which Willame has described as a system of survival within a fictitious state—"a system of government functioning on the basis of clientelism and resting on the pillage . . . of human and material resources." The state plays at being a state because it has become the "product of a dynamic of civil society" whose substratum consists only of the clientelist activities of its ruling class.[33]

What kind of future does all this spell for Zaire? In a situation in

[31] The brutality of the colonial administration's relations with the Congolese earned for it the African nickname, *Buli Matari*, "one who crushes rocks."
[32] Young (fn. 29), 81.
[33] Willame (fn. 25), 83, 87, 88.

which the key phrase is *débrouillez-vous* (survive), the potential for violent confrontation is always present. Extraction from the periphery will continue because the center has the mechanisms for it. Young is doubtful that the state can be restored within the present political formulation:[14] without elaborating, however, he and Turner see some potential for economic regeneration in the informal sector (p. 405).

Any conclusions to be drawn from these recent books and their authors' perceptions of salient national issues in Zaire over the past thirty years must focus on the continuing struggle for resources in a situation where the state functions only partially and its rulers hold a tenuous grasp on political authority and order. Given the kinds of conflicts described in the books under review, is it possible to see Zaire today as something more than an "almost institutionless arena with conflict and disorder as its most prominent features"?[15]

The case of contemporary Zaire challenges the meaning of our notions of institutionalization. By African standards, the Mobutu regime has enjoyed an unusual longevity, now over twenty years. This longevity, however, has not increased bureaucratic efficiency or contributed to political development. Nor has it provided Zaire with a desirable form of stability. Minimum political order has been assured at the price of open political participation. The regime has maintained its fragile authority through periodic suppressions of opposition movements and through making deals for the sake of expediency. This mode of order and authority has contributed to Zaire's economic regression. It does not, however, indicate a lack of institutionalization.

The sort of institutionalization taking place in Zaire has much more to do with establishing behavior patterns in which individuals seek to appropriate the power associated with institutions than with initiating measures for increasing the effectiveness of the state structures themselves. The most clearly identifiable practices arising in postcolonial Zaire center on finding the most efficient means for appropriating whatever political and economic resources are at hand. Efforts at structural reform have often masked an internal process of using the state for personal gain. Patterns of corruption, clientelism, and patrimonialism do not signify an absence of institutions; rather, they denote the presence of political relationships that favor neither political and economic development nor social mobility. To the extent that such patterns and political relationships resemble those occurring elsewhere in the region, Zaire in the 1980s, like

[14] Young (fn. 29), 82.

[15] Aristide Zolberg, "The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States of Africa," *American Political Science Review* 62 (March 1968), 70-87, at 70.

the Congo in 1966, remains an accurate, if disturbing, model of politics in sub-Saharan Africa.

The picture is equally dismal with regard to political and national integration in Zaire—unless we are content to abandon the generally positive normative sense in which these terms are used. Integration has indeed occurred in Zaire; an emerging social stratification has ensured that structures do not hinder the corrupt clientelist and patrimonialist interests that use them. But this kind of integration has a truly negative normative value. It institutionalizes patterns of social inequality and immobility which, because of the kinds of relationships that sustain them, resist efforts for gradual improvement or change, and lead in the direction of violent confrontation. The books under review correctly stress the importance of internal processes that have lives of their own. The state has not been the only victim of such processes. What is really at stake in Zaire is the life of civil society. If the endogenous tendencies have not destroyed civil life in Zaire, they have certainly made it more precarious.

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# NEW PERSPECTIVES ON APPEASEMENT: Some Implications for International Relations

By J. L. RICHARDSON*

THIS article examines two questions: (1) To what extent have historians, taking advantage of the passage of time and access to the British archives on the 1930s, opened up new perspectives on British policy in those years? and (2) to the extent that new perspectives have been attained, what is their wider significance for the study of international relations? Its findings are that the new writing points to the need for a radical revision of the traditional understanding of appeasement, and that this reappraisal has significant implications for the discipline of international relations.

Substantiation of the first of these conclusions requires the examination of an extensive literature. The sheer magnitude of the documentary sources has not been an unmixed boon for historical research. Donald Watt has deplored the emergence of

> a new group of professional cream-skimmers, "instant historians," the urgency of whose publishers' deadlines made any collation with other sources, let alone any possibility of serious digestion and rethinking of the *idées reçues*, virtually impossible.[1]

Even more damagingly, Robert Skidelsky suggests that

> the release of official papers has led to the writing of some very official history. . . . On any but the most resolute historian, all those memoranda have the same effect that they had on the Ministers for whom they were first produced: to show that nothing different could possibly have been done. A historian who comes, naked, to the corridors of power is almost as likely to *write* conservative history as is the politician who arrives in the same condition to *make* conservative history.[2]

* A draft of this paper was presented to a seminar in the Department of International Relations, Australian National University, in August 1986. It has benefited from comments by Christopher Andrew, Peter Dennis, Richard Higgott, J.D.B. Miller, and Ursula Vollerthun.

[1] Watt, "The Historiography of Appeasement," in Alan Sked and Chris Cook, eds., *Crisis and Controversy: Essays in Honour of A.J.P. Taylor* (London: Macmillan, 1976), 120-21.

[2] Skidelsky, "Going to War with Germany: Between Revisionism and Orthodoxy," *Encounter* 39 (July 1972), 58.

The following discussion is based on contributions that are more highly regarded by historians: those that derive most insights from the new sources, offer new interpretations, or cover hitherto neglected aspects of the topic. It does not attempt to evaluate the writing on appeasement published before the 1970s, some of which remains indispensable. Research on France, the United States, and other relevant actors is not included: although the sources are less extensive, the perceived issues differed in important ways in each national capital, and thus a thorough discussion of each would be required. On the other hand, recent research on Hitler's foreign policy is taken into account because questions relating to German intentions are central to any reappraisal of appeasement.

The discussion will focus on (1) the persistence of the traditional view of appeasement; (2) the "structural" approach, which offers a new interpretation; (3) studies of the economic, military, and intelligence dimensions of policy, which provide detailed evidence for (2); (4) contemporary reappraisals of Chamberlain and Churchill, in light of the foregoing and of recent research on Hitler; and (5) some implications for the study of international relations, and for structural theory in particular.

## I. The Traditional View

The historiography of appeasement published before the 1970s has been well reviewed by a number of authors. Most notable of these is Watt, who in 1965 foreshadowed themes that were soon to become prominent, and in 1976 provided a masterly survey of the views and formative experiences of changing generations of English historians of the 1930s.[3] Two phases may be distinguished in the literature before 1970, the dividing line being the publication, in 1961, of A.J.P. Taylor's *The Origins of the Second World War*.[4] The first phase was dominated by the distinguished critics of appeasement whose views had been formed by the experience of the 1930s—above all L. B. Namier, J. W. Wheeler-Bennett, Alan Bullock, and Winston Churchill himself; their principal works were published between 1948 and 1952.[5] They provided the authoritative statement of the traditional view of appeasement as a policy of shameful weakness before the challenge of the dictators, which was doomed to fail. They did not, however, *create* this image, which had become estab-

[3] Watt (fn. 1), and "Appeasement: The Rise of a Revisionist School," *Political Quarterly* 36 (No. 2, 1965), 191-213.

[4] Taylor, *The Origins of the Second World War* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1961).

[5] John W. Wheeler-Bennett, *Munich: Prologue to Tragedy* (London: Macmillan, 1948); Lewis B. Namier, *Diplomatic Prelude* (London: Macmillan, 1948), and *Europe in Decay* (London: Macmillan, 1950); Bullock, *Hitler: A Study in Tyranny* (London: Odhams, 1952); Churchill, *The Second World War*, I: *The Gathering Storm* (London: Cassell, 1948).

lished in the harsh experience of 1939, when the collapse of Chamberlain's hopes for "peace for our time" appeared to bear out the truth of Churchill's warnings and David Low's cartoons. Churchill drove home the "lesson" that the war could have been prevented by a policy of timely resistance to German aggression: "there never was a war more easy to stop."[6] Historians of the 1950s did not challenge this interpretation; nonetheless, readers of Feiling's biography of Chamberlain or Templewood's defense of appeasement were aware that there was a case to be answered.[7]

It was the traditional image of appeasement that influenced the assumptions of Western foreign policy makers during the cold war and that has more recently provided emotional support for opposition to detente. This image is upheld—unquestioned—in influential texts on international relations, in the 1980s as much as it was four decades ago.

Hans Morgenthau, for example, defines appeasement as

> a foreign policy that attempts to meet the threat of imperialism with methods appropriate to a policy of the status quo. ... One might say that appeasement is a corrupted policy of compromise, made erroneous by mistaking a policy of imperialism for a policy of the status quo.[8]

Frederick Hartmann strikes an even harsher note:

> It is precisely when the vital interests are bartered in return for minor concessions, or none at all, that appeasement has taken place. Appeasement may result from weakness or ignorance, either from an inability to fight or a misconception of the effects on vital interests.[9]

Although K. J. Holsti begins by describing appeasement as "a good example of the kinds of conflicting principles and values with which policymakers have to struggle," his further comments reinforce the traditional image:

> Prime Minister Chamberlain was a man of great rectitude. ... His principles and intentions were above reproach. By surrendering one position after the other through diplomatic negotiations he was able to keep the peace for two years, but in the process he and his colleagues sacrificed the independence of Austria, Danzig and Czechoslovakia. Was two years of "peace" and strict adherence to the League Covenant worth this price? The principles the British observed were commendable, but they did not help to create any effective policies for the Nazi threat.[10]

[6] *Ibid.*, x.

[7] Keith Feiling, *Life of Neville Chamberlain* (London: Macmillan, 1946); Viscount Templewood (Sir Samuel Hoare), *Nine Troubled Years* (London: Collins, 1954).

[8] Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 4th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1967), 61.

[9] Hartmann, *The Relations of Nations*, 3rd ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 96.

[10] Kalevi J. Holsti, *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1967), 435. Holsti's details are surprisingly inaccurate: there were no diplo-

That image is endorsed by Kenneth Waltz:

> A small-number system can always be disrupted by the actions of a Hitler and the reactions of a Chamberlain. . . . One may lament Churchill's failure to gain control of the British government in the 1930s, for he knew what actions were required to maintain a balance of power.[11]

A recent general text by Steve Chan suggests that an influential theory of war has been constructed on the basis of the traditional reading of British and French policy at Munich:

> Their concession—made at the expense of their ally Czechoslovakia—appears only to have whetted Hitler's appetite for additional territory. . . . According to the appeasement theory of war, World War II might have been averted if the democracies had been more resolute in their opposition to Hitler's earlier aggressions. . . . The moral of the lesson of Munich is that appeasement discredits the defenders' willingness to fight, and encourages the aggressor to escalate his demands.[12]

The authors differ in their assessments of the morality of appeasement—Morgenthau, like Holsti, distinguishes between "good motives" and "bad policies"[13]—but they agree in generalizing from a historical stereotype which coincides with that held by the original opponents of Chamberlain's policy.

The first challenge to that stereotype came, appropriately enough, from a historian well known for his iconoclastic views: A.J.P. Taylor. Taylor's account of Hitler as a pure opportunist reacting to the initiatives of others, his ambivalent comments on appeasement, and his parting shot that the outbreak of war was due to Hitler's "launching on 29 August a diplomatic manoeuvre which he ought to have launched on 28 August"[14] revived interest in the complex politics of 1938-39 and in the events preceding the final crisis.[15] There was a new awareness that much evidence was not yet available and that many of the decisions were poorly understood. It was in this context that Watt advanced a number of provocative reinterpretations of particular topics such as the role of Sir Warren Fisher, Permanent Under-Secretary of the Treasury and a close adviser

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matic negotiations over Austria, and Danzig was not surrendered to Germany. The League of Nations had ceased to count in policy thinking after 1936.

[11] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 175-76.

[12] Steve Chan, *International Relations in Perspective: The Pursuit of Security, Welfare and Justice* (New York: Macmillan, 1984), 88-89. Britain and Czechoslovakia were not allies.

[13] Morgenthau (fn. 8), 6.

[14] Taylor (fn. 4), 278.

[15] See, e.g., Christopher Thorne, *The Approach of War 1938-9* (London: Macmillan, 1967) and Esmonde M. Robertson, ed., *The Origins of the Second World War: Historical Interpretations* (London: Macmillan, 1971).

to Chamberlain.[16] A short time later, W. N. Medlicott and F. S. Northedge attempted more balanced reconstructions of British foreign policy in the interwar years, taking into account the considerations and constraints perceived by decision makers.[17] Although the Cabinet papers and those of the relevant departments were not yet available, the sources for such studies were already voluminous. Each of these scholars in his own way drew attention to the common ground shared by the appeasers and their critics: Medlicott argued that the policy differences between Chamberlain and the Foreign Office had been greatly exaggerated, while Northedge pointed to flaws in the characteristic British foreign policy style.[18]

## II. The Structural Approach

Whereas most of the recent British and American research on appeasement has taken the form of specialized monographs, German scholars such as Reinhard Meyers, Gustav Schmidt, Wolf D. Gruner, and Gottfried Niedhart have adopted a "structural" (or "structuralist") approach that seeks to reconstruct the essential features of the situation as a whole; this approach has been further developed by one prominent British historian, Paul Kennedy. The term "structure" is used in a variety of senses in different disciplines and theoretical traditions. There appears, however, to be a common idea: that, underlying the immediately perceived diversity of human action, it is possible to discern configurations of forces that bring about regularities of behavior and that constrain actions and outcomes, thereby opening up certain options while closing off others. Structural explanations are frequently contrasted with volitional explanations, the latter emphasizing choice, the former the limits to choice. Kennedy refers to "the deeper structures and chief recurrent patterns" underlying British diplomacy, but also to "reconstructing the totality of the decision making process."[19] The distinctive feature of the structural analysis of this school of historians is their investigation of the way in which different structural developments—economic and strategic, do-

[16] Donald C. Watt, *Personalities and Policies. Studies in the Formulation of British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century* (London: Longmans, 1965), 100-116.

[17] William Norton Medlicott, *British Foreign Policy since Versailles* (London: Methuen, 1968); Frederick S. Northedge, *The Troubled Giant: Britain among the Great Powers, 1916-1939* (London: Bell, 1966).

[18] William Norton Medlicott, *Britain and Germany: The Search for Agreement, 1930-1937*, Creighton Lecture, 1968 (London: Athlone Press, 1969); reprinted in David Dilks, ed., *Retreat from Power: Studies in Britain's Foreign Policy of the Twentieth Century*, I (London: Macmillan, 1981), 78-101; Northedge (fn. 17), 617-30.

[19] Kennedy, "The Study of Appeasement: Methodological Crossroads or Meeting-Place?" *British Journal of International Studies* 6 (October 1980), 185, 187.

mestic and international—combined to constrain British foreign polic
options and to favor some approaches over others, giving rise to well
entrenched attitudes and traditions. From the standpoint of politicians
these amounted to constraints as intractable as the structures themselves
By employing this perspective, the structuralists have sought to distanc
themselves from the polemical, participant character of the earlier writ
ing on appeasement.[20]

Many of these structural features, such as the decline in Britain's rela
tive power since the mid-19th century, are in themselves familiar. Wha
is significant is the study of their interconnections—for example, th
study of conflicting or mutually reinforcing tendencies. Northedge'
theme of the discordance between British foreign policy attitudes in th
interwar period and the demands of the international situation provide
an early example of this kind of analysis.[21] Other structuralist writing
draw attention to unfamiliar continuities, providing, in turn, a new con
text that highlights the significance of particular changes.

The appeasement policies of the 1930s have often been traced back t
the early British reaction against the terms of the Treaty of Versailles.[2
In the 1970s, several authors introduced a new perspective by postulating
a tradition of appeasement in British foreign policy since the mid- or even
early 19th century. Paul Kennedy has suggested that, after the death o
Palmerston, British diplomacy adopted a characteristic approach tha
may be termed "appeasement" in its pre-1939 sense:

> the policy of settling international (or, for that matter, domestic) quarrels by admitting and satisfying grievances through rational negotiation and compromise, thereby avoiding the resort to an armed conflict which would be expensive, bloody and possibly very dangerous.[23]

This tradition became established at the beginning of the long decline in Britain's relative power. It was not merely an expression of liberal optimism concerning man's inherent reasonableness, but was in accord with Britain's strategic, economic, and domestic interests. Although conservative and liberal rhetoric differed, the underlying approach showed continuity from the 1860s to the 1930s. It did not rule out Britain's going to

[20] Theda Skocpol makes a similar point in discussing structural explanations of revolutions: "Any valid explanation of revolution depends upon the analyst's 'rising above' the viewpoints of participants to find important regularities across given historical instances." *States and Social Revolutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 18.

[21] See Medlicott (fn. 18); also Frederick S. Northedge, *Freedom and Necessity in British Foreign Policy* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1972).

[22] E.g., Martin Gilbert, *The Roots of Appeasement* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1966).

[23] Kennedy, "The Tradition of Appeasement in British Foreign Policy, 1865-1939," *British Journal of International Studies* 2 (October 1976), 195-215, at 195.

war if the stakes were sufficiently high, but ensured that war would b only the last resort. This central tradition was under constant attack fron publicists of the Right and Left: on the one side, as dangerously compla cent in its neglect of the primacy of power; on the other, as too compro mising and not sufficiently principled. For the most part, the pragmati center, securely in power, was untroubled by either set of critics, eve though they often dominated the public debate. Wolf D. Gruner, in structural analysis similar in its essentials, traces the roots of appeasemer even further back, to the Napoleonic era, seeing it as the foreign policy c a rising as well as a declining industrial imperial power.[24]

Paul Schroeder offers an interesting variation on the same theme.[25] He too, finds continuity between the 1930s and the 19th century—not in th overall British approach to foreign policy, but in the content of Britis policy toward central Europe. The predominant British reaction to th emergence of German nationalism was positive: German unification un der the auspices of Prussia was perceived as quite natural and in accord ance with progress. Moreover, it was seen as being good for the balanc of power since it strengthened the center of Europe against the main dan gers to stability, the ambitions of France and Russia. The British had rather mechanical view of the central European component of the bal ance of power, and assumed that the detailed political arrangements i central Europe were of no vital concern. In all these respects, British pol icy in the 1930s was in line with the 19th-century tradition.

At the turn of the century, according to the structuralist view, Britai was able to adapt to the loss of primacy and to Germany's increasin power in Europe by reaching accommodations with the United States France, and Russia. The overall international system was still recogniz ably the 19th-century European balance of power, augmented by th emergence of the United States and Japan as major actors. In the interwa period, Britain's position became immeasurably more difficult.[26] Th Treaty of Versailles, as Trotsky observed, had turned Europe into a mad house, but had failed to provide the inmates with straitjackets. The ol

[24] Gruner, "The British Political, Social and Economic System and the Decision for Peac and War: Reflections on Anglo-German Relations, 1800-1939," *British Journal of Internationa Studies* 6 (October 1980), 189-218.

[25] Schroeder, "Munich and the British Tradition," *The Historical Journal* 19 (No. 1, 1976 223-43.

[26] In addition to the writings of Kennedy, above, see Gottfried Niedhart, "Appeasement Die britische Antwort auf die Krise des Weltreichs und des internationalen Systems vor der zweiten Weltkrieg" [Appeasement: The British answer to the crisis of the world empire an the international system before World War II], *Historische Zeitschrift*, 226 (No. 1, 1978), 67 88, and Reinhard Meyers, *Britische Sicherheitspolitik 1934-1938: Studien zum aussen-und sich erheitspolitischen Entscheidungsprozess* [British security policy 1934-1938: Studies of the deci sion-making process on foreign and security policy] (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1976).

rules of the balance of power were discredited, but the new rules of collective security under the League never won acceptance by the majority of the powers. Britain was not able to reduce the number of its potential adversaries by accommodations such as those it had made before 1914; even if Britain had been more interested in alliances, the United States was not available, and British governments mistrusted France and above all the Soviet Union. With its external assets greatly depleted by World War I, Britain had lost its financial preeminence. Although it was spared the intense ideological conflict of the Continent, the reality of the class conflict was dramatized by the general strike of 1926: Baldwin as leader of the Conservative Party sought to reconcile the opposing class interests, necessitating expenditure on domestic reform and welfare.[27] Following the Great Depression, policy was dominated by attempts to achieve economic recovery and by continued nervousness over class conflict. When, by 1935, the need for rearmament came to be recognized, its scale was limited by the dangers to the economic recovery and to Britain's external financial position. With British power thus drastically curtailed in the face of foreign policy problems that were of far greater magnitude than before 1914, it is not surprising that policy makers continued to follow the earlier appeasement tradition.

In his essay "Strategy versus Finance in Twentieth-century Britain," Kennedy postulates that, in view of these changes, a basic contradiction had developed between the requirements of Britain's economic and strategic interests.[28] The economy lacked the material and financial resources to provide for Britain's security in facing all its potential enemies. There was no good or "proper" solution: the demands of military security and economic security were not merely in competition with one another, but were mutually incompatible. This goes far beyond endorsing the government's claim that the economy was "the fourth arm of defence." Kennedy's contention is that rearmament within the limits which the Treasury quite rightly considered necessary for Britain's peacetime stability, and which were observed up to 1938, was manifestly inadequate to meet the military threats, but that the massive increase in armaments on which Britain embarked in 1939 could not be sustained by the economy, which by 1941 was indeed to become dependent on American assistance.

[27] In 1933, the share of social services in British public expenditure was 46.6%, compared with 33% in 1913; the share of defense was 10.5% and 29.9%, respectively. Payment on the national debt had increased from 6.1% to 21.4%. Paul Kennedy, *The Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British External Policy, 1865-1980* (Glasgow: Fontana, 1981), 240.

[28] In Paul M. Kennedy, *Strategy and Diplomacy 1870-1945* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1983), 87-106.

It was recognized in 1938-39 that Britain could not rearm rapidly enough to defeat Germany in a short war; it was *not* recognized that the economy could not sustain rearmament on the scale necessary to defeat Germany in a long war.

Schroeder draws very much the same conclusion: Britain had no good choices in the 1930s, only a choice of evils and dangers.[29] The Treasury, the appeasers, and the antiappeasers were all correct in their warnings of the negative consequences of the policies to which each was opposed, but they were overoptimistic concerning their own policies. Ultimately, the economic and political consequences of victory were to be almost as damaging to Britain's position as a great power as the consequences of defeat. The German historians Niedhart and Hildebrand even go so far as to suggest that, whereas Churchill's policy of all-out war ensured Britain's rapid decline as a great imperial power, Chamberlain may have glimpsed the one faint possibility of delaying this as long as possible.[30]

Although Northedge goes too far in suggesting that the limitations on British power were not understood at the time, he is correct with regard to the public debate.[31] The perception of limits is very prominent in the archival sources subsequently available, but even so it is clear with the advantage of hindsight that the decision makers did not perceive the full extent of those limitations—hence the remarkable overconfidence that was frequently expressed in 1939. The British could not bring themselves to consider that the situation might be as dire as the structuralists now maintain: they continued to believe that a more measured tempo of rearmament could preserve the fourth arm of defense and place Britain in a position to defeat Germany through blockade in a war of attrition.

To what extent are these interpretations deterministic? Northedge suggests that the margin for choice was extremely narrow: it is *almost* true that British governments could not have acted otherwise.[32] Kennedy and Schroeder suggest that there was indeed a choice, but only between evils. Schroeder notes the cumulative weight of the considerations favoring appeasement up to 1938:

> If one begins to tot up all the plausible motivations for appeasement—fear and horror of another war, Britain's state of unpreparedness, fear for the British economy and the Empire, the unprepared state of public opinion, the isolationism of the Dominions and the United States, lack of confidence

[29] Schroeder (fn. 25), 242-43.

[30] Niedhart (fn. 26), 86, 88; Klaus Hildebrand, " 'British Interests' und 'Pax Britannica': Grundfragen englischer Aussenpolitik im 19. and 20. Jahrhundert" ["British interests" and "Pax Britannica": Basic questions on English foreign policy in the 19th and 20th century], *Historische Zeitschrift* 221 (No. 3, 1975), 637-38.

[31] Northedge (fn. 17), 628.

[32] Northedge (fn. 21), 3-4.

> in France, lack of interest in Central Europe, failure to understand Hitler and Nazism, fear and distrust of the Soviet Union and Communism, the absence of a viable alternative presented either by the Conservative Opposition or Labour, and more—one sees that these are far more than enough to explain it. It was massively overdetermined: any other policy in 1938 would have been an astonishing, almost inexplicable divergence from the norm.[33]

It should be noted that the structural interpretation is not limited to economic and systemic constraints. These would explain why Britain placed so high a value on avoiding war, but they would not explain the particular strategy for doing so: appeasement, rather than, for example, deterrence. It is here that the influence of tradition and the lessons of experience are relevant. The methods of appeasement had been remarkably effective in defusing conflicts with many and varied adversaries since the mid-19th century. On the other hand, however eloquently Churchill might invoke Britain's traditional balance-of-power policy (the policy of organizing a coalition against the potential hegemonial power), his listeners were aware that the balance had invariably been restored through a great war: Philip of Spain, Louis XIV, and Napoleon had not been deterred from their attempts at hegemony by the prospect of war against a hostile coalition. Why should Hitler be?

## III. The Economy, Rearmament and Intelligence

### The Economy

The constraint on British policy imposed by public reluctance to contemplate involvement in another great war—a reluctance that was shared by most of the decision makers themselves—has always been familiar to students of the 1930s. What the new literature brings out is the extent to which economic constraints further limited British strategic and diplomatic choices. It is true that one author, Robert Paul Shay, Jr., reaffirms the familiar thesis that the financial limits imposed by the Treasury could have been greatly relaxed if Keynes's advice had been heeded: the government declined to place economic stability at risk, but was prepared to take chances with regard to military preparedness.[34] But the view that the Treasury had good reason to insist on the economic limits to rearmament enjoys stronger support.[35] The most compelling of these reasons related

[33] Schroeder (fn. 25), 242.
[34] Shay, *British Rearmament in the Thirties: Politics and Profits* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 277-78, 287-88.
[35] Paul M. Kennedy, "'Appeasement' and British Defence Policy in the Inter-war Years," *British Journal of International Studies* 4 (July 1978), 161-77; G. C. Peden, *British Rearmament*

to the balance of payments. Rearmament, even on the modest scale attempted, increased imports (since Britain could not produce all the requisite equipment and components) and decreased exports by diverting factories from the production of export goods. This reflected the overall weaknesses of the British economy with respect to modern technologies and industrial capacity: steel production was considerably below that of Germany, and the production of machine tools was far below. Excessive borrowing would have been inflationary, placing further strain on the balance of payments; the United States threatened to match any devaluation of sterling, ruling out that option for adjustment. It was generally agreed that Britain's financial strength needed to be husbanded to sustain the nation through the war of attrition that was anticipated if appeasement should fail.

The authors do not contend that the Treasury was always correct in its advice, but that the dilemmas which it perceived were genuine. G. C. Peden has pointed out that Keynes, at the time, differed only marginally from the Treasury.[16] He recognized the same inflationary and balance-of-payments dangers, and he was opposed to "undue influence with the normal course of trade" and to proposals that the government secure priority for rearmament by direct controls over industrial production and labor. On this latter point, critics of the rearmament policy move from the economic to the political constraints accepted by the National Government. In principle, the production of aircraft and other key equipment could have been accelerated by the assumption of direct controls; in practice, the government bowed to the pressure of business lobbies, but also acted in accordance with the prevailing sentiment of its own backbenchers, the "establishment," and Cabinet members themselves. Chamberlain was a stronger leader than most 20th-century prime ministers, but his leadership was asserted within the bounds of establishment consensus. He occasionally took a strong line where there was no consensus, but did not challenge a consensus that happened to accord with his own prejudices.

A similar mixture of economic and political considerations affected the level of taxation as a means to finance rearmament. There were legiti-

*and the Treasury: 1932-1939* (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1979); R.A.C. Parker, "Economics, Rearmament and Foreign Policy: The United Kingdom before 1939—A Preliminary Study," *Journal of Contemporary History* 10 (October 1975), 637-47, and "British Rearmament 1936-9: Treasury, Trade Unions and Skilled Labour," *English Historical Review* 96 (April 1981), 306-43; J.P.D. Dunbabin, "British Rearmament in the 1930s: A Chronology and Review," *The Historical Journal* 18 (No. 3, 1975), 587-609.

[16] George C. Peden, "Keynes, the Economics of Rearmament and Appeasement," in Wolfgang K. Mommsen and Lothar Kettenacker, eds., *The Fascist Challenge and the Policy of Appeasement* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 142-56.

mate concerns that sharp increases in taxation would endanger the economic recovery. Nevertheless, when Chamberlain was Chancellor of the Exchequer, he edged the standard rate upward in 1936 and 1937—back to what was regarded as the crisis rate of 1931: 5s. The highest rate in World War I had been 6s; in 1938, the rate rose to 5s 6d, in 1939 to 7s.[37] Senior Treasury officials were not always in agreement over the effects of projected tax increases, even though they preferred taxation to borrowing; but they were by no means mere protagonists of financial orthodoxy. Sir Warren Fisher commented in February 1938 that he had

> some difficulty in coming to a conclusion whether we should start up now increasing taxation. Would that discourage the now fortunately favourable prevalent mood in favour of rearmament? Would it affect business psychology and help to bring about a depression? It is anyone's guess ... the world is a lunatic asylum, and unorthodox measures may be unavoidable for a time.[38]

The new sources not only make available the detailed argumentation with which the Treasury influenced the overall scope of rearmament, but suggest that it played a significant part in the choice of priorities within that program. Indeed, it appears that in the absence of a Ministry of Defence, the Treasury in large measure assumed the task of coordinating the separate and increasingly incompatible proposals of the services.[39] Control of the purse strings enabled it to promote the Cabinet's priority—the expansion of aircraft production—while keeping a tighter rein over the expenditures of the other services. In 1937, it sought with some success to change the priorities in favor of air defense, but in 1938-39 it had difficulty in implementing this new priority against the strong preference of the air staff for heavy bombers.[40]

[37] Peden (fn. 35), 89.

[38] *Ibid.*, 92. One aspect of appeasement that has not been discussed above, but that also throws light on the complexities of the nexus between economics and politics in the late 1930s, is "economic appeasement"—the attempt to use economic leverage and incentives to induce Germany to move back from its autarchic policies and, by way of particular agreements, move toward liberal trade relations. This topic has been explored in depth by Bernd-Jürgen Wendt. For a summary of his book, *Economic Appeasement. Handel und Finanz in der britischen Deutschland-Politik, 1933-1939* [Economic appeasement: Trade and finance in British policy toward Germany, 1933-1939] (Düsseldorf: Bertelsmann, 1971), see Wendt, " 'Economic Appeasement'—A Crisis Strategy," in Mommsen and Kettenacker (fn. 36), 157-72. See also C. A. MacDonald, "Economic Appeasement and the German 'Moderates,' 1937-39," *Past and Present*, No. 56 (1972), 105-35. For a view that draws attention to British reluctance to favor political considerations over market forces, see David E. Kaiser, *Economic Diplomacy and the Origins of the Second World War: Germany, Britain, France, and Eastern Europe, 1930-1939* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980).

[39] Peden (fn. 35), 59 and *passim*; Watt (fn. 16), 103.

[40] Peden (fn. 35), 152-60; Malcolm Smith, *British Air Strategy between the Wars* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 210-26.

## Rearmament in Context

The changing priorities with respect to air power are just one illustration of the magnitude of the problems posed by the rapid changes in the strategic environment. Technological advances such as the developmen of radar opened up new but uncertain possibilities that ran counter to the hitherto unchallenged assumption of the supremacy of the bomber. The political changes in Europe between 1933 and 1939, and the consequen transformation of the strategic outlook, were unprecedented in times o peace. British policy appeared to be lagging behind events; yet the frequent adjustments of military policy, and the surprisingly good state o preparedness achieved in its areas of priority, explain the more balance assessments in recent studies of the National Government's rearmamen efforts.

The "ten-year rule"—the assumption of no major war for ten years—was in force until 1932; its abandonment coincided with the extreme financial stringency with which Britain responded to the Great Depression. Despite this, the civilian members of the Defence Requirements Committee, established in November 1933 to coordinate Britain's response to the still undefined threats, went beyond the proposals of the services. The Cabinet accepted an expansion of the R.A.F. considerably beyond what was proposed by the air staff, while cutting in half the proposed additional expenditure for the Army.[41] The public commitment to maintain air parity with Germany led to further increases even before the National Government obtained its electoral mandate in December 1935 for its cautious platform on rearmament. From this point, a more familiar pattern began to assert itself, with the services seeking more than the Treasury and Cabinet were prepared to allocate.

Thanks to Britain's new vulnerability to direct attack, priority remained consistently with air power. It has long been recognized that the threat from the air was exaggerated, but it was this perception that explains the scale of the increased expenditure on the R.A.F. In 1934, it had been less than 30 percent of naval expenditure, but it came to exceed the latter in 1938 and 1939.[42] Financial constraints scarcely affected this expansion except in relation to plans for the early 1940s, but production was delayed throughout by shortages of specialized equipment and skilled labor—hence the controversy over direct controls.[43] Major problems also

[41] Dunbabin (fn. 35), 590-91; Michael Howard, *The Continental Commitment: The Dilemma of British Defence Policy in the Era of Two World Wars* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974), 104-12.

[42] Peden (fn. 35), 205; Shay (fn. 34), 297.

[43] Shay (fn. 34), 92-133, 246-63; Parker (fn. 35, 1981), passim; Keith Middlemas, *Politics in*

arose over the commitment to parity with a constantly expanding German Air Force, and over strategic doctrine.[44] The definition of parity in "first line" aircraft was even more problematic than the present confusion over parity in the context of the SALT negotiations. The aim gradually changed from seeking to induce the Germans to enter into agreed limitations to deterring a German air attack. Increasingly, however, it was realized that deterrence might fail, one reason being the greater vulnerability, for geographical reasons, of major British cities and industrial centers. By 1938, except within the R.A.F. (which retained its preference for the offensive), air defense had become the central preoccupation: it was the prime military consideration, the salient British weakness, at the time of the Munich crisis.

Naval rearmament illustrates the problems of a service whose preferred equipment, the fleet of capital ships, had been "frozen" due to financial stringency and arms control agreements; new construction and modernization required a long lead time. Existing agreements precluded the construction of new capital ships until after 1936. The Cabinet subsequently approved an accelerated program that included all the new construction of which the shipyards were capable. In the event, only five of the nine approved capital ships could be completed to take part in the war. But throughout 1937-38, there was heated argument between the Admiralty and the Treasury over the ultimate dimensions of the program—in particular over whether the Navy should adopt a "New Standard" that would permit it to oppose Germany and Japan simultaneously—potentially as open-ended a commitment as air parity with Germany.[45] The Navy was the service most insistent that diplomacy should seek to reduce the number of Britain's potential enemies. With the collapse of these hopes in 1939, it had no option but to concentrate its forces in European waters, abruptly reversing the imperial and Far Eastern priorities of the previous twenty years. The scarcity of smaller vessels that became evident during the war was more a consequence of the Navy's priorities than of financial stringency.[46]

The Army, the service at the bottom of the priorities, was the main sufferer from financial limits and changing perceptions of strategic needs.[47] The "limited liability" policy of the mid-1930s, providing for

*Industrial Society: The Experience of the British System since 1911* (London: Deutsch, 1979), 244-65.

[44] Smith (fn. 40), 140-226; Meyers (fn. 26), 303-32.

[45] Peden (fn. 35), 113-17, 160-167; Norman H. Gibbs, *Grand Strategy*, I: *Rearmament Policy* (London: H.M.S.O., 1976), 323-74.

[46] Peden (fn. 35), 160-67.

[47] Howard (fn. 41), 97-122; Brian Bond, *British Military Policy between the Two World Wars*

only a token force for Europe, was the logical consequence of the agreed priorities. Less understandable, even allowing for the financial pressures, was the decision in February 1938 to downgrade the European theater even further. Yet, because of the extreme pressure on resources and the need to retain some credibility for imperial defense, this was seen as the lesser evil. Only the perceived emergency of 1939 and the subordination of financial considerations could reverse this decision. With the wisdom of hindsight, it can be argued that, even if more adequate resources had been available, the Army would probably not have adopted the kind of strategy and equipment likely to have made a crucial difference to the campaign in France in 1940.[48]

Consistent priorities were essential; yet, given Britain's overextension, they were impossible to maintain—short of abandoning most of the Empire to its fate. Military policy and foreign policy were often at cross-purposes. A startling illustration from an earlier date, which expresses Britain's strategic dilemma with unusual forthrightness, was the Chiefs of Staff's comment on the Treaty of Locarno:

> The size of the forces of the Crown maintained by Great Britain is governed by various conditions peculiar to each service, and is not arrived at by any calculations of the requirements of foreign policy, nor is it possible that they ever should be so calculated. Thus, though the Expeditionary Force, together with a limited number of Air Force Squadrons, constitute the only military instrument available for immediate use in Europe or elsewhere outside Imperial territory in support of foreign policy, they are so available only when the requirements of Imperial Defence so permit.
>
> It follows that so far as commitments on the Continent are concerned, the Services can only take note of them. . . .[49]

The "worst-case" assumption of the Chiefs of Staff in the 1930s—that Britain might have to face war against three hostile powers simultaneously—has been criticized by Williamson Murray.[50] Because that fear became a reality by 1941, however, this would appear to have been one occasion when worst-case analysis was prudent and justified, whatever its weaknesses as a shortcut to intelligence assessments in other contexts.

(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980). Peter Dennis, *Decision by Default: Peacetime Conscription and British Defense, 1919-1939* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1972).

[48] Bond (fn. 47), 337-38, suggests that there is a case for the contrary view; but he also shows that the senior officers who favored an Expeditionary Force for the Continent held highly conservative opinions on mechanized warfare, while advocates of the latter (such as Liddell Hart) were opposed to creating an Expeditionary Force.

[49] Howard (fn. 41), 95.

[50] Murray, *The Change in the European Balance of Power, 1938-1939: The Path to Ruin* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 62-64.

INTELLIGENCE

Although much of the source material on intelligence has not been released, enough is now available to researchers to enable them to begin to fill in this "missing dimension" in the history of the period.[51] Financial constraints greatly limited the scope of British intelligence efforts, but many of the problems were due to organizational weaknesses and anachronistic attitudes. The startling absence of security provisions in the Rome and Berlin embassies, for example, left British diplomatic communications freely exposed to the Axis governments. Financial stringency affected the quality of intelligence staffs as much as their numbers: the problems of analysis and use of intelligence material were even more serious than those of obtaining it.[52] There was a spectacular lack of coordination of intelligence activities and findings. The services operated separately, with little integration among them and even less cooperation with the Foreign Office. Political and military intelligence were supposed to be brought together at Cabinet committee level, but without prior coordination this was ineffective. During the crises of 1938-39, a great deal of political and military "intelligence" of uncertain reliability passed across the desks of senior officials, who were keenly aware of the problem of evaluating such information, but too hard-pressed to devise better procedures for doing so. They were also keenly aware that on the crucial question of Hitler's intentions the evidence remained ambiguous.[53]

There were some successes, nonetheless. Intelligence on the size of the German armed forces, for example, which was very unreliable in the early stages of German rearmament under Hitler, became quite accurate by 1938-39; the processes by which this came about are not yet clear. Less was known about the performance of German weapons, and even less about German strategic and tactical thinking. The first of these gaps was caused by the difficulty of obtaining such information. The second, however, reflected the philosophy of the service staffs, which discouraged such inquiries as speculative, and "desired to confine their activities and

[51] See Christopher Andrew, *Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community* (London: Sceptre, 1986); Francis Harry Hinsley, *British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations*, I (London: H.M.S.O., 1979), 3-85; Wesley K. Wark, "British Military and Economic Intelligence: Assessments of Nazi Germany before the Second World War," in Christopher Andrew and David Dilks, eds., *The Missing Dimension: Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century* (London: Macmillan, 1984), 78-100, 261-65; Wark, "British Intelligence on the German Air Force and Aircraft Industry, 1933-1939," *The Historical Journal* 25 (No. 3, 1982), 627-48; David Dilks, "Appeasement and 'Intelligence,'" in Dilks (fn. 18), 139-69; Donald C. Watt, "British Intelligence and the Coming of the Second World War in Europe," in Ernest R. May, ed., *Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence Assessment before the Two World Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 237-70.

[52] Andrew (fn. 51), 559, 566-73.

[53] Dilks (fn. 51), 146-49.

those of their representatives abroad to purely military matters."[54] The distorting effects of preconceptions and the failure to ask the right questions were especially prominent at the time of the Munich crisis. In particular, the immediacy of the German air threat was greatly exaggerated. F. H. Hinsley argues that a study of the training of the *Luftwaffe* and of the physical and logistic requirements for the much-dreaded "knockout blow" against London and the Midlands would have shown that the Germans were not capable of this kind of assault.[55] In the absence of such studies, extreme worst-case assumptions prevailed, and misperceptions of major consequence were not corrected. Although the filling in of the missing dimension may not greatly change the overall understanding of the 1930s, it brings out the extent and the limits of the information that was available, and thus offers insight into otherwise puzzling aspects of policy.

## IV. Chamberlain, Churchill, and Hitler

Reinhard Meyers suggests that the weakness of the standard accounts of Munich is that

> the actors in the drama appear only as personified images, no longer as real persons. Those men with the stiff collars appear as the embodiment of character-types reflected in a momentous spectacle—the man of Munich, who confronts the armed might of Germany with an umbrella, draws back in terror and gives way, because he lacks courage and determination. ... The drama has a villain (Hitler) and a sinner (Chamberlain)—what more does one need to explain the outbreak of war in 1939, especially when the supporting roles are played by lesser villains such as Mussolini and Stalin, and lesser sinners like Beck and Daladier?[56]

The picture of Chamberlain that emerges from more recent accounts is quite different from the stereotype. It is true that he was motivated by his intense awareness of the human cost of war, but he was also acutely conscious of the dangers to Britain's position in the world, and of the need for more adequate military power to provide backing for diplomacy.[57] In its essentials, his policy toward Germany was the same that had been pursued by all British governments since 1919. Far from being deceived as to Hitler's intentions, he was deeply suspicious: his unfortunate promise of

[54] Hinsley (fn. 51), 76.
[55] *Ibid.*, 78-79; see also Wark (fn. 51, 1984), 81-82.
[56] Meyers (fn. 26), 19, 23; translation by the present author.
[57] Watt (fn. 16), 164-66; Keith Middlemas, *Diplomacy of Illusion: The British Government and Germany, 1937-39* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1972), 44; Maurice Cowling, *The Impact of Hitler: British Politics and British Policy, 1933-1940* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 178-79.

"peace for our time" was a momentary aberration after the inhuman stress of the preceding crisis.

Whether or not appeasement was a 19th-century tradition, there is no doubt of the continuity of British policy toward Germany from shortly after 1919: it was a policy of bringing Germany back into the community of nations and negotiating the relaxation of those treaty restrictions that were perceived as untenable. British governments never supported the French policy of enforcing the Treaty of Versailles or the French system of alliances with Eastern Europe. The virtues of appeasement were invoked as early as 1922; as late as 1936, shortly after the remilitarization of the Rhineland, it was Eden who spoke of "the appeasement of Europe as a whole that we have constantly before us."[58] From the time Hitler came to power, Britain sought military and political agreements with Germany. On two important occasions, proposals that were to include major concessions to Germany were close to formal presentation when Hitler unilaterally preempted the projected concessions by the reintroduction of conscription in March 1935 and the remilitarization of the Rhineland in March 1936.[59]

The change of style under Chamberlain as Prime Minister, his readiness to take the diplomatic initiative, has long been noted. The years 1937-38 were perceived as especially dangerous, since Britain's rearmament was not expected to reach a level permitting armed resistance to Germany until 1939; thus, later negotiations would proceed from a position of greater strength. Vansittart wrote at the end of 1936:

> To the Foreign Office falls therefore the task of holding the situation until at least 1939. There is no certainty of our being able to do so, though we are doing our utmost by negotiating with Germany, and endeavouring to regain lost ground with Italy.[60]

Chamberlain frequently referred to the need for adequate military force in order to resist German "bullying," but was even more skeptical than other British politicians of the value or reliability of any of the other powers as potential allies. Working within these constraints, he sought to use Britain's limited freedom of choice to promote solutions to the problems most likely to provoke crises.

Chamberlain does not provide the classic instance of misperception of the adversary's intentions, as has so often been asserted. His diaries and letters were strewn with references to Hitler as "half mad," "lunatic," or untrustworthy, and he believed that British and French firmness had de-

[58] Niedhart (fn. 26), 69; Meyers (fn. 26), 32. [59] Medlicott (fn. 18), 11-25.
[60] See *ibid.*, 31.

terred Hitler from invading Czechoslovakia in May 1938.[61] He was by no means confident that German aims were limited to the incorporation of German nationals into the *Reich*. Rather, the premise of British policy in 1938 was that Hitler's intentions were uncertain, and that in the light of this uncertainty, the particular issue at stake—the future of the Sudeten Germans—should not constitute the *casus belli*.[62]

During the Sudeten crisis, the Cabinet gradually moved from favoring Sudeten autonomy within Czechoslovakia to acceptance of a transfer of territory. What the recent sources reveal is a greater divergence between Chamberlain and his colleagues over the terms of such a transfer than had been supposed, foreshadowing a divergence between Chamberlain and the Cabinet majority on many of the issues between Munich and the outbreak of war.[63] Chamberlain acted on the logical consequences of the agreed premises of the Cabinet in 1938; many of his colleagues found the logic distasteful, even though they rallied to his support after the apparent triumph of Munich.

If Munich is coming to appear largely as the logical working out of what had gone before, the developments during the following year have come to appear more problematic. In the light of the many interrelated causes of appeasement, the extent of the acceptance of war in 1939 calls for more explanation than it has received. The occupation of Prague was no doubt the catalyst for what A.J.P. Taylor has termed "an underground explosion of public opinion such as the historian cannot trace in precise terms";[64] but the Hoare-Laval Pact had triggered a similar explosion without altering the fundamental course of British policy. The most committed of the appeasers—Chamberlain and R. A. Butler in England, Bonnet in France—continued their tenacious pursuit of any option that held out even a slim prospect of averting war.[65] The overall military balance was even more unfavorable to Britain and France than it had been in 1938, the Empire in even greater peril, and direct assistance to Poland even less feasible than to Czechoslovakia. Yet, whereas the military had

[61] Feiling (fn. 7), 350, 354, 357, 360.

[62] The assumptions behind British policy in 1938 are discussed in Middlemas (fn. 57), 184-88, and in Telford Taylor, *Munich: The Price of Peace* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1979), 618-33. Taylor's work offers the fullest account of the Munich crisis. Chamberlain's uncertainty concerning Hitler was expressed frequently. His comment to his private secretary on the Anglo-German declaration signed after the Munich Conference provides a striking example: "If Hitler signed it and kept the bargain, well and good; alternatively, if he broke it, he would demonstrate to all the world that he was totally cynical and untrustworthy" (p. 60).

[63] Cowling (fn. 57), 190-206, 293-352.

[64] Taylor (fn. 4), 203.

[65] For a recent discussion of Butler's views, see Paul Stafford, "Political Autobiography and the Art of the Plausible: R. A. Butler at the Foreign Office, 1938-39," *The Historical Journal* 28 (No. 4, 1985), 901-22.

tended to "soften" policy toward Germany in 1938, as Dunbabin expresses it, they tended to "harden" it in 1939.[66] The change of attitude of the military and of other key sectors of opinion invites further examination. To what extent, for example, did British decision makers now place their hopes on deterring Germany?[67] The changes in the pattern of influence on decisions, both within the Cabinet and from outside it, have not yet been fully analyzed. Maurice Cowling, among others, offers interesting insights, but his treatment is selective, and his hypotheses are only partially substantiated.[68]

Recent works endorse Medlicott's thesis that, on closer examination, "the lines of distinction between the popular stereotypes, appeasers and resisters, tend to disappear."[69] Neville Thompson, in his study of Conservative opposition to appeasement, presents a number of examples, such as the readiness of Eden and Vansittart in February 1936 to contemplate far-reaching concessions to Germany in the interests of "European tranquillity and economic reconstruction."[70] Similar instances have been noted above. Thompson emphasizes the differences of approach among the Conservative critics of appeasement as well as their inability to work together or to win a substantial party following. A striking example was Eden's failure to consult Churchill after his resignation in February 1938. Instead, he sought the advice of Baldwin (which he appears to have followed), intending to build up his own image as a potential centrist leader, more consensual than either Churchill or Chamberlain, with vaguely worded appeals to idealism, patriotism, and national unity.[71]

The most formidable opponent of the government's policies was of course Churchill; in his series of powerful speeches, he condemned the delays in rearmament and expressed increasing criticism of the whole foreign policy stance. Although recent scholarship does not contest this, the discussion of Churchill in the 1930s has for some time been critical. That is due not so much to Churchill's actual record at the time, but to the influence of his retrospective version of those events in the first volume of his history of the Second World War, *The Gathering Storm*. The polemical tone, selectiveness, and overstatement may enhance the work

[66] John P.D. Dunbabin, "The British Military Establishment and the Policy of Appeasement," in Mommsen and Kettenacker (fn. 36), 186. Wark makes similar observations (fn. 51, 1984), 87-89, 99-100.

[67] See, e.g., Sidney Aster, *1939: The Making of the Second World War* (London: André Deutsch, 1973) for the most satisfactory general account of British policy in 1939, which, however, does not fully resolve this question.

[68] Cowling (fn. 57), 257-352.

[69] Medlicott (fn. 18), 32.

[70] Thompson, *The Anti-Appeasers: Conservative Opposition to Appeasement in the 1930s* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 43-44.

[71] Cowling (fn. 57), 2[illegible]5-39.

as literature, but many scholars now regard it as a contribution to legend rather than to history: the legend that, if Churchill's clear-sighted advice had been followed, the tragic devastation of World War II could have been avoided.

One historian has commented in a different context that to show that the popular stereotype of Churchill "ignores the complexity of this remarkable man and sets him on an unreal pedestal" is not to belittle his greatness.[72] A reader of *The Gathering Storm* would never suspect that, when in office in the 1920s, Churchill, as Michael Howard rather uncharitably expresses it, "having spent five years at the Admiralty building up the Royal Navy was now spending another five at the Treasury trying with equal zest to cut it down again."[73] Far from having qualms over the ten-year rule, Churchill unsuccessfully sought to persuade the Navy to accept a twenty-year rule: "They should be made to recast all their plans and scales and standards on the basis that no naval war against a first-class Navy is likely to take place in the next twenty years."[74]

In the 1930s, Churchill's speeches on German air power contributed to the growing acceptance of the need for rearmament, but they also contributed to the general exaggeration of the destructiveness of bombing.[75] With respect to Italy's invasion of Abyssinia—the issue over the handling of which the National Government destroyed any possibility of a consensus on foreign policy in the mid-1930s—Churchill maintains that, though initially reluctant to alienate Italy, he came to argue against half-measures: "If we thought it right and necessary for the law and welfare of Europe to quarrel mortally with Mussolini's Italy, we must also strike him down."[76] At the time, however, this insight was denied to Churchill as to the other Conservatives. Like them, he sought to straddle the issue, advocating both staunch support for the League of Nations and compromise with Italy, thus provoking Arthur Greenwood's comment: "There are few people in this House who possess his powers of oratory and that highly florid style with which he has succeeded in boxing the compass."[77]

Like many others, Churchill presents the remilitarization of the Rhineland on March 7, 1936 as the last opportunity for preventing World

[72] David Reynolds, "Churchill and the British 'Decision' to Fight On in 1940: Right Policy, Wrong Reason," in Richard Langhorne, ed., *Diplomacy and Intelligence during the Second World War: Essays in Honour of F. H. Hinsley* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 166.

[73] Howard (fn. 41), 89. [74] *Ibid.*, 89-90.

[75] See, e.g., Robert Rhodes James, *Churchill: A Study in Failure, 1900-1939* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1970), 230-33.

[76] Churchill (fn. 5), 150. For critical comments on *The Gathering Storm*, see James (fn. 75), 221-22.

[77] See Thompson (fn. 70), 85.

War II, had Britain and France responded to Hitler's treaty violation by using their still overwhelming military superiority against him. At the time, however, he withheld comment in the House of Commons debate that took place two days later and endorsed France's appeal to the League instead of resorting to arms. He delivered his principal speech on the issue on March 26, more than two weeks after any possibility of stronger action had passed.[78] Historians are agreed, however, that such action was not politically feasible in either France or Britain. Eden's cab driver remarked that Jerry could do what he liked in his own back garden. According to Eden, "Academically speaking, there is little dispute that Hitler should have been called to order, if need be forcibly. . . . But nobody was prepared to do it, in this country literally nobody."[79] Even as a backbench critic, Churchill could not free himself from the confusion and uncertainties of the time. Had he been in government, he would have been subject to all its constraints: he could not have greatly accelerated rearmament, still less have resolved the basic dilemmas of strategy and finance. He might have used Britain's margin of choice differently, but if he had sought to construct a coalition against Hitler, he would have encountered formidable obstacles, not least of which was the need to carry with him a parliament and public deeply averse to any prospect of war.

But would such a policy have been likely to deter Hitler? The foreign policy of the Third Reich has been studied by German historians in the context of extensive research on the ideology, institutions, and internal dynamics of the National Socialist regime. The image of Hitler that emerges is remarkably familiar: the interpretations are fuller, some of the details are new, but the essentials are not surprising.

Hitler did not expect to be able to achieve his goal of *Lebensraum* without a great war. While he did not think Britain would fight in 1939, and sought to reduce the risk to a minimum by entering into the Nazi-Soviet Pact, he was resolved to attack Poland regardless of Britain's reaction. Appeasement had encouraged his faulty expectation, but that was not crucial to his decision. His willingness to risk war, possibly even his desire for war, had increased along with the state of German rearmament—indeed, even ahead of it.

If this reaffirmation of the traditional view of Hitler's values is accepted, it follows that neither appeasement nor deterrence could have succeeded in averting war. The fundamental reason for the failure of appeasement was that Hitler's goals lay far beyond the limits of reasonable

[78] *Ibid*., 106-10; James (fn. 75), 261-64.

[79] Earl of Avon, *The Eden Memoirs: Facing the Dictators* (London: Cassell, 1962), 346, 366-67.

;commodation that the appeasers were prepared to contemplate. If ap-
:asement encouraged him to increase his demands, it was only in a
ıort-term, tactical sense. Likewise, if a policy of deterrence or firmness
ıd been adopted earlier, it would have changed Hitler's tactical calcu-
tions, but there is no reason to suppose that he would have modified his
ɔals.[80]

The main contribution of recent research is that it substantiates the tra-
ıtional view in greater detail. Those historians who focus on the internal
ynamics of the Nazi system rather than on the individual decision
ıaker, Hitler, reaffirm the expansionist tendencies of the system as a
hole.[81] Those who seek to explain the specific goals, strategies, and
ıoices of Nazi German foreign policy continue to focus on Hitler. Re-
'nt German interpretations have developed the concept of Hitler's for-
gn policy "program"—meaning something less than a blueprint, but
ımething more than Alan Bullock's thesis that Hitler was both ideo-
gue and opportunist. His opportunism reflected a clear sense of direc-
ɔn, a strategic sense that guided the particular moves.[82]

Hitler's perception of Britain, as it emerges in these interpretations,
ffered greatly from that postulated in the traditional view of appease-
ent.[83] Initially, Hitler had hoped to win the support of Britain, the na-
ɔn that had barred the way to Germany's bid for world power in 1914,
r German expansion to the East; but by the time Chamberlain became
rime Minister in 1937 he sought no more than a free hand. Chamber-
in's overtures, however, were exasperating to the Nazis rather than re-
suring: England was seeking to play the role of governess, demanding
surances of German good behavior, endeavoring to create a new net-

[80] Cf. Ernest R. May: " 'Anti-appeasers' had their own illusions which were almost equally
ıtant from reality. They believed that Hitler could be deterred from aggression by the threat
war. Few suspected that Hitler *wanted* war." May (fn. 51), 520.

[81] This school of thought, as well as that which focuses on Hitler's goals and program, is
ıcussed in John Hiden and John Farquharson, *Explaining Hitler's Germany: Historians and
' Third Reich* (London: Batsford, 1983), 110-29.

[82] Klaus Hildebrand, *The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich* (London: Batsford, 1973; pub-
ıed in German, 1970); also "Hitlers 'Programm' und seine Realisierung 1939-1942" [Hit-
's program and its realization, 1939-1942], in Manfred Funke, ed., *Hitler, Deutschland und
Mächte: Materialien zur Aussenpolitik des Dritten Reichs* [Hitler, Germany and the powers:
ıterials on the foreign policy of the Third Reich] (Kronberg: Athenäum, 1978), 63-93; An-
:as Hillgruber, *Hitlers Strategie: Politik und Kriegführung, 1940-41* [Hitler's strategy: Politics
ɹ the conduct of war] (Frankfurt am Main: Bernard & Graefe, 1965); Bullock, "Hitler and
' Origins of the Second World War," in Robertson (fn. 15), 189-224.

[83] Andreas Hillgruber, "England in Hitlers Aussenpolitischer Konzeption" [England in
tler's foreign policy thinking], *Historische Zeitschrift* 218 (No. 1, 1974), 65-84; Josef Henke,
*gland in Hitlers politischem Kalkül, 1935-1939* [England in Hitler's political calculations,
35-1939] (Boppard: Harald Boldt Verlag, 1973); Henke, "Hitlers England-Konzeption—
rmulierung und Realisierungsversuche" [Hitler's conception of England: Formulation and
empts at realization], in Funke (fn. 82), 584-603.

work of agreements to promote European stability. By rebuffing these overtures, Hitler hoped to reduce Britain to passive acquiescence, but he increasingly recognized that this might fail. From this perspective, Munich was not at all a diplomatic triumph but the crisis in which Britain rejected Hitler's Godesberg demands and mobilized the fleet, signaling its refusal to grant Hitler a free hand. The outcome was ambiguous, but future planning had to take more seriously the risk that England would intervene. Thus, while the traditional image of Hitler is upheld, it is revised in important details.

## V. Appeasement and the Study of International Relations

How is the study of appeasement related to the wider study of international relations? This question may be pursued in two directions: (1) What is the contribution of contemporary theories of international relations and the methods developed within the discipline to the study of appeasement, and (2) what are the implications of the contemporary understanding of appeasement for the study of international relations as a whole?

The answer to the first of these questions is that the contribution of scholars using international relations theories and methods has been disappointingly limited. Only two of the many books on appeasement draw substantially on such theories: Thorne's *The Limits of Foreign Policy* and Meyers's *Britische Sicherheitspolitik 1934-1938*.[84] Thorne's widely acclaimed case study draws on theories of decision making and reviews the case in the light of other major theories.[85] Meyers's work, unfortunately not translated into English, is structured in terms of a more thoroughgoing analysis of theoretical issues concerning national security and decision making.[86] A special issue on appeasement of the *British Journal of International Studies* brings together contributions by historians and social scientists, including a quantitative analysis of British decisions in the 1930s and a decision-making analysis of the Munich crisis. Although these illustrate the potential of such approaches, they also demonstrate the

[84] Thorne, *The Limits of Foreign Policy: The West, the League and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1931-1933* (New York: Capricorn, 1973); Meyers (fn. 26).

[85] Thorne's work is discussed more fully by R. J. Barry Jones, "The Study of 'Appeasement' and the Study of International Relations," *British Journal of International Studies* 1 (April 1975), 74-75.

[86] In a recent article, Meyers suggests that Thomas Kuhn's concept of the paradigm might be adapted to throw new light on appeasement by viewing it as illustrating a tradition of international political thought—the "Grotian" tradition discussed by Martin Wight and Hedley Bull. See Reinhard Meyers, "International Paradigms, Concepts of Peace, and the Policy of Appeasement," *War and Society* 1 (May 1983), 43-65.

problems as much as the payoffs of interdisciplinary research. They do not go deeply enough into the historiographical issues to establish their interpretations convincingly; there is little cross-fertilization between the disciplines.[87]

A partial exception is to be found in discussions of deterrence; this issue is so prominent in present-day international relations that considerations of deterrence in the 1930s inevitably reflect contemporary thought. Even so, as Barry Jones laments, many discussions of military policy and diplomacy in that period fail to explore the kinds of issues that suggest themselves to those familiar with contemporary strategic analysis.[88] As one exception, he notes Michael Howard's comments on deterrence; he might have added George Quester's *Deterrence before Hiroshima*, which examined interwar doctrine on airpower in light of contemporary strategic theory.[89] There have been several further discussions: Malcolm Smith offers a fuller treatment of the dilemmas of British air policy,[90] and Alan Alexandroff and Richard Rosecrance provide an interesting analysis of the reasons for Britain's failure to deter Hitler in 1939.[91] Even though they appear to play down the difficulty of deterring a decision maker with Hitler's values, they introduce an important distinction between short-term and long-term deterrence. This distinction is developed along original lines by John Mearsheimer in the context of deterring a major offensive after the outbreak of war.[92]

The reappraisal of appeasement does not create a problem for deterrence theory, only for its application to the particular case. It does create a problem for what Steve Chan terms "the appeasement theory of war," which appears to assume that any war can be deterred; but contemporary deterrence theorists make no such assumption. One of their major concerns is to establish the conditions under which deterrent threats may be expected to succeed. Thus, the finding that Hitler was unlikely to have been deterred from eventually going to war presents no theoretical problem.[93]

[87] The special issue, *British Journal of International Studies* 6 (October 1980), edited by Paul Kennedy and John E. Spence, includes Kennedy (fn. 19), Gruner (fn. 24), and contributions by Stephen G. Walker, Aaron L. Goldman, and Naomi Black.

[88] Jones (fn. 85), 73-74.

[89] Quester, *Deterrence before Hiroshima: The Airpower Background of Modern Strategy* (New York: Wiley, 1966).

[90] Smith (fn. 40), 140-97.

[91] Alan Alexandroff and Richard Rosecrance, "Deterrence in 1939," *World Politics* 29 (April 1977), 404-24.

[92] Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983).

[93] Chan (fn. 12). For discussions of deterrence along these lines, see Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 58-113; Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974).

Several aspects of appeasement raise questions that invite theoretical analysis and explanation. As suggested earlier, the pattern of decision making in 1939 is still incompletely understood. This is partly a matter of fuller description, but also one of deepening the analysis. British decision making after the occupation of Prague has been described as incrementalist, but the situation was one in which incremental decisions led to fundamental changes in policy. Such a case, theoretical analysis suggests, may expose basic weaknesses in the incremental style of decision making. Some of the changes in perception and policy recommendation between 1938 and 1939 provide striking illustrations of the phenomena of selective perception and the avoidance of value trade-offs; they invite further examination in the light of cognitive theory.

Although the contribution of international relations scholars to the study of appeasement has been limited, the reappraisal of appeasement is rich in implications for the study of international relations. A full exploration of these would be a topic for another study, but two preliminary suggestions may be offered. The first concerns the discipline's view of the origins of World War II if it can no longer be attributed to the errors of the appeasers. The focus should be on the international system rather than on individuals: the starting point could be Trotsky's comment on the Treaty of Versailles, noted earlier, or Eden's comment in 1938, cited approvingly by E. H. Carr: "It is futile to imagine that we are involved in a European crisis which may pass as it has come.... Stupendous forces are loose, hurricane forces."[94]

These forces were loose in an international system that was not merely unstable, but close to breakdown. Many sensed that a great war was imminent. Schroeder's comment, cited earlier, that Britain's policy of appeasement was overdetermined is equally valid with respect to the instability of the international system. The original peace settlement did not enjoy sufficient acceptance, and its beneficiaries were neither able nor willing to enforce it. The League of Nations never won acceptance, and *none* of the great powers acted in terms of the balance-of-power norms of the 19th century. The relatively predictable balancing of the five powers in Europe could not suddenly be replicated by the seven powers in the global arena after 1919. The collapse of the international economic order in the Great Depression, and the transnational ideological strife and confusion exacerbated by it, represented further dimensions of the breakdown of international order. Once the larger setting is established, the internal determinants of the policy of each of the powers can be investigated, as was done by the structural historians in the case of Britain.

[94] E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939*, 2d ed. (London: Macmillan, 1946), 40.

The second implication concerns structural theory. The structural terpretation of British foreign policy appears to be a theory of quite a fferent type from the best-known structural theory in international re- tions, Kenneth Waltz's *Theory of International Politics*.[95] The latter of- rs a parsimonious explanation of some of the most general features of ternational politics; the former is presented as a holistic explanation of ingle case. The structural-historical theory can be presented more ab- actly, however. But first, it is convenient to note that certain structural alyses of foreign policy have been attempted at a much less general vel than Waltz's structural realism. Waltz himself has explained differ- ces in the performance and style of British and American policy in ms of the structure of political institutions; and Peter Katzenstein and collaborators have compared the foreign economic policies of ad- nced industrialized countries in terms of certain aspects of the domestic ucture: the nature of business-state coalitions and policy networks.[96]

Structural-historical theory focuses on change rather than on continu- , explaining foreign policy in terms of the changing power of the state question; this, in turn, is explicated in terms of the changing pattern of ernal and external structural determinants, both economic and politi- . Power is understood in relative terms—relative, that is, to the other ors in the overall strategic context. In examining a state's foreign policy a particular period, the structuralist seeks to identify the main elements the conjuncture of internal and external structures—in this case, Brit- 's secular decline in power coinciding with an exceptionally unstable ernational milieu.

Historians normally explain the relative stability or instability of the ernational system at different periods in terms of a combination of spe- ic circumstances. There is scope for theoretical analysis of these consid- itions. Schroeder's recent discussion of structural differences between 18th- and 19th-century systems, which could explain the greater sta- ity of the latter,[97] has considerable *prima facie* relevance to the interwar iod: all three of the changes that made for greater stability after 1815 re reversed, indeed negated, after 1919.

One of these was the "fencing off of the European states system from extra-European world," such that European and imperial conflicts

[95] Waltz (fn. 11).

[96] Kenneth N. Waltz, *Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics: The American and British Ex- ience* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967); Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., "Between Power and Plenty: eign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States," special issue, *International Organ- ion* 31 (Autumn 1977), 587-920.

[97] Paul W. Schroeder, "The 19th-Century International System: Changes in the Structure," *rld Politics* 39 (October 1986), 1-26.

did not interact as they had in the 18th century. After 1919, conflicts outside Europe impinged greatly on the European balance, mainly to Britain's detriment. Second, there was a change in the role of the smaller states, which after 1815 had served as buffers or intermediaries between the great powers. After 1919, the smaller states in Eastern Europe, in particular, enhanced instability, forming part of a brittle French sphere of influence vulnerable to a German takeover; insofar as they formed a *cordon sanitaire* against the Soviet Union, they added to the impediments to the latter's resuming an active role as a great power. The third change—normative rather than structural—was the absence in the interwar period of accepted rules of the game and of a common conception of the rights and duties of the great powers, such as had characterized the 19th-century system. This extrapolation of Schroeder's discussion suggests that structural theory at this level of analysis may have considerable potential for explaining some of the larger changes in international politics, a task that is not attempted by structural realism.

The artificial separation between the disciplines of international history and international relations is costly to both. The separation is fortunately not complete: historical case studies are becoming increasingly prominent in international relations.[98] But the foregoing analysis suggests that there remains much to be gained by closer interchange, not least in the challenge and stimulus to theory which the work of historians can present.

[98] In addition to the authors cited in fn. 93, Glenn H. Snyder and Richard Ned Lebow have made substantial contributions. See, for example, Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making and System Structure in International Crises* (Princeton. Princeton University Press, 1977), and Lebow, *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981). For a recent overview, see Christopher Hill, "History and International Relations," in Steve Smith, ed., *International Relations: British and American Perspectives* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985), 126-45.

# REALISM, GAME THEORY, AND COOPERATION

By ROBERT JERVIS *

EVER since Thucydides, scholars have emphasized that international politics is shaped by the anarchical context in which it takes place. he pernicious effect of what John Herz called the security dilemma— e fact that most of the ways in which a country seeks to increase its seırity have the unintended effect of decreasing the security of others— so is familiar, and indeed, also can be found in Thucydides: "What ade war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear hich this caused in Sparta." In view of such dynamics, how can states ıoperate? Recent analyses have formalized these problems and analyzed em by means of modern social science techniques.[1]

The work arises from the intersection of Realism and game theory. Alough common interests are stressed more than in some forms of Realn, the basic assumptions clearly fit within this school: the focus is on the ıte as an actor[2] and on the strategies that can rationally be used to furer its interests. The studies use simple game-theory models, or what ırry O'Neill calls "proto-game theory,"[3] in order to gain the insights

* I am grateful for comments by Robert Art, John Conybeare, Jeffrey Frieden, Joanne ›wa, Joseph Grieco, Ernst Haas, Stanley Hoffmann, Stephen Krasner, Deborah Larson, ed Lawson, Helen Milner, Richard Nelson, and Jack Snyder.

[1] John Hertz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 2 (Janry 1950), 157-80; Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, trans. by Rex Warner (Harmondsırth, U.K.: Penguin, 1954), 25. The recent literature is summarized and extended in *World litics* 38 (October 1985), also published as Kenneth Oye, ed., *Cooperation under Anarchy* ·inceton: Princeton University Press, 1986). The framework used grows out of Robert :elrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Robert Jervis, "Coeration under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30 (January 1978), 167-214; and Robert ·ohane, *After Hegemony* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). Related arguments · made by Michael Taylor, *Anarchy and Cooperation* (New York: Wiley, 1976). Although : subject matter is the same as that treated in Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society* (New ›rk: Columbia University Press, 1977), Bull's approach is different and his work is not cited this literature. For arguments that Bull provides a better foundation for understanding innational politics than does the work analyzed here, see Hayward Alker, Jr., "The Prenption of Anarchy in World Politics," and Richard Ashley, "Hedley Bull and the Anarchy ›blematique," both in Alker and Ashley, eds., *After Realism: Anarchy, Power, and Internaıal Collaboration* (forthcoming).

[2] See Charles Lipson, "Bankers' Dilemmas: Private Cooperation in Rescheduling Sovern Debts," *World Politics* 38 (October 1985), 200-225, for an analysis of non-state actors hin this framework.

[3] O'Neill, "Game Theory and the Study of Deterrence of War," in Robert Axelrod, Robert vis, Roy Radner, and Paul Stern, eds., *Perspectives in Deterrence*, forthcoming.

and rigor that stem from formalization. But the formalization is limited: what is most important is the basic structure of the game and the analogies that are provided.[4] Game theory and Realism are generally compatible—both are structural, strategic, and rational—but each has its own vulnerabilities. Thus, some of my criticisms can be traced more to problems with Realism, others more to problems with game theory. But my focus is on the work that exemplifies the intersection of the two; it is not a full-blown critique of the entirety of either approach.

Drawing on the concepts of the iterated Prisoners' Dilemma (PD) and public goods,[5] the basic question posed by the recent work is how self-interested actors can cooperate in the face of anarchy and important conflicting interests. By taking two actors and positing that each of them has only two choices (cooperating with or defecting from the other), an interesting world emerges in which four outcomes are possible. They are preferred by the actor in the following order: first, the actor defects while the other cooperates (DC), thus allowing the former to gain an advantage; second, both actors cooperate (CC); third, both may defect (DD), thus producing competition; the fourth and worst outcome would be for the actor to cooperate while the other defects (CD) and thereby exploits him. What makes this configuration disturbing is that even if each side prefers CC to DD (and each knows that this is the other's preference), the result can be DD because each is driven by the hope of gaining its first choice—which would be to exploit the other (DC)—and its fear that, if it cooperates, the other will exploit it (CD).

When a good idea like this comes along, our exuberance at finding new insights leads us to extend and apply it widely, postponing a consideration of problems and limitations. To some extent this is functional: as Albert

[4] For contrasting evaluations of the potential of higher forms of game theory, see *ibid.*, and Duncan Snidal, "The Game *Theory* of International Politics," *World Politics* 38 (October 1985), 25-57. For an excellent general discussion, see Thomas Schelling, "What is Game Theory?" in Schelling, *Choice and Consequence* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), 213-14.

[5] The relationship between PD and public goods is technical, complex, and subject to dispute. See John Conybeare, "Public Goods, Prisoners' Dilemma, and the International Political Economy," *International Studies Quarterly* 28 (March 1984), 5-22, and Russell Hardin, *Collective Action* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 16-30. The essential similarity between the two that is relevant here is that the equilibrium solution is non-optimal. That is, in the absence of devices to avoid this outcome, individual self-interested rationality leads each actor to be worse off than he could have been if all players had acted differently. This is true even though public goods are characterized by non-rivalry of consumption and non-excludability—two dimensions that can be distinguished: see Duncan Snidal, "Public Goods, Property Rights, and Political Organizations," *International Studies Quarterly* 23 (December 1979), 532-66—in contrast to two-person PDs that have both rivalry and excludability. When large numbers are involved in a PD, as they are in the Tragedy of the Commons, excludability is precluded and the situation can be considered as one of a public good that has the characteristics of non-excludability but not non-rivalry. These distinctions are important in many analyses, but they are not central here.

Hirschman has noted, in many cases we would not start what will prove to be a fruitful enterprise if we were aware of the difficulties at the beginning.[6] But if we ignore the problems in the early stages, we may overreact and reject the entire approach when they become obvious later. It would be more productive if scholars simultaneously explored the potential of and the problems with the approach. Since the potential has been discussed elsewhere (see fn. 1), I will concentrate on the problems.

Three strengths that have made this research stimulating and important should be noted, however. First, it builds upon central characteristics of international politics—anarchy, the security dilemma, and the combination of common and conflicting interests. Second, the approach is parsimonious and lends itself to deductive theorizing. Third, it seeks to bring together the study of conflict and the study of cooperation, and tries to explain a wide range of phenomena encompassing both security and political economy. The deterring of exploitation may be as relevant to the stability of monetary systems as to arms control; strategies by which states can gain the benefits of mutual cooperation may be as important for nuclear postures as for international trade. Indeed, as the links to the theory of public goods indicate, the propositions produced should apply to a wide range of cases outside of international politics.

It is not a good sign, however, that prisoners confronted by a District Attorney do not behave as the model would lead us to expect.[7] In order to apply the framework, we have to *assume* many of the elements of world politics that in fact are most problematical. The actor's values, preferences, beliefs, and definition of self all are exogenous to the model and must be provided before analysis can begin.[8] If they were straightforward, the analysis of international politics would be much simpler. They therefore need to be investigated and explained, not taken as givens. Adoption of stereotypical Realist assumptions can supply some of the inputs the analysis requires, but I will argue that this is not completely satisfactory.

## Choice and Context

Perhaps the most important limitation of the work on anarchy is that it looks at individual actors, their preferences, and their choices, and thus

[6] Hirschman's discussion of what he calls the "hiding hand" is in his *Development Projects Observed* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1967), 9-34.

[7] Brian Forst and Judith Lucianovic, "The Prisoner's Dilemma: Theory and Reality," *Journal of Criminal Justice* 5 (Spring 1977), 55-64.

[8] The model also assumes that states can fruitfully be considered as unitary actors. The debates over this issue, although important, are so well known that they will only be touched on here.

*blinds us to the broader setting in which behavior occurs. Problems arise* in a context and out of a history, and not all patterns are the product of careful or even conscious choice. Just as in most of our everyday lives we carry out routines, so states also continue established policies with little calculation or thought.[9] Each new day does not bring a new beginning; severe restrictions are placed on us by the expectations—including our own expectations about ourselves—that constitute the context within which we must behave.

When clear points of choice occur, they are often structured by the settings in which they arise. The timing of decisions and events is important and at least partially beyond a decision maker's control. For example, the production schedule for new nuclear submarines has periodically presented President Reagan with the choice of whether to abide by the unratified SALT II Treaty and destroy a usable but older missle-launching submarine, or to break at least part of this agreement. The date on which these decisions had to be made was in part an arbitrary product of industrial vagaries.[10] Furthermore, unexpected events may occur at the same time as the decision, and force themselves on the statesmen's feelings and calculations. Thus, by straining the NATO alliance, Reagan's air strike against Libya in April 1986 may have made it harder for him to break the treaty at the decision point six weeks later. In turn, this decision greatly increased the pressures on Reagan to take a tougher position at the next choice point in late 1986.[11] Similarly, the United States might have made more of an effort to cooperate with the Soviet Union in banning MIRVs had it not been simultaneously negotiating over ABMs. Another example is that American cooperation with the Mariel boatlift of refugees from Cuba was reduced by the accidents of a change in relevant laws—adopted for unrelated reasons—and a large simultaneous emigration from Haiti to the U.S.[12]

More generally, issues arise in particular historical contexts that shape

[9] James Rosenau stresses the role of habits in "Before Cooperation: Hegemons, Regimes, and Habit-Driven Actors in World Politics," *International Organization* 40 (Autumn 1986), 861-70.

[10] Michael Gordon, "Air Force's Delay Said to Keep U.S. to '79 Arms Limit," *New York Times*, August 29, 1986.

[11] Michael Gordon, "Reagan Declares U.S. Is Dismantling Two Nuclear Subs," *New York Times*, May 28, 1986; also see Gordon, "U.S. Still Divided on 1979 Arms Treaty," *New York Times*, April 23, 1986. When the U.S. did break the limits, some critics held that one motive was to show that the controversy over the Iran arms deal, which had just been revealed, would not inhibit the administration from acting decisively. Michael Gordon, "U.S. Exceeds Limit Set in 1979 Accord on Strategic Arms," *New York Times*, November 29, 1986.

[12] Jorge Dominguez, "Cooperating with the Enemy: U.S. Immigration Policies toward Cuba," in Christopher Mitchell, ed., *Immigration Policy and U.S. Foreign Relations with Latin America* (forthcoming). For additional examples, see Glenn Seaborg with Benjamin Loeb, *Stemming the Tide* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987), 121, 158.

preferences and behavior. The operating incentives are given not only by the present circumstances, but also by how these circumstances came about. Where the players are is strongly influenced by where they have been.[13] Thus the U.S. decision to respond with force immedately to the seizure of the *Mayaguez* is to be explained largely by the fact that this event occurred shortly after the fall of Vietnam, when U.S. leaders believed that they had to act forcefully to show others that the previous defeat had not undermined American willingness to use force. Similarly, one reason why Britain could not cooperate with Germany and restrain Russia in 1914 was that she had done so in the previous crisis and feared that a repetition would destroy the Triple Entente. In other cases, defection or cooperation in one interaction will lead to more of the same. Cooperation can change the situation the actors face, and their beliefs, in ways that make further cooperation more likely. Perhaps more frequently, the process of mutual defection will lead each side to fear and dislike the other, and to develop distorted views of it, which cannot be quickly reversed if the other suddenly begins to cooperate.[14] Actors do not react merely to the *immediate* stimulus they face.[15]

We often talk of repeated plays of a Prisoners' Dilemma. But this formulation is misleading when the preferences and beliefs of the actors, and the nature of the game itself, change as it is played. What is at stake and the nature of the issue is defined over time, as actors develop their positions, in part in response to the positions taken by others. As one Senator explained his vote to permit the export of advanced arms to Saudi Arabia:

> The whole issue changed in the last week or 10 days. The media began to play it up as a question involving the president's ability to conduct foreign policy.... Had it not been for the media hype, the issue would have been strictly the arms sale. And I would have been very comfortable voting against it."[16]

[13] For a nice example taken from the pattern of social relations within a community of chimpanzees, see Jane Goodall, *The Chimpanzees of Gombe* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1986), 337-38.

[14] See the discussion of the "spiral model" in Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 62-84. For arguments that one or two instances of cooperation are not likely to be sufficient to break these spirals, see Charles Osgood, *An Alternative to War or Surrender* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962).

[15] For a discussion of a parallel in biological evolution, see Stephen Jay Gould, "Not Necessarily a Wing," *Natural History* 94 (November 1985), 12-25. Also see Gould, "Of Kiwi Eggs and the Liberty Bell," *Natural History* 95 (November 1986), 22-29. The argument that structures shape and limit later development is in sharp contrast to the standard evolutionary assertion that natural selection operates in a way that provides the best fit between organisms and their present environment.

[16] Quoted in Richard Fenno, Jr., "Observation, Context, and Sequence in the Study of Politics," *American Political Science Review* 80 (March 1986), 11-12.

The moves in a game can change it. Chicken can become Prisoners' Dilemma if each side's behavior leads the other to believe that being exploited would be worse than mutual defection. Schelling notes: "When a boy pulls a switch-blade knife on his teacher, the teacher is likely to feel, whatever the point at issue originally was, that the overriding policy question now is his behavior in the face of a switch-blade challenge."[17]

Other objections can be grouped under three headings, each of which has three components. The first set of questions concerns the actors' preferences, which need to be probed and explained. The second deals with the concepts employed by the framework, which may turn out to be ambiguous or troublesome. The third set involves the causes and consequences of the actors' perceptions, beliefs, and values. The representations of reality employed often beg crucial questions. Like many experiments, the models often gain internal validity at the cost of external validity: the order they impose is too rigid to catch the reality they seek to explain.

## Preferences and Preference Orders

As noted, the central question for the work on anarchy is how cooperation is possible when actors are in a Prisoners' Dilemma—i.e., when they have the following preference order: exploiting or taking advantage of the other, mutual cooperation, mutual defection, and being exploited. The most important issue may be not what happens after these preferences have been established, but the preferences themselves. Much of the explanatory "action" takes place in the formation of the preferences; we cannot afford to leave this topic offstage. Three questions need to be addressed: How do we know what the actors' preferences are? What is the pattern of distribution of preferences over large number of cases? How are preferences established?

### What Are the Actors' Preferences?

The first question is the most obvious one. How do we know whether a situation resembles a PD? The problem is even greater for those variants of the framework that call for cardinal rather than ordinal utilities.[18] The danger, of course, is that we will infer the actors' preferences from

[17] Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), 265.

[18] This is true for Jervis (fn. 1).

their behavior. Actors rarely give complete statements of their preferences. In some cases we can use the method of "revealed preferences," but this technique can be used only when preferences are stable and consistent; if it is not to be tautologous, we must examine a large number of instances in order to test the preferences on behaviors that we did not use to derive the preferences in the first place.

Furthermore, while the standard PD model points to four possible outcomes that need to be ranked, decision makers may define the situation differently—most frequently by ignoring the possibility of mutual restraint. In 1914, for example, most leaders did not ask themselves whether they preferred peace to war because they did not think that peace could be maintained. In some cases, a lack of cooperation may be explained in significant measure by the actors' inattention to the possibility of such an outcome.

### How Common Is Prisoners' Dilemma?

The second problem lies in determining the relative frequency of various games. How common is Prisoners' Dilemma? Harrison Wagner and George Downs and his colleagues note that states often fail to cooperate, not because they cannot surmount the PD, but because they are in Deadlock and prefer mutual defection to mutual cooperation.[19] For example, were the states in 1914 in PD or in Deadlock? (These are not, of course, the only alternatives.) Are we in PD with the Soviet Union today? Ronald Reagan is not alone in answering in the negative; much of the debate over whether American threats have deterred the Soviet Union or created unnecessary conflict is a disagreement about Soviet intentions and preference orders, not a dispute between two contending general theories.[20]

To put the questions in their most general form: How much of international conflict is caused by the states' inability to make and enforce binding agreements? How much of international politics is driven by this problem? The model of PD may be popular, not because it catches the most important dynamics of international politics, but because it is intriguing and lends itself to interesting manipulations. The "law of the instrument" may be at least partly at work. Furthermore, the model is congruent with the Anglo-American bias of seeing world politics as tragedy

[19] Harrison Wagner, "The Theory of Games and the Problem of International Cooperation," *American Political Science Review* 70 (June 1983), 330-46; George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Randolph M. Siverson, "Arms Races and Cooperation," *World Politics* 38 (October 1985), 118-46.

[20] Jervis (fn. 14), 84-113. Similarly, many of the arguments about whether the failure of detente was inevitable or a matter of errors can be phrased in terms of whether the relaxation of tensions was Pareto-superior to a high level of competition.

rather than as evil, of believing that most conflicts can be ameliorated for the good of all concerned.[21]

The empirical problems in answering these questions are relatively clear, although extremely difficult. Perhaps equally troublesome but less obvious are two conceptual difficulties. First, are we concerned only with situations in which the agreements cannot be enforced, or also with those in which no outside agency is available to force the actors to reach an agreement in the first place? Even where enforcement is available, as it is in domestic society, some mutually beneficial outcomes may be missed because of bargaining dynamics and miscalculations. Similarly, the dilemma of public goods is not that actors cannot ensure that others will live up to their commitments, but that it is not rational for anyone to make a commitment to contribute in the first place.

A second problem is that whether or not a situation is a Prisoners' Dilemma depends in part on how we define its boundaries. If we look at Japanese-American negotiations in the summer and fall of 1941, the framework does not apply: both sides preferred mutual defection (in this case, war) to the concessions that would have been necessary to reach agreement. Japan would rather fight than give up the effort to dominate China and South East Asia; the United States would rather fight than permit this to happen. But if we step back and ask why Japan sought its sphere of influence, anarchy and the Prisoners' Dilemma emerge as crucial. Domination was sought primarily as a means to the goal of autarky. Japanese leaders wanted the self-sufficiency that would go along with unhindered access to Asian markets and raw materials in order to become relatively immune from Western pressures.[22] Had it been possible for the West and Japan to make a binding agreement giving the latter economic freedom in Asia in return for renouncing the use of force, a bargain might have been struck.

### Sources of Preferences

By taking preferences as given, we beg what may be the most important question on how they are formed. When and why do actors find exploitation particularly attractive, or the danger of being taken advantage of particularly unacceptable? When and why do decision makers see mutual cooperation as desirable? Economic theory treats tastes and prefer-

[21] See Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), chap. 15.

[22] James B. Crowley, *Japan's Quest for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy, 1930-1938* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966); Michael Barnhart, *Japan Prepares for Total War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).

:nces as exogenous. Analysis is therefore facilitated, but at the cost of lrawing attention away from areas that may contain much of the explan- ıtory "action" in which we are interested.[23]

Sometimes we can deduce preferences from the structure of the sys- em, as Realism suggests. But even a structural theory of international ›olitics as powerful as Waltz's has trouble producing many precise de- luctions.[24] As the endless arguments about the national interest remind ıs, only rarely can descriptions and prescriptions of what the state will or hould prefer be drawn from its objective situation.[25] Conybeare is able to leduce a state's economic interests from trade theory;[26] but this inference ›nly applies if we assume that the state is an actor. Such an assumption is ›ften a valid guide when overriding issues of national security are at take; but the relevant actors for economic issues are often classes, sectors, nd groups, or even smaller and more numerous units. In the security rea, the preference for protecting the status quo rather than retreating nay be deducible from the external situation, but the choice for expan- ion is often the result either of preferences of important subnational ;roups or of internal bargaining.[27] More broadly, one does not have to be Wilsonian or a Marxist to argue that the goals states seek, the costs they re willing to pay, and the instruments that are believed appropriate can ›e deeply affected by the nature of the state.

Transnational forces are a third general source of preferences. Thus, ames Joll sees the prevalence of Social Darwinism in the early 20th cen- ury as a major cause of the preference for competition in world politics, nd Van Evera argues that rampant nationalism strongly influenced the ıtilities that attached to various outcomes.[28] The maddeningly vague spirit of the times" may help to account for the fact that, during the years ›efore World War I, all the major powers opted for offensive military

[23] See the discussion of tastes in James March, "Bounded Rationality, Ambiguity, and the :ngineering of Choice," *Bell Journal of Economics* 9 (Autumn 1978), 593-604.

[24] Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison Wesley, 1979).

[25] But see Stephen Krasner, *Defending the National Interest* (Princeton: Princeton University 'ress, 1978). Also see David Lake, "Beneath the Commerce of Nations: A Theory of Inter- ational Economic Structure," *International Studies Quarterly* 28 (June 1984), 145-49, and .ake, "Power and the Third World: Toward a Realist Political Economy of North-South :elations," *International Studies Quarterly* 31 (June 1987), 221-28.

[26] John Conybeare, *Trade Wars* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987).

[27] See Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire*, forthcoming.

[28] James Joll, "1914: The Unspoken Assumptions," in H. W. Koch, ed., *The Origins of the 'irst World War* (London: Macmillan, 1972), 307-28; Koch, "Social Darwinism as a Factor in ıe 'New Imperialism,'" *ibid.*, 329-54; Stephen Van Evera, "Why Cooperation Failed in 914," *World Politics* 38 (October 1985), 80-117. For a related general argument on the source f preferences, see Aaron Wildavsky, "Choosing Preferences by Construction Institutions: A :ultural Theory of Preference Formation," *American Political Science Review* 81 (March 987), 3-22.

strategies when defensive ones would have been more likely to make them reach their foreign policy goals.[29]

Preferences also stem from the ideologies and beliefs of individual decision makers. Some are "hard-line," others "soft-line" in dealing with an adversary. Whether these orientations hold across interactions with a range of adversaries we do not know, although some evidence indicates that they do.[30] The effect is that under circumstances in which some statesmen will believe that mutual cooperation is beneficial, others will see it as a trap. Thus, because of their beliefs about the nature of the adversary, Ronald Reagan and his supporters believe that many kinds of cooperation with the Soviet Union are likely to produce greater Soviet pressures on the West rather than further cooperation.

Herbert Simon's argument about Duverger's Law of the relations between voting rules and party systems applies to theorizing in international politics as well: "Most of the work is being done by propositions that characterize the utility function of the [actor] and his or her beliefs, expectations, and calculations."[31] Realism and game theory are of limited help here since the latter must assume the actors' preferences and utilities, and Realism's generalizations, although powerful, are often vague. Furthermore, these approaches imply that preferences are constant when, in fact, they change and thus pose a range of challenges for the anarchy framework.[32] First, and most obviously, a state's preferences change as one set of decision makers replaces another. Thus the dim prospects for arms control throughout much of the Reagan administration are explained by the President's belief that agreements that others saw as advantageous are in fact unacceptable. Game theory focuses on the prefer-

[29] Van Evera (fn. 28); Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," *International Security* 9 (Summer 1984), 58-107; Jack Snyder, "Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984," *ibid.*, 108-46; Snyder, *The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984). For a rebuttal, see Scott Sagan, "1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability," *International Security* 11 (Fall 1986), 151-76, and the exchange of letters between Snyder and Sagan, *ibid.*, 11 (Winter 1986/87), 187-98.

[30] For a discussion of this issue in the domestic context, see Robert Putnam, *The Beliefs of Politicians* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973).

[31] Simon, "Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology and Political Science," *American Political Science Review* 79 (June 1985), 298; also see William Riker, "The Heresthetics of Constitution-Making: The Presidency in 1787, with Comments on Determinism and Rational Choice," *American Political Science Review* 78 (March 1984), 1-16. In a different intellectual tradition, Adam Przeworski comes to a similar conclusion: "Marxism and Rational Choice," *Politics and Society* 14 (No. 1, 1985), 379-409.

[32] For a general discussion of changing preferences, see James March and Herbert Simon, *Organizations* (New York: Wiley, 1958), 141; Michael Cohen and Robert Axelrod, "Coping with Complexity: The Adaptive Value of Changing Utility," *American Economic Review* 74 (March 1984), 30-42; Barbara Farnham, "Value Conflicts and Political Decision-Making" (Ph.D. diss. in progress, Columbia University).

ences that are held at any given time, and therefore simply puts this question to one side; Realism implies that preferences come from the position of the state in the international system, and therefore implies that changes in leadership do not matter. Realism is less troubled by a second source of change: that produced by shifts in the external situation. On the simplest level, a previously desired outcome may become unacceptable because the state would no longer gain by it. Thus, for instance, states begin to resist mutual low tariffs as their competitive position deteriorates. Similarly, in the fall of 1961 American decision makers came to doubt the wisdom of their own nuclear test-ban proposal when they suspected "that the Russians might have drawn even with or even past us in some aspects of thermonuclear weapons."[33]

In other cases, preferences change through the process of the interaction itself. When two states are hostile, one will often assume that anything the other urges must be bad; an outcome that was previously favored will be viewed with skepticism if the adversary endorses it. Similarly, the fact that a state takes a strong interest in an issue can lead the adversary to develop a contrary preference. The conflict process then *generates* interests and preferences rather than being produced by them.[34] It would otherwise be impossible to explain why the United States supports Jonas Savimbi in Angola, or refuses to admit refugees from Cuba. Unlike other communist regimes, Cuba *wants* its internal opponents to leave; so the U.S., counter to its normal policy of accepting such people, keeps them out.[35] Although this interdependence between states' preferences is compatible with Realism, it leads to interests and maneuvers that complicate, if not contradict, the normal prescriptions produced by the anarchy framework. For example, splitting up a large transaction into a series of small ones may be ineffective in these circumstances.

Experience and knowledge can also change preferences. Although such processes account for many important outcomes, they are exogenous to game theory and the anarchy framework. As actors participate in an arrangement, they may come to see that the consequences are quite different from those they expected. Thus the experience of the follow-up conferences on the Helsinki Agreement seems to have convinced the Soviets that the discussion of human rights, while annoying, does not

[33] Glenn Seaborg, *Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 120.

[34] Of course, each state wants to limit the other's power and influence and will therefore try to see that any actor the adversary is supporting does not win; but from this we cannot deduce preferences for specified countries or factions to prevail.

[35] Linda Greenhouse, "U.S. Assailed Again on Curbing Cuban Immigrants," *New York Times*, September 27, 1986.

do as much harm as they once believed.[36] In other cases, the emergence of new scientific information may be the source of change. The U.S. position in the test-ban negotiations was altered when people realized that testing might take place inside a large cavern, thus muffling the blast and undercutting the verification techniques in which the West previously had faith. New information or new beliefs can also lead to preferences for cooperation. Robert Rothstein argues, for example, that North-South conflict over commodity pricing decreased as the developing states came to see that their previous proposals for price stabilization might not increase their income, as they had initially believed.[37] Negotiations proceed not only by bargaining, but also by persuasion; in some cases, that leads to solutions that neither side had previously thought of and that each comes to prefer to its original proposal.[38]

Finally, preferences may be unstable. Because the intellectual problems are great, key decisions are often difficult, and continued thought may produce shifting evaluations. Although such processes are difficult to generalize about, most people know them from their own experience: deciding what car to buy, what job to take, or whom to marry. Most sharply, decision makers may come to prefer mutual cooperation to mutual defection, or vice versa. Thus, the Soviet-American negotiations for arms control in the Indian Ocean broke down largely because the Carter administration, after first favoring an agreement, came to believe that it would not be in the American interest. Similarly, in the early 1960s, the United States favored land-mobile missiles, then (in SALT I) proposed prohibiting them, then favored them as stabilizing, and has recently again called for banning them. The same kind of changes have occurred in the U.S. stance toward antisatellite weapons. Those shifts can only in part be explained by changes in technological possibilities or Soviet activities.[39]

[36] John Maresia, "Helsinki," in Alexander George, Philip Farley, and Alexander Dallin, eds., *U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons* (New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming 1988). Also see Raymond Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1985), 480. For an argument that people's preferences are often formed by their behavior, see Daryl Bem, "Self-Perception Theory," in Leonard Berkowitz, ed., *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, VI (New York: Academic Press, 1972); for an application to international politics, see Deborah Larson, *The Origins of Containment* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985).

[37] Rothstein, "Consensual Knowledge and International Collaboration: Some Lessons from the Commodity Negotiations," *International Organization* 38 (Autumn 1984), 732-62.

[38] See Mary Parker Follett, *Dynamic Administration: The Collected Papers of Mary Parker Follett*, H. C. Metcalf and L. Urwick, eds. (New York: Harper & Row, 1942); Richard Walton and Richard McKersie, *A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), 126-83; Ernst Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1964), 86-125.

[39] For a discussion of the ways in which changes in technology influenced American attitudes toward antisatellite weapons, particularly by providing satellites with offensive as well

In summary, the research on cooperation under anarchy assumes the actors are in PD, which may not be correct. It further takes the actors' preferences as given and ignores how, why, and when they change. Game theory cannot help here; Realism's analyses of these questions are limited at best.

## Concepts

The concepts employed by the anarchy framework seem unproblematic at first glance. Cooperation and defection, offense and defense, and power are fairly standard concepts, but the requirements for rigorous analysis within a game-theoretic approach demand that we squeeze some of the richness out of these terms. The admirable gain in precision may have to be purchased at an unacceptably high price.

### Cooperation and Defection

The concepts of cooperation and defection are crucial to the framework. These terms work well for a laboratory Prisoners' Dilemma, but most situations are more complex. To start with, are these the only two alternatives? Perhaps we should think not of a dichotomy, but of a continuum. But can we add this measure of realism without sacrificing the parsimony and deductive power of the theory? Furthermore, can most alternatives really be arrayed along such a continuum? Some policies express a high degree of both cooperation and defection simultaneously; others—in some instances, the policy of isolation—express neither.[40] In many cases the most interesting choices are not even on this continuum.

Concrete questions often arise about how to characterize any individual outcome or policy. Sometimes these questions come down to whether the glass is half full or half empty, but even then the answer is not inconsequential. An example of an outcome is the "chicken war" between the United States and the E.E.C. in the early 1960s, which Conybeare sees as mutual defection because Europe raised the tariff on frozen poultry and the U.S. retaliated by raising tariffs on some European products.[41] But one can argue that what is more significant than the deviation from pure cooperation is the fact that the dispute was held to one round of action

as defensive military capabilities, see Paul Stares, *The Militarization of Space* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985), and Steve Weber and Sydney Drell, "Cooperation and Discord in the Militarization of Space: U.S. Strategy, 1960-1985," in George, Farley, and Dallin (fn. 36).

[40] Thus it is not surprising that quantitative studies find that conflict and cooperation are not always inversely related to each other.

[41] Conybeare (fn. 26).

and counteraction. It did not produce a spiral of conflict, and relations between the countries were not embittered. An example of an ambiguous military policy is the question whether the U.S. cooperated or defected in its strategic arms procurements between the mid-1960s to the late 1970s. On the one hand, the United States, unlike the Soviet Union, did not deploy additional missiles. On the other, it did make major qualitative improvements, most notably in the form of multiple warheads.

How we judge a policy may also depend on the time span we examine. Defection in one instance can produce mutual cooperation over the longer run. Indeed, one implication of the theorizing about anarchy is that cooperation is enforced by the possibility of defection. Thus, President Reagan argues that his policy will induce Soviet cooperation, which will then be mutual. If he turns out to be correct, is it more useful to call the whole policy one of cooperation, or to divide it into discrete rounds and label the initial American behavior as defection? And if the Soviets have been conciliatory in order to weaken the West, and will ultimately return to an uncooperative stance from an improved position, should the policy not be characterized as defection? A simpler version of this ambiguity is revealed in the Cuban missile crisis. This episode is often considered an American victory; in fact, *mutual* cooperation greatly increased in the months that followed. If we take an even longer perspective, however, we might label the outcome as mutual defection, because of the Soviet arms build-up that was caused partly by the humiliation in Cuba. In game theory or in the laboratory, we can define what each play of the game is. But in the situations we are trying to analyze, these distinctions, and the answer to the question whether the behavior is seen as cooperative or not, are subjective if not artificial.

In other cases, the very meaning of cooperation is unclear. It usually denotes doing what the other actor prefers, but how do we characterize a response that is undesired but is designed to benefit the other, and/or has that effect? How do we classify behavior when one side desires a high degree of friction with the other and the other responds with the sought-for hostility? What do we say about cases in which neither side thinks about the impact on the other? Does the notion of defection imply something more than, or different from, noncooperation? The labels may squeeze out much of the reality that we are trying to catch. A recent example displays several of these ambiguities. In April 1986, the United States asked East Germany to restrict the travel of Libyan diplomats who might be aiding terrorism in the West. In response—or what they asserted to be response—the East Germans demanded that all diplomats except those of Britain, France, and the U.S. show their passports as they

crossed from East to West Berlin. (Previously, only special passes issued by the East German Foreign Ministry had been required.) The U.S. took this action, not as cooperation, but as "a clearly unfriendly negative act that is intended to undermine the four-power status" of Berlin.[42] This interpretation is not unreasonable, but neither is it compelled by the facts.

The problem of the subjective and political nature of definitions of cooperation is compounded in the cold war because the two sides have very different perspectives. Most Americans think about cooperating with the U.S.S.R. to maintain the status quo or to bring about mutually beneficial changes, particularly in arms control. But the Soviets not only consider the status quo in the sense of the current distribution of influence as disadvantageous, but believe that it cannot be maintained because it is being moved by the forces of history. Thus, for the Soviets, CC consists of managing the changes in a peaceful way. While the United States would steadily lose ground, the Soviets argue that Washington should accept this process because the alternative would be even worse.[43]

Even when such problems are absent, it is easy to overlook the fact that what is deemed a defection is in part rule-governed. The United States—and most of the world—considered the Soviet emplacement of missiles in Cuba in 1962 as strongly noncooperative; the Soviet arms build-up of the late 1960s, which had a much greater influence on the military balance, was seen as less of a defection. Although what Waltz calls "internal balancing" may not be welcomed by others, it is accepted as a normal part of international politics. It is seen as legitimate; indeed, coercive attempts to block it would be perceived as illegitimate and highly threatening. These distinctions cannot be understood by measuring the objective harm done to the state. The fact that the actors usually give little thought to the rules does not reduce their importance in defining the crucial concepts we use.

Some of these difficulties are summarized by the question a student raised when I played a version of multiperson Prisoners' Dilemma in class: what, she asked, are we to cooperate *about*? For decision makers, the question is never cooperation or defection, but rather what goals to seek and the tactics that will be most apt to reach them. Of course it is not illegitimate to impose our categories on the behavior of actors—and the notions of cooperation and defection are hardly foreign to them—but

[42] James Markham, "Allied Diplomats Defy East German Controls," *New York Times*, May 28, 1986. For parallel discussion of an important case in the late 18th century, see Paul Schroeder, "Old Wine in New Bottles: Recent Contributions to British Foreign Policy and European International Politics, 1789-1848," *Journal of British Studies* 26 (January 1987), 10.

[43] See Garthoff (fn. 36), 38-50, 1069. The Japanese had a similar conception of cooperation with the British in China in the 1930s: see Paul Haggie, *Britannia at Bay* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 126.

when actors define their problems and choices quite differently from the theoretical model, we may be forcing disparate behavior into an inappropriate framework.

### Offense and Defense

Questions can also be raised about the concepts of offense and defense. Both logic and evidence indicate that the prospects for cooperation are increased to the extent that defensive military systems and strategies can be distinguished from, and are stronger than, offensive ones.[44] In principle, the difference between offense and defense is clear: the former involves the ability to attack the other and seize his territory; the latter the ability to repel such an attack and protect one's own territory. The issue of whether attacking or defending is preferable comes down to whether a decision maker who believed that war was inevitable would prefer to attack the other side, as in 1914, or be on the defensive while the other side attacked—which, as the history of World War I shows, would have been a better strategy.[45]

But questions arise. Even if it is possible to say whether the offense or the defense has the advantage, can one distinguish between offensive and defensive weapons and strategies? Much of the interwar disarmament efforts were devoted to doing so. The fact that statesmen worked hard on this question indicates that they believed that a positive answer was attainable; that such efforts yield success only occasionally indicates that the endeavor may be doomed—although in the interwar case the reason may have been the refusal to forgo offensive options rather than the inability to make the relevant distinctions. Similarly, George Downs and his colleagues find that arms races are not terminated by the shift to defensive systems[46]—which indicates that statesmen are either unwilling or unable to avoid threatening others while seeking to maximize their own security.

Can the concepts of offense and defense be applied to nuclear weapons? A frequent argument is that the common-sense definitions have to be turned on their heads. That is, offense is the ability to take one's cities out of hostage; conversely, the ability to destroy the other side's population and other values, previously associated with the offense, is now con-

[44] See Jervis (fn. 1), at 186-214; George Quester, *Offense and Defense in the International System* (New York: Wiley, 1977); Jack Levy, "The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology: A Theoretical and Historical Analysis," *International Studies Quarterly* 28 (June 1984), 219-38; Van Evera (fns. 28 and 29); Snyder (fn. 29); Barry Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984); Weber and Drell (fn. 39).

[45] See the literature cited in fn. 29 above.

[46] Downs, Rocke, and Siverson (fn. 19).

sidered defensive (as long as the other side has a similar capability) because such an act could be credibly threatened only as retaliation for the other's attack. The obvious implications are that superpower strategies designed to deter war by developing counterforce capabilities exacerbate the security dilemma and make cooperation more difficult, and that countervalue targeting would permit mutual security. But such paradoxical reasoning has not been accepted by all analysts, with the result that there is no consensus about how the concepts fit the current situation.

Even if the distinction between offense and defense works, at least to some extent, in the military arena, can it be transferred to other dimensions of international relationships?[47] To find the answer, one would have to ask under which conditions bandwagoning as opposed to balancing is likely to take place.[48] The former dynamics make the offensive potent; the latter support the defensive. When initial gains are expected to create positive feedback, each state will have strong incentives to defect, irrespective of whether its ultimate intentions are aggressive; moving first may endanger the other, but it is necessary in order to protect the state. As a result, mutual restraint will be difficult to maintain even if both sides are satisfied with the status quo. By contrast, when balancing prevails and gains by one side call up counteracting pressures, states can afford to await developments, making major efforts only on the relatively rare occasions when another power poses a direct threat. Cooperation should thus be more prevalent when bandwagoning is neither feared nor hoped for.

The most obvious example of bandwagoning—or at least the expectation of it—is the "domino theory." When a defeat in one country is expected to have major and deleterious consequences for the state's influence in other areas, then even minor threats must be met swiftly and firmly. On the other hand, when one side believes that the other side's local victory is likely to be contained—for example, by the efforts of neighbors who are alarmed by the new threat—then it can afford to try cooperating with the other because the costs of being taken advantage of are relatively low. The political defensive is potent; the security dilemma

[47] For one effort at doing so, see Robert Jervis, "From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation," *World Politics* 38 (October 1985), 58-79, at 62-64. For a further discussion, see Jervis, "Cooperation Under Anarchy: Problems and Limitations," in Alker and Ashley (fn. 1).

[48] Arnold Wolfers, "The Balance of Power in Theory and Practice," in Wolfers (fn. 21), 122-24; Waltz (fn. 24), 125-28; Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," *International Security* 9 (Spring 1985), 3-43, and *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987); Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis, eds., *Strategic Beliefs and Superpower Competition in the Asian Rimland*, forthcoming.

is ameliorated; and a state can gain a high degree of protection without proportionately undermining the interests of its adversary.

Arguments like these need much more development before we can be sure that the distinction between offense and defense is possible and helpful in the political arena. What we have so far are essentially exploratory probes; the results, while suggestive, are hardly definitive. Furthermore, we have not even tried to apply such an extension to the realm of international economic relations.

## THE NATURE OF POWER

A third conceptual difficulty is created by the fact that in many encounters the main stake is power—a notoriously difficult concept. But in almost all formulations, power in international politics is relative rather than absolute.[49] When states think about the possibility of an armed conflict, they have to judge how their forces compare to those of their adversaries; the absolute sizes of the forces on each side are irrelevant. This is true for many political conflicts as well. Knowing how much leverage one state has over another tells statesmen and analysts very little unless they also know how much leverage the other state has. Thus, it can be rational for statesmen to act in ways that reduce the absolute level of benefits they receive.

This view is not only compatible with Realism, but is embedded in it. But it shows that, as long as power is central, an element of inherent conflict will be involved, thus complicating statesmen's attempts to establish cooperation and undercutting some of the prescriptions that can be deduced from the anarchy framework. When states care primarily about maximizing their power advantage and not about absolute gains and losses, many of the strategies and conditions that should lead to cooperation in a Prisoners' Dilemma no longer produce this result.[50] Thus Robert

[49] Nuclear weapons may have changed this, as is indicated by the title and essays in Bernard Brodie et al., *The Absolute Weapon* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1946).

[50] The implications of the fact that states often seek relative rather than absolute gains have been discussed by Arthur Stein, "The Hegemon's Dilemma," *International Organization* 38 (Spring 1984), 355-86. Also see Joanne Gowa, "Anarchy, Egoism, and Third Images: *The Evolution of Cooperation* and International Relations," *International Organization* 40 (Winter 1986), 176-77, and Joseph Grieco, "Distributional Uncertainty and the Realist Problem of International Cooperation," paper presented to the 1986 APSA meeting. For a discussion of the issues and a summary of the experimental literature, see Deborah Larson, "Game Theory and the Psychology of Reciprocity" (unpub., Columbia University), 25-31. More generally, Fred Hirsch, in *Social Limits to Growth* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), brilliantly demonstrates that many goods in society are "positional"—that is, they are inherently competitive. Only a few people can be at the top of an established hierarchy of power or prestige. Certain goods—such as living in an uncrowded area—cannot be shared with large numbers of others. More fundamentally, in many aspects of life we judge how well we are doing by comparing ourselves to others.

Axelrod points to the irony that the strategy of reciprocity (Tit-for-Tat) that proves so effective in computer tournaments of PD can never win any individual game.[51] The strategy works well, however, because it accumulates large numbers of points when matched against fellow cooperators and is not terribly badly exploited when matched against more competitive strategies. But if the main rewards in international politics are for relative gains, a strategy that can, at best, only tie will not be attractive.[52]

The conditions under which states seek to maximize their relative as opposed to their absolute gains need more exploration.[53] These concerns are likely to be greater in the security area than in international economics, but they are present in the latter as well, especially because military and economic strengths are closely linked. Third-world states often seek greater economic equality with the developed countries as well as absolute economic growth. Furthermore, the drive to increase their political power vis-à-vis the developed states would make relative gains even more important.[54]

Even among allies, concern for relative gains is rarely completely absent. For example, would the United States gain or lose (or both) if Japan made new breakthroughs in microelectronics? The U.S. would benefit by importing better goods, but would fall further behind Japan in various technologies. This, in turn, might enable Japan to keep widening the productivity gap with America. More than national pride is involved, especially since no one can guarantee that Japan will maintain its political orientation in the future. Indeed, Stein has shown that the "hegemon's dilemma" operates in the economic arena because a dominant state that cares only about absolute gains is more likely to be overtaken by other powers.[55] Aaron Friedberg has similarly demonstrated the importance of this issue in the debate about the decline of Britain's economic power at the turn of the century. Those who were least concerned stressed the continuing growth of the British economy; those who felt the situation was dangerous concentrated on the fact that other economies were growing even faster.[56]

[51] Axelrod (fn. 1).

[52] See the discussion of strategies in Axelrod's computer tournament in Roy Behr, "Nice Guys Finish Last—Sometimes," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 25 (June 1981), 289-300.

[53] The relevant literature from experimental psychology is summarized in Larson (fn. 50), 28-29.

[54] See Robert W. Tucker, *The Inequality of Nations* (New York: Basic Books, 1977); Stephen Krasner, *Structural Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).

[55] Stein (fn. 50).

[56] Friedberg, *The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, forthcoming 1988), chap. 2.

Waltz's argument raises similar difficulties. He denies that states see to maximize either absolute or relative power. Instead, they try to max mize their security.[57] But since the state's security can be influenced-positively or negatively, depending on the situation—by the power an security of others, this concept is likely to be inherently interactive. U like the desire to maximize relative gains, this may increase cooperatio but the result still will complicate the standard proto-game theory fo mulations.

### Perceptions, Values, and Self-Interest

The final set of problems concerns psychology, beliefs, and values. I increasing order of conceptual difficulty, the issues are the psychologic impediments to cooperation, the role of values and the autonomy of b liefs, and the question of whether narrow self-interest can explain mo international behavior. Realism has generally ignored the decisio making level of analysis; game theory can incorporate the empirical fin ings in this area only at the cost of parsimony and a revision of many cu rent conclusions. To understand when cooperation occurs, we need to s how different beliefs and values can affect the actors' evaluation of th outcomes. A related question is whether self-interest is defined coolly an atomistically or is driven by passions and care for what happens to other If the latter is the case, the important factors will be outside of, if not d nied by, the anarchy framework.

#### Psychological Impediments to Cooperation

Robert Keohane has noted that cooperation may be explained in pa by the fact that people can operate with only bounded rationality; state men need to conserve cognitive resources, and shared norms and princ ples can be extremely useful in easing the burdens of prediction, choic and coordination.[58] But cooperation is decreased by other aspects of th way people think. People do not mechanically reciprocate conciliatio and defection. Instead, their behavior is mediated by their analysis c what the other did and why it did it. The interpretation of others' actio is rarely self-evident, but it is almost always important. Most behavior i ambiguous; even more so are the underlying intentions. Since actors' re sponses are linked to their predictions of how the other will react to al ternative policies they can pursue, their attributions of the causes of th

[57] Waltz (fn. 24); see also Waltz, "Reflections on *Theory of International Politics*: A Respon to My Critics," in Robert O. Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and Its Critics* (New York: Columb University Press, 1986), 334.

[58] Keohane, *After Hegemony* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 110-32.

other's behavior will be crucial. Thus, how they react is influenced by their inferences as to whether the other intended the results that were produced and whether the behavior is best explained by the transient situation the other was in or by its enduring dispositions.[59] Furthermore, since international politics is an interactive process, a statesman's understanding of the other's behavior is influenced by how he thinks his own state is behaving toward the other. Indeed, perhaps the most important psychological factor that interferes with cooperation is that statesmen—and people in their everyday lives—greatly underestimate the extent to which their actions threaten or harm others. They think they are cooperating when an objective observer would say that they are, at least to some extent, defecting.

Part of the reason is that most statesmen are only dimly aware of the security dilemma. When they are peaceful, they think that their intentions are clear and that others will not be threatened by the measures they are taking in their own self-defense. Former Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle once said that if we are in doubt about Soviet intentions, we should buy arms: if the Soviets are aggressive, the build-up will be needed, and if they are not, the only consequence will be wasted money. Similarly, when U.N. troops were moving toward the Yalu, Secretary of State Acheson stated that there was no danger that the Chinese would intervene out of self-defense because they understood that the U.S. was not a threat to them.[60]

Statesmen who think well of themselves generally believe that their actions are compatible with the reasonable interests of others. For example, Raymond Garthoff shows that, during the period of detente, Americans—leaders and general public alike—believed that their country was restrained and cooperative toward the U.S.S.R.; actually, the U.S. continued to seek unilateral advantage by freezing its adversary out of the Middle East, courting China, and developing advanced military technology.[61] As a result of this faulty self-image, any hostile reaction by the adversary is likely to seem unprovoked.

This problem is compounded by a second and better-known bias: states tend to overestimate the hostility of others and will often see as de-

[59] For further discussion of the inference processes and evidence of their importance drawn from experiments and case studies, see Jervis (fn. 14), 32-48, and Larson (fn. 50).

[60] Daniel Yergin, " 'Scoop' Jackson Goes for Broke," *Atlantic Monthly* 233 (June 1974), 81. (The same error is made, even more crudely, by Secretary of Defense Weinberger in *Annual Report to the Congress, FY 1988* [Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1987], 16.) Acheson's views are presented in John Spanier, *The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War* (New York: Norton, 1965), 97. Similar examples are discussed in Jervis (fn. 14), 67-76, and Seaborg (fn. 12), 30-31.

[61] Garthoff (fn. 36). Also see Van Evera's discussion (fn. 28) of the role of nationalism in preventing statesmen from objectively gauging the behavior of their own states.

fection actions that a disinterested observer would record as at least partly cooperative. Dulles's view of Khrushchev's arms cuts in the mid-1950s is one such example; Reagan's view of most Soviet arms proposals may be another.[62]

These two biases often operate simultaneously, with the result that each side is likely to believe that it is cooperating and that the other has responded by defecting. Thus, the United States says that while it has been restrained, the Soviet Union has accumulated many more arms than it needs for deterrence. The Soviets probably have a similar perception of the American defense posture and may think they have limited their own arms. The breakdown of detente reveals the same pattern of perceptions (although that may not provide the primary explanation for the inability of the superpowers to maintain cooperation). To take just one example, when Brezhnev told Nixon in the spring of 1973 that the status quo in the Middle East was unacceptable, and when Gromyko later warned that "the fire of war [in the Middle East] could break out onto the surface at any time," they may well have thought that they were fulfilling their obligations under the Basic Principles Agreement to consult in the event of a threat to peace. The Americans perceived the Soviets to be making threats and, by failing to restrain the Arabs or to notify the U.S. of the impending attack, to be violating the spirit of detente.[63] The same effect often appears during bargaining when each side thinks that the concessions it has made are greater than those it has received.[64]

Furthermore, when statesmen realize that the other side has cooperated, they often believe that it did not have much choice. Thus, decision makers underestimate the ability of others to defect, and therefore frequently believe, incorrectly, that they can get away with some exploitation. This factor played a role in the deterioration of the recent detente as well as in the cooling of relations between England and France in the 1840s.[65] The Soviet Union in the 1970s, and both sides in the earlier in-

[62] See the classic essay by Ole Holsti, "Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy: Dulles and Russia," in David Finlay, Ole Holsti, and Richard Fagen, *Enemies in Politics* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967), 25-96. Michael Sullivan, *International Relations: Theories and Evidence* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1976), 45-46, questions the links between Dulles's beliefs and American behavior, however.

[63] Gromyko is quoted in Galia Golan, *Yom Kippur and After* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 68. The treatment of the 1973 war is a good litmus test for one's views on detente: compare, for example, the discussions in Harry Gelman, *The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Detente* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), chap. 4; Garthoff (fn. 36), chap. 11; and Alexander George, *Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983), chap. 7.

[64] For experimental support for this proposition, see Michael Ross and Fiore Sicoly, "Egocentric Biases in Availability and Attribution," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 37 (March 1979), 322-36.

[65] Roger Bullen, *Palmerston, Guizot, and the Collapse of the Entente Cordial* (London: Athlone, 1974), 81, 93.

stance, thought they could safely act against the other side's interests because they exaggerated the constraints inhibiting the rival's retaliation.

Because of biases like these, analyses that assume both sides to be perceiving each other accurately are likely to be incorrect; strategies that are based on this assumption are likely to be ineffective. Axelrod shows that the strategy of Tit-for-Tat works quite well when there is a one-percent error rate in the correct identification of the other's behavior.[66] But such a figure is drastically lower than that which can be expected in political interactions; George Downs and his colleagues have shown that when the error rate is higher, this strategy is not likely to yield stable cooperation.[67] It is partly for this reason that Larson argues that Charles Osgood's GRIT (Graduated Reciprocation in Tension-reduction), which makes a major effort to break through the adversary's perceptual biases, may induce more cooperation than Tit-for-Tat.[68] Strategies that are not tightly conditional on what the other does, and that do not require immediate and matching reciprocation, may produce a change in the other's attitudes, and so may be more effective than game-theoretic analyses would suggest. Strict reciprocity may fare less well than expected. Put in slightly different terms, cognitive biases decrease transparency, thus making regimes harder to establish and maintain.

Cooperation is more likely to come about when actors correct for these conflict-inducing biases or are willing to tolerate a higher level of perceived cheating by the other side. But such conditions and strategies also increase the chances that the other side will, in fact, cheat. One of the reasons why Israel was taken by surprise in 1973 was that its decision makers were highly sensitive to the security dilemma and believed that the most probable cause of war would be Egyptian preemption growing out of an incorrect belief that Israel was about to strike. They therefore interpreted Egypt's behavior preceding the war as evidence, not that Egypt was defecting, but that its decision makers thought Israel might be planning to do so. As a result, Israel did not respond by increasing its own military readiness.[69] The problems of misperception thus heighten the statesman's dilemma in deciding whether to cooperate or not.

[66] Axelrod (fn. 1), 182-83.

[67] Downs, Rocke, and Siverson (fn. 19), 133-34. Also see Jonathan Bendor, "In Good Times and Bad: Reciprocity in an Uncertain World," *American Journal of Political Science* 31 (August 1987), 531-58. Downs and Rocke discuss the implications of this finding in "Tacit Bargaining and Arms Control," *World Politics* 39 (April 1987), 297-325.

[68] Deborah Larson, "Crisis Prevention and the Austrian State Treaty," *International Organization* 41 (Winter 1987), 30-34.

[69] Janice Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence II: The View from Jerusalem," in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Stein, *Psychology and Deterrence* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 60-88. This is part of the broader difficulty statesmen face in deciding whether the other side is an aggressor who must

Strategies that are robust in the face of misperception are extremely valuable, but it is far from certain that they exist.[70] Stable cooperation is most likely to result when the decision makers' preconceptions provide an accurate fit with what the other side is like; that may be as much the product of luck, however, as of sensitivity and statesmanship. It is clearly important to determine the extent to which strategies that would work well when information is accurate can also serve in a world permeated by ambiguity and strong perceptual and decision-making biases. Neither scholars' analyses nor statesmen's policies can safely be based on the assumption that either side understands the other.

## Beliefs and Values

Expected utilities are the valuation an actor places on a course of action or outcome; they involve both estimates of consequences and judgments about intrinsic worth. Contrary to the implications of many Realist writings, these estimates and judgments are not objective, and they should not be accepted without investigating their formation, as is done in most of the work on game theory and anarchy. In many cases, what is crucial in determining whether the actors cooperate is their beliefs about the effectiveness of alternative policies—beliefs that often prove to be either lacking in evidentiary support before the fact and/or wrong after the fact. The most obvious and consequential example is the great exaggeration by decision makers of the efficacy of the offensive before World War I, which meant that a crisis was likely to lead to war.

The general question raised by this case is the extent to which (and the circumstances under which) the main impediments to cooperation are rooted in potentially malleable beliefs about the situation rather than in its structure.[71] For example, many historians have argued that there could have been much greater cooperation between Britain and Russia in the 19th century if the former had not greatly exaggerated the hostility and capability of the latter.[72] More generally, decision makers are often un-

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be met with firmness (if not force), or a more reasonable state that can be conciliated or, to use the older term, appeased. See Jervis (fn. 14), chap. 3.

[70] *Ibid.*, 109-13; Richard Ned Lebow, "The Deterrence Deadlock: Is there a Way Out?" in Jervis, Lebow, and Stein (fn. 69), 180-202.

[71] See Ernst Haas, "Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes," *World Politics* 32 (April 1980), 357-405; Robert Rothstein (fn. 37); Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes," *International Organization* 36 (Spring 1982), 359-60, 373-75; Jack Snyder, "Perceptions of the Security Dilemma in 1941," in Jervis, Lebow, and Stein (fn. 69).

[72] See, for example, Norman Rich, *Why the Crimean War?* (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1985), and R. W. Seton-Watson, *Disraeli, Gladstone, and the Eastern Question* (New York: Norton, 1972).

aware of the security dilemma, and therefore act in ways that compound it. Is it possible to alter such perceptions, and thus alter behavior? One reason why the Kennedy and Carter administrations were favorably predisposed toward arms control was that many of the top officials believed that arms races were often driven by action-reaction cycles. Similarly, can perceptions of the relative efficacy of offense and defense be altered without changing technology? If military leaders are driven to favor the offensive because of organizational interests, and if civilian leaders are also disposed to underestimate the power of the defensive,[73] then perhaps the security dilemma and the resulting DD is more a creature of biases and domestic interests than of the structure of the international system.

This question arises with the current concern that World War III is most likely to start through "crisis instability" approximating that which prevailed in 1914. The vulnerability of command, control, and communications facilities might lead statesmen to believe that, even though any nuclear war would be dreadful, there would be real advantages to striking first if the choice were between doing so and being attacked. On closer examination, however, it does not appear that even a well-executed first strike would greatly reduce damage to the state; so the danger of crisis instability may lie less in the objective situation than in decision makers' incorrect beliefs.[74]

Most theorists who use the framework of anarchy take for granted not only people's instrumental beliefs but also the values that they place on outcomes. Although we realize that how the Prisoners' Dilemma is played—and indeed, whether it is a dilemma at all—is deeply influenced by the value each actor puts on the other's well-being,[75] scholars know little about the processes by which this evaluation is established and by which it can change. It is a central tenet in international politics that people value the security and well-being of their own state more than they do that of others. The self is defined as the national self. But this need not

[73] Snyder (fn. 29); Posen (fn. 44).

[74] For a further discussion, see Robert Jervis, *The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), 126-29; Jervis, "Psychological Aspects of Crisis Stability," in Jervis, *The Implications of the Nuclear Revolution* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, forthcoming); Richard Ned Lebow, *Nuclear Crisis Management: A Dangerous Illusion* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987); Ashton Carter, John Steinbruner, and Charles Zraket, *Managing Nuclear Operations* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1987).

[75] Morton Deutsch, "Trust and Suspicion," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 2 (December 1958), 265-79; Deutsch, "The Effect of Motivational Orientation upon Trust and Suspicion," *Human Relations* 13 (May 1960), 123-39. Similarly, rational choice analyses of politicians' behavior would yield very different results if it were assumed that the value being maximized was the individual's economic prospects rather than his power or votes. We would then expect politicians to cater to popular or constituency interests only to amass enough power that could be efficiently traded upon for pecuniary gain.

*be true forever. It may be in the nature of human beings to put first their own well-being and that of others who carry their genes, but it is not inevitable that people will always care more about the fates of those on their side of a national border than they do about similar individuals on the other side.*[76]

The issue is often put in terms of self-interest versus altruism, but it may be more useful to think of how the self is defined. Why should our attitudes toward others be based on their geographic location rather than on the values they hold?[77] Shared values can be one reason for national identity, but any individual can have more in common with many people in other countries than with many in his or her own. (Indeed, how Americans regard fellow-nationals seems less determined by their race and ethnicity than by the extent to which they share their values.)[78] Similarly, Alker and Sherman stress the importance of the "scope and depth of insecurity-relevant normative integration" in the international system as a determinant of foreign policy.[79]

The degree of value integration, and therefore the scope of the definition of the relevant self, may sometimes be larger than we assume. Statesmen usually like to present themselves as "hard-headed" and as caring almost exclusively about their own country. But policy is in fact often driven by motives that are hard for Realists to accommodate. For example, how can we explain the fact that the United States did not conquer Canada sometime in the past hundred years?[80] A Realist account would

[76] Some observers have attributed the relative lack of concern in the home country for the German hostages taken in Beirut in January 1987 to the weak German national identity. See James Markham, "West Germans Low-Key About Abductions," *New York Times*, January 19, 1987. Compare the reaction of Japan, a country some describe as "a huge tribal society," in a similar situation: Clyde Haberman, "Japan Outraged at Manila Abduction of Executive," *New York Times*, February 15, 1987.

[77] This question is an ancient one and can be traced back at least as far as Aristotle's advice that Alexander distinguish among his subjects according to whether they were Greeks or non-Greeks rather than according to their personal, individual characteristics; see *The Politics of Aristotle*, ed. and trans. by Ernest Barker (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), 388. For an attempt to use sociobiology to explain national loyalty, see R. Paul Shaw and Yuwa Wong, "Ethnic Mobilization and the Seeds of Warfare: An Evolutionary Perspective," *International Studies Quarterly* 31 (March 1987), 21-26.

[78] Milton Rokeach and Louis Mezei, "Race and Shared Belief in Social Choice," *Science* 151 (January 1966), 167-72; Rokeach, *Beliefs, Attitudes, and Values* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1968). Similarly, in the view of the Ottomans, "the community of true believers, . . . not the state, constitutes the basic Muslim policy, transcending all boundaries." See Thomas Naff, "The Ottoman Empire and the European States System," in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, eds., *The Expansion of International Society* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 143.

[79] Hayward Alker, Jr., and Frank Sherman, "Collective Security-Seeking Practices Since 1945," in Daniel Frei, ed., *Managing International Crises* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1982), 141-44. This essay draws on the work of Karl Deutsch, esp. Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).

[80] William T.R. Fox, *A Continent Apart: The United States and Canada in World Politics* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985).

be strained, having to conjure up power-based disincentives that are hard to find. American cooperation is better explained by focusing on value integration in three senses. First, the use of force is negatively valued by most Americans unless the object is to remove a menace to American security or to establish a democratic regime. Second, many values are shared between citizens of Canada and of the United States. Even if conquest would have given the U.S. greater wealth or security, the fact that Canadian society resembles American means that most of what we want to see in a country is already in place in Canada. Third, largely because of the common values between the two countries, Americans prize the well-being of Canadians. Thus, using force against them would, by constituting an offense against Canadians, diminish the utilities of Americans as well.

Common and conflicting values also help to explain whom a state will offer to protect and whom it will oppose.[81] Karl Deutsch and his colleagues stress the role of the "compatibility of the main values held by the politically relevant strata of all participating units" in the formation of what they call security-communities—i.e., groups of nations among whom war is unthinkable.[82] This factor is also important in less drastic forms of cooperation. The American commitment to Europe—and still more, to Israel—cannot be accounted for apart from the common heritage and values that make Americans care about the fates of these peoples. Security considerations are insufficient to explain American ties, which would be deeply affected if Europe or Israel were to become fascist. Similarly, American opposition to communism in the third world is based not only on national security concerns, but also on an identification with human beings in other countries whom we do not want to live under tyranny.[83] It may then be quite wrong to see Realpolitik as the source of the decision to fight in Vietnam and to dismiss as cant the desire to save that country from misery. Is it an accident that the proponents of the war were wrong in their predictions of widespread "domino effects" of an American defeat, but were correct in their argument that millions of people in Indochina would suffer or die from a North Vietnamese victory?

The most far-reaching changes in international politics involve changes in national goals and values. Japan is now a much more suitable partner for cooperation than it was in the 1930s, and not only because ter-

[81] For a discussion of the role of ideology in alliances, see Ole Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John Sullivan, *Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances* (New York: Wiley, 1973), and Walt (fn. 48), 18-26.

[82] Deutsch (fn. 79), 46.

[83] For discussions of this argument, see Robert Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 244-50; George Quester, *American Foreign Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1982).

ritorial expansion is neither possible nor economically necessary. Some thing has occurred that is more basic than changes in instrumental beliefs Rabid nationalism and the drive to dominate have been transmuted. A Japanese nationalist of the 1930s who saw his country today would be horrified, as Mishima was. Because it took a cataclysm to produce such a change, this pattern does not provide an attractive route to a more co-operative world. But it does show both the importance and the mutability of values.

A less dramatic alteration may be a more hopeful model. In the late 1960s, West Germans came to accept the existence of the East German regime. The division of the country, while still deeply regretted, was no longer completely intolerable. With the territorial status quo generally accepted, tensions and the danger of war were reduced, and cooperation in the form of the Quadripartite and the Helsinki Agreements became possible.

In Realism, values are generally taken as unproblematic and constant; they are givens in game-theoretic studies. Thus, although analysis within the framework of anarchy can produce accurate results, it may make our treatment excessively static and distract us from important questions. How values are developed, maintained, and changed may be crucial to international politics, and may strongly influence the extent of cooperation; it is a matter, however, that cannot be explained within the anarchy framework.

### Norms: Is Narrow Self-interest Enough? Hatred and Norms

Utilities can reflect passions as well as interests. Considerations of theoretical parsimony speak for ignoring greed, hatred, and envy, as well as morality and self-sacrifice; but that does not mean that such motives are absent in the world. Witness Lord Salisbury's analysis of Prussia's demands on France in 1870 (which, it can be argued, laid the foundations for World War I):

> Unless [the Germans] enjoy the pleasing sensation of witnessing the mortification of France, they will think that the objects of the war are only half-attained. . . . [I]t is revenge that they desire: not a strategic frontier, or the recovery of lost "brothers"—but terms of peace which shall drive the iron well into their enemy's soul.[84]

These are the sort of impulses that older Realist scholars from Thucydides to Morgenthau warn of. They lead to destructive policies and are dif-

[84] Lord Robert Salisbury, "Count Bismarck's Circular Letters to Foreign Courts, 1870," *The Quarterly Review* 129 (October 1870), 553. I am grateful to Marc Trachtenberg for pointing me to this article.

icult to theorize about. Although Realism recognizes that cool, narrow self-interest may fail to guide behavior, it provides few grounds for predicting when it will fail or what behavior will follow if it does.

A related issue is the role of norms in furthering cooperation. In one sense, norms indicate behavior that is expected, standard, or normal. In another sense, they indicate behavior that is approved and valued positively.[85] But when do norms in the first sense become norms in the second sense? If they do not, can they really produce a great deal of cooperation? One of the themes of the anarchy literature, of course, is that narrow self-interest is sufficient under many conditions, but the evidence is not very strong and the conditions may be very restrictive.[86] For example, many scholars have argued that in the balance of power, stability can arise out of the interplay of the states' narrow national interests in survival and expansion. The results are not always peaceful, but they do maintain the system. Paul Schroeder's fascinating historical studies deny that this is an accurate picture of European balance-of-power politics, however. He argues that mediating structures of smaller states, a common understanding of international law, and a shared sense of the appropriate behavior were required if war was not to grow from a tool of statecraft to the dominating fact of international politics.[87]

In tracing much of the cause of World War I to the decline in Austria's position, Schroeder points to Britain: although it had a great stake in the

[85] Kratochwil and Ruggie argue that our standard methodology is inappropriate for verifying the existence of norms in the latter sense because pointing to instances in which norms are violated does not establish that they do not exist or are not important. See Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie, "International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State," *International Organization* 40 (Autumn 1986), 766-69. A more general treatment of norms along these lines is Friedrich Kratochwil, *Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 1988).

[86] This question is raised, among other places, in Alker's analyses of how people play and think about Prisoners' Dilemma in the laboratory. See Hayward Alker, Jr., and Roger Hurwitz, "Resolving Prisoner's Dilemmas" (unpub., M.I.T.); Alker, "Reflective Resolutions of Sequential Prisoner's Dilemmas," presented at the meeting of the Society for General Systems Research, May 30, 1985; and Alker, "From Quantity to Quality: A New Research Program on Resolving Sequential Prisoner's Dilemmas," presented at the 1985 meeting of the American Political Science Association. The incentives and settings of laboratory situations are so different from those operating in international politics, however, that it is far from clear that these experiments tell us much that can be directly transferred.

[87] See the following essays, all by Schroeder: "The Lost Intermediaries: The Impact of 1870 on the European System," *International History Review* 6 (February 1984), 1-27; "Containment Nineteenth-Century Style: How Russia Was Restrained," *South Atlantic Quarterly* 82 (Winter 1983), 1-18; "World War I as Galloping Gertie," *Journal of Modern History* 44 (September 1972), 319-45; "The Nineteenth-Century Balance of Power: Language and Theory," paper delivered at the 1977 meeting of the American Political Science Association; "The 19th-Century International System: Changes in the Structure," *World Politics* 39 (October 1986), 1-26. Also see Friedrich Kratochwil, "On the Notion of 'Interest' in International Relations," *International Organization* 36 (Winter 1982), 1-30.

status quo and in avoiding conflict, it never acted to limit or control dangerous shifts in the Balkans. Others also failed to maintain the necessary balance, although their behavior was logical to the extent that they were willing to tolerate a high risk of war. After showing how much Austria was weakened by Rumania's realignment in 1913, Schroeder stresses that despite its importance,

> no government addressed itself to the most obvious and critical question of all: how was this new, crucial development to be managed? How, that is, could it be harmonized with the overall European balance, incorporated into the prevailing international system without raising the already fearful strains to the point of explosion? No one thought about this problem or suggested doing anything about it.[88]

Without conscious management—without at least some states seeking the common interest of the members of the system—stability, peace, and the best interests of the individual states could not be maintained. A similar argument was made by Lord Salisbury, later to become Foreign Secretary, when he criticized the refusal of the British government to counteract the harsh terms Prussia imposed on defeated France:

> If [the leaders'] intention is . . . to draw all the profit they can from the arrangements of the greater international republic, and yet to bear no share of the cost and dangers of its government, we doubt not that they are preparing themselves for a severe condemnation from the English people. We only trust that they are not also preparing for England the national doom that always waits for the selfish and timid.[89]

A parallel point arises from one of Axelrod's computer simulations. He finds that stable cooperation is much more likely to occur when actors follow "metanorms" that call for punishing those who fail to enforce norms. In other words, actors must not only be prepared to punish those who defect, but also to act against those who fail to punish them.[90] In the same way, cooperation can be powerfully reinforced by injunctions to help others, or at least to limit the harm done to them. Thus "although prescriptive morality is not usually expressed in laws, in a number of Eu-

[88] Paul Schroeder, "Romania and the Great Powers before 1914," *Revue Roumaine D'Histoire* 14 (No. 1, 1975), 52-53. As Schroeder puts it in "World War I as Galloping Gertie": "Everyone wanted a payoff; no one wanted to pay" (fn. 87), 345.

[89] Salisbury (fn. 84), 556. During the Eastern Crisis of 1877, William Gladstone asked: "What is to be the consequence to civilisation and humanity, to public order, if British interests are to be the rule for British agents all over the world, and are to be for them the measure of right or wrong?" (Quoted in Seton-Watson, fn. 72, p. 69.) For a related general argument, see Armatya Sen, "Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavior Foundations of Economic Theory," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 6 (Summer 1977), 326-41.

[90] Robert Axelrod, "Modeling the Evolution of Norms," *American Political Science Review* 80 (December 1986), 1095-1111.

ropean countries and now also in some [American] states . . . , helping others in certain kinds of extreme need is required by law."[91]

Applying the same reasoning, Robert Trivers argues that evolution should select for people who reciprocate altruism. Emotions such as anger at those who do not reciprocate, and guilt over one's own cheating are also functional because they bolster reciprocity. Short-run calculations might lead people to ignore the transgressions of others (or to reply to them only mildly), or to shirk reparations when they have been caught cheating. But over the long run, such behavior is destructive. Disproportionate retribution for cheating, called up by anger, can induce future compliance: "it seems plausible . . . that the emotion of guilt has been selected for in humans partly in order to motivate the cheater to compensate his misdeed and . . . thus to prevent the rupture of reciprocal relationships." Because these emotions may sustain long-run cooperation more than calculation would,

> selection may favor distrusting those who perform altruistic acts without the emotional basis of generosity or guilt because the altruistic tendencies of such individuals may be less reliable in the future. One can imagine, for example, compensating for a misdeed without any emotional basis but with a calculating, self-serving motive. Such an individual should be distrusted because the calculating spirit that leads this subtle cheater now to compensate may in the future lead him to cheat when circumstances seem more advantageous.[92]

The issue is by no means closed. It is possible that narrow self-interest may be able to explain most instances of cooperation in the absence of binding authority. But we should note that in Gouldner's classic article, reciprocity is not only a common empirical pattern and a way out of a dilemma; it is also a moral imperative: "people *should* help those who have helped them."[93] Such a sense of obligation—if shared—may well

[91] Ervin Staub, *Positive Social Behavior and Morality*, I (New York: Academic Press, 1978), 3.

[92] Trivers, "The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism," *Quarterly Journal of Biology* 46 (March 1971), 50-51. On p. 52, Trivers anticipates Axelrod's arguments about metanorms. A similar argument about deterrence is made by Dean Pruitt, "Some Relationships Between Interpersonal and International Conflict," in Axelrod et al. (fn. 3).

[93] Alvin Gouldner, "The Norm of Reciprocity," *American Sociological Review* 25 (April 1960), 169-71 (emphasis added); also see Larson (fn. 50), 20-22. For a nice summary of the normative hold of reciprocity, see Robert Cialdini, *Influence* (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman, 1985), 20-34, and especially the marvelous story on page 27. Staub notes that experiments indicate "that willingness to ask for help is reduced when people do not expect to have an opportunity to provide help in return" (fn. 91, p. 346). The reverse should have been found if rational calculation were the driving force. Also see Charles Kindleberger's review of *After Hegemony*, "Hierarchy vs. Inertial Cooperation," *International Organization* 40 (Autumn 1986), 844-46.

have great "practical value," as John Mackie notes.[94] Considerations o morality, fairness, and obligation are almost surely large parts of the ex planation for the fact that individuals in society cooperate much mor than the Prisoners' Dilemma would lead us to expect. Only economist behave as the theory says they should; others are likely to contribute t public goods, especially when they believe that fairness calls for them t do so.[95] Indeed, it is possible that morality provides the *only* way to reacl many mutual cooperative outcomes. In part because of the tendency fo people to be self-righteous and to see their own acts as cooperative an those of others as hostile, temptations and fears may produce mutuall undesired outcomes as long as narrow self-interest is dominant. At a min imum, the feeling that one is morally obligated to reciprocate coopera tion—and that others live under the same code—permits a wider rang and scope for mutually beneficial exchanges. In fact, the actors may gai most when they do not regard the interaction as one of self-interested ex change at all. Even if this extreme is not approached (and it is not likel to be in international politics), without the power of at least some share values, without some identification with the other, without norms tha carry moral force, cooperation may be difficult to sustain.[96]

## Conclusions

The queries and objections raised here are not all of the same type Some are assertions that the anarchy framework leads us to concentrat

[94] John Mackie, *Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong* (Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin, 1977 119-20; see also Keohane (fn. 58), 126-27, and Keohane, "Reciprocity in International Rela tions," *International Organization* 40 (Winter 1986), 20-24.

[95] Gerald Marwell and Ruth Ames, "Economists Free Ride, Does Anyone Else?" *Journa of Public Economics* 15 (June 1981), 295-310. I am grateful to Joanne Gowa for referring m to this instructive article. Also see Charlan Nemeth, "A Critical Analysis of Research Utiliz ing the Prisoner's Dilemma Paradigm for the Study of Bargaining," in Leonard Berkowitz ed., *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, VI (New York: Academic Press, 1972), 203 34; Daniel Kahneman, Jack Knetsch, and Richard Thaler, "Fairness and the Assumptions o Economics," *Journal of Business* 59 (October 1986), S285-300; Sen (fn. 89). Transcripts of th deliberations during the Cuban missile crisis reveal President Kennedy's concern with per ceived fairness: McGeorge Bundy, transcriber, and James Blight, editor, "October 27, 1962 Transcripts of the meetings of the ExComm," *International Security* 12 (Winter 1987/88), 30 92.

[96] In his presidential address to the Public Choice Society, Dennis Mueller made a simila point: contrary to the logic of PD, in these situations

> most of us choose the cooperative strategy most of the time. Why? Because we were taught to do so. . . . One is almost embarrassed to make these observations were it not that so many of us who work with rational egoist models continually build our models on assumptions that ignore these truisms from psychology and everyday life.

Mueller, "Rational Egoism vs. Adaptive Egoism as a Fundamental Postulate for a Descriptive Theory of Human Behavior," *Public Choice* 51 (No. 1, 1986), 5-6.

on questions that are not central. That is true for the discussion of preferences. Even if my arguments about the importance of the preference orders and of changes in them are correct, the framework can still be applied, albeit at the cost of requiring us to treat as given what may be crucial and problematical. But if this objection is not fatal, it also applies more broadly to the use of game-theory models in general rather than to Prisoners' Dilemma in particular. Other problems complicate the picture. Basic concepts such as cooperation, offense, and power are not as straightforward as they appear in many analyses, and we may lose a great deal when we squeeze behavior into the categories the former two provide. Strong perceptual biases also undermine many of the central predictions derived from the PD. Although the national behavior that actually occurs is often consistent with the general Realist emphasis on conflict, the reasons are different from those stressed by this tradition. Game theory can accommodate both uncertainty and differences between the perceptions of the two sides,[97] but we must know what these perceptions are; they may be more important and difficult to understand than the resulting interaction. Problems that are even more fundamental arise if narrow self-interest is not the driving force behind national behavior: although game-theory models could be built around different premises, many of the Realist arguments about anarchy would be undermined.

While I have discussed the problems inherent in the anarchy framework, I have said little about its numerous strengths. To do so would be to recapitulate familiar arguments; but I do want to note that the framework is useful for reminding us that human action is often driven by the twin impulses of fear and temptation. It provides tools for analyzing how these impulses can be harnessed (if not tamed) in a way that leaves all parties better off. The concepts of anarchy and the security dilemma lead us to see that the international system not only permits conflict, but can create it: actors may refuse to cooperate with others, not so much because they seek the positive gains of exploitation, but because they fear that their own cooperative initiatives will be mistreated. For purposes of both analysis and prescription, the framework yields significant propositions on the conditions and strategies that increase the likelihood of cooperative behavior and outcomes. But its simplifications can be misleading, its assumptions require scrutiny, and it relegates many important questions to the background. Understanding and exploring both the uses of the approach and its limitations, without being overwhelmed by either, will lead to a better grasp of world politics.

[97] See, for example, John Harsany, "Bargaining in Ignorance of the Opponent's Utility Function," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 6 (March 1962).

# TRADING PLACES:
## Industries for Free Trade

By HELEN MILNER*

### INTRODUCTION

TODAY, protectionism is once again a central political issue in the United States. Pressures for protectionism have captured the national attention several times during the 20th century. In the 1920s, U.S. trade policy made a U-turn. Protectionism had declined from the Dingley tariff bill in 1897 until the Fordney-McCumber tariff law of 1922, as the average value of tariffs on dutiable goods fell from 45 percent to 2[illegible] percent.[1] But this downward trend was reversed during the 1920s: between 1922 and 1930, the United States closed its market dramatically with tariffs attaining an ad valorem average of 53 percent.[2] This level, se by the 1930 Smoot-Hawley tariff, was one of the highest ever, and th highest so far in the 20th century.

Beginning in the 1930s, protectionism in the U.S. once again abated The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (R.T.A.A.), which was introduced in 1934 and served as a model for future trade acts, initiated th opening of the American market. Between 1934 and 1972, average U.S tariff levels declined by some 70 percent.[3] By 1972, tariffs averaged a mere 9.9 percent.[4]

In the early 1970s, the course of U.S. trade policy again became a source of heated debate. Among the questions that were raised about the future of American trade policy was what direction trade policy would take in the 1970s and beyond. Many observers and scholars feared a resurgence of rapidly rising protectionism and international trade wars.[5] Extrapolat-

* I would like to thank David Baldwin, Jeffry Frieden, Stephen Haggard, Robert Keohane and the participants at the Ford Foundation Conference on Blending Political and Economic Analysis of International Trade Policies for their helpful comments.

[1] Robert Pastor, *Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), Table 3, p. 78; David Lake, "International Economic Structures and American Foreign Economic Policy, 1887-1934," *World Politics* 35 (July 1983), 517-43 Table 2, p. 534.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] U.S. Tariff Commission, *Trade Barriers: An Overview*, No. 665 (Washington, DC: G.P.O. 1974), 81-82.

[4] Pastor (fn. 1), Table 6, p. 119.

[5] Harald Malmgren, "Coming Trade Wars?" *Foreign Policy* 1 (Winter 1970), 115-43; C. Fred Bergsten, "The Crisis in US Trade Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 49 (July 1971), 619-35; June

ing from previous historical periods of rising and falling protectionism, these analysts expected the 1970s and 1980s to look much more like the 1920s than like the period between 1934 and 1970. In fact, the 1920s were offered frequently as the example for the decade after 1973. For many, the threat of a significant closure of the U.S. market evoked a repetition of the dismal interwar years.

In this article, I challenge that view of the current period. There were sizable differences in trade policy outcomes between the 1920s and the 1970s; these differences are puzzling because they belie the predictions of other theories. I maintain that a primary reason for these different policy outcomes was the growth of international economic interdependence after World War II. By the 1970s, the expansion of these international economic ties helped to dampen pressures for trade barriers as the preferences of industries turned against protectionism. Using evidence from a number of industries in the 1920s and the 1970s, I shall show how the internationalization of firms reduced their interest in protection even in difficult economic times, and thus helped the United States to resist protectionism in the 1970s.

## THE PUZZLE

Two common elements, which distinguish the 1920s and the 1970s from the intervening years, seem central in this comparison between their trade policies. First, both the 1920s and the 1970s were times of serious economic distress and instability. Such difficult conditions have been seen as a key precondition for rising protectionist activity. One economist noted:

> It is generally agreed that in a modern industrial economy the cyclical state of the economy and the country's competitive position internationally are the principal determinants of the degree of protectionist pressure. Low levels of economic activity, high unemployment, unused capacity, trade deficits, rapid increases in imports, and increases in import penetration all op-

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Kronholz, "Trade and Currency Wars Deepen the Depression," *Wall Street Journal*, October 23, 1979, p. 1.

Hegemonic stability theorists have also predicted such a resurgence. See Charles Kindleberger, *The World in Depression, 1929-1939* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), esp. 307-8; Robert Gilpin, *US Power and the Multinational Corporation* (New York: Basic Books, 1975), esp. 258-62. For more skeptical views, see Stephen Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of International Trade," *World Politics* 28 (April 1976), 317-47; Robert O. Keohane, "The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes," in Ole Holsti, Randolph Siverson, and Alexander George, eds., *Change in the International System* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980), 131-62.

erate to increase the temptation to protect domestic industries from import competition.[6]

Economic difficulties were similar in the two periods, which were marked by relatively high unemployment rates and sizable agricultural ınd industrial overcapacity. In the 1920s and early 1930s, the U.S. econ- ɔmy suffered two major downturns—one in 1920-1923 and one in 1929- 1933. Price deflation, labor unrest, and international monetary problems :reated further economic instability.[7] In the 1970s, the U.S. economy ex- ɔerienced deep recessions during 1973-1975 and 1978-1982. Sparked by he oil shocks, these recessions were aggravated by rapidly shifting trade ɔatterns, price instability, and a confused international monetary situa- ion. These high levels of economic distress and instability that were felt n the 1920s and 1970s might be expected to generate similar widespread ɔrotection.

Indeed, in view of the absolute levels of economic distress during the wo periods, the 1970s might have generated even greater levels of mar- ‹et closure than the 1920s.[8] The averages for three major economic in- licators all are worse in the 1970s than in the 1920s, as Table 1 indicates.

Table 1
Averages for Three Major Economic Indicators
(percent)

| | *1923-1929* | *1973-1979* |
|---|---|---|
| \verage annual growth in real GNP | 3.1 | 2.3 |
| \verage mean value of unemployment rate | 3.5 | 6.8 |
| \verage value of non-residential fixed investment to GNP | 11.2 | 10.2 |

All data from Feldstein (fn.7), 104-5.

[6] Wendy Takacs, "Pressures for Protectionism: An Empirical Analysis," *Economic Inquiry* 9 (October 1981), 687-93, at 687. In general, see Timothy McKeown, "Firms and Tariff Re- ime Change: Explaining the Demand for Protectionism," *World Politics* 36 (January 1984), 15-33; Giulio Gallarotti, "Toward a Business Cycle Model of Tariffs," *International Organi- ation* 39 (Winter 1985), 155-87; Susan Strange and Roger Tooze, eds., *The International Pol- 'ics of Surplus Capacity* (London: Butterworths, 1980).

[7] W. Arthur Lewis, *Economic Survey, 1919-1939* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1949); U.S. De- artment of Commerce, *Survey of Current Business*, various issues, 1919-1930 (Washington, )C: G.P.O.); U.S. Census Bureau, *Historical Statistics of the U.S., Colonial Times to the Present* Washington, DC: G.P.O., 1975); Kindleberger (fn. 5), esp. chaps. 5-8; League of Nations, *'conomic Fluctuations in the U.S. and U.K., 1918-1942* (Geneva: League of Nations, 1942); 1artin Feldstein, ed., *The American Economy in Transition* (Chicago: National Bureau of Eco- omic Research, 1980), 12[illegible]

[8] Sidney Ratner, James Soltow, and Richard Sylla, *The Evolution of the American Economy*

Since the U.S. economy performed more poorly in the 1970s, one might expect that, if economic difficulty were a precursor to protectionism, this period should have experienced protectionism with a vengeance.

A second similarity between the 1920s and 1970s that has been linked to protectionism is the declining power of the world's hegemonic state. This change in the international distribution of power has been cited as a major factor leading to the closure of the world's markets. Robert Gilpin has stated that

> Today, . . . the dominant economy is itself in relative decline and is being challenged by rising centers of economic power. With the decline of the dominant economic power, the world economy may be following the pattern of the late nineteenth century and of the 1930s: it may be fragmenting into regional trading blocs, exclusive economic alliances, and economic nationalism.[9]

In the 1920s, Great Britain, the hegemon of the 19th century, was losing its status. From a peak of 24 percent in 1870, Great Britain's share of world trade had fallen to 14 percent before World War I.[10] Furthermore, its share of the world's manufacturing output tumbled from a dominant 32 percent in 1870 to a third-rate level of 14 percent in 1913.[11] Germany and the United States overtook it in industrial competitiveness in certain critical, advanced sectors.[12] In addition, Britain's control over the international monetary system was declining. Its problems in returning to and maintaining the gold standard in the 1920s and its final abandonment of that system in 1931 signaled this loss of influence.[13] By the 1920s, then, Britain's hegemony had seriously eroded.

The situation was fairly similar in the 1970s. By the early part of the decade, the global dominance that the United States had exercised in the 1950s and 1960s had been reduced as other nations mounted a challenge.

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(New York: Basic Books, 1979), 482, 502-3. The worst economic difficulties of the Great Depression followed (rather than preceded) the tariff increases, occurring in the early 1930s: unemployment averaged 3% in 1930, the year Smoot-Hawley was passed, but rose to 25% by 1933, the year before the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act.

[9] Gilpin (fn. 5), 258-59. Also see Kindleberger (fn. 5), esp. 307-8; Krasner (fn. 5), 317-47; Keohane (fn. 5), 131-62; David Lake, "Structure and Strategy: The International Sources of American Trade Policy, 1887-1939" (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1983); Charles Kindleberger, "Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy," *International Studies Quarterly* 25 (June 1981), 242-54; Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

[10] Lake (fn. 1), Table 1, p. 525.

[11] Ratner, Soltow, and Sylla (fn. 8), 385.

[12] Lake (fn. 1); Alexander Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), chaps. 1 and 2; Samuel Hays, *The Response to Industrialism, 1885-1914* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), chaps. 1, 7, 8.

[13] Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), 70; Kindleberger (fn. 5), 63-68, 146-70.

America's share of world trade dropped from 18.4 percent in 1950 to 13.4 percent in 1977.[14] More tellingly, its share of the world's manufactured exports plummeted from nearly 30 percent in 1953 to about 13 percent in the late 1970s.[15] Its share of the world's manufacturing output also lost ground, dropping from 62 percent in 1950 to 44 percent in 1977.[16] Many U.S. industries had lost their economic advantage and faced bitter competition both at home and abroad. In addition, the United States was no longer as dominant in the international monetary system. By 1973, it had scuttled the monetary system it had created and found itself unable to fashion a new, stable one. American hegemony in monetary relations in the 1970s, however, was not as reduced as Britain's had been in the 1920s and early 1930s.[17] But it had declined substantially, especially in trade and production, leaving the international distribution of power in the 1970s more closely resembling that of the interwar period than that of the immediate post-World War II period. This eclipse of hegemony might have been expected to produce widespread protectionism, as it had in the 1920s.

Although both periods experienced the decline of a hegemon, this may be less important to American policy than the relative position of the United States. The striking fact is how similar the relative international position of the U.S. appears to be in the late 1920s and the late 1970s, and how different it was in the 1950s and 1960s. America's share of the world's manufacturing output reached 42 percent in 1929 and had leveled off at 44 percent in 1977. In contrast, the U.S. had dominated in the 1950s and 1960s, with 62 percent in 1950 and 51 percent in 1960. In the trade area, the United States was more dominant in the 1920s than in the 1970s, but nowhere near as dominant as in the 1950s. In the 1920s, it was the world's largest exporter and biggest foreign investor, and ranked second only to Britain in its imports.[18] By the late 1970s, it had become the world's second-largest exporter of manufactures—West Germany led with almost 16 percent compared to America's 13 percent—and was being challenged for that spot by Japan (11 percent). In 1953, by contrast, the U.S. had reigned supreme in trade, controlling nearly 30 percent of all manufactured exports.[19]

[14] Lake (fn. 1), Table 3, p. 541; Keohane and Nye (fn. 13), 141.

[15] Feldstein (fn. 7), 193, 196.

[16] *Ibid.*, 191.

[17] U.S. hegemony in money was diminished less than in trade. Its ending of the Bretton Woods system was more an act of power than of weakness, according to many analysts. See Keohane and Nye (fn. 13), 141, 165-86; John Odell, *U.S. International Monetary Policy: Markets, Power, and Ideas as Sources of Change* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), chap. 4, esp. p. 219.

[18] Ratner, Soltow, and Sylla (fn. 8), 464; Feldstein (fn. 7), 191.

[19] Feldstein (fn. 7), 196.

A similar story is told by changes in relative economic size and productivity. According to Lake, who uses these two measures in his analysis of international economic structures, the position of the United States was almost identical in 1929 and 1977.[20] This contrasts with its clear predominance in 1950. Moreover, in both 1929 and 1977, the U.S. appeared similarly situated relative to its nearest rivals. In 1929, it led all countries on these two indicators, barely edging out Britain while retaining a substantial lead over France and Germany. In 1977, its relative position was comparable: it was almost even with West Germany, but still outdistanced Japan and France.

Hence, two strong similarities in the international distribution of economic power existed in the 1920s and 1970s. In both, a hegemon was in decline, and in both the relative position of the United States was slightly superior to all others—but, most importantly, was being challenged by several nations. These conditions in the international economic structure have been linked to rising protectionism, and thus might have been expected to engender similar protectionist responses in the two periods.[21]

The argument here is *not* that the 1920s and the 1970s were alike in all respects. Two important differences, at least, may attenuate the comparison. First, the United States was a rising hegemon in the 1920s and a declining one in the 1970s. Although hegemonic stability arguments provide no theoretical reason to expect this difference to affect a hegemon's trade policy, the notion of a lag has been introduced to account for this.[22] A rising hegemon may fail to appreciate its own significance, while a declining one may fail to understand its weakness and need for closure. This difference may account for dissimilarities between the two periods. But the reason for such a lag is obscure.

Second, there was a difference in the monetary systems operating at the two times. In the 1920s, a shift occurred from the controlled flexible exchange-rate system that had been in effect before 1925, to a fixed gold-standard system which was in effect until 1931. In the 1970s, the movement was in the opposite direction: from a fixed, dollar-gold standard to a managed flexible rate system after 1973. The consequences of these two different systems for trade policy are unclear, however; the effects of different exchange-rate systems on trade are not well understood. It has been asserted by some that flexible rates should hinder protectionism be-

[20] David Lake, "Beneath the Commerce of Nations," *International Studies Quarterly* 28 (June 1984), Figs. 5 and 6, pp. 143-70.

[21] I do not agree with Lake's interpretation of these two structures and their differences; see fn. 20.

[22] Kindleberger (fn. 5); Krasner (fn. 5).

cause such barriers are nullified by exchange-rate changes.[23] Others maintain that flexible rates augment protectionist pressures by increasing risk, and that fixed rates are best for ensuring free trade.[24] It seems fair to say that the exchange-rate systems operating in both periods did little to provide a stable environment for international trade.

A related issue is whether the value of U.S. exchange rates had a different effect on trade policy in the two periods. The argument is that the level of exchange rates was driving trade policy, especially in the 1970s. Thus, the relative undervaluation of the dollar in the late 1970s weakened protectionist pressures, while its overvaluation in the early 1980s led to new pressures for barriers.[25] The problem with this argument is that the 1920s look similar: after World War I, the U.S. dollar appeared to be undervalued, supposedly mitigating protectionist pressures. But later in the decade, the dollar seemed overvalued relative to the mark, lira, franc, and gold, although undervalued relative to sterling.[26] Differences in exchange-rate levels, then, *do not* seem to distinguish the two periods.

Despite these differences, the similarities between the 1920s and 1970s in terms of economic difficulties and the relative economic position of the United States might lead one to expect that U.S. trade policy in the 1970s would look like that of the 1920s. The 1970s, however, were not marked by the extensive closure of the U.S. market that occurred in the 1920s. American trade policy remained oriented toward a relatively open market. Although it is commonly believed that protectionism grew substantially in the 1970s and the early 1980s, U.S. trade policy actually had mixed currents. Overall, there was probably a small net increase in trade barriers relative to the 1960s, but these new barriers never reached levels near those attained in the 1920s. Moreover, unlike in the 1930s, these barriers had little effect on the volume of trade: global and U.S. trade continued to grow throughout the decade of the 1970s, and to grow faster than production. In addition, tariffs had been reduced to their lowest levels, about 5 percent on average, through the GATT Tokyo Round negotiations.[27]

On the other hand, some non-tariff barriers (NTBs) were growing.

[23] Herbert Grubel, *International Economics* (Homewood, IL: Irwin, 1977), chap. 22; Charles Kindleberger and Peter Lindert, *International Economics*, 6th ed. (Homewood, IL: Irwin, 1978), chap. 21; Robert Baldwin and J. David Richardson, *International Trade and Finance*, 3rd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1986), chap. 21.

[24] C. Fred Bergsten and William Cline, "Overview," in William Cline, ed., *Trade Policy in the 1980s* (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1983).

[25] Kindleberger and Lindert (fn. 23), chap. 21, esp. Fig. 21.5.

[26] *Ibid.*, chap. 21, Fig. 21.3. Note how all other currencies rise in value against the dollar after the change in 1931.

[27] U.S. Tariff Commission (fn. 3), 81-82.

These are difficult to measure (and were generally not measured while tariffs remained high), but their relative importance increased in the late 1970s. By that time, nearly 30 percent of all categories (not values) of American manufactured imports were affected by them.[28] One empirical study concludes, however, that these new NTBs have had only limited protectionist effects; as the authors point out, "on average over a full range of manufactured products, the protection given by NTBs that may limit or reduce imports . . . is not nearly as large as the protection afforded by tariffs . . . or natural barriers to trade. . . ."[29] They project that, "if the United States continues on its present policy course, the U.S. economy will be considerably more open in 1985 than it was in 1976."[30] Thus the erection of NTBs in the 1970s and 1980s may have produced a small net increase in protection. But this increase did not approach the levels of the 1920s even though two key preconditions—serious economic distress and declining hegemony—characterized both periods. Given the fertile ground of the late 1970s, protectionism could have grown rampantly, as it did in the 1920s. For some reason, it did not.

## Other Explanations

The question, then, is why trade policy was different in the 1920s and 1970s even though key pressures influencing it were similar. This puzzle has been addressed by a number of studies. Three answers, all of which focus on aspects of the international or domestic system that are different from the one central to this study, require examination. They should be seen less as competing than as being pitched at different levels of analysis. I maintain that the argument developed in this study has been neglected and that it is more basic than these others.

One type of explanation looks at the international distribution of power, usually in terms of economic capabilities. It involves modifications of the hegemonic stability thesis, which, as has been shown, cannot in its original form explain the differences in policy outcomes between the 1920s and the 1970s.[31] Three modified arguments have been presented. First, it has been asserted that American hegemony has not declined enough to set off the expected protectionist response.[32] Even though other

[28] Robert Reich, "Beyond Free Trade," *Foreign Affairs* 61 (Spring 1983), 773-804, at 786.

[29] Peter Morici and Laura Megna, *U.S. Economic Policies Affecting Industrial Trade: A Quantitative Assessment* (Washington, DC: National Planning Association, 1983), 11.

[30] *Ibid.*, 103.

[31] Krasner (fn. 5).

[32] Bruce Russett, "The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony; or, Is Mark Twain Really Dead?" *International Organization* 39 (Spring 1985), 207-32; Susan Strange, "Still An Extraordinary Power," in Raymond Lombra and Willard Witte, *Political Economy of International and Domestic Monetary Relations* (Ames: Iowa State University, 1982).

countries have caught up with the United States, it still remains th strongest, especially when its military might is considered. Thus, this ar gument depends on military capabilities being an important factor i trade policy considerations. However, the fungibility of these power re sources is questionable.[33] In fact, the second type of hegemonic stabilit argument denies this fungibility. Considering only trade-related powe resources, it suggests that U.S. hegemony has not declined enough t evoke extensive protectionism.[34] But in comparison to its trade position i the 1920s, the U.S. held a similar, or even less dominant, position in th 1970s. One explanation for this disparity is the lag phenomenon discusse earlier. A third argument modifying the thesis of hegemonic stabilit holds that different configurations of states in terms of their relative eco nomic power lead to different outcomes in trade policy. But this argu ment is not able to explain the differences between the 1920s and 1970s since the configuration of states at those two points (1929 and 1977) wa very similar.[35]

A second type of explanation focuses on the existence of an interna tional regime in trade. In this view, the creation of the GATT system afte World War II and its continued functioning have been partially respon sible for the maintenance of a relatively open international economy. I the 1920s, the lack of any such regime helped to spread protectionism GATT is seen as working against protectionism in numerous ways. Som analysts argue that it operates through the externalization of a norm— i.e., "embedded liberalism"—which promotes trade but also minimize its domestic costs and, with it, protectionist demands.[36] Others sugges that the regime and its norms are embodied in domestic policies and prac tices and that it is effective through constraining and shaping domesti behavior.[37] Still others see the regime as encouraging international com

[33] David Baldwin, "Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends Versus Old Politics, *World Politics* 31 (January 1979), 161-94; Keohane and Nye (fn. 13), chap. 2.

[34] *Ibid*., chap. 3; Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the Worl Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), chaps. 4, 9; Vinod Aggarwal *Liberal Protectionism: The International Politics of Organized Textile Trade* (Berkeley: Univer sity of California Press, 1985), chaps. 2, 7.

[35] Lake (fns. 1, 9, and 20). To overcome this difficulty, Lake makes two points: first, tha due to the disruption caused by World War I, much greater uncertainty existed in the 1920s which prompted more protectionist activity. Second, he implies that the height of protection ism globally was in the 1930s, not the 1920s, when the structure was somewhat different. Pro tectionism, however, was rising world-wide throughout the 1920s; it hit its peak in the U.S by 1930 and elsewhere by 1933 or 1934. This explanation of trade policy outcomes is mor sophisticated and perhaps more accurate than other hegemonic stability arguments, but it stil has difficulty accounting for the differences between the 1920s and the 1970s.

[36] John Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change," *International Organi zation* 36 (Spring 1982), 379-415.

[37] Charles Lipson, "The Transformation of Trade," *International Organization* 36 (Sprin

merce by increasing its efficiency.[38] Differences thus exist over exactly how the GATT has worked to abate protectionism, but generally it is seen as exerting a brake on domestic pressures for protection.

In all of these views, however, regimes play only an intermediate role. They are acknowledged as an intervening variable, influencing the preferences, pressures, and practices already established at the domestic and international levels.[39] In order to judge the effect of the regime, it is necessary to examine these pre-existing factors. Regime analysis thus needs to be supplemented with analyses of other domestic and international forces, which this study provides.

A third type of explanation focuses on the structure of the domestic policy-making system. The argument here is that, despite the pressures for protection in the 1970s, a different policy structure existed which helped defuse these pressures. This structure insulated political actors, especially Congress, from societal pressures for protection. Hence, the state was able to resist such pressures in the 1970s, but not in the 1920s. Explanations differ on the specific way this insulation occurred. Most scholars acknowledge the importance of the shift in tariff-making authority from Congress to the President as being central.[40] Others point to the nature of the relationship between Congress and the executive;[41] some to the way trade policy is made within the executive branch;[42] some to the lessons of the 1930s and the norms and ideology now surrounding those lessons;[43] and yet others to the way Congress functions and responds to societal pressures.[44]

This proliferation of domestic policy "structures" indicates that trade policy is not made within one structure. Many economic actors are involved, and they bring their complaints and pressures to bear on different political actors. Moreover, no single, coherent national trade policy exists. The policy relating to one sector of the economy may differ completely

1982), 417-56; Stephanie Lenway, *The Politics of U.S. International Trade* (Boston: Pitman, 1985).

[38] Lipson (fn. 37).

[39] See *International Organization* 36 (Spring 1982), esp. the introduction by Stephen Krasner.

[40] Pastor (fn. 1); Judith Goldstein, "The Political Economy of Trade," *American Political Science Review* 80 (March 1986), 161-84; I. M. Destler, *American Trade Politics: System Under Stress* (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1986).

[41] Pastor (fn. 1).

[42] Roger Porter, *Presidential Decision-Making* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Gilbert Winham, "Robert Strauss, The MTN, and the Control of Faction," *Journal of World Trade Law* 14 (September-October, 1980), 377-97.

[43] Goldstein (fn. 40); Judith Goldstein, "A Reexamination of American Commercial Policy" (Ph.D. diss., UCLA, 1983).

[44] E. E. Schattschneider, *Politics, Pressures and the Tariff* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1935); Raymond Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis Dexter, *American Business and Public Policy* (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1972).

from that concerning another. Thus, the policy for automobiles may differ greatly from the policies for wheat, textiles, or telecommunications equipment. Moreover, for each of these industries, the influence of Congress, the executive, and the International Trade Commission varies. A knowledge of the relevant domestic actors and their trade preferences is essential to understanding the influence of the particular policy structure for that sector on the policy outcome.

## The Argument

My argument operates on a different level of analysis. I maintain that the increased international economic interdependence of the post-World War II period has been a major reason why protectionism did not spread widely in the 1970s and early 1980s. By altering domestic actors' preferences, aspects of America's greater integration into the international economy worked against recourse to protectionism. Specifically, while increased interdependence has subjected some areas of the economy to new foreign competition, it has also greatly augmented international economic ties for some firms in the form of exports, imports of critical inputs, multinational production, and global intrafirm trade. Despite pressures for closure, the growth of these international ties is a major reason for the maintenance of a relatively open market in the 1970s.

Evidence of the growth of these international ties is abundant. American trade grew phenomenally between the 1920s and the 1980s.[45] More goods and more different types of goods were traded. Specifically, America's trade dependence grew substantially. U.S. export dependence (exports as a percentage of total domestic production) rose from about 2 percent in 1923 to 9 percent in 1960, and to about 20 percent by the late 1970s. Likewise, imports climbed from 2.5 percent of total domestic consumption in 1921 to 5 percent in 1960, and to over 20 percent in 1980.[46] The multinationality of American firms also rose substantially over these five decades. The total of American direct foreign investment abroad grew from about $5.5 billion in 1923 to $11.8 billion in 1950, and to over $86 billion in 1970.[47] Moreover, the internationalization of American industry

[45] Ratner, Soltow, and Sylla (fn. 8), 463-66.

[46] For the 1920s, see Robert Lipsey, *Price and Quantity Trends in the Foreign Trade of the U.S.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 434-35; for the period from 1960 on, see Report of the President's Commission on Industrial Competitiveness, *Global Competition: The New Reality*, Vol. I (Washington, DC: G.P.O., 1985), 36.

[47] Robert Dunn, *American Foreign Investments* (New York: Viking, 1926), 182; Kent Hughes, *Trade, Taxes, and Transnationals* (New York: Praeger, 1979), 94. Ratner, Soltow, and Sylla (fn. 8), 464, show it grew to $17.2 billion in the 1920s and then retreated to $11.5 billion by the end of the 1930s. According to Robert Pollard, *Economic Security and the Origins of the*

grew in relative terms. Foreign assets of U.S. industry accounted for only 2.5 percent of total industrial assets in 1929, but for over 20 percent in the 1970s.[48] In addition, the global operations of these firms intensified, leading to the creation of webs of international trade flows within firms. Exports by American multinationals from foreign production sites back to the U.S. market have grown immensely. This practice was almost unknown before the 1940s; at present, these types of transfers account for somewhere between 15 and 50 percent of all U.S. industrial imports.[49] In sum, the integration of the United States into the international economy through both trade and multinationality has deepened considerably since the 1920s.

This aspect of increased interdependence has lessened pressures for protection in domestic industries. I hypothesize that firms with greater international ties in the form of exports, multinationality, and global intrafirm trade will be less interested in protection than firms that are more domestically oriented. The former will view protection as undesirable, since it will be more costly for them than for the latter, for five reasons. First, firms that export or produce abroad will be concerned about foreign retaliation and its costs. Demanding protection at home may prompt greater protection abroad, which may lead to a reduction of exports or to new restrictions on foreign operations and their trade flows, thus reducing profitability. Second, protection in one market may hurt a firm's exports to third markets as other exporters divert their products to these markets to compensate for market closure elsewhere.

Third, firms with a global web of production and trade will view trade barriers, even at home, as a new cost—one that may undermine their competitiveness. For these firms, protection will be disruptive and costly. Fourth, for firms dependent on imports—whether from subsidiaries, subcontractors, or foreign firms—new trade barriers will increase costs and thus erode competitiveness. Finally, intra-industry rivalries will create opposition to protectionism. Trade barriers will put internationally oriented firms at a disadvantage relative to their domestically oriented

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*Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 205. U.S. direct foreign investments dropped to their lowest point in the century so far in 1946.

[48] For the 1920s, see U.S. Congress, Senate, *American Branch Factories Abroad*, S. Doc. No 258, 71st Cong., 3rd sess., 1931, p. 27, on the value of U.S. direct foreign investment in manufacturing, and Lipsey (fn. 46), 424, on the value of U.S. manufacturing GNP. For the 1970s, see U.S. Department of Commerce, *1977 Enterprise Statistics* (Washington, DC: G.P.O., 1981).

[49] The figures vary widely. See Joseph Grunwald and Kenneth Flamm, *Global Factory* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1985), 7; Gerald Helleiner and Real Lavergne, "Intra-firm Trade and Industrial Exports to the U.S.," *Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics* 41 (November 1979), 297-312; Gerald Helleiner, "Transnational Corporations and the Trade Structure," in Herbert Giersch, *On the Economics of Intra-Firm Trade* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1979), 159-84.

competitors. Such barriers impose new costs on international firms while providing benefits to domestic ones. These different relative costs and benefits within an industry may lead international firms to oppose protection. For all these reasons, firms with strong international ties will find protection of the home market very costly and will be likely to resist appeals for it, even when faced with severe import competition.

While containing an international element, this argument is similar to those concerning domestic interest groups. Most interest-group analyses, however, focus on the forces pushing *for* protection.[50] One reason is the assumption of a collective action problem in trade politics. Small groups of producers (management and labor) facing import competition are seen as more likely to press actively for help since it will bring them concentrated and substantial benefits, while larger groups (other industries, consumers) opposing protection will be less likely to act since the benefits of openness will be diffuse and less tangible.[51] But some small groups may also suffer from the high costs of protection and receive important tangible benefits from openness.

Increasingly, the interest-group literature has focused on the variables examined here. Several aggregate-level studies of U.S. industries have shown that high levels of export dependence reduce industries' preferences for protection and lead to lower trade barriers for these industries.[52] Other studies reveal that, even in the 1920s, the growth of an export sector contributed to attempts to open American and foreign markets.[53] Some have also linked the adoption of the R.T.A.A. in 1934, with its antiprotectionist bent, to the influence of American exporters and multinationals.[54] These studies have lent credence to the idea that export-dependent industries may not prefer protection and may even advocate the dismantling of trade barriers.

[50] Examples are Richard Caves, "Economic Models of Political Choice: Canada's Tariff Structure," *Canadian Journal of Economics* 9 (May 1976), 278-300; William Brock and Stephen Magee, "The Economics of Special Interest Politics: Case of the Tariff," *American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings* 68 (May 1978), 246-50; Robert Baldwin, *The Political Economy of U.S. Import Policy* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986); Jonathan Pincus, *Pressure Groups and Politics in Antebellum Tariffs* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977); Edward Ray, "Determinants of Tariff and Nontariff Trade Restrictions in the U.S.," *Journal of Political Economy* 81 (No. 1, 1981), 105-21; Real Lavergne, *The Political Economy of U.S. Tariffs* (Toronto: Academic Press, 1983).

[51] Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), for the classic treatment; also see Brock and Magee (fn. 50).

[52] Glenn Fong, "Export Dependence and the New Protectionism" (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1982) supports this contention. So does Robert Baldwin (fn. 50). Lavergne (fn. 50) and Goldstein (fn. 43) provide mixed evidence for this assertion.

[53] Joan H. Wilson, *American Business and Foreign Policy, 1920-33* (Boston: Beacon, 1971); William Becker, *The Dynamics of Business-Government Relations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).

[54] Thomas Ferguson, "From Normalcy to New Deal," *International Organization* 38 (Winter 1984), 40-94.

Scholars have also examined how multinationality and its related intrafirm trade affect trade policy. On the one hand, the idea that the spread of multinational firms would reduce trade barriers has been challenged because these firms often enter a market to circumvent such barriers, and thus come to see them as a brake against other foreign competitors; on the other hand, the growth of global intrafirm trading has led to the idea that firms with such trade would be adverse to protection in their markets.[55] Analysis at the aggregate industry level has produced mixed evidence for both of these arguments.[56]

In this study, I do not adopt an aggregate approach; rather, I examine a set of industries and their firms in detail. This method permits the consideration of firms who are the chief actors experiencing the particular costs and benefits of protection. It thus overcomes a central problem of aggregate studies; that is, that they mask the distribution of international ties within an industry, and with it the intra-industry divisions over protectionism. The poor results of aggregate analyses concerning export dependence and multinationality are partly due to these divisions within industries. An industry that is highly multinational may actually contain only one or two large multinational firms, who may or may not be able to impose their preferences against protection on the industry and/or on state actors. These intra-industry differences and their effects on trade policy will be examined in the present study.

This focus corrects for another problem. Unlike arguments based on international systems, regimes, or domestic structures, my argument can account for differences in trade policy outcomes among industries during the same period. Why some industries demand and receive protection, while at the same time others do not, is hard to explain parsimoniously with these other arguments. For example, the fact that 60 percent of all imports entered the U.S. duty-free in the 1920s is not easily explicable if one asserts that the international structure, the lack of any regime, or the domestic political structure encouraged the adoption of widespread protectionism at that time.[57] The argument here is better able to address such differences among industries at any one time and to account for differences over time. It should not be seen, however, as directly competing

[55] Gerald Helleiner, "Transnational Enterprise and the New Political Economy of U.S. Trade Policy," *Oxford Economic Papers* 29 (March 1977), 102-16; also Helleiner (fn. 49). See Lipson (fn. 37) for a discussion of the effect of intra-industry trade on industry trade preferences.

[56] Baldwin (fn. 50) and Lavergne (fn. 50) do not find much influence exercised by these variables, but Thomas Pugel and Ingo Walter, "U.S. Corporate Interests and the Political Economy of Trade Policy," *Review of Economics and Statistics* 67 (August 1985), 465-73, do find multinationality to be an important brake on protectionist preferences.

[57] Lake (fn. 9), chap. 5, p. 8 and Table 5-1.

with the other explanations, which operate at different levels of analysis and may all have some validity. The point is that examinations of trade politics have missed antiprotectionist interests, and that a domestic politics view of the pressures for and against trade barriers is the place where one should start to understand trade policy.

## The Case Studies

The industries examined were those experiencing the greatest growth in import penetration among those already having high levels of import penetration in the two decades.[58] In addition, these industries showed evidence of other economic difficulties: unemployment, profit problems, overcapacity, and so forth. Since studies have demonstrated that high levels of import penetration are strongly associated with demands for protection and high actual levels of protection, the industries selected should be the least likely to confirm my argument;[59] they should have been most likely to desire protection. Indeed, it would be surprising to find that these import-threatened industries did *not* prefer new trade barriers.

Once these "hard" cases were chosen, I explored the extent of their integration into the international economy and their trade policy preferences. To measure their integration, data on their export dependence, import requirements, multinationality, and global intrafirm trade were collected for both the industry and its firms. In order to understand their preferences, I surveyed their activities in a number of political arenas. In the 1920s, these were (1) the U.S. Congress, which handled most issues related to tariff levels; (2) the U.S. Tariff Commission, which investigated industry complaints about trade matters; and (3) industry trade associations, whose internal deliberations over trade issues were reported in various newspapers and industry trade journals. For the 1970s, the arenas were slightly different: (1) the U.S. Congress, which authorized general tariff level changes and introduced bills to help particular industries; (2) the U.S. International Trade Commission (I.T.C.), which investigated industry trade complaints; (3) the U.S. Special Trade Representative (S.T.R.) and other executive agencies, who decided on and implemented solutions to industry trade complaints while also managing U.S. activities in the GATT negotiations; and (4) the industry trade associations, which developed industry-wide positions on trade.

[58] Eighteen industries were examined in detail; see Helen Milner, "Resisting the Protectionist Temptation: Industry Politics and Trade Policy in France and the US in the 1920s and 1970s" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1986).

[59] Many studies have found that high levels or high rates of increase in import penetration are strongly correlated with high levels of demand for protection and high actual levels of protection. See, for example, Baldwin (fn. 50); Lavergne (fn. 50); Goldstein (fn. 43).

The investigation of the industries chosen revealed a strong correlation between their firms' international ties and their trade policy preferences. (See Table 2.) In the face of mounting import competition, firms that lacked ties to the international economy voiced rising demands for extensive protection. By contrast, firms with well-developed multinational operations, *including integrated global production and trade flows*, and strong exports did *not* seek protection even when imports rose to high levels. In fact, these firms often desired that markets at home and abroad be opened further still. Firms with substantial export dependence but no multinational production also did not desire protection as long as import competition did not swamp their exports. Finally, firms with some foreign production but no U.S. exports or intrafirm trade often resorted to limited protectionism when facing import competition. These firms sometimes sought selective protection; that is, they attempted to curb their strongest competitors through limited protection against a particular country or product line while leaving undisturbed the main foreign markets in which they were involved. Overall, the cases revealed that the more integrated a firm was into the international economy, the less likely it was to seek import restraints even when imports rose significantly.

U.S. manufacturers of woolen goods in the 1920s and producers of footwear in the 1970s were typical of industries lacking international economic ties. Most firms in the woolen goods sector were domestically oriented, with few exports and no multinationality. After World War I, when import competition resumed and other difficulties set in, the majority of firms in this industry began lobbying for closure of the U.S. market.[60] They demanded and received increased tariffs through the 1921 Emergency Tariff bill; later, during the Fordney-McCumber tariff hearings, they called for a 130 percent rise in their duties and were granted a sizable increase. They lobbied for even higher tariffs before and during the Smoot-Hawley hearings after problems arose in the late 1920s. Success with Congress did not satisfy them, however: they fought against changes in tariff-making rules that could have made tariff reductions easier. They also pressured the U.S. Tariff Commission for greater protection. Thus, the woolens manufacturers' demands were voiced in all possible political arenas and were focused on obtaining global protection for all segments of the industry. In view of their economic problems and lack of international ties, their intense and unified advocacy for closure of the home market was not surprising.

Like the woolen goods manufacturers, the American (non-rubber) footwear producers had largely domestic operations in the 1970s. Begin-

[60] For the full story, see Milner (fn. 58), 138-63.

TABLE 2

THE INDUSTRIES, THEIR PREFERENCES, AND POLICY OUTCOMES

| *International Ties* | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Export Dependence* | *Multinational and Global Intrafirm Trade* | *Industry* | *Expected Preferences* | *Actual Preferences* | *Policy Outcomes* |
| Low | Low | Woolens, 1920s | Protectionist | Protectionist | High, increasing tariffs |
| | | Watches and Clocks, 1920s | Protectionist | Protectionist | High, rising tariffs |
| | | Footwear, 1970s | Protectionist | Protectionist | Some protection via voluntary export restraints in mid-1970s |
| High | Low | Textile Machinery, 1920s | Open markets, esp. abroad | Divided; some free trade and some moderate protection | Low tariffs in early 1920s; some increases later |
| | | Machine Tools, 1970s | Open markets, esp. abroad | Free trade in 1970s; Protectionist in early 1980s | Tariff reductions in 1970s; voluntary export restraints in mid-1980s |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Low | High | Newsprint, 1920s | Selective protection, if any | Free trade | Duty-free |
| | | Tires, 1970s | Selective protection, if any | Free trade, some complaints of unfair trade | Tariff reductions |
| | | Watches & Clocks, 1970s | Selective protection, if any | Divided; some free trade, some selective protection | Some tariff reductions |
| | | Radios & Television sets, 1970s | Selective protection | Some selective protection; some free trade | Some tariff reductions; voluntary export restraints in mid-1970s |
| High | High | Fertilizer, 1920s | Free trade | Free trade | Duty-free |
| | | Photo Equipment, 1920s | Free trade | Moderate protection; increasing free trade | Some tariff increases in early 1920s; some decreases in late 1920s |
| | | Semiconductors, 1970s | Free trade | Free trade in 1970s; strategic trade demands in 1980s | Tariff reductions, but export pricing agreement with Japan in mid-1980s |

*ning in the late 1960s, when shoe imports began flooding the U.S. mar the industry association—backed by almost all of the producers launched a campaign to obtain tariff protection.*[61] *After the early 197* the association and the firms pursued this goal with increasing intensit The association filed numerous trade complaints with the I.T.C.; it lol bied Congress for help and formed a coalition of congressmen to promo the industry's cause; and it launched a public relations campaign to ger erate public support. These activities forced President Carter to negotiat voluntary export restraints with several East Asian competitors; eve those restraints were not restrictive enough for many of the firms wh sought global quotas. By the early 1980s, however, the industry's unit over trade matters began to decline. A growing number of producer started to oppose renewed protection as they began importing or produc ing offshore. This opposition weakened the association's appeals for hel and contributed to its more limited political success since then. Overal the firms' waxing and waning protectionist demands were related to th level of their international economic ties.

By contrast, large multinationals with extensive international trad flows and exports from the United States avoided protection as a solutio to their import problems largely because of the costly effects it woul have on the firms' global operations. U.S. fertilizer producers in the 1920 and the semiconductor producers in the 1970s were characteristic. By th early 1920s, for example, the large fertilizer producers were highly ex port-dependent and multinational. Despite their economic problem they preferred freer trade.[62] In the 1921 tariff hearings, they requeste and received the retention of the duty-free status of their products. Dur ing the Smoot-Hawley hearings, this preference prevailed among most o the firms, although certain producers advocated demanding protectio on certain goods if they did not receive tariff reductions on others. Thi strategy was aimed at, and resulted in, greater openness of the U.S. mar ket, since no tariffs were imposed on fertilizers, and some were reduced Finally, throughout the 1920s, the major producers—i.e., those with in ternational operations—opposed the demands of some small domesti producers for higher tariffs on various fertilizer products. In general, th internationally oriented fertilizer manufacturers wanted to preserve th U.S. market's openness and, despite mounting foreign competition, op posed attempts to erect new barriers around it.

During the 1970s, the American semiconductor industry faced seriou competition for the first time. The largest firms in this industry—I.B.M.

[61] *Ibid.*, 300-19.

[62] *Ibid.*, 244-70.

Texas Instruments, and Motorola—had widespread foreign operations and intrafirm trade flows, while the remainder were more domestically oriented. Most of the firms favored trade liberalization throughout the 1970s; despite rising foreign competition, demands for aid or protection were nonexistent before the late 1970s.[63] Later in the decade, the smaller firms, united in the new Semiconductor Industry Association (S.I.A.), began formulating a trade complaint against Japan. Due to the opposition of the large firms—mainly I.B.M. and T.I.—this complaint was not formalized at the time. Instead, I.B.M. joined the S.I.A. and helped turn its attention toward negotiations with Japan over further tariff *reductions*. These negotiations, impelled by the industry, resulted in lower tariffs for semiconductors; other negotiations, to open the Japanese market further, continued as well. In the early 1980s, however, the S.I.A. and some firms within the industry filed several trade complaints against the Japanese, as did the Reagan administration itself.[64] These complaints resulted in intensified efforts to open the Japanese market and in a pact to regulate export prices of Japanese semiconductors, which was intended to alleviate illegal dumping. On the whole, however, American firms resisted the strong pressures for protection; their international economic ties made protection less desirable than the further opening of markets at home and abroad.

Like these trade-oriented multinationals, firms with extensive export dependence (but not multinationality) tended to avoid protectionist demands in times of difficulty. Examples are the U.S. textile machinery builders in the 1920s and machine tool manufacturers in the 1970s. The former, while having significant export dependence in the aggregate, were divided: the producers of cotton machinery had become substantial exporters since World War I, while those of woolen machinery were still domestically oriented.[65] This division, as well as the novelty and volatility of the producers' exports, rendered the industry unable to develop a unified trade policy preference. In the early 1920s, when exports were most significant, the producers did not lobby Congress for any change in their tariffs despite severe economic distress and rising imports. Over the decade, the export interests of some firms declined, and so did the capacity of these firms to forestall protectionist demands. In the 1929 Smoot-Hawley hearings, firms from the woolen machinery sector pressed for and received moderate tariff increases on their machines; the more

[63] *Ibid.*, 343-71.
[64] *Boston Globe*, April 13, 1986, Business section, pp. A-1, A-9; *Wall Street Journal*, March 12, 1986, p. 7; *Wall Street Journal*, March 31, 1986, p. 2.
[65] Milner (fn. 58), 190-215.

export-oriented firms remained silent. Even though they were besieged
imports, these exporters refrained from demanding protection for mu
of the decade and remained moderate and divided in their later request

The American machine tool builders were sizable although declinin
exporters in the 1970s. During this decade, these producers lost majo
market shares to imports and experienced other economic difficultie
Their response, however, was not a resort to demands for protection
rather, the industry association—backed by most producers—favored
tariff reductions during the GATT negotiations and lobbied Congress to
obtain aid for their exports.[66] In particular, the builders wanted to open
major foreign markets—especially those of the Soviet Union and other
Eastern bloc countries. By the late 1970s, the failure of these export initiatives, the continuing decline of the industry's export trade, and the rising import tide pushed some in the industry to seek relief from imports. Pressure for protection rose in the late 1970s; but it was not formalized into a public complaint until the early 1980s, when the tide of imports overwhelmed the firms' exports. The Reagan administration responded to this trade complaint against several countries' imports—mainly Japan's—by negotiating a set of voluntary export restraints.[67] The case of the machine tool builders thus shows how sizable export dependence may promote an interest in freer trade and dampen pressures for protection even when imports surge. But, when the firms' export orientation declined, their trade preferences shifted as well.

Industries with firms that had foreign production but no intrafirm or export trade showed some resistance to protection when imports grew, but it was often weaker than that of export-oriented industries. In many of these industries, growing foreign competition was met by calls for limited protection because the costs of this protection could be minimized. Two examples are the American newsprint producers in the 1920s and U.S. television makers in the 1970s. Newsprint producers in the 1920s were multinational but had only minor U.S. exports. Their foreign operations were concentrated almost exclusively in Canada; from there, they exported heavily back to the United States. The industry thus had substantial intrafirm trade. Throughout the 1920s, the newsprint producers actively supported freer trade of their products, and did not try to have the duty-free status of newsprint altered in either the 1921 or the 1929 tariff revisions.[68] In 1921, several manufacturers did attempt to make their status conditional on other countries' treatment of imports

[66] *Ibid.*, 320-42.
[67] *New York Times*, February 3, 1986, p. D-2; *New York Times*, March 6, 1986, p. D-3.
[68] Milner (fn. 58), 271-97.

nd exports. But this strategic maneuver was distasteful to many firms and was never adopted as part of U.S. policy. As their trade between Canada and the U.S. grew in the 1920s, interest in protection waned even more. During the Smoot-Hawley tariff revision, when most tariffs reached their highest levels ever, the newsprint manufacturers uniformly supported the continuing duty-free status of their products. Not even rising imports could induce these international producers to think about protection.

American television makers had some foreign operations in the 1970s; but, unlike the newsprint producers, they were not very trade-oriented. The industry was, in fact, divided in two: the largest producers, RCA and General Electric, were multinationals with global trading operations, while the rest, including Zenith, Magnavox, and GTE-Sylvania, were domestic producers. In the 1970s, imports started pouring into the United States, and the domestically oriented firms, led by Zenith, initiated a series of trade complaints on several specific products, targeted against a few East Asian countries.[69] These complaints met with varying success, but they were opposed by RCA, the industry's giant multinational. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, much of this protectionist activity had abated as the domestically oriented American firms moved production abroad, left the industry, or were bought by foreign interests. This international adjustment process eroded support for even the limited, selective protection that some had desired earlier.

In all of these cases, then, the existence or creation of extensive international economic ties prompted firms to resist seeking protection even in times of severe import competition. Conversely, the lack or loss of these ties was associated with rising demands for protection. This pattern occurred both in the 1920s and the 1970s. In both decades, increased integration into the international economy was experienced similarly by firms in spite of their different historical contexts. This pattern helps to explain the varied nature of trade policy *within* each time period. At each point, industries that were dominated by firms with extensive international ties were less protectionist than those that were not.

In addition to accounting for variation in preferences *within* each period, the argument and the cases suggest why trade policy varied *between* the two periods. On a macro level, the evidence implies that in periods like the 1970s, when such international economic ties are widespread and well-developed, pressure for protection by industries will be reduced.

Although the growth of international ties contributed to the mainte-

[69] *Ibid.*, 372-96.

nance of free trade in the 1970s and early 1980s, it must be noted that the internationalization of U.S. industry went hand in hand with trade liberalization in the postwar period. The liberalization of trade in the 1950s and 1960s was one factor promoting the growth of these international ties. But much of this expansion had occurred before the two most significant reductions in trade barriers. U.S. export dependence, and especially U.S. multinationality, had grown significantly before the phasing in of the Kennedy Round tariff cuts in the early 1970s. America's industrial export dependence (exports as a percent of total domestic production) rose 33 percent between 1960 and 1970, while the value of U.S. direct foreign investment in manufacturing increased nearly 800 percent between 1950 and 1970.[70] The growth of these international ties cannot be separated from the liberalization of trade occurring at the same time. But, since industries with international ties were in place prior to the 1970s, they probably contributed to the liberalization that occurred during that decade. In any case, by the 1970s there were many more firms that were willing to resist protectionist pressures. Despite higher levels of import penetration, demands for protection were less widespread than they had been in the 1920s. This provides a partial answer to our central puzzle.

## Industry Divisions, Context, and Policy Outcomes

The argument raises three further issues. The first deals with intra-industry divisions on trade issues. One notable feature of the growing internationalization of U.S. industries has been its uneven character. Within an industry, some firms—usually the largest—have become international, while the smaller ones have often remained dependent on the domestic market. This difference has tended to divide industries on trade politics: a pattern of large multinationals opposing the more numerous but smaller domestic-centered firms is evident in the cases.

Two consequences of this political division stand out. First, it makes developing an industry-wide stand difficult. As seen in the textile machinery case, internal divisions created by different international interests can leave an industry without the capacity to develop a political position on trade. Second, the attempt to create an "industry" position in a divided industry may lead to the fashioning of compromises that are not as pro-

[70] Consistent data series on export dependence and multinationality as a percent of GNP from 1945 on are not available. The export dependence data come from Report of the President's Commission (fn. 46), 36. The data on direct foreign investment come from Feldstein (fn. 7), Table 3.30, p. 240.

tectionist as the majority of firms may prefer, as was evident in the semiconductor case. Both results may reduce protectionist demands even more than the extent of internationalization of the industry would suggest. Thus, the creation of these intra-industry divisions through unevenly rising interdependence may further reduce pressures for protection.

In the 1920s, these internal divisions were less apparent than in the 1970s, because internationalization was less widespread.[71] Moreover, existing divisions tended to be only the initial breach in an industry's unity—a consequence of recent internationalization. The textile machinery industry is a good example. Thus, intra-industry divisions, another counterweight to protectionist pressures, were also weaker in the 1920s.

Second, contextual differences between the two periods have been alleged to undercut any comparison between them.[72] But contextual differences did not override the powerful influence that a firm's international position exerted on its trade preferences. In both periods, internationally oriented firms opposed protectionist solutions to their problems. This finding suggests that the broad differences between the two periods—e.g., in macroeconomic circumstances, political structures, and economic ideology—did not greatly affect the way firms calculated their preferences. The similarities in preferences in the two periods imply that factors differentiating the two times may have only a minor impact on demands for protection by industries at any time.

Moreover, firms often did not take these contextual features as given. In both periods, some firms worked to alter domestic political structures responsible for trade policy. In the 1920s, for example, several industries attempted to make U.S. procedures more free-trade oriented, opposing the American valuation plan and supporting flexible tariff provisions; other industries, including the domestically oriented woolen goods one, took the opposite stance.[73] In the 1970s, those footwear and television manufacturers who pursued protection lobbied to change U.S. procedures in order to make them more open to protectionist outcomes. This involved efforts—most of which were successful—to loosen U.S. trade laws and to shift their enforcement to agencies more favorable to domestic industry.[74] Certain contextual features, such as the domestic political process for trade issues, may thus not be exogenous; rather, the structures

[71] Milner (fn. 58), chap. 8.
[72] For example, see Kenneth A. Oye, "The Sterling-Dollar-Franc Triangle: Monetary Diplomacy 1929-1937," *World Politics* 38 (October 1985), 173-99, at 199.
[73] Milner (fn. 58), chap. 4.
[74] *Ibid.*, chap. 5.

in which firms are assumed to operate may be responsive to the influence of firms.

A final issue involves the question of trade policy outcomes. I have focused more on explaining firms' preferences than on policy decisions. The influence of such preferences on policy outcomes has been largely assumed. The cases presented here provide support for this assumption. In almost all of the cases, the industries' demands for protection or for freer trade had some effect upon policy.[75] (See Table 2.) First, in none of the cases were industries accorded protection when they did not demand it. This suggests that the issue of protection was usually placed on the political agenda by the industries themselves. Second, industries desiring the maintenance of low trade barriers or reductions of restraints were successful in all the cases, as the fertilizer, newsprint, and semiconductor industries show. Thus, no systematic bias against low or reduced trade barriers appears to have existed even in the 1920s.

Finally, industries seeking increases in trade barriers also tended to be successful. Where an industry was divided, however, its capacity for effective political influence was reduced, as exemplified by the limited success of the domestically oriented television makers in the 1970s. In contrast, where industries were united in favor of protection, they generally received it. This was true for all cases in the 1920s and for all but two in the 1970s. Although the footwear producers failed throughout the early 1970s to have new trade barriers erected, their efforts met with some success in the late 1970s, when the Carter administration negotiated voluntary export restraints for them. Likewise, the early efforts of the machine tool builders in the late 1970s and early 1980s failed to produce any response from the government. By the mid-1980s, however, the Reagan administration was pressing the industry's case and negotiating export restraints with foreign governments.

In neither period did industries always get exactly what they wanted when they wanted it. But their demands tended in time to move policy in the desired direction. The greater difficulty that industries experienced in attaining their demands for protection in the 1970s may reflect both the greater awareness among industry and government officials of the international problems caused by protection and the more limited responsiveness to domestic pressures of the executive (now in control of more trade issues) as opposed to Congress (which played a larger role in the 1920s). Some bias in the trade policy system against protection appears evident in

[75] *Ibid.*, see cases and chap. 8.

the 1970s. Unlike firms' preferences then, trade policy outcomes may depend more on factors that differed in the two contexts, such as policy-making structures and ideology.

In both periods, industries were able over time to realize trade policies close to the ones they desired. Thus, their preferences seemed to count in the policy process. Other influences on trade policy, such as the interests of labor or the ideologies of decision makers, were also likely to be important. The evidence presented here simply shows that, by itself, reduced interest in protection by internationally oriented industries in the 1970s was one important reason for the resistance to protectionism in the United States.

## Conclusion

Why did trade policy outcomes differ between the 1920s and the 1970s when a number of conditions influencing trade politics were similar? Why was protectionism resisted in the 1970s when economic difficulties were severe and U.S. hegemony was in decline? While noting other answers to this puzzle—such as the influence of the international distribution of power, international regimes, and domestic political structures—I maintain that aspects of rising international economic interdependence in the post-World War II period led to changes in the trade policy preferences of domestic actors. Rising interdependence meant, in part, the growth of firms' ties to the international economy through exports, multinationality, and global intrafirm trade; because of these ties, protectionism had become a more costly policy. The new interdependence made protectionism a less viable option for many firms facing serious import competition. Consequently, it dampened the demand for protection.

Examination of a set of industries from the 1920s and 1970s supports the contention that internationally oriented firms were less likely to demand protection than were domestically oriented ones, even if both faced high levels of import penetration. The cases also pointed to the importance of firm-level analysis. International ties conditioned firms' preferences, and divergences in these ties *within* the industry created important political divisions over trade. These intra-industry divisions also helped to dampen pressures for protectionism.

Differences in the historical context between the 1920s and 1970s did not override the argument. Despite differences in the international and domestic structures, internationally oriented firms in both periods were less protectionist than their domestic counterparts. In fact, features often

considered contextual were responsive to influence by firms. Moreover trade preferences among the firms examined mattered. Policy outcomes often reflected the desires of firms. Thus, reduced demand for protection in the 1970s may be one important, but not the only, reason why U.S trade policy differed in the two periods.

# *Review Articles*

# PARADIGM LOST:
## Dependence to Democracy

By DANIEL H. LEVINE*

Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, 710 pp.

I

THIS essay is about the proper study of transitions to democracy. In particular, I explore the relation between analysis of transitions and attention to democracy itself as a coherent system of social relations, politics, and government. I argue that the two are joined in practice and should not be held apart in analytical terms. This means that predominant or exclusive attention to transitions will not suffice. Full understanding requires that study of transitions to democracy be rooted in consideration of democracy's own characteristic motivations, organizational resources, and operative patterns of leadership and legitimacy.

The reflections that follow arise out of the practical and theoretical consequences of recent political change. The noteworthy upsurge of democratic politics in Southern Europe and Latin America over the last dozen years underscores democracy's continuing vigor and popular appeal. Moreover, the specific ways in which these democracies emerged challenge a number of assumptions and expectations that have recently been advanced with great vigor in the study of comparative politics, most notably in dependency theory.

Perhaps the most remarkable challenge comes from the very presence of democracy in countries once thought doomed to endless authoritarianism as a byproduct of the political dynamics of peripheral capitalism. Further, as we shall see, a close inspection of recent political transformations points up the central role of variables once confidently dismissed as epiphenomenal by scholars working within dependency theory. Ele-

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ments such as effective leadership, organizational strength, deliberat consensus building, and close attention to institutionalization have combined in case after case to take center stage in the creation and consolidation of democracies. In the process, creative and committed political actors have repeatedly underscored the centrality of national-level politics, countering deterministic expectations according to which national patterns are ineluctably set by the play of global or regional forces.[1]

The whole process has attracted considerable public and scholarly interest. The work under review here, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy*, is just one of many studies on the growth, restoration, and consolidation of democracy to come out in recent years.[2] The scale of the present enterprise, however (one cloth edition of over seven hundred pages, four separate paperback volumes, three editors and twenty-two other contributors, seven years in the making from conferences to publication) and the prominence of the editors, together with the central role some of them played in elaborating earlier dependency paradigms, makes this a fit occasion for more general commentary.

The argument of this essay is developed around four related issues. The first is an exploration of the context in which dependency theory arose. I note its fit to concepts of democracy and democratization and to the political changes of the last decade. A distinction between political liberalization and a broader definition of democratization (embracing social relations, economic equity, and politics) that runs throughout the *Transitions* series, has consistently led editors and authors to undervalue the appeal of liberal democracy. A second issue concerns the nature and status of pacts and accommodations. Such arrangements commonly reflect efforts to reduce risk and uncertainty by extending mutual guarantees and devising operative rules of the game acceptable to key political actors. In the *Transitions* volumes, such pacts are depicted mostly as matters of elite self-protection and behind-the-scenes manipulation, but this view fails to address popular support for pacts. By the same token, the stress

[1] In Tony Smith's apt phrase, they thereby reassert "the autonomy of the peripheral state." See Smith, *The Pattern of Imperialism: The United States, Great Britain, and the Late Industrializing World Since 1815* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 68-84.

[2] Relevant collections include Enrique Baloyra, ed., *Comparing New Democracies: Transition and Consolidation in Mediterranean Europe and the Southern Cone* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987); Paul Drake and Eduardo Silva, eds., *Elections and Democratization in Latin America, 1980-85* (La Jolla, CA: Institute of the Americas, 1986); Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour Lipset, eds., *Democracy in Developing Nations* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, forthcoming 1988); and James M. Malloy and Mitchell Seligson, eds., *Authoritarians and Democrats: Regime Transition in Latin America* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987).

on pacts as antidemocratic manipulation ignores the ties that link the elites who make the pacts to popular groups, and thus obscures the reasons why the latter give them a grant of legitimacy.

The links between elites and popular groups constitute the third point for reflection. Such links are built and maintained in many ways; political parties often play a central role in articulating these relationships. But parties are notable in these volumes mostly by their absence. Instead, the editors highlight the nature of civil society and its overall relation to the process of political change. But their discussion is unsatisfactory, for with rare exceptions, civil society is treated in general and abstract terms, with insufficient attention to specific groups and to the *organized* relations that bind sectors and movements to the leaders, structures, and institutions of national life.

Fourth, the conclusion presents some general comments on the reasons why scholars working out of dependency theory have so hard a time (as evidenced in these volumes) dealing with democracy. The crux of the matter lies in a pervasive discomfort with liberal democracy itself. Dependency theory in general, and the *Transitions* series in particular, rest on a notion of critical theory which in the matter at hand leads analysis to reach beyond political democracy (with its characteristic cautions, compromises, and accommodations) to something better—presumably involving dramatically expanded popular participation in the context of some form of socialism. Throughout these volumes, democracy appears mostly as the absence of negatives: better than the regimes it replaces, but with limited appeal of its own. By this account, democracies emerge out of mutual fear among opponents rather than as the deliberate outcome of concerted commitments to make democratic political arrangements work. The result is analysis that has more to say about transitions than about democracy, and little light to shed on the reasons for democracy's resurgent vigor in the contemporary period.

## II

A few words on recent intellectual and political history are appropriate at this point, to set the context for the commentary that follows. Over the past few decades, scholars working with concepts of dependence and political economy have crafted an innovative paradigm for comparative political analysis. Important insights were developed and a generation of fruitful research was launched to work out the contours of this perspective and to solve the puzzles it identified. This new paradigm emerged

first within Latin America; over time, it has expanded to cover broader issues of social, economic, and political change, moving in the process to Africa, Asia, and, as these volumes show, to Southern Europe.[3]

The basic ideas are familiar by now. The overthrow of democracies in Latin America and the creation of supposedly "new authoritarianisms" was attributed to the elective affinity between an expanding security apparatus, an assertive civil-military technocratic elite, and a development strategy intended to promote capitalism on the periphery through long-term investment in industrialization. Authoritarian rule was said to emerge in order to secure these policies, making repression of the popular sector an integral part of the package.[4] Domestic actors, institutions, and priorities are occasionally conceded to have played an important intervening or mediating role, but in general terms regional and national structures (with their characteristic range of likely outcomes) can be understood from this perspective only in a historically contingent relation with the global political economy.

The problems addressed in this literature stem from the appearance of authoritarianism in the most developed societies of Latin America (e.g., Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay).[5] This localization of the theory's origins and application points up a major early contribution, which, O'Donnell argues, exploded the "optimistic equation" according to which democracy was a natural concomitant of development.[6] From this new vantage point authoritarianism became the norm, and democracy an anomaly requiring explanation.

[3] Note the reversal of longstanding patterns of intellectual transfer. This body of theory emerged within Latin America, determined to make sense of the Latin American experience without simply borrowing terms of reference from Europe or North America. In the process, it challenged many key tenets of social science theory, and gradually spread to order research and reflection elsewhere in the Third World, and now in Europe itself. The well-known case of Liberation Theology offers important parallels, suggesting notable intellectual vigor in contemporary Latin America.

[4] For a still useful overview, see David Collier, ed., *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979). See also Alejandro Foxeley, *Latin American Experiments in Neo-Conservative Economics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), and Joseph Ramos, *Neo-Conservative Economics in the Southern Cone of Latin America, 1973-1983* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

[5] The position is not well adapted to the study of agrarian or ethnically divided societies. It thus has little specific relevance to the revolutionary upsurge in Central America, despite notable parallels between agrarian change in this region and industrialization elsewhere. On the link between agrarian transformation and political change, see Enrique Baloyra, "Reactionary Despotism in Central America," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 15 (November 1983), 295-319. The position is also ill-suited to the analysis of countries in the middle range of development, leaving them in a residual category.

[6] See Guillermo O'Donnell, "Reflections on the Pattern of Change in the Bureaucratic Authoritarian State," *Latin American Research Review* 13 (No. 1, 1978), 3-38, and also his *Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics* (Berkeley, CA Institute of International Studies, 1973).

But history did not end with the fall of Southern Cone democracies over the last two decades. Lately, authoritarian regimes have themselves disappeared throughout South America, remaining firm only in the extreme case of Chile and in traditional holdouts like Paraguay. As major Latin American nations returned to democratic politics, they have been joined by older authoritarian systems like Spain and Portugal, and by Southern European variants of the Latin American model such as Greece. In the early 1980s, scholars working within the dependency paradigm began to reflect on these experiences. New concepts and concerns attracted their attention: authoritarianism's presumed inevitability (overdetermined, according to earlier analysis) is no longer emphasized. Instead, stress is placed on failures of political leadership and organization, which undermined democracies and paved the way for military rule in the first place.

These conceptual reorientations gained added impetus from the way the political process evolved.[7] As a practical matter, most of the transitions and democratic consolidations that concern us here have been dominated by a liberal political agenda, one in which civil liberties and political rights, elections and a general concern with due process and procedure take center stage. Key leaders have focused attention and energies on such issues, extending mutual guarantees and trying to draw old enemies together in support of democratic political arrangements. Such efforts have also had wide popular support. Radicals consistently falter in the founding elections of the new democracies, and do little better afterwards.[8]

[7] One becomes accustomed after a while to hearing specialists state that "we used to believe A was true, now we know it is really *B*." The *Transitions* editors approach this position, but as we shall see, attribute their conceptual shift more to changing circumstances than to theoretical reevaluation. O'Donnell and Schmitter state the matter as follows:

> Our exploration took a rather different turn from those which have attempted to explain the advent of the very authoritarian regimes whose demise—actual or potential—was the object of our interest. This is somewhat ironic, given the fact that several of the protagonists in our project (one of the coauthors included) were active protagonists in the research and discussions generated by attempts to account for the emergence of those authoritarian regimes. This may be a sign of intellectual flexibility—or of theoretical fuzziness. But in our opinion it is basically a recognition that political and social processes are neither symmetric or reversible. What brings down a democracy is not the inverse of those factors that bring down an authoritarian regime (Vol. 4, p. 18).

[8] The editors treat this largely as the result of "necessary" manipulations of the electoral system. According to O'Donnell and Schmitter:

> Put in a nutshell, parties of the Right-Center and Right must be "helped" to do well, and parties of the Left-Center and Left should not win by an overwhelming majority. This often happens either "artificially," by rigging the rules—for example, by overrepresenting rural districts or small peripheral constituencies—or "naturally," by fragmenting the partisan choices of the Left (usually not a difficult task) and by consolidating those of the

*This should be no surprise. Truly radical or revolutionary change* is rare, occurring most often in the wake of the previous regime's total disintegration. In the absence of such collapse or of overwhelming military power on one side, balance and accommodation are the order of the day, and these are the very stuff of liberal democracy. In any event, liberal democracy's characteristic stress on due process and procedural guarantees is bound to look good after lengthy bouts of abuse and arbitrary rule. It may not be very surprising, but the process nonetheless disappoints those who see the demise of authoritarian rule as a chance for thorough reorganization of class relations, of power, and of state and society generally. Przeworski's formulation echoes through the four *Transitions* volumes:

> ... unfortunately, authoritarian regimes often produce as a counterreaction the romanticization of a limited model of democracy. Democracy restricted to the political realm has historically coexisted with exploitation and oppression at the workplace, within the schools, within bureaucracies, and within families. Struggle for political power is necessary because without it all attempts to transform the society are vulnerable to brutal repression. Yet what we need, and do not have, is a more comprehensive, integral project of antiauthoritarianism that would encompass the totality of social life. (Vol. 3, p. 63.)

*Transitions from Authoritarian Rule* is of course not the first effort to grapple with issues of authoritarianism, democracy, or transitions after a period of political transformation. Without going all the way back to de Tocqueville, to Weber's great address on "Politics as a Vocation," or to Schumpeter's classic *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, we can still identify a number of significant scholarly efforts. Dahl and Lipset come immediately to mind, along with Lijphart, and Linz and Stepan.[9] The

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Center and Right (sometimes possible thanks to the incumbency resources of those in government) (Vol. 4, p. 62).

This formulation assumes that victory by the Left is somehow normal and natural; a leftist defeat is presented as an anomaly to be explained. The empirical grounds for such an assumption are not clear.

[9] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 2 vols. (New York: Schocken, 1961); Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in W. G. Runciman, ed., *Max Weber: Selections in Translation* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 212-25; Joseph Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1961); Robert A. Dahl, *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), Dahl, *Regimes and Oppositions* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), and Dahl, *Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy vs. Control* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982); Seymour M. Lipset, "Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review* 53 (March 1959), 69-105, Lipset, *Political Man* (New York: Doubleday, 1960), and Lipset, *The First Nation* (New York: Basic Books, 1963); Arend Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), and Lijphart, *Democracies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984); Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds., *Breakdowns of Dem-*

analysis in *Breakdowns of Democratic Regimes* by Linz, Stepan, and their collaborators gave particular emphasis to the autonomous role of political variables. Their studies of regime collapse shed considerable light (as in a mirror) on what might make for firmer and more stable democratic politics. In this way, they provided a kind of reverse primer on how to build more viable political agendas while avoiding crises and untenable situations wherever possible.

The concepts of democracy and democratization as used in *Transitions* warrant separate mention. Contemporary discussions of "democracy" generally reflect Schumpeter's lasting influence by their agreement on a few basic defining traits: a national political system characterized by free and open elections, choice between competing slates of leaders, genuine competition, protection of civil liberties, and relatively low barriers to participation. Political arrangements need not be wholly egalitarian or completely participatory to merit the term "democracy": equity in procedure and expandable rules for access and participation, rather than substantive equality, are predominant in this view.

In common usage, "democratization" has several related senses, each with notable implications for democracy. The first is temporal: democratization as a stage in the creation and maintenance of democracy. Relevant phases may run from initial decay of the old regime and inauguration of a new system, through consolidation to (hoped-for) maturity. The second sense of democratization refers to the creation, nurture, and spread of more egalitarian social relations and norms of leadership and authority. These are rooted in greater social and economic equity, and worked out in associational life, especially through encouragement of participation, the development of new sources and styles of leadership, and generally in the way group life is linked to the big structures of national politics.[10] In the volume under review, the label "democratization" is reserved for this second sense; a number of other terms, such as "transitions" and "liberalization," are used more or less interchangeably for the first.

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*ocratic Regimes* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978). The wealth of relevant precedents makes the scarcity and inward-looking character of notes and references in the O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead series all the more surprising. Many internal references are to one or another of the editors' "original" formulations of the matter, presumably derived from the series of conferences held between 1979 and 1981 at the Woodrow Wilson Center, where papers were first presented. The *Transitions* volumes have no individual or collective bibliography or index.

[10] Ties like these undergird formal legitimations of democracy with a generalized experience of competition and association in all walks of life. They also provide a concrete basis for the diffusion of norms of accountability. De Tocqueville (fn. 9) and John Stuart Mill, *Considerations on Representative Government* (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1962), remain classic statements of the issue.

The editors of *Transitions* repeatedly criticize earlier reliance on static and uncritical concepts of political culture, or on simple correlations with rates of growth or levels of socioeconomic development. Thus, Whitehead properly notes that such formulations made democracy appear to be inevitable and automatic, and in this way hampered efforts to account for the uncertainties and reversals possible in any real historical situation (Vol. 3, p. 38). All this is unexceptionable, but the editors go further to assert that the circumstances that led to earlier democratic breakdowns (as discussed, for example, by Linz and Stepan) are *different in kind* from those that underlie the transitions they wish to address. Thus, O'Donnell and Schmitter argue that what "actors do and do not do seems much less tightly determined by 'macro' structural factors during the transitions we study here than during the breakdown of democratic regimes" (Vol. 4, p. 19).

This large claim rests mostly on the editors' impression of the difference between the apparent "dismayed impotence" of earlier democratic actors caught in a web of closing spaces and reduced opportunities and the "exultant feeling" of openness and expanding opportunities that accompanies the end of authoritarian rule (Vol. 4, p. 19). They also argue that, while democracies are brought down by conspiracies involving few actors, the opening and eventual fall of authoritarian regimes has a "crucial component" of large-scale popular mobilization (Vol. 4, p. 18). They believe that such elements dramatically reduce the determining role of external factors in the political process, thereby enhancing the autonomy of national-level actors in new and unique ways.

On closer inspection, these assertions do not hold up very well; the evidence is at best mixed for all cases and periods. Popular mobilizations are not exclusive to opposition to authoritarian rule. Massive mobilizations have also hastened the fall of democracies; Chile is perhaps the most notable recent case in point. The economic and military difficulties that presaged the collapse of many interwar European democracies are well known. Economic and fiscal crises also spurred the fall of Latin American democracies during the 1960s and 1970s. Similar problems have undermined recent authoritarian regimes, driving some military elites from office (Greece, Argentina) while encouraging others (Peru, Brazil, Uruguay) to negotiate a way out of power. In all these cases, new governments were left to deal with the consequences of failed economic policies and armed adventures.[11] These observations suggest that the relative

[11] John Sheahan's unfortunately brief contribution discusses the difficult economic legacy of recent authoritarian regimes and outlines a sensible agenda for the future (Vol. 3, pp. 154-64).

weight of political variables and intra-national circumstances is most likely constant.

Throughout the *Transitions* series, the editors affirm a normative bias for democracy, but a closer look turns up a curiously empty set of concepts. Political democracy appears in these volumes mostly as a temporary, second-best solution. Democratic political arrangements are painted in neutral colors, characterized at best by the absence of negatives, with few positive virtues of their own. Thus, O'Donnell and Schmitter:

> . . . political democracy is produced by stalemate and dissensus rather than by prior unity and consensus. . . . Transition toward democracy is by no means a linear or rational process. There is simply too much uncertainty about capabilities and too much suspicion about intentions for that. Only once the transition has passed and citizens have learned to tolerate its contingent compromises can one expect political democracy to induce a more reliable awareness of convergent interests and to create a less suspicious attitude toward each others' purposes, ideas, and ideals (Vol. 4, p. 72).

These are the last lines of the entire series; together, they sum up much of what the editors and contributors have to offer. They reveal an empirical focus more concerned with transitions than with either authoritarianism or democracy. This heightens awareness of uncertainties and makes short-term tactical maneuvering central to analysis. In theoretical terms, the passage just cited assumes that agreements reached (often reluctantly) under crisis conditions tend to diffuse slowly, with great difficulty and notable social costs to society at large. Average people are excluded from this analysis, as if they had not been involved all along; they simply remain in the wings, waiting for the transition to be complete. But this will not do. It divorces the process from those involved, as if elite maneuvers were the only point at issue. It also ignores the many ties that bind leaders to mass publics, for example through political parties, trade unions, and secondary associations of all kinds.

When regimes change, rules of the game are in flux, new leadership groups emerge, and different kinds of issues, demands, and interests clamor for a place in the political sun. In circumstances like these, a central task for political leaders is to order the transition in ways that ensure minimal loss and maximum possibilities for future growth and consolidation. Creation of durable methods for dealing with uncertainty is critical to the whole process. The uncertainties characteristic of democratic politics are not limitless; rather, they are *institutionalized*. If these incipient democracies are to have any hope of achieving durable legitimacy, structures and operating procedures cannot be uncertain in the same way outcomes are. Legitimacy, in turn, involves commitment to operative

rules that make conflict, change, and conciliation possible without institutional collapse. The central role of dealing with uncertainty is recognized by Przeworski, who describes democracy as a "contingent institutional compromise" (Vol. 3, p. 59). He goes on to note that

> What is possible are institutional agreements, that is, compromises about the institutions that shape prior possibilities of the realization of group-specific interests. If a peaceful transition to democracy is to be possible, the first problem to be solved is how to institutionalize uncertainty without *threatening the interests of those who can still reverse this process*. The solutions to the democratic compromise consist of institutions (Vol. 3, p. 60).

These considerations suggest that transitions are a time for working out basic issues about the character and conduct of public affairs. It is thus not surprising that much early regime-building effort hinges on pacts, agreements, constituent assemblies, and constitution making—all of which provide forums for negotiating the terms of present and future political life. Classic questions of legitimacy and representation surface repeatedly. What makes representation legitimate? What makes legitimacy durable and institutions effective? No clear guidelines or answers are provided in these volumes, but the editors' general stance emerges in the way they distinguish "mere liberalization" from "full democratization."

The broad outlines of this distinction are indicated by Przeworski's call, cited above, for the development of an anti-authoritarian project embracing the totality of social life. Liberalization has more modest goals, and is depicted in these volumes as a combination of loosened restrictions and expanded individual and group rights. Democratization goes beyond conventionally political categories of rights to include "social democracy" and "economic democracy." O'Donnell and Schmitter state that "their simultaneous presence or attainment is what is meant here by 'socialization,' and this remains a powerful hope for many actors" (Vol. 4, p. 12). In this vein, they go on to affirm that "in the contemporary world, these two transitions—to political democracy and to socialism—are simultaneously on the agenda" (Vol. 4, p. 13).

The distinction of liberalization from democratization raises issues of sequence and substance at one and the same time. The editors believe that, in the absence of overwhelming external force, stabilizing a political transition requires leaders to accommodate interests and extend guarantees of protection to property. Such agreements help to pull elements of the old regime out of previous alliances and to assure them that the new democracy poses little threat to their basic interests. This type of accommodation may enhance the survivability of transitional regimes, but the cost can be high. Class and property relations are typically frozen

(Przeworski, Vol. 3, pp. 61-63; O'Donnell and Schmitter, Vol. 4, p. 69), and radical challengers and their programs are effectively made marginal if not eliminated altogether. Movement away from such "limited democracies" toward what the editors see as "more advanced forms" (Vol. 4, pp. 42, 43) is likely to come slowly, "on the installment plan" (Vol. 4, p. 45), with these initial agreements providing a foundation onto which a series of piecemeal reforms can be added.

Arrangements of this kind are well known in the literature. They may be concluded among outgoing and incoming leaders, and also between political challengers, in an effort to control the tenor of post-authoritarian politics, regardless of the wishes of those leaving power.[12] The agreements in question can take many specific forms, ranging from informal understandings about rules of the game to explicit pacts between groups and parties, and formal constitutions. All these pacts, agreements, and rules have a curious status in the *Transitions* series. They are recognized as common, but disliked for the accommodation and deferral of popular interests they entail. Editors and contributors repeatedly suggest that the trade-offs which undergird these arrangements cost more than they are worth (O'Donnell, Vol. 2, pp. 9, 12-13). Accepted as occasionally desirable and possibly necessary in the short term, they are criticized as elitist manipulations, negotiated behind the backs of mass publics.[13] The point is stated most boldly by Terry Karl, who argues that elite pact-making "represents the construction of democracy by antidemocratic means" and is an "inherently antidemocratic form of interest representation" (Vol. 2, pp. 198, 218). The matter is of some moment: as noted earlier, many recent transitions to democracy (including the most durable) are controlled by Center or Center Right coalitions, where the kinds of pacts just described play a significant role. To assume that such experiences are by nature elitist and antidemocratic sidesteps the issue of representation, and avoids the question how elites are linked to mass publics in the first place.

[12] This suggests that O'Donnell and Schmitter may be too quick to see rulers' potential refusal to negotiate as a negative index of the necessity of pacts (Vol. 4, p. 39). Pacts can be negotiated among challengers themselves; in any event, exiting rulers may lack the capacity to enforce agreements insisted upon with great tenacity. In his contribution to Volume 2, Gillespie makes this point for the case of Uruguay. Pacts can cover a wide range of situations, including some in which group interests may be sacrificed indefinitely for the goal of long-term consolidation. A case in point is Togliatti's famous *svolta di Salerno*, which committed Italian communists to work within a liberal political framework. There is an extensive scholarly literature on pacts. In addition to the sources cited in fn. 10, see Brian Barry, "Review Article: Political Accommodation and Consociational Democracy," *British Journal of Political Science* 5 (October 1975), 477-505, and Arend Lijphart's still influential "Consociational Democracy," *World Politics* 21 (January 1969), 207-25.

[13] This sort of critique has become common lately. Another recent example is John Peeler, *Latin American Democracies: Colombia, Costa Rica, Venezuela* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986).

These reflections suggest the need to give classic notions of representation their due, and not to insist on some ultimate test according to which institutions and political systems generally can be democratic only if each component part is egalitarian and democratic. The editors underscore the manipulative and exclusionary character of pacts, but they rarely ask why the political leaders had elite status in the first place. This question would require serious attention to the social foundations of political parties, and to how leaders find roots in the transformations through which parties and other mediating structures emerge and take hold.

Leaders and followers cannot be examined in isolation, but must be grasped through the construction of organized social and political relationships, and through the day-to-day struggle whereby issues are framed and legitimating arguments advanced in concrete societies and social groups. As a practical matter, such links are commonly maintained by political parties, which often manage to retain popular support even in the face of extended repression.[14] But political parties are not much in evidence here. The editors remain content to call for parties "rooted in the popular sector" (Vol. 1, p. 13) while rejecting any particular party that might claim such rootedness through support at the ballot box. Thus, we are left with reified social forces moving at one level, and leaders interacting at another.

These general comments suggest the extent to which many of the central themes in these volumes rest on assumptions about civil society and the role of popular groups. The editors and authors use the concept of civil society to denote the emergence of groups independent of state tutelage and control. Such groups develop and ultimately press claims of collective identity and autonomous action against states and social elites long accustomed to dominate through corporatist or patrimonial manipulations. The editors emphasize that the "resurrection of civil society" (Vol. 4, p. 26) helps to spur and empower transitions to democracy. They also note that the proliferation of popular "spaces" (through new organizations and demands) can force regimes to alter policy agendas and to lay the ground work for more enduring decentralization and democratization (Vol. 4, p. 53). Indeed, civil society is a sufficiently important category here for Schmitter to attribute much of the strength of incipient Southern European democracies to the greater "civicness" of civil society in these cases (Vol. 1, pp. 6-8).

All this makes one look for systematic treatment of specific elements

[14] Cf. Karen Remmer, "Redemocratization and the Impact of Bureaucratic Authoritarian Rule in Latin America," *Comparative Politics* 17 (April 1985), 253-75.

that develop such a life or press such claims. Such studies would have to consider changes in social structure and cultural norms that help create and nurture new groups, and that shape their links to the state and other dominant institutions. They could shed light on the way new ideas are worked out in practice, through the ordinary structuring and routines of group life. Analysis of this kind would be especially welcome now, in view of how rich recent experience is in relevant instances: neighborhood groups, food price protests, churches, human rights networks, mothers' groups, ecological movements, and independent peasant groups and trade unions, to name only a few.[15] But, apart from a handful of case studies (Garretón on Chile is a notable instance), there is very little here. O'Donnell and Schmitter discuss civil society and political change in the concluding volume (Vol. 4, pp. 48-56), but their treatment is too quick and schematic to do more than give a rough overview and broach the subject in general terms. Among the general and comparative chapters, only Cardoso's account of Brazilian entrepreneurs takes up the matter of civil society in concrete terms.

To this point, I have underscored the need to give greater value to the pacts and accommodations typical of liberal democracy. I have also argued for incorporating civil society into analysis in more specific and systematic ways. The tension between these two arguments can be resolved in theory as it is in practice, by close attention to linkages. The editors' criticisms of previous work on "correlates of democracy" (e.g., economic, social, cultural) is generally well taken. But their own inadequate analysis of the linkages between leaders and followers suggests that much remains to be learned from close inspection of the "social bases" of democratic politics—the organized relations among mass publics, social movements and groups, and elements of leadership, motivation, and legitimacy. Without careful attention to these issues, little insight is possible into how democratic life can be built in open systems, why it is valued by elites and average citizens, or the specific ways in which it can be reinforced (or undermined) in daily practice.

These considerations are pertinent to the analysis of pacts. Pacts are possible only where several conditions hold. Leaders must want to make them happen. They also need to trust one another to respect any agreements reached. Such desire and trust often come only as a result of learning from bitter failures in the past. Although inter-elite agreement is nec-

[15] Cf. the studies collected in Susan Eckstein, ed., *Power and Popular Protest: Latin American Social Movements* (Berkeley: University of California Press, forthcoming 1988); Scott Mainwaring and Eduardo Viola, "New Social Movements, Political Culture, and Democracy: Brazil and Argentina in the 1980s," *Telos*, No. 61 (Fall 1984), 17-52; and Richard Sklar, "Developmental Democracy," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 29 (October 1987), 686-714.

essary, it is not a sufficient condition. Leaders must also be able to brir their followers along, convincing them that pacts are worthwhile, ar that short-term sacrifices are necessary for long-term institutional su vival. The whole package works only if elites and popular groups a linked in mutually valued and enduring ways. Of course, the ties betwee leaders and followers are neither inevitable nor automatic. They refle continuous organizational effort, a measure of accountability, and parti ipation by popular sectors in ways that grant legitimacy to the leade whose actions and stated goals resonate with their own needs and asp rations.

In this regard, the editors' concern for democracy and democratizatic isolates a real problem, but poses the issue in misleading terms. As c Tocqueville pointed out, the lessons learned, the skills acquired, and th habits developed in one sphere of life can spill over to shape perceptic and action elsewhere.[16] But the process cannot be grasped in abstra terms. For analysis to have any hope of accuracy or completeness, it is v tal to deal with real people, not simply "the people." To say that analys must deal with real people affirms neither voluntarism nor some extrem form of methodological individualism. Rather, it underscores the need t address how specific groups continuously renegotiate their ties to dom nant institutions, and in the process rework their understanding of wh these relations are all about and what, if anything, makes them legit mate. Such analysis would put human agents at the center of attentio and address particular issues like class, injustice, exploitation, or equalit as they are worked through by real people in concrete historical circum stances. An excellent recent example of this kind of study is James Scott *Weapons of the Weak*, which shows in fine detail that legitimacy, acqu escence, and resistance come in many forms.[17] As Scott demonstrates, vc

[16] A concrete instance much stressed by de Tocqueville is the relation of associational li to politics. He argued that experience in political associations gave Americans habits, skill and models of proper action that they then put to use in other walks of life, thereby givir political democracy a firm base in everyday discourse and action. For this reason, he saw th art of association as "the mother of all action," and described political associations as "larg free schools, where all the members of the community go to learn the general theory of asso ciation" (de Tocqueville, fn. 9, pp. 139-40).

The title given to Chapter 9 of the first volume of *Democracy in America* is suggestive: "Th Laws Contribute More to the Maintenance of the Democratic Republic in the United Stat Than Do the Physical Circumstances of the Country, and Mores Do More than Laws." B "mores," de Tocqueville meant to denote much of what is considered here under the rubri of civil society: manners and styles of social interaction, patterns of family life, prevailin norms about hierarchy, equality, and authority, and the mutually reinforcing links betwee civil and political associations.

[17] Scott, *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance* (New Haven: Yale Uni versity Press, 1985). See in particular Scott's discussions of the need to put human agents a the center of analysis (pp. 41-47), of ideology and ideological work (pp. 184-240), and of th concept of hegemony (pp. 304-50).

cabularies of class or democratization do not exhaust the possibilities of understanding, motivation, or action.

III

Limitations of space preclude detailed assessment of the individual essays, but a few points may nonetheless be noted. The specific case studies vary enormously in time frame, scope of coverage, and core issues. They run the gamut from vast, generalizing analyses of change around the Mediterranean (Giner) to detailed accounts of a democracy's genesis and subsequent consolidation (Diamandouros on Greece, Gillespie on Uruguay). Some of the strongest contributions (Cavarozzi on Argentina, Maxwell on Portugal, Cotler on Peru) are distinctly Linzian in tone. This means that they look closely at the independent role that political variables—such as effective leadership, organizational strength or weakness, ideology, and specific institutional configurations—play in determining political outcomes. Others (Karl on Venezuela, Martins on Brazil) hold more or less to the dependence paradigm, stressing the critical part of class interests and economic constraints and opportunities in the transition to democracy.

There is, understandably, much concern with change and transformation. Occasionally this leads to creative and useful analyses. A case in point is Cavarozzi's chapter on Argentine political cycles, which illuminates the reasons for that nation's many political failures and shows how each failure changed the subsequent balance of forces and outlooks. In other studies, change appears more as movement from one stable point to another than as a process of continuing conflict and struggle. This static vision emerges most clearly in Martins's chapter on Brazil, which presents the fact of change within authoritarian regimes as a major discovery. Only a handful of contributors stick to the editors' general themes (Sunar and Sayari on Turkey, Maravall and Santamaria on Spain), while others (Middlebrook on Mexico) are simply straightforward (though well-done) descriptive accounts of recent political history.

As noted earlier, the conceptual move from dependence to democratization entails a shift in levels of analysis, away from global or regional elements and toward enhanced concern with the play of forces within national societies. Indeed, Whitehead argues that in recent transitions, local political forces have operated with "an untypically high degree of autonomy" (Vol. 3, pp. 4-5). This new emphasis on internal forces and contexts underscores the role leaders play in shaping alternatives, managing crises, and putting creative solutions together, rather than passively awaiting the

operation of automatic forces or the arrival of marching order abroad.

The editors' concern with political variables and intranational forc welcome, but on the evidence presented here, external influences may underplayed. For example, Italy's democratic consolidation was clear guaranteed by Allied military occupation, leaving only the details of r gime form to be decided.[18] Military events also played a decisive role i discrediting authoritarian regimes in Greece, Portugal, and Argentin Other relevant external forces include the allure (and conditions) c membership in the E.E.C., the role of organizations like the Socialist In ternational (detailed by Whitehead), and the economic disasters that con vinced several Latin American militaries to quit office in as good order a they could manage. These reflections suggest that the issue is not so mucl internal versus external forces as why and how alternatives take the forn they do in given societies. Although the editors have apparently come over time, to value the autonomy of internal politics, they remain unsat isfied with the outcomes. They are also unwilling to draw the obvious les sons from experience: that conservative transitions are more durable, tha it is wise to avoid polarization wherever possible, that the left rarely ha massive electoral support, and that popular groups often value civil lib erties and political democracy as much as they prize issues of equity o redistribution.[19]

## IV

Why does liberal democracy appear to be so little loved by these ob servers despite its apparent vigor and popular backing? Why is it so ofter accepted only with grudging ill grace, as "mere liberalization," "bour geois," "semi-," "quasi-," or "restricted" democracy, to be distinguishe at every turn from a supposedly truer and more pervasive "democrati zation"? The matter has complex theoretical roots that stem from how the editors define the task at hand, and also from their view of what the ory is all about in the first place.

The studies collected in *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy* focus more on conjunctures and moments of transition than on the dynamic characteristics of any system in particular. A mo-

[18] In a similar vein, it seems at the very least inadequate to attribute postwar restoration of French democracy to the effects of "armed struggle" (Vol. 1, p. 14).

[19] Cf. Paul Cammack and Philip O'Brien, *Generals in Retreat* (Manchester, U.K.: Manchester University Press, 1985); Cammack, "Democratisation: A Review of the Issues," *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 4 (No. 2, 1985), 39-46; Juan Rial, "The Uruguayan Elections of 1984: A Triumph of the Center," in Drake and Silva (fn. 2), 245-72.

nt's reflection suggests how curious it is to pretend to study "prospects ·· democracy" without serious consideration of democracy itself. A focus on transitions alone is unlikely to get to the heart of the matter. Complete understanding requires that transitions be set in the larger context of democracy's social, economic, cultural, and institutional bases. Only then can the relation between transitions and the possibilities for subsequent democratic politics be elaborated in full and convincing fashion. But, as we have seen, little of this is done. Inadequate specification of civil society and the marginalization of political parties are especially crippling in this regard.

Part of the problem grows from a commitment to critical theory that undergirds the *Transitions* volumes. According to this general position, theory must do more than just clarify and sort out causes, effects, and relationships. Such a position would leave reality unchallenged and unchanged. In contrast, a critical theory is committed to change and provides social agents with theoretical tools for understanding and altering conditions of oppression. Dependency theory has long stressed the need for practical critical action and the importance of remaining open to alternatives beyond those visible in any given situation.[20] Commitment to a critical vision of theory puts the *Transition* editors in a quandary. They hope to grasp the dynamics of transitions and subsequent "prospects for democracy," but pay little heed to democracy as a coherent political system. They are unhappy with the outcomes democracies produce, and consistently look beyond existing or likely democracies to better alternatives—presumably some form of socialism. They echo Przeworski's warning against undue romanticization of liberal democracy, but fail to recognize their own romanticization of popular groups or to see the danger of attributing support for radical alternatives to such groups in an automatic way.

Without a more adequate concept of democracy, the whole effort stalls. A purportedly critical theory is self-defeating if it cannot address the operative principles of a system. It is not enough to state preferences for democracy; any social or political theory or body of explanation that claims to study and promote democracy must articulate concepts that

[20] As one classic formulation has it, verification of this theory

> depends on the capacity of social movements to implement what are perceived as structural possibilities [which in turn depend on] real social and political struggle. So the "demonstration" of an interpretation . . . depends to some extent on its own ability to show socio-political actors the possible solutions to contradictory situations.

Fernando H. Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, *Dependence and Development* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), xiv.

make effective action within political structures possible, even if only to change them. Machiavelli observed that "men always commit the error of not knowing where to limit their hopes, and by trusting to these rather than to a just measure of their resources, they are generally ruined."[31] The point holds as much for theories of politics as for politics itself. There are simply too many theoretical and empirical gaps in the *Transitions* volumes for analysis or prescription to be of much help. The difficulty lies not in a lack of will, but in a weak concept of democracy.

The editors and many of the contributors seem to consider the major motivation behind transitions to democracy to be fear and a healthy respect for opponents. Although these are important, they are insufficient to explain the commitments to institutionalized compromise, accommodation, and mutual guarantees typical of democratic political systems. Reading through these volumes, one would (with rare exceptions) have no idea of why or how democracy as an ideal has inspired generations of political struggle to get it started and make it last. There is much conflict in these pages and lots of tactical maneuvering, but little passion or commitment. But reducing democracy to the temporary outcome of uncertainty and stalemate short-changes the people who have fought so long and hard in so many times and places to turn it from hope into reality. Those who treat democracy as little more than the absence of negatives forget that there is no democracy without democrats, at least not for very long.

[31] Machiavelli, *The Discourses* (New York: Random House, 1950), Second Book, chap. xxvii, p. 378.

# A SEARCH FOR IDENTITY: The "German Question" in Atlantic Alliance Relations

By JOYCE MARIE MUSHABEN

James A. Cooney, Gordon A. Craig, Hans-Peter Schwarz, and Fritz Stern, eds., *The Federal Republic of Germany and the United States—Changing Political, Social and Economic Relations*. Boulder, CO, and London: Westview Press, 1984, 253 pp.
Gregory Flynn and Hans Rattinger, eds., *The Public and Atlantic Defense*. Totowa, NJ, and London: Rowman & Allanheld, 1985, 398 pp.
Eberhard Schulz and Peter Danylow, *Bewegung in der deutschen Frage? Die ausländischen Besorgnisse über die Entwicklung in den beiden deutschen Staaten* [Movement in the German question? International apprehensions regarding developments in the two German states]. Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 1984, 166 pp.
Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Die gezähmten Deutschen. Von der Machtbesessenheit zur Machtvergessenheit* [The tamed Germans: From power as obsession to power in abeyance]. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1985, 191 pp.
Werner Weidenfeld, ed., *Die Identität der Deutschen* [The identity of the Germans]. Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1983, 355 pp.

## I. Redefining the German Question

PRESIDENT Richard von Weizsäcker of the German Federal Republic observed in conjunction with the 40th anniversary of the collapse of the Third Reich that "a question does not simply cease to exist because no one has an answer for it, especially when the state of affairs is such that it keeps raising the question anew."[1] What, exactly, constitutes the core of the German question? The countries of Europe, including the two Germanys, have managed to avoid the ravages of war for four decades. Both the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic have assumed positions of political and economic preeminence within their respective blocs. As separate entities, they have cultivated a degree of internal security and social solidarity never before witnessed in German history. Other industrial states look to German economic and technological achievements in the postwar era with a mixture of respect, envy,

[1] Von Weizsäcker, *Die deutsche Geschichte geht weiter* [German history goes on] (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1985), 8. Unless noted otherwise, all translations are by the present author.

and—inevitably—trepidation. Does the problem of a resurgent *furor teutonicus*, capable of reinflicting its insatiable quest for power and *Lebensraum* on the weaker states of Europe, exist mainly in the minds of the beholders? Does the current constellation of political, economic, and military forces dictate that what was and is conceivably good for the Germans is and will necessarily remain bad for everyone else?

The posture of conscious ambivalence manifested by members of both the Eastern and Western camps since at least the early 1980s is due in part to the general uncertainty as to what the Germans really want, either in the short or the long run. This uncertainty does not preclude other international actors from making assumptions about what the two states should and could aspire to after forty years of division. Neither the uncertainty nor the corresponding assumptions reflect the extent to which the German question has been transformed over the last decade-and-a-half, largely as a result of *Ostpolitik* developments initiated by then-Chancellor Willy Brandt. But the very success of earlier *Ostpolitik* and *Deutschlandpolitik* initiatives in reducing the tensions between the FRG and the GDR has created domestic demands for a "pacification" of the two Germanys that balance-of-power advocates also find unsettling. Improvements in FRG-GDR relations have, moreover, given birth to a set of political paradoxes that compel the German states themselves to adopt a posture of conscious ambivalence regarding their common "future perspectives."

*The* German question has been transformed into *many* German questions whose resolution depends upon a number of ostensibly contradictory or mutually exclusive prerequisites. In order to comprehend what it is that the Germans could possibly want and reasonably hope to attain by way of collective security policies, I have devised an analytical framework consisting of four paradoxes. These paradoxes reflect the inconsistent, if not irreconcilable, nature of prevailing political visions, official state policies, and the collective *modus vivendi* determining the West German role in the Atlantic Alliance. Although I recognize that the German Democratic Republic constitutes at least half of the equation, this essay's emphasis on the Atlantic Alliance precludes more than summary references to the paradoxes evolving "over there."

The analyses presented in the volumes under review are representative of the different paradoxes that emerge—depending on which German questions are posed and which are accorded priority by forces inside and outside the two Germanys. For simplicity's sake, I will ascribe a single paradox to each of four works cited above, using the fifth to frame my conclusions; that is not to deny the importance of cross-cutting arguments

and interactive effects, however. The four paradoxes may be described as follows: (1) the nation/state identity paradox; (2) the reunification/integration paradox; (3) the stability/security paradox; and (4) the lessons of history/normalcy paradox. Although each deserves serious consideration by other members of NATO, not all call for decisive action on the part of the collective security system. Of the four, the stability/security paradox appears to be the most salient, raising the more problematic issues with regard to future Atlantic Alliance relations. Certain courses of action that might have been pursued three decades earlier to alleviate contradictory German stability and security needs have lost their relevance (for example, reunification through neutralization, as proposed in the Stalin Note of 1952). New approaches, better suited to a possible shift in the prevailing security paradigm, have yet to be devised.[2] An assessment of the significance of the German question thus transformed, and possible reverberations in the larger field of East-West relations, will be reserved for the concluding section of the essay.

On the premise that the transformation of the German question is largely the result of dramatic changes that have occurred in the domestic and global political-economic and geostrategic environments since the end of World War II, it may be useful to summarize the more important of these changes before examining each paradox. What factors or developments are responsible for a renaissance of interest in a pan-Germanism that is not yet clearly defined but nonetheless hotly debated? From the Germans' perspective, two significant changes have *not* come to pass: first, "the Six," then "the Nine" (and probably "the Twelve") member-states have failed to bring about the permanent, supranational integration of Europe foreseen by the founding fathers of the Common Market. Especially among the younger generations, the European Community is more likely to be perceived as a bureaucratic monolith in its own right rather than as an alternative to the regulation, hierarchy, and ineffective use of resources found within the national boundaries. Second, deterrence strategies and protracted arms control negotiations have failed to eradicate the sources of antipathy and distrust between nations. Recent NATO and Warsaw Pact modernizations have not succeeded in providing the ultimate clients of their respective alliance systems with a sense of more rather than less security—although the Geneva and Reykjavik

[2] Among those who have long hinted that such a shift in paradigms may be occurring are Donald Puchala and Stuart I. Fagan, "International Politics in the 1970's: The Search for a Perspective," *International Organization* 28 (Spring 1974), reprinted in Ray Maghroori and Bennett Ramberg, eds., *Globalism versus Realism: International Relations' Third Debate* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982), 37-56.

summits have raised new hopes that arms reductions are possible if not imminent.

In addition to these non-developments, five changes *have* occurred that also appear to have contributed to a renewed interest in the German question. First, under the labels of interdependence and postindustrialism, the nation-state has lost many of its traditional functions—only to acquire new ones that are often more difficult to balance and to fulfill.[3] The state's former capacity for imposing internal order and regulating relations between its own people and those of other systems has been undermined by a democratic commitment to self-determination, rising educational levels, and a corresponding increase in citizen demands, combined with the advent of mass communication and popular access to international travel, among other things. The state's ability to determine the character of its economy and define its culture has been superseded by the reality of transnational investment and production and the inescapable influences of Coca-Cola, McDonalds, blue jeans, and "Dallas." Moreover, because of bipolarization and nuclear armaments, the nation-state's power to secure its sovereignty and its survival by means of bilateral and regional defense accords has been rendered more or less symbolic. The new functions of the state focus on expanded responsibilities for citizens' welfare and the negotiation of conditions at the international level that pertain ever more directly to citizens' livelihood, such as the reduction of unemployment based on export competition, or the avoidance of future Chernobyls.

The 1970s witnessed a reemphasis on the importance of national interests in the wake of resource shortages and rapid fluctuations in the international climate, as manifested, for example, in protectionist trends and in the expansion of the French *force de frappe*. No state wishes to make its ability to survive completely dependent upon the goodwill of the collective, especially in the event of a serious deterioration in East-West or superpower relations. By the end of the 1970s, a second development gathered momentum, involving a growing consciousness of (and dissatisfaction with) the lack of symmetry between the reality of West German *economic* strength and influence, on the one hand, and the artificial limi-

[3] Two German scholars attempting to redefine the functions of the nation-state are Peter Alter, *Nationalismus* [Nationalism] (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1985), and Reinhard Kühnl, *Nation, Nationalismus, Nationale Frage* [Nation, nationalism, national question] (Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein Verlag, 1986). Diverse positions in the American debate over whether or not "interdependence" is on the rise are represented by Peter Katzenstein, ed., *Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979); Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Power and Interdependence* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977); and Richard N. Rosecrance and Arthur Stein, "Interdependence: Myth or Reality?" *World Politics* 26 (October 1973), 1-27.

tations upon the FRG's exercise of *political* power in regional and international affairs, on the other.[4] This rejection of a longstanding "political dwarf/economic giant" characterization goes hand in hand with West Germany's evolving interest in wielding greater influence abroad: both can be interpreted as a sign of normalization and of the FRG's coming of political age under a set of firmly established liberal-democratic institutions.

Third, after forty years of unquestioning loyalty to the Alliance, the West Germans have begun to voice the expectation that they have earned a more sympathetic hearing with regard to their unique security plight. They seek more active support for their efforts to alleviate the human costs (that is, the separation of families) associated with the ongoing division of Europe.[5] In light of the disproportionately heavy risks now associated with the collective security requirements to which they "voluntarily" ascribe, they would like to be appreciated rather than feared.

A fourth, generation-linked value change is becoming evident among the younger, better-educated segments of the population that are no longer inclined toward uncritical acceptance of American dominance in European affairs. The U.S. image has changed in Europe; in part, this is due to the different attitudes of Americans toward Europe, and in part to the Europeans' altered assessment of themselves and their capacity for independent diplomatic action. Europe's changing perceptions of the United States, in particular, have precipitated a crisis of confidence among the Western allies, bolstered by military-technological developments that render a decoupling of American and European/German security interests possible if not probable. Finally, popular acceptance of *Ostpolitik* and the politics of negotiation seem to be irreversibly entrenched in the FRG, geared toward improving relations with "the other Germany." Detente constitutes an important plank in the platform of all four parliamentary parties. Treaties, accords, and negotiations between the two Germanys have acquired a dynamic of their own; concrete gains

[4] Though not exactly "mainstream," one politician who has occasionally been quite vocal in this regard is Bavarian Minister-President Franz-Josef Strauss. The view that Bonn is compelled to play a world-political role but is denied that which would enable it to do so is presented by Ernst-Otto Czempiel, "Die Bundesrepublik—Eine heimliche Grossmacht?" [The Federal Republic—A secret superpower?] in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* B26/79 (June 1979), 3-19.

[5] Such sentiments are expressed most directly in the context of major diplomatic gaffes, usually on the part of the United States. One fairly notorious example involved Richard Perle, then Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security. In an interview with an Osnabrück newspaper in mid-December 1986, Perle unleashed a bevy of protests in conservative as well as in liberal and left circles by suggesting that Bonn curtail its special loans and credits to the G.D.R. in order to increase its financial contributions to NATO. *Der Spiegel* 52, December 22, 1986, pp. 28-29.

will not be traded lightly for abstract promises by alliance partners. support for rapprochement has remained stable through good-a[illegible] weather periods in East-West relations.[6]

Although many of these changes were rooted in the policies [illegible] SPD-FDP coalition (1969-1982), the trends have thus far persisted u[illegible] Chancellor Kohl's Christian-Liberal government. Still, all of the d[illegible] opments and non-developments cited above offer only partial expla[illegible] tions as to why the German question has been transformed, and why [illegible] making its way back onto the European political agenda. More importa[illegible] for our purposes is how the various German questions have been mod[illegible] fied, and how they relate to each other.

## II. The Nation/State Identity Paradox

For those bold enough to enter the historical thicket of German nationalism, Werner Weidenfield's edited volume provides a politically provocative and critically self-reflective overview of the many paths to be taken in search of the German identity. The definition of identity applied throughout these essays by prominent (and predominantly) German academics rests upon Erik Erikson's concept of a reciprocal relationship between a permanent, self-contained consciousness and a continuous, if partial, participation in a collective, group-specific orientation (p. 18). The array of topics covered in fifteen separate analyses is consistent with Weidenfeld's threefold aim: to treat the past and the present more or less equally as constituent elements of the German identity; to balance the negative against the positive aspects of the German character in its various developmental phases; and to allow for the interplay of three potentially competitive identities, rooted in the Federal Republic, the German Democratic Republic, and the all-German nation, respectively.

The specific German question addressed in this work can be broken down into three points of inquiry. The first—what do the Germans really want?—is easily answered in the form of a generally accepted proposition: they are searching for a new identity that will liberate them from the pre-1945 profile of the "guilty Nazi" and the postwar image of "vassals" in an occupied state.[7] The second and third queries—namely, which identity do they mean, and what shall comprise its substance? and why do they need it, and what will they do with it?—find no definitive answer either among these authors or within the Federal Republic at large. Con-

[6] Richard Löwenthal, "The German Question Transformed," *Foreign Affairs* 63 (Winter 1984-85), 313.

[7] *Ibid.*, 302.

imperatives introduced in 1949, when juxtaposed against the ealities of the 1970s and 1980s, give rise to the nation/state iden- dox that renders these questions unanswerable in either the short long run.

e parameters of the nation/state identity paradox are specified by Preamble to the West Germany *Grundgesetz* (Basic Law) that serves the provisional constitution until that day when it shall be replaced by e "freely decided upon" by all Germans, not just those residing in the western zones [Article 146/GG]. Eberhard Schulz has noted, however, that the imperative contained in the Preamble is in fact addressed to *das deutsche Volk*, not to the government of the Federal Republic. Moreover, it does not specify the eventual creation of a unified set of state institutions. The emphasis falls not on unity *per se* but on "unity in freedom."[8] Looking to the once-and-future nation, the Federal Republic is not free to cultivate an identity in the form of self-contained state consciousness that would be more deep-seated than mere system-affect, for fear of overriding or excluding the prospects for a new national consciousness. Yet, Willy Brandt's formula for "two states in one nation," when coupled with Egon Bahr's prescription for *Wandel durch Annäherung* (a "moving closer" to East Germany intended to produce in the GDR the internal changes necessary to allow for the free determination of a new, shared constitution), implies that citizens of the Federal Republic would have to identify first with their own state as a stepping stone to an eventual identification with the other, and thence, with the reunified nation.[9]

The GDR, having largely disassociated itself from the fascist past, has avoided the nation/state identity paradox by assuming a more positive orientation toward its own nationhood. In a concerted effort to legitimize its own existence internally by elevating its status in the court of other nation-states, it dropped its 1968 title of "socialist state of the German nation" in 1974, and redesignated itself "the socialist German nation-state." The past ten years have witnessed a conscious attempt on the part of the

[8] The German word *Volk* is a much more holistic or organic concept than its English translation "folk" or "people" would imply; I therefore prefer to use the original. For a further elaboration of the Preamble, see Eberhard Schulz, *Die deutsche Nation in Europa. Internationale und historische Dimensionen* [The German nation in Europe: International and historical dimensions] (Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 1982), 166ff.

[9] The formulation of "two states in Germany" was first used by Brandt in his Inaugural Address (October 28, 1969) and elaborated as the two-states-in-one-nation theme in his Report on the Condition of the Nation to the West German Bundestag (January 14, 1970). Bahr introduced the concept of *Wandel durch Annäherung* in his Lecture at the Evangelical Academy in Tützingen (July 15, 1963). Relevant excerpts from all three addresses are reprinted in Peter Brandt and Herbert Ammon, eds., *Die Linke und die nationale Frage. Dokumente zur deutschen Einheit seit 1945* [The Left and the national question: Documents on German unity since 1945] (Reinbeck bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1981), 302-5, 235-40.

SED's leadership to "de-Germanize" its half of the former Reich by ı placing the adjective *deutsch* with the label *DDR-national* in the names various organizations and publications.[10] Constitutional and statutory ı visions undertaken in 1974 were part of a bold campaign to confront t problem head-on with the formula, "citizenship: GDR; nationality: Gı man." While the leadership may have escaped the identity paradox at t official level, it is nonetheless a long way from resolving the split imaį double life and non-identification problems witnessed at the grassro level, as illustrated in the chapters by Rudolph and Grunenberg.

It is conceivable that national reunification need not be structured terms of "blood, soil, and iron," or a shared set of governing institutio with mutually binding political processes and policies. Its longstandi *Abgrenzung* (demarcation) policy notwithstanding, the East Germ leadership is suddenly rediscovering a common history, rehabilitating t likes of Luther, Bismarck, and even Frederick the Great. Is there a ne constitutionally permissible German identity waiting to be forged with the framework of a "culture-nation" as opposed to a "state-nation"? T image becomes no clearer with this distinction. The historical treatmer in the Weidenfeld volume by von Thadden, Bussmann, Stürmer, v Bredow, and Rovan illustrate that the German *Volk* needs to know whe it has come from in order to determine where it is going. But the retu to a common historical foundation provides no guarantee that a divid people will interpret this history in the same light or derive common le sons for the future. "For the Germans of the GDR," von Thadden not "the Reformation took place in Wittenberg, for the Germans of the FR in Worms; [it is] only unfortunate that in both cities it was the same L ther" (p. 57). Reliance on the culture-nation concept alone results "commonality without identity" (p. 84).

The Federal Republic is thus left to its own devices. Three contributc to the Weidenfeld volume, Rausch, von Krockow, and Mommsen, asce tain that the West German identity is in flux—or at least, that the poli cal consciousness and social values seem to be. But are these not the co elements of a new, FRG-national identity that Schweigler discerned ov a decade ago?[11] What becomes of the "two states in one nation" min one state (the GDR)? Are we left with one state plus one nation, or do v get two nations in the longer run? Weidenfeld's prognosis is that the Gı mans will learn to live with an identity of many layers, and that separa FRG- and GDR- "state consciousnesses" will move into the foregroun

[10] Schulz (fn. 8), 409.

[11] Gebhard Schweigler, *National Consciousness in a Divided Germany* (Beverly Hills, C Sage, 1975).

the desire for self-determination will persist, as will the diffuse, psychological support for the reunification mandate found in the Basic Law. The Preamble functions as a *Bekenntnis ohne Bedürfnis*—a profession of faith, not a call to action.[12] The national consciousness will consist of a "passionless" but nonetheless stable acceptance of democratic values and institutions. The new "homeland feeling" will be more social than nationalistic.

In sum, the nation/state identity paradox requires no immediate action: the passage of time will provide the ultimate resolution. The Federal Republic is less "provisional" than the rhetoric of politicians implies. Those who would argue that reunification remains the charge for later generations no longer find a positive echo among the public, for "the FRG is accepted by her citizens as their state."[13] What the population actually perceives as open is not the all-German, but the inter-German question: "How the relationship of the Germans in the two German states to each other is to be shaped, that is the question that currently and intensely moves these human beings, not the question of a new state formation."[14]

The Federal Republic by itself is unable and unwilling to pursue "the special German way" against which Hättich, Hassner, and Sontheimer caution in the Weidenfeld book. The possibility that the two Germanys *together* might embark upon a special course—for example, in search of neutralism—is fraught with even more contradictions and qualifications against which the complexity of the nation/state paradox begins to pale. After all, the German question "is not the property of the Germans" (p. 84).

## III. The Reunification/Integration Paradox

The German question is, and in fact always has been, a European question. Both questions became an American responsibility as a matter of military necessity rather than by virtue of political choice. Emerging relatively unscathed from the devastation of World War II, the United States "in a splendid act of practical, self-serving idealism," established

[12] Schulz (fn. 8), 186. More recent survey results show a striking majority in favor of maintaining the Preamble in its present form. Noelle-Neumann found 79% for, 7% against in October-November, 1983. See Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, "Im Wartesaal der Geschichte. Bleibt das Bewusstsein der deutschen Einheit lebendig?" [In the waiting room of history: Does the consciousness of German unity still live?], in Werner Weidenfeld, ed., *Nachdenken über Deutschland. Materialien zur politischen Kultur der deutschen Frage* [Reflections on Germany: Materials on the political culture of the German question] (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1985), 137.

[13] Schulz (fn. 8), 175.

[14] *Ibid.*

the Marshall Plan and related assistance mechanisms to secure the rapid economic reconstruction of a liberal-democratic Europe (Stern, in Cooney et al., 237). American support for moves toward the creation of a United States of Europe was grounded in the twofold belief, first, that a Germany thus integrated would be a Germany democratized and demilitarized; and second, that a recovered Europe would assume ever more responsibility for its own defense while providing a growing, cooperative market for the disposition of American exports. What developed instead was a Europe that has remained militarily dependent while becoming economically ever more competitive.

Cooney's study of relations between the Federal Republic and the United States, considered in the larger context of European-American relations, is a story of mutual disappointment and cultural estrangement. This compilation of essays summarizes the deliberations of some forty social theorists and political practitioners invited by the Woodrow Wilson Center in 1983 to examine the growing divergencies in economic policies and security preferences as a function of value changes that have begun to occur on both sides of the Atlantic. A sense of undefined urgency underlies their collective appeal for a search for policy alternatives to sustain and strengthen the "special relationship" that is seen to exist between the FRG and the U.S.

Gordon Craig argues that what is special about this relationship is not only the fact that it has lasted some 300 years. Historically, Germans and Americans have both been considered "outsiders" (the latter by choice); they developed a sense of "exceptionalism" and came to manifest a certain xenophobia vis-à-vis Europe. In recent years, both have been plagued by a crisis of confidence in their respective economic miracles, as discussed in the chapters by Cooney and Jones. The essays by Löwenthal and Moltmann emphasize that America's national "identity" (as well as its image abroad) has been shaken in recent years by the traumatic experiences of Vietnam and Iran. While the Federal Republic and the United States share a forty-year commitment to the preservation of the free market and to military containment, the differences in their preferred styles and strategies for pursuing these goals have now moved into the foreground. Their respective searches for identity and for a return to power appear to be leading them in substantially different directions.

The German question as a European question that emerges in this context is multidimensional in character: What are the specific political, economic, and security prerequisites that must be met in order to permit the eventual reunification of Germany? The fact that the official pronouncements refer more frequently to *Einheit* (unity) than to *Wieder-*

*vereinigung* (reunification) raises the corollary question: What does the Federal Republic really want from the United States as a means of enhancing its prospects for overcoming the postwar division?

Many intellectuals and politicians preoccupied with the question of national unity are fond of repeating that "Germany is divided because Europe is divided."[15] But that is only one of *two* main reasons underlying the German division. The breakdown in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union that resulted in the formation of the NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances, along with the overarching ideological conflict between East and West, must bear the responsibility for the official creation and maintenance of two separate German states. But, as emphasized in von Weizsäcker's eloquent appeal, it is not the *end* of the war that provided the catalyst for division. The source of the many human hardships facing the peoples of both states in the postwar era "lies in the beginning of that regime of violence that led to war. We cannot separate the 8th of May, 1945, from the 30th of January, 1933."[16]

German was divided to ensure its denazification, its democratization, and its pacification; there was little agreement between the competing occupational powers of East and West as to the best strategy for achieving these objectives. By 1955, divided Germany had become the symbol as well as the stage for a dramatic heightening of tensions between the superpowers. Much of the confusion and controversy over the "openness" of the German question now stems from the emphasis placed by different actors, at different times, on one or the other of the reasons for the existence of the two Germanys. This confusion is manifested in the paradoxical conditions set down for German reunification within the framework of European integration.

The reunification/integration paradox has its origins in the incomplete nature of the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements. The lack of a final peace treaty and the collective nature of four-power responsibility during the occupation years kept the dream of reunification alive for the inhabitants of "the zones." But the deeper the division became between the superpowers, the more committed to Western values the Federal Republic appeared to be; and the more actively prepared the Germans were to accept the necessity of a defense contribution of their own, "the sooner the Western powers could tolerate their claimed right to reunification, even in contractual terms, 1952-1954."[17] Germany cannot hope to reunify with-

[15] See, *inter alia*, von Weizsäcker (fn. 1), and Schulz (fn. 8).

[16] Richard von Weizsäcker, "Gedenkstunde des Deutschen Bundestages zum 40. Jahrestag der Beendigung des zweiten Weltkrieges" [Commemoration by the German Parliament on the 40th anniversary of the end of World War II], *Europa Archiv* 40 (No. 10, May 1985), 265.

[17] Schulz (fn. 8), 159.

out the active support of its European neighbors and without the concurrence of the Soviet Union. (Official U.S. policy allows the FRG to presume American support.) The more thoroughly integrated the Federal Republic strives to become in the West European Community, the more it expects to win trust and support for its efforts to move closer to the GDR. One should recall, however, that it was France's desire *not* to see Germany reunited that led to de Gaulle's early push for European integration. Furthermore, the more institutionalized and permanent the FRG's commitment to the West, the more unacceptable her efforts to integrate or combine with the GDR will become to the countries of Eastern Europe, such as Poland.

A thirty-year identification with the European Community has complicated, if not strained, the Federal Republic's ties to the United States, whose approval and security guarantee are absolutely essential to the FRG's desire to avoid an "integration by force" with the East. What the West Germans ostensibly seek from the United States is an end to the further "Americanization" of their economy and culture—the loudest demands being posed by the peace and "alternative" movements that are criticized sharply by Schwarz (for example, p. 65). This is paralleled by the call for a halt to the Europeanization of the political and economic costs for security-related policies no longer viewed as sensitive to German interests. The U.S. has responded with hurt surprise to (alleged) manifestations of anti-Americanism, especially in the FRG; yet it overlooks the adverse impact of its own "seemingly erratic impositions of egocentrism" on the European economies, e.g., in the form of high interest rates and protectionist measures, as described by Jochimsen and Biedenkopf (Cooney et al., 148ff). The fact that the Federal Republic remains "a net importer of security" imposes other domestic economic costs as well, according to Joffe and May (p. 181). Schlesinger admits that American fears of an ultimate Soviet takeover are probably no more realistic or unrealistic than European watchfulness-mixed-with-faith that the economic enticements growing out of the detente era will subdue the "hordes of Soviet manpower" (p. 227). Stern warns that Bonn should not be forced to choose either between the United States and Europe or between Western Europe and German-German rapprochement. The trick is to find strategies that permit as much congruence as possible, as much diversity as necessary. Finally, the United States is exhorted to adopt a more flexible response to the change in European economic interests and security preferences.

The attainment of economic stability based on liberal market principles and an unshakable commitment to democratic institutions are but

wo of the prerequisites West Germany must fulfill if the Preamble is ·ver to become a political reality. Inevitably, however, the reestablish- nent of national unity will only become possible "when it appears to the ;ermans and all other powers who determine the fate of Europe to be ess dangerous than the maintenance of division."[18] In other words, not ·ven time will resolve this paradox—until East-West antagonisms are )ermanently laid to rest.

## IV. The Stability/Security Paradox

Nowhere are the differences between American and European needs .nd interests more apparent than in the area of military and strategic de- ense policy. While a majority of West German political, industrial, and nilitary elites continues to support nuclear deterrence as the best defense gainst possible Soviet aggression, a critical, vociferous segment of the )ublic has shifted in favor of detente and disarmament as the key to Eu- opean security.[19] As inconsistent and sporadic as its involvement in for- ign policy deliberations has been since the 1950s, the often uninformed )ublic has emerged as a participant in and an object of current national ecurity debates. This was nowhere more evident than during the "hot utumn of 1983" when peace movement organizers succeeded in mobi- izing an estimated two to three million demonstrators and sympathizers n opposition to the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles.

The ostensible "demobilization" that followed in the wake of actual leployments suggests, however, that the public's role in these debates has 'et to stabilize; as a result, the policy maker's role becomes more compli- ated. On the one hand, the political leadership bears responsibility for 'designing and pursuing defense and security policies that promise to be ·ffective according to established military and strategic criteria, while si- nultaneously taking into account new realities of the social context sur- ounding national security. . . ." On the other hand, it cannot ignore a )ossible erosion of public support for the Atlantic Alliance, which holds deep implications regarding the process of legitimizing defense and mil- tary strategy in Western democracies" (Flynn and Rattinger, 102).

The question of the public's future role in foreign policy formation )oses new research challenges to international relations experts and de- ision-making theorists alike. We have little understanding as to how )ublic attitudes toward foreign policy in general and national security is-

[18] *Ibid.*, 111.

[19] For an early appraisal, see Dietmar Schössler and Erich Weede, *West German Elite Views n National Security and Foreign Policy Issues* (Königstein/Ts: Athenäum Verlag, 1978).

sues in particular are formed. We are even less capable of determir what influences or components remain stable over time, or what deg of personal importance citizens attach to foreign as opposed to domes items. Nor can we distinguish cognitive from affective or from behavior factors, much less assess the significance of historical or geographic vari ables, when attempting to compare public attitudes toward foreign policy across cultures.

Gregory Flynn and Hans Rattinger have undertaken an important first step in identifying the need for a conceptual inventory that links the public with foreign policy decision-makers. Their recent edited volume reviews national public attitudes toward defense, with special emphasis on mass orientations since the mid-seventies (when foreign policy was at last discovered as an important subfield by survey researchers). The analyses of public-opinion data compiled from a variety of sources in Britain, France, the Federal Republic, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and the United States are organized and developed around four axes or "images." The first, "Images of the Soviet Union," looks to differences in the Soviet "threat" as perceived by American and European citizens at large. The second, "Images of Security," juxtaposes internal against external, economic against military factors, as a source of increasing popular uncertainty and discontent. The third set of concerns involves "Images of Deterrence," in light of growing public suspicion that the "cure" of nuclear war might be worse than the disease of Soviet encroachment. The final axis, "Images of Allies," is applied to problems of reliability, trust, and meaningful communication between the United States, on the one hand, and its European partners, on the other.

The analysis of polls conducted in the FRG reveals an extremely complicated set of internal and external security concerns that is unique to a divided Germany. The most important questions that arise in this context pertain to the current and future status of the Federal Republic in the Western military alliance. First, one needs to inquire whether the specters of pacifism and neutro-nationalism raised by discussions within the peace movement have fundamentally altered the nature or strength of the West Germans' commitment to NATO. What do the citizens of the Federal Republic expect and demand from the Alliance? Second, do their expectations differ significantly from those of other NATO members? Third, what price are the Germans prepared to pay in terms of security risks, especially if neutralization and nonalignment are presented as the preconditions for reunification?

Recent empirical efforts to test the waters of German public opinion demonstrate that the tide has not yet shifted against Alliance membership

*per se*—even when the sample contains a significant number of peace movement supporters.[20] Some 56 percent of those affiliated with the Green Party in May 1983 considered NATO "necessary" despite their rejection of the pending Pershing II and cruise missile deployments (pp. 166-67). There appears to be little disagreement regarding the overall importance of American security guarantees; when respondents are faced with a direct choice between NATO membership and neutrality, the former prevails over the latter by a significant margin: 70 versus 17 percent (February 1982), and 72 percent for continuing membership versus 9 percent for withdrawal (August 1983) (p. 144).

Thus, the first question is answered more easily than the second. The West Germans evince no inclination to withdraw from a collective defense system that, up to now, has guaranteed them a historically unprecedented degree of internal stability and external security. They nevertheless appear to be interested in redefining their status in NATO in such a way as to permit them to play a more active, participatory role in Alliance decision making. The call is for more prior consultation rather than for briefing or *ex post facto* appeals for support. Interviews with thirty members of the *Bundestag*, conducted by this author in 1986, reveal that where the choice of tactical weapons systems and regional defense strategies is involved, attitudes are somewhat ambivalent as to the desirability of genuine co-determination.[21] On the other hand, an overwhelming majority would prefer greater autonomy in the conduct of foreign policy where German interests are involved. Co-determination and autonomy are no doubt rights that the Bonn government would exercise only with great caution, trapped as it is in a unique security paradox.

The stability/security paradox finds expression in an article by Richard Löwenthal, who holds that the German Federal Republic, some thirty-five years after its founding, has become the most stable of the larger Eu-

[20] See esp., Karl-Heinz Reuband, "Demoskopische Verwirrungen in der Nachrüstungsfrage: Was halten die Bundesbürger vom Nachrüstungsbeschluss?" [Misinterpretations of survey data regarding the deployment question: What do FRG citizens think about the NATO deployment resolution?] *Vorgänge* 66 (1983), 64-80; Reuband, "Die Friedensbewegung vor und nach den 'Aktionswochen' im Herbst 1983" [The Peace Movement before and after the action weeks of fall 1983] *Vorgänge* 67 (1984), 12-25; Reuband, "Die Friedensbewegung nach Stationierungsbeginn: Soziale Unterstützung in der Bevolkerung als Handlungs potential" [The Peace Movement since the beginning of deployment: Social support in the population as a basis for action potential], *Vierteljahresschrift für Sicherheit und Frieden* 3 (No. 3, 1985), 147-56; Reuband, "Antiamerikanismus—ein deutsches Problem?" [Anti-Americanism—A German problem?], *Vierteljahresschrift für Sicherheit und Frieden* 3 (No. 1, 1985), 46-52.

[21] These interviews, of about 60-90 minutes each, were conducted in German, June through December, 1986, under a grant from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, for a forthcoming book, *Security Conceptions and Successor Generations: Changing Attitudes towards the National Question and Changing Perceptions of the Atlantic Alliance in Postwar Germany*.

*ropean states when measured by such objective standards as price stability, unemployment rates, and electoral succession. The problem is,* the West Germans cannot believe it. *Objective stability is not matched by* subjective security: "The self-conception of the Federal Germans lacks the ability to take itself for granted."[22] The reasons for this perceived insecurity derive as much from the present as from the past: in order to demonstrate fidelity to the ideological precepts imposed by their respective superpowers, the two German states were compelled, during the first twenty years of their existence, to engage in frequent, often vehement public disavowals of each other's domestic and foreign policy achievements. Efforts to secure the political-economic survival of one German state were perceived to pose an existential threat to the other. Yet, the very division of Germany that has held the two states hostage to a provisional condition of insecurity has itself become one of the stablest elements in the ongoing, globally destabilizing confrontation between the Eastern and Western blocs.

History and geography make it impossible for both German states to divorce questions of national security—and the issue of their postwar national identity—from the dialectic of international relations. The Federal Republic seeks "maximal coupling with minimal provocation" (Joffe, in Cooney et al., 190). While the general perception of the overall East-West military balance has not undergone a significant change in recent years, the public's main worry has shifted from military strength to keeping the peace. Neither defense spending nor the expansion of the *Bundeswehr* are viewed as "extremely important;" the peace movement draws sympathy, but not necessarily active commitment. In short, "military defense is endorsed by public opinion much more easily as an abstract principle than its burdensome practice . . ."; when the "ugly label," nuclear weapons, is affixed, "it has no chance if it is up against more 'civilized' concepts such as negotiation and détente" (Flynn and Rattinger, 127).

The Federal Republic is shown to possess a rather stable set of images both of the Soviet Union and of its own internal and external security imperatives—albeit with a new sensitivity to the inherent dangers of reliance on deterrence. It is the last set, "Images of Allies," that provides evidence of subtle but significant changes in the public's orientation and yields at least a partial answer to the question of German "different-ness" from other Alliance partners.

The conclusion drawn by Flynn and Rattinger is that the West Ger-

[22] Löwenthal, "Stabilität ohne Sicherheit—Vom Selbstverständnis der Bundesrepublik Deutschland" [Stability without security—On the self-conception of the Federal Republic of Germany"], *Der Monat* (1978), 75.

nan public thinks pretty much like other European publics, but perhaps more so." The real differences lie between European and American perceptions. The Europeans are now inclined to view the Soviet Union as a nore "normal adversary," one to be lived with and negotiated with ather than to be wiped out in a messianic confrontation between the superpowers. Security defined primarily in military terms is judged inadequate, as more weapons on *either* side mean decreased prospects for peace. Declining confidence in the "rationality" of either a graduated or an extended deterrence strategy is linked to the public's loss of faith in the "expert" character of decisions made by political/technical elites. The ever nore attentive publics are prepared to pay the social and financial price of European security only to the extent that Alliance policies are perceived to be defensive ("structural, non-offensive capacities"); otherwise, hey will impose political costs of their own. Even the craziest or most chaotic" peace protester one might encounter in the FRG is no less "rational," no more "aberrant" than the citizens of other Alliance states in ejecting the proposition that one's own country may have to be destroyed n order to be defended.

## V. The Lessons of History/Normalcy Paradox

Divided or reunified, neutralized or allied, the two German states will emain physically, and therefore politically, in the middle of the East-West conflict. In no position to drop out of the international, bipolarized ystem, both Germanys appear to have but one other option for securing heir mutual survival—namely, to cast aside the political sackcloth-and-ashes roles they donned in 1945 and to assume the cloak of power accorded to other "normal" sovereign states. This alternative, seeking to nsure that the security needs of one's own country prevail through the esponsible exercise of power, is likely to resurrect the original German question, albeit adapted to the constraints of the 1980s. Do the calls for a ommunity of responsibility, a coalition of reason, and a security partnership mean that borders will be maintained while the character of the two tates is radically altered? Or are the two parts again moving to reestablish something bigger, a *Gesamtdeutschland* (federated Germany), hrough confederation and reunification? Have the Germans sufficiently toned for sins of the past—now three generations removed—or does original sin" leave its black mark on their souls forever? What evidence an they deliver "that will convince the rest of the world that they have earned their lesson and have become all the better for it"? (Schwarz, 23).

The question of pan-Germanism has lost its relevance, but the need to

conquer the past remains a salient issue. In a two-part work on power politics and the style of West German foreign policy making, Hans-Peter Schwarz argues that postwar Germans have truly become different. He holds that their proclivity for too little attention to power politics has become almost as bad as too much. Once obsessed with power, the Germans have banned its use from the collective political memory, and have thus deprived themselves of a capacity for pragmatic-purposive maximization of their own interests. "The tamed Germans of the Federal Republic have traveled much farther than the German Reich with its nervous striving for a place in the sun" (p. 39). Bonn's initiatives over the last fifteen years have resulted in a network of diplomatic and economic engagements that allows its representatives to move with self-assurance into regions and states that were closed to the previous two generations. But Schwarz admonishes that the Federal Republic manifests both anxiety and arrogance (especially vis-à-vis the United States) in scorning a power-political approach to foreign policy making. Instead, "the cured alcoholic as the preacher of universal sobriety" has adopted an antistatist, naively moralistic dream role as harmonizer and peacemonger (p. 56).

It appears that "the Germans more than many other peoples cultivate extremes in the style of their international activity: sometimes berserk, sometimes the friendly household pet lacking any instincts against danger" (p. 58). Whatever "taming" of the Germans remained to be done subsequent to the experiences of the capitulation and the occupation years was eventually effected by group pressure and the imperatives of routinized adaptation to multinational foreign policy entanglements. Schwarz maintains that "adherents to the so-called peace movement" who demand a denuclearized, bloc-free Germany are "without appreciation for the disciplinary and behaviorally stabilizing effect of the multilateral system" (pp. 41, 47). Yet the general thrust of his own argument is to urge that the Federal Republic simultaneously "do more" and "do less" to render its geopolitical position less vulnerable and to combat growing domestic resentment over its condemnation to a state of permanent provisionalism. "Without a hard core of patriotic responsibility toward their own country, toward their own liberal way of life, for the welfare and power interests of their own state," the Germans have become "politicians and citizens who predominantly lay their sacrifices on the altar of international order and cooperation, and forget that their own land will sooner or later be punished by the gods" (p. 151).

The concurrent, rather contradictory calls for more multilateral cooperation and a stronger emphasis on Germany's "own" interests—even

to the point of possible withdrawal from NATO—reflect a growing gap between the successor generations. In undertaking delayed efforts to conquer Germany's past, members of the "economic miracle" and "long march through the institutions" generations have drawn very different conclusions for West Germany's present and future foreign policy course. These conclusions find expression in the "lessons of history"/return to normalcy paradox.[23]

"We have learned the lessons of history" is a declaration oft repeated by Helmut Kohl who, at age 57, is the first Chancellor of the FRG with no direct experiential link to the events of 1933–1945; he refers to this condition as "the blessing of having been born late." By contrast, Premier Erich Honecker of the GDR spent the years 1935-1945 in a Nazi prison; he is therefore inclined to view the division of Germany as a barrier against resurgent fascism, just as he refers to the "antifascist protection wall" in Berlin. In either case, one can argue that the national shock of shifting from major-power to no-power status has produced internal political asymmetries in both states, which in turn lead to errors of judgment and behavior that the Germans themselves mistakenly perceive to be "normal."

The Alliance partners would like to believe that the Germans have thoroughly mastered the lessons of history and that they have indeed become "better"; they are sympathetic to the two states' desire to avoid serving as a potential Ground Zero. But if the two were to attempt to disentangle themselves from the never-ending risk of a major superpower confrontation, the "tamed" Germans would immediately be suspected of trying to establish a new German federation. Their common efforts to solidify their respective dream roles as harmonizers and peace mediators—even at the rhetorical level of a security partnership—raises the world's anxiety level and generates counterpressures abroad. From this, one concludes that neither the Federal Republic nor its Eastern counterpart have yet to be perceived as normal states. Schwarz contends that "even the self-torturing efforts to conquer the past should soon belong to the past" (p. 141). Nevertheless, the lesson of history, the acceptance and mastery of which was and is expected to result in a return to normalcy in

[23] Stephen F. Szabo's earlier work in this area looks primarily at the postwar generation that began to make its political influence felt in the 1970s. I have attempted elsewhere to distinguish analytically among *three* successor generations; the last two of these have contributed significantly to the "alternative politics" and new social movements of the 1980s. Compare Szabo, ed., *The Successor Generation: International Perspectives of Postwar Europeans* (London and Boston: Butterworths, 1983), and Joyce Marie Mushaben, "Anti-Politics and Successor Generations: The Role of Youth in the West and East German Peace Movements," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 12 (Spring 1984), 171-90.

...mans never have been "norm
... as such for a long time to come.

## VI. Questions for the Alliance: Division and Defense Postures

*In being transformed from one into many, the German questions have acquired new meaning for the future course of the Atlantic ance. For neighboring and partner states, the most important quest entails a mixture of old and new elements—namely, the issue of u and those issues variously known as the "Dutch question," the "Austr solution," and fears of "Finlandization." Schulz and Danylow sugg that, instead of reacting rashly to potential threats to their national sec rity, which they attribute to too much inter-German rapprochement, t Western powers face an obligation to lay the old German question per manently to rest: they should offer a more attractive alternative, couplec with real political concessions (Schulz and Danylow, 15). One possibility would be to permit the creation of chemical- and nuclear-free zones of a limited but expandable nature, as already agreed upon by the SED and the SPD in behind-the-scene negotiations.*

For the citizens of East and West Germany, the fundamental task ahead is to find ways to resolving the new *German-German* question which promote an optimal balance among "unity," "freedom," "security," "peace," and "autonomy." The governments in Bonn and East Berlin must clearly and publicly divorce their shared objective of overcoming the negative human costs of division from the anachronistic aim of reunification. In order to achieve this, policy makers on both sides will have to adhere to five important ground rules. First, German-German dialogues need to begin with an emphasis on *common* interests; this would replace the traditional method of focusing initially on conflicts of principle without compelling either state to lose sight of the "real existing difference." Second, the expression of common FRG-GDR security interests will have to be couched in terms of European responsibility. Third, policy makers articulating these interests will have to refrain from directly challenging each other's loyalty to either alliance system. Fourth, the dialogue between the two polities will have to be conducted with greater transparency in order to establish confidence-building mechanisms among the neighboring states. Finally, whatever measures the two sides jointly resolve to implement will have to rest upon the principles of balance, territorial integrity, verifiability, and predictability. The power to assume

direct responsibility for their own defense might serve both states ...anneling over-reactive neutralist or national aspirations, while sta-...g and domesticating internally divisive debates over security pol-

...ith regard to possible long-term consequences, the stability/security ...dox appears to outweigh the other three issues because of its direct ... to collective defense strategies. The conflicting interests inherent in ... paradox become even more significant in view of the new arms-...trol proposals that have been set forth by the superpowers since the ...86 Reykjavik summit. In theory, the leadership in both German states ...ould rejoice over any move to reduce the number of longer-range in-...rmediate nuclear forces that hold them hostage on the East-West fault ...ne. In practice, they fear they will be rendered more vulnerable to im-...balances in the conventional arena or to asymmetries at the shorter-range end of the I.N.F. spectrum—even though it was at Bonn's suggestion that NATO proposed the original "zero solution" to Euromissiles in 1981.[25]

The conscious ambivalence that characterizes the demand for reunification is also reflected in the German hopes for disarmament: it is easy for Bonn to appeal publicly for dramatic policy changes as long as they are judged unacceptable to the superpowers, especially to the Soviet Union. It is incumbent upon the two Germanys that they develop new approaches to the peculiar identity problems and security dilemmas they share. Not only should the international community encourage them to make use of whatever opportunities arise outside the arena of traditional power politics: it is imperative that they convey the full range of negotiation successes and failures to their respective allies. The principles best suited to normalization, rapprochement, and good neighborly relations between the two are the same as the prerequisites for effective East-West arms control and disarmament: balance, territorial integrity, confidence building, verifiability, and predictability. The two Germanys can become a laboratory for positive, responsible, peaceful East-West change.

Must the older German question—with its emphasis on the elimination of the psychological and physical walls that divide the nation—be

[24] Schulz and Danylow (pp. 112-13) borrow from Holmes on this point: cf. Kim R. Holmes, *The West German Peace Movement and the National Question* (Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1984), 70ff. I have found much food for thought along these lines in a working paper by Wilhelm Bruns, "Der Beitrag der beiden deutschen Staaten zur Sicherheits- und Entspannungspolitik" [The contribution of the two German states to a policy of security and reduction of tension] (Bonn: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, January 1986).

[25] Elizabeth Pond, "Europe Does Want Arms Deal Despite Unease," *Christian Science Monitor*, March 5, 1987, p. 1.

*resolved in formal legal terms in order to guarantee the strength* and ef-*fectiveness of the Atlantic Alliance? For the United States, Britain,* France, and the smaller partner states, *the answer is no. As Grosser* de-fines the situation, "the Western allies only want reunification as long as it is impossible," while an American source notes that "we are not being asked to do anything about the German question, and we prefer not be asked."[26] Is the Federal Republic's loyalty to the Alliance jeopardized by, or dependent upon, a *de jure* solution to the German question? In the short term, the answer is *for the most part, no*—as long as the FRG is not compelled to choose between the United States and Europe, between Western integration and the improvement or intensification of German-German relations. The longer-range answer also is *probably not*; it is conceivable, however, that the FRG could later insist upon some compensation (for example, in the form of a veto over theater nuclear missile release, or of greater tactical flexibility within its own borders) in exchange for "voluntary" renunciation of the right to national reunification.

Movement in the search for a new, post-postwar German identity can be construed as evidence that the citizens of the Federal Republic have begun to develop confidence in themselves and in their own "free-democratic basic order"—a development meriting the active support of the Western partners. The emergence of independent peace and ecology groups, along with Erich Honecker's own "damage-limitation" activism since the 1983 commencement of the NATO deployments, indicates that *Wandel durch Annäherung* (change through rapprochement) has occurred in the GDR as well as in the FRG. Moreover, both states have become subject to *Annäherung durch Wandel* (rapprochement through change) in the global economic and strategic environment.

If one accepts the verity of the French axiom, *c'est seulement le provisoire qui dure*, then the members of the Alliance will have to consider the extent to which a strengthening and deepening of ties between the two German Republics can and must contribute to the future stability of the region (Schulz and Danylow, 99ff). If it is not true that only the provisional—namely, the existence of two states in search of nationhood—will prove to be the most permanent feature of the postwar global order, then one would be well advised to heed the warning of Richard von Weiz-

[26] Alfred Grosser is casually cited by von Weizsäcker (fn. 1). For an elaboration of Grosser's position, see P.-J. Franceschini, "Sept regards sur l'Allemagne" [Seven observations on Germany], review of Gérard Sandoz, ed., *Les Allemands sans miracle* [The Germans without a miracle], in *Le Monde*, October 2, 1983. The American quote derives from an interview conducted by this author at the U.S. Mission in West Berlin on January 3, 1986; my source prefers to remain anonymous.

säcker: "The German Question will remain open as long as the Brandenburg Gate remains closed."[27] The opening of the Brandenburg Gate and the demolition of the Wall of which it has become an integral part will constitute a necessary but not, I contend, a sufficient condition for the closing of the German question.

[27] Von Weizsäcker, "Die deutsche Frage aus der Sicht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland" [The German question from the perspective of the German Federal Republic"] speech (June 8, 1985), reprinted in *Europa Archiv* 40 (July 1985), 398.

# EXTERNAL AMBITION AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE

By MILES KAHLER*

AMBITION imposes a price; that moral lesson runs deep within our culture. Nowhere has it exerted a greater influence than in our treatment of the rise and fall of nations. Writers, beginning in classical times, have expressed their belief, sometimes with a shudder, sometimes with scarcely concealed pleasure, that national success and imperial ambition carry within themselves the seeds of their own destruction. Like other adages and bits of folk wisdom, however, this belief requires scrutiny rather than simple acceptance.

Aside from a longstanding fascination with the causes of national economic decline (particularly among those currently on top), there are two reasons for interest in this question, one theoretical and crossnational, one concerned with policy and closer to home. The relationship between strategic choices and economic well-being should be a central theoretical concern in international relations and international political economy. Realists and neorealists have long been absorbed in defining and estimating the bases of international power. Underlying such analysis has been the mercantilist assumption that wealth and power are complementary. Robert O. Keohane describes the "key trade-offs" in such a view as "not between power and wealth, but between the long-term power/wealth interests of the state and the partial interests of individual merchants, workers, or manufacturers on the one hand or short-term interests of the society on the other."[1] Instead of a straightforward trade-off between consumption and investment, however, others have suggested a more complex relationship between the quest for international power and its effects on the economy that supports this quest, raising the possibility that the search for power may erode wealth, and that seeking hegemony may be bad for the national economic well-being.

Chief among those who have posed this possibility is Robert G. Gilpin, whose work, *War and Change in World Politics*, continues and broadens a line of investigation that began with his study of American power and

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[1] Keohane, *After Hegemony* (Princeton University Press, 1984), 23.

multinational investment.[2] Gilpin pays attention to the external elements that may produce hegemonic decline, but he also points to several purely internal consequences of international power that may in themselves induce a decline in the economic position of states. Gilpin's sweeping and original account brings the debate back to its central position in neorealist argument, but leaves several questions unanswered. Do the dynamics of decline apply to other than hegemonic or dominant states in the international system, to any state that attempts what I will call an "ambitious" foreign policy? Why, given Gilpin's rational-choice, cost-benefit frame, do states (which are viewed as unitary) make the miscalculations that produce decline?

Those concerned with economic prescriptions have also debated the precise causal connections between ambitious external policies (and associated military spending) and domestic economic performance. The importance of the military in episodes of economic acceleration and decline since the Industrial Revolution has left a wide field for interpretation by historians and social scientists. In the realm of public policy, the question of foreign policy burdens and economic outcomes has recently become a pressing issue in the United States in view of the Reagan administration's efforts to reverse the relative balance between military and non-military spending in the national budget.[3] The administration's view of the economic impact of defense expenditures on the superpowers is positive or negligible for the United States and negative for the Soviet Union.

In the first section of this paper, arguments that link economic performance and an ambitious external strategy are gathered in a model that emphasizes three paths—fiscal, structural, and protectionist—by which strategy affects the economy. Some of the arguments are drawn from the debate over military spending, others from the literature on imperialism. Most are riddled with the biases of observers who aim for either a more restrained foreign policy stance (and a lower share of national resources devoted to external goals) or a more activist posture with its consequent higher expenditure and allegedly beneficial side effects.

In the second part of the paper, I reexamine one controversial national experience—that of Japan in the 1930s—and suggest that some of the broad generalizations set out in the first section, and based on national experience since 1945, need to be modified or specified more precisely. In

[2] Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), esp. chap. iv; *U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation* (New York: Basic Books, 1975).

[3] Bruce Russett documents the shift in "Defense Expenditures and National Well-being," *American Political Science Review* 76 (December 1982), 767-77.

the decade before World War II, Japan combined a pattern of external expansion with an economic performance that can only be described as remarkable for an industrializing economy. It is difficult to determine the precise causal relationships, if any, between military build-up, external expansion, and economic dynamism. Even if such relationships exist, the weight of external ambition in Japan's economic record during this period must be compared to the effects of other variables that influence economic growth.

In the final section of the paper, I apply the tentative conclusions drawn from the Japanese case to other instances in which external ambition seems to have shaped economic resurgence or decline: National Socialist Germany, contemporary developing and newly industrializing countries, and the superpowers. Though the experience of the newly industrializing countries resembles that of Japan most clearly, the similarities and differences in this universe of cases permit some further refinement of the posited linkages between external strategy and the national economy, as well as speculation about the effects of those linkages on international politics.

## Modeling the Linkage between External Ambition and Economic Performance

At least three possible effects of an ambitious external strategy on the domestic economy can be distilled from the welter of arguments surrounding military spending, imperial expansion, and their relationship to economic growth and decline. First, military spending may have purely macroeconomic effects—on the rate of inflation, for example, or on the balance of payments; I shall call this the *fiscal* effect. Second, military spending may also have longer-term implications for the growth path of an economy and for its international competitiveness, through firm efficiency and technological innovation; these microeconomic and sectoral effects may be labeled the *structural* effects of an ambitious foreign policy. Finally, through an ambitious foreign policy, a state may attempt to exercise external influence over other economies or to increase national power by other than military means. In particular, such instruments of foreign economic policy as the construction of trade and currency blocs may distort external economic transactions in the interest of the state's goals, with implications for domestic economic performance. This cluster of less well-defined effects can be described as the *protectionist* effects of an ambitious foreign policy. The relations can be sketched as follows:

Feedback effects on domestic economic performance (defined as eco-

FIGURE 1
LINKS BETWEEN EXTERNAL STRATEGY AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE

nomic growth) are the central issue. It is not important to define the line between "normal" and "ambitious" foreign policy; what is of concern are the intermediate and measurable consequences of foreign policy—increased military expenditure and the use of foreign economic policy for political ends. If feedback effects are strongly positive, improved economic performance will support an expansive external strategy; if they are negative, they will tend to undercut external goals.

Defining the avenues through which external strategy affects economic performance and specifying the conditions in which the signs of these feedbacks may be positive or negative is not sufficient, however. Some effort must also be made to weigh the importance of these effects on the economy against other determinants of economic performance—a much more difficult task. The case of Japan in the 1930s will suggest that these effects were real, but that they were overestimated for much of the decade. A further qualification concerns the behavior of other states: some research strongly suggests that the war/peace division will affect the scale of the intermediate consequences and possibly the direction of the feedback effects. My concern will be with peacetime effects, though that will pose problems of definition in the case of Japan.

The first step in constructing a set of predictions for the economic consequences of external ambition is a closer scrutiny of the constituent fiscal, structural, and protectionist effects and their likely impact—positive or negative—on economic performance.

## FISCAL EFFECTS OF MILITARY SPENDING: ARE DEFENSE DOLLARS DIFFERENT?

Attitudes toward military spending underwent a transformation in the late 1950s and early 1960s: as a corollary of the triumph of Keynesian eco-

nomics, the notion of an absolute ceiling on peacetime military spending was discarded. No longer was it believed that high military expenditures would "bankrupt" the economy. As Hitch and McKean asserted in a work that codified the new wisdom: "There is no presumption that the defense budget is now, or should be, near any immovable upper limit" *if* other economic policies are changed to accommodate it and to maintain fiscal balance.[4]

To those who stress the detrimental effects of military spending on macroeconomic equilibrium, internal and external, the reply has typically been that military spending is public spending, and that its economic effects should be regarded as the same as other public spending.[5] If the fiscal deficit is too large, any of the categories of public spending could be reduced (or taxes increased) to the same effect. Yet, purely in terms of macroeconomics, and leaving aside the impact on firm efficiency and economic structure, arguments have been made that military spending is different and less desirable; the *composition* of military spending is particularly important to such arguments.

The debate over the significance of fiscal deficits and possible "crowding out" as the result of deficits does not concern military spending alone: on this score, all public spending can be viewed as roughly equivalent. But it may be more difficult to manage fiscal balance if public spending shifts toward military spending with a high component of investment (procurement, research and development, military construction) as opposed to operating expenditure. Military spending of this sort may be harder to control than other forms of public spending, largely because of a tendency to underestimate the costs of major weapons systems.[6] A further drawback—again in a high procurement budget—is the possibility that military spending will contribute to cost-push inflation before full employment is reached, particularly if the increase in military spending is rapid, and capacity in the principally affected industries is limited.[7]

A more fundamental and global argument concerns the crowding-out effects that military spending may have on other sectors of the economy—private consumption, non-military government spending, and private investment. Even stern critics of military spending find little evi-

[4] Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, *The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age* (New York: Atheneum, 1965), 47.

[5] Gavin Kennedy, *Defense Economics* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), 186, 204.

[6] James R. Capra, "The National Defense Budget and Its Economic Effects," *Federal Reserve Bank of New York Quarterly Review* (Summer, 1981), 25-27.

[7] *Ibid.*, 28-30; Robert W. DeGrasse, Jr., *Military Expansion, Economic Decline: The Impact of Military Spending on U.S. Economic Performance* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1983), 117-25.

dence that private consumption has been compressed in its favor; nor despite considerable comparative analysis, has much evidence of a direct trade-off between civilian and military expenditures been discovered.[8] More controversial (because the relationship to economic performance is assumed to be direct, and because the evidence is mixed) is the potential trade-off between private investment and defense expenditure. Here, some studies have found a negative relationship between investment and military spending.[9] A number of cautions are necessary in interpreting these relationships, however. Once again, the effect of public spending must be separated from the narrower impact of defense spending; as Kennedy states, "the selection of defense as the inhibitor of investment is a value judgement because all public expenditure on non-market activity acts as an inhibitor."[10] In certain countries, the investment alternatives to military spending may be no more productive of economic growth, and possibly less. (One of the explanations for evidence that military spending and economic growth are associated in developing countries is precisely the possibility of inefficient investment alternatives.)[11] Most of the assumptions of a trade-off omit the possibility of foreign borrowing to offset military expenditure, an honored tradition since at least the time of Edward III. Finally, even if there are plausible reasons to explain the trade-off across a broad spectrum of societies—the direct competition of military procurement with private firms for skilled workers and investment goods—as well as historical episodes that clearly illustrate the trade-off, the substitution of military spending for investment rests on *political* choices and *political* processes.[12] The difficulty for advanced industrialized societies—even nondemocratic ones—may be the impossibility of reducing private consumption expectations in the face of apparently unshakable military needs. In less industrialized societies and in other his-

[8] On private consumption, see *ibid.*, 50; on possible trade-offs with civilian public expenditures, in addition to DeGrasse, see Russett (fn. 3), 771; William K. Domke, Richard C. Eichenberg, and Catherine M. Kelleher, "The Illusion of Choice: Defense and Welfare in Advanced Industrial Democracies, 1948-1978," *American Political Science Review* 77 (March 1983), 33; Kennedy (fn. 5), 192.

[9] R. P. Smith, "Military Expenditure and Capitalism," *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 1 (March 1977), 72-73; DeGrasse (fn. 7), 47-48 and Appendix B.

[10] Kennedy (fn. 5), 204.

[11] The principal study is that of Emile Benoit, *Defense and Economic Growth in Developing Countries* (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1973); also "Growth and Defense in Developing Countries," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 26 (January 1978), 271-80.

[12] Perhaps the best-documented case in which military expenditures collided with investment needs to the detriment of the long-term growth prospects of an economy is that of Britain during the Korean War rearmament; see Sidney Pollard, *The Wasting of the British Economy* (London: Croom Helm, 1982), 36-37. The choice in favor of consumption and military expenditures over investment has been argued for the Soviet Union by Myron Rush, "Guns over Growth in Soviet Policy," *International Security* 7 (Winter 1982/83), 167-79.

torical periods, those political constraints and the trade-off may not be as severe.

### Microeconomic Efficiency and Sectoral Bias: Baroque Arsenal or Engine of Innovation?

The potential trade-off between military spending and investment points toward a second set of economic consequences that are *structural* in nature. One cluster of arguments has linked military expenditure with *declining firm efficiency*; even more attention has been devoted to defense expenditures as either a spur or a drag to *technological innovation*. Unfortunately, arguments at the microeconomic and structural level are often vague, and evidence tends toward the anecdotal; the counter-factual (what would the outcome have been in the absence of military expenditure?) is more difficult.

The rise of a discernible group of firms with close ties to military bureaucracies and high dependence on military budgets dates from the industrialization of warfare in the 19th century: Krupp, Vickers, and Wendel were the ancestors of today's defense contractors.[13] The peculiarities of the defense sector of the economy could be detected early on: the state as monopsonist with price determination by negotiation; concentration and a low level of competition among suppliers because of barriers to entry and the exclusion of foreign suppliers.[14] In reviewing the American defense industry before the current build-up, Jacques Gansler asserted that

> it is first absolutely essential to recognize that there is no free market at work in this area and that there likely cannot be one because of the dominant role of the federal government. . . . Perhaps the dominant characteristic of the conduct of defense business is the lack of competition for most of the dollars involved.[15]

A recent evaluation of the American defense sector after four years of vastly increased spending maintains that inefficiency has not diminished in an era of budgetary largesse.[16]

If such an anticompetitive pattern can be generalized across economies and time (though government procurement policies may alter certain fea-

[13] William H. McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 269-94.

[14] Kennedy (fn. 5), 164; also see Murray Weidenbaum, *The Economics of Peacetime Defense* (New York: Praeger, 1974), 44-49.

[15] Gansler, *The Defense Industry* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1980), 69, 92. Similar arguments are a major theme in the work of Seymour Melman.

[16] Richard Stubbing, "The Defense Program: Buildup or Binge?" *Foreign Affairs* 63 (Spring 1985), 865-68.

tures), diversion of resources into the defense sector of the economy will lower economic performance. Firms in which X-inefficiency is high would benefit (and probably become more inefficient), and overall economic welfare would be less than with a different pattern of government spending. Another useful perspective on the defense sector can be borrowed from Janos Kornai's work on socialist economies: defense firms are subject to the "soft" rather than the "hard" budget constraint experienced by firms in more competitive circumstances.[17] (Evidence in the United States is provided by the Lockheed bailout and the cosseting of the shipbuilding industry).

A second and countervailing structural effect of defense spending is also highly dependent on sector-by-sector analysis. Since Hitch and McKean, most students of the economic impact of defense spending have admitted (or promoted) its contribution to research and development and technological innovation. These technological spin-off effects may result from direct sponsorship of research by the military or, often related, the provision of a protected market for technologically advanced goods prior to their successful commercialization.[18]

This positive reading of the technological effects of military spending has been challenged; the arguments of challengers and their targets revolve around the technological preferences of the military consumer: Are they cutting-edge or conservative, closely tied to civilian uses, or arcane and unrelated to the needs of nonmilitary consumers? Those on either side have emphasized different sectors. The American computer and semiconductor industries have been cited as examples of the beneficial effects of military spending on technologically advanced industries. In the first, the government actually sponsored research and development directly; in the second, it guaranteed a market if the prototypes met its needs. In successive waves of innovation in these industries, a large commercial market quickly emerged that soon overshadowed the market provided by the military budget. Key benefits of early Defense Department support included the government's encouragement of smaller, more innovative firms:

> Few of the leading producers of the electron tube managed to retain their component market positions in the new technologies. In this reshuffling process, defense and aerospace procurement created a market incentive for

[17] Kornai, *Economics of Shortage*. Vol. B (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1980), esp. chaps. 13 and 22.

[18] Gansler, for example, notes the "leading edge" quality of much military R & D and the ease of its transfer to civilian uses (if they exist), while also criticizing the trend toward concentration of research and development in fewer and larger firms rather than in small firms that may have a better record at innovation (fn. 15), chap. 4.

entrepreneurial, technological risk-taking and thereby helped create an independent sector of semiconductor component manufacturers.[19]

If semiconductors and computers represent the positive impact of defense spending on industrial development, shipbuilding is often cited as the nightmare case. Shipbuilding is the centerpiece of Mary Kaldor's "baroque arsenal," and the decline of the British company Vickers is symbolic of the technologically inhibiting effects of dependence on military expenditures:

> The warship was the perfect expression of the competitive dynamism of nineteenth-century industry and the traditional conservatism of the armed forces—a foretaste of the relationship between modern armourers and the military that has produced the weapons system of today. ... [Military spending] reinforced the "mummification" of British industry and put off the day when the necessary structural adjustments would have to be made. ... Arms did not simply postpone the kind of restructuring necessary for the survival of old industries: they also removed the necessity of entering new ones.[20]

The portrait that Kaldor paints is reinforced by Gansler's account of the American shipbuilding industry: wholly dependent on military spending, it is noncompetitive, with very low innovation and a poor record in cost reduction.[21]

Just as analyses of the fiscal effects of military spending have been plagued by excessive aggregation, so the effects of military spending on firm efficiency and technological development require a more systematic choice of cases across time and sectors rather than the careful (and possibly biased) selection of the critics and supporters of defense spending. The core of the technological debate turns on an assessment of the effects of government intervention on defense industries, over and above the possible anticompetitive effects described earlier. Do military consumers encourage conservative technological solutions, or do they force the search for more advanced technology? Does the research and development that they encourage diverge systematically over time from the demands of the private market, inhibiting the possibility for beneficial spin-offs?[22] The

[19] John Zysman and Laura Tyson, eds., *American Industry in International Competition: Government Policies and Corporate Strategies* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 155; on government assistance in the early years of the semiconductor industry, see pp. 150-56. On this and other sectors, see Richard R. Nelson, *High-Technology Policies: A Five-Nation Comparison* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1984), 42-45, 51-52, 78-80. For a more negative view of the role of military procurement in the semiconductor industry, see DeGrasse (fn. 7), 84-96.

[20] Kaldor, *The Baroque Arsenal* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1981), 34, 40-41.

[21] Gansler (fn. 15), 184-203.

[22] Ira C. Magaziner and Robert B. Reich raise this possibility in *Minding America's Business* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1982), 233.

answers to these questions are likely to vary over time and across sectors and firms. For example, the economic historian Clive Trebilcock has argued, in contrast to Kaldor, that British armament firms at the turn of the century did enjoy beneficial spin-offs from military spending in their commercial operations, and that they were highly competitive internationally.[23]

PROTECTIONISM AND ECONOMIC DECLINE

Nations pursuing ambitious foreign policies may incur economic benefits or costs that are distinct from the economic effects of increased military spending. Not all ambitious foreign policies are costly in terms of the government budget or a large military sector: some empires, notably the British, managed to lower budgetary costs by forcing many expenses onto colonial budgets and by hewing to standards of rigorous financial orthodoxy.

Even if fiscal and structural effects on the domestic economy are insignificant, however, other effects can be traced to the instruments of foreign economic policy used to pursue external aims. In an earlier period, trade, monetary transactions, and investment were all shaped (and, economists would say, distorted) by metropolitan policies designed to intensify economic relations within empires and to exclude or discriminate against transactions with those outside. The result, in the case of some of the European empires, was the creation of a high-cost and relatively inefficient trading and monetary bloc that was stripped away only with decolonization.[24]

Past imperial roles have shaped foreign economic policy long after empires disappeared. The attachment of Britain to the sterling area and an illusory international role for its currency has been used to explain part of the poor economic performance of the British economy since 1945.[25] In the postcolonial world, privileged regional trading relations have persisted, often tied to the pursuit of foreign policy goals; export controls directed against strategic adversaries are another variant of foreign economic policy that can have substantial economic consequences.

These protectionist or trade-distorting results of a particular external

[23] Trebilcock, " 'Spin-off' in British Economic History: Armaments and Industry, 1760-1914," *Economic History Review*, 2nd series, 22 (December 1969), 485-90.

[24] Jacques Marseille suggests that privileged colonial markets in the interwar period served to trap French resources in declining sectors and to skew French trade patterns even after decolonization. See his *Empire colonial et capitalisme français* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1984), 84-86.

[25] For the debilitating effect of stop-go policies on British investment, see Sidney Pollard, *The Wasting of the British Economy: British Economic Policy 1945 to the Present* (London: Croom Helm, 1982), chap. 6.

strategy are far more difficult to estimate than the fiscal and structural effects. They bear a close resemblance to the negative structural effects of military spending: potentially conservative and economically stultifying outcomes of state policies designed to achieve political or strategic ends.

## JAPAN IN THE 1930S: TESTING THE EFFECTS OF AN AMBITIOUS STRATEGY

The economic consequences surrounding the fiscal, structural, and protectionist effects of an ambitious external strategy are likely to be negative for the domestic economy. They usually involve expenditures that are hard to control and that may crowd out private investment; anticompetitive effects on firms in the defense sector; and a foreign economic policy tilted toward protectionism. Only the possibility of technological gains (one element of the structural effects) points to clear benefits—though that view, as mentioned above, is contested.

Because the signs in Figure 1 are more likely to be negative than positive, a country case that combines external ambition, rising military burdens, and economic dynamism is anomalous; it indicates that some of the arguments outlined above should be qualified or amended. Japan in the 1930s offers such an anomalous case, an ideal first test for examining the linkages—fiscal, structural, and protectionist—between stellar economic performance and external aggrandizement, and for weighing those explanations against others that have been offered for Japan's economic record during this period.

A description of the Japan of fifty years ago, between the Depression and Pearl Harbor, resembles later records of the postwar "economic miracle":

> ... Japan passed through a period of exceptionally rapid economic growth. In manufacturing industry her progress was especially remarkable. She demonstrated her command of new skills and technologies. She made extensive additions to her capital equipment at home and she invested heavily in regions beyond her own shores. At a time when international trade was stagnating, her exports flourished. In a wide range of products and in a diversity of markets she became a formidable competitor of the older industrial countries of the West. ...[26]

The outlines of that decade are clear: high growth, a shift to more capital-intensive industry, a brilliant export record. There was, however, a darker side to this expansion even in purely economic terms. Dualism grew more pronounced within the economy and its wage structure, and

[26] G. C. Allen, *Japan's Economic Expansion* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), 1.

productivity growth tapered off in the later part of the decade.[27] Nevertheless, the contrast with other, more advanced, industrial economies in an era of depression is striking.

Equally striking, and the principal point of this inquiry, is the coupling of Japan's economic record with military expansion, which had begun before the Manchurian incident in 1931, but took on new dynamism during the decade. In contrast to postwar Japan, which has been a favored example of the benefits of low military spending and forced decolonization, Japan in the 1930s offers an example of an apparently strong and positive relationship between external burdens and economic performance.

Closer scrutiny of the Japanese economic record during the 1930s has long been avoided for fear of embarrassment. For the Japanese, a decade that led to the catastrophe of the Pacific War is best forgotten, particularly since a different postwar strategy produced enviable economic success. For outsiders as well, it has been easier to view the 1930s through the dark lens of Japanese aggression. For the left, the economic record of that era was contaminated with militarism and war; for conservatives, there was, in addition, a growing state involvement in the economy. The present effort to reexamine the economic consequences of choices made in the 1930s does not mean that those choices should be condoned. Criticism of aggression on the ground that it does not pay for the aggressor state is a weak moral argument; conversely, the argument that military expansion may produce economic benefits does not mean that aggression should be applauded.

A second caveat should be registered. Since my concern is with the economic consequences of an ambitious foreign policy and not with war, the period before the beginning of full-scale aggression against China in 1937 is of greatest interest here. Some attention will be given to the post-1937 period, but the shift to wartime footing had significant economic consequences that are not under discussion.[28]

## Keynes in a Uniform? Fiscal Effects of Military Expansion

An observer of Japanese economic policy in the 1920s—a decade of relatively poor economic performance—would have been surprised at the turn taken after 1932. For Japan in the 1920s closely resembled Britain after 1945: its attachment to the international rules of the game led to

[27] Described by Michio Morishima, *Why Has Japan Succeeded?* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 112, 130-31.

[28] Admittedly, the line blurs because Japan, by one estimate, was involved in ten internal or international conflicts between the Meiji Restoration and 1945. Nevertheless, with the possible exception of the Russo-Japanese War, the level of economic mobilization remained low until 1937.

stop-go economic policies aimed at reestablishing the yen at its pre-1914 gold parity. With a stiff dose of deflation, Finance Minister Inoue succeeded at precisely the wrong moment: just when the Great Depression caused a collapse in the market for Japan's exports (particularly raw silk).[29] As deflation was exacerbated by world depression, a dramatic policy change was brought about after December 1931 by growing political discontent and military pressure: "What followed probably could not have been anticipated: one of the most successful combinations of fiscal, monetary, and foreign exchange rate policies, in an adverse international environment, that the world has ever seen."[30]

The Japanese cabinet, led by Finance Minister Korekiyo Takahashi, implemented a classic Keynesian pump-priming strategy from 1932 to 1936: deficit spending (a lid on taxes, increased public expenditure), a lowering of interest rates, and, perhaps most critically, going off the gold standard, devaluing the yen, and introducing exchange controls. The results of this package of policies were equally classic: fiscal stimulus and sharp recovery in exports produced a rapid increase in output, a reinforcement of the shift toward heavy and capital-goods industry, and an increase in investment. As one observer noted, by 1937 (*before* the invasion of China), Japan "could claim to be an industrialized state," and by 1940, "one of the great trading nations of the world," surpassed as an exporter only by the United States, Britain, and Germany—a feature that has not been emphasized in the conventional and distorted portrait of autarchy.[31]

The Takahashi "break with orthodoxy" included an increase in government expenditure, the greatest share of which went to the military. How critical was the increase in military spending to Japanese economic expansion in the first half of the 1930s? It was hardly dramatic at first: as a percentage of central government expenditures, it surpassed the level of 1920 only in 1937; as a percentage of net domestic product, it hovered around 6 percent (slightly below the level of 1920-21) until the big jump in 1937.[32] Even the relative share of military spending in the increase in

[29] Hugh Patrick, "The Economic Muddle of the 1920s," in James William Morley, ed., *Dilemmas of Growth in Prewar Japan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 239-44, 255; Allen (fn. 26), 1-2.

[30] Patrick (fn. 29), 256.

[31] Allen (fn. 26), 6, 227; on the Takahashi program, see Patrick (fn. 29), 256-59, and Takafusa Nakamura, *Economic Growth in Prewar Japan* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), chap. 9. Gross national expenditure grew at an average annual rate of 4.6% during the decade of the 1930s, more than during any preceding period; the percentage share of heavy industry in manufacturing output grew from 32.8% in 1930 to 43.5% in 1935, and to 58.8% in 1940. See Nakamura, Tables 1.5 and 1.15, pp. 7 and 23.

[32] Patrick (fn. 29), Table 8, p. 251; Nakamura (fn. 31), Table 1 22, p. 39.

government expenditure is open to some reinterpretation because the Takahashi budgets directed spending toward two centers of discontent—rural areas and the military. If one combines local and central government expenditures, relief (principally directed to rural areas) surpassed military spending in the Takahashi years.[33] Despite the surge in demand for the underutilized heavy industries that military spending provided, the impact of direct military demand (as compared to the multiplier effects of increased government spending and the resultant general increase in demand) was relatively small: on one estimate, in the first half of the decade, government (including military) demand for steel represented only about 10 percent of the total. As Nakamura notes, "Although the mood was one of expanding military demand, the scale of actual demand was limited."[34]

Military spending was only one element in the novel economic program that Japan instituted in 1931-1936 to overcome economic depression; it served the positive role of such expenditure in a period of excess capacity. Because the conquest of Manchuria was, as even Kenneth Boulding admits, "almost fantastically cheap," and the depression was a very deep one, negative fiscal effects of the new course took some time to appear. The Takahashi economic program responded to military demands, but these became pre-eminent—though still not uncontested—only after an attempted coup by radical officers (the February 26 incident of 1936), which resulted in the assassination of Takahashi and other political leaders.

Following that incident, the new Finance Minister, Baba Eiichi, conceded the budgetary demands of the military by increasing government expenditure in an economy nearing full employment, in which heavy industry was embarking on an investment surge. The result was as classic an example of overheating as the Takahashi policy had been of pump-priming: imports ballooned and the balance-of-payments deficit widened. At the same time the military pressed for massive investment plans that would build up strategic industries in Japan and the empire (particularly Korea and Manchuria). These conflicting adamantine demands, confronting the constraint of the balance of payments, necessarily pointed

[33] *Ibid.*, 238.

[34] *Ibid.*, 248; compare Nakamura's evaluation with a contemporary one: "relatively small orders for armaments and munitions helped to develop industries which produced a much larger volume of chemical fertilizers, industrial chemicals, metals and machinery for general industrial purposes." See Elizabeth B. Schumpeter, ed., *The Industrialization of Japan and Manchukuo, 1930-1940: Population, Raw Materials, and Industry* (New York: Macmillan, 1940), 14-15. Both Nakamura and Schumpeter diverge somewhat from the overall assessment of the impact of military spending given by Henry Rosovsky in *Capital Formation in Japan, 1868-1940* (New York: Free Press, 1961), 27.

toward a widening of direct controls over external transactions—a course favored by some before the outbreak of war with China, and one mandated soon after.[35]

The semi-war economy of 1936-1937 and a proliferation of controls during the war with China typified one fiscal effect of military spending that Japan was finally unable to avoid: its uncontrollable increase—in this case not caused by inflation or the peculiarities of procurement, but by the institutional power of the military and their grandiose plans to expand production while pursuing a full-scale war in China. The crowding out that occurred in these circumstances, however, was *not* a crowding out of investment, but of private consumption—a pattern that appeared well before the war with the United States.[36] The trade-off was set by two constants: military preferences and *external* constraints—no foreign borrowing and the need to maintain sufficient non-yen bloc exports to pay for those imports essential to strategic industries and military procurement.[37]

### Structural Effects of Expansion: State Intervention, Competition, and Innovation

Associated with the image of military-driven economic growth in Japan in the 1930s is that of an economy increasingly cartellized, dominated by the great *zaibatsu* (industrial combines), and subjected to state direction and control. It is a package viewed with intense distaste by most Western economists; others have offered the image as a distorted preview of the beneficial role that the Japanese state was to play in the economy of the 1950s and 1960s. That conventional image—whether viewed in a positive or a negative light—is inaccurate in certain respects. Yet the structural effects of Japan's expanded military role are still worth examining. How was Japan able to escape some of the inefficiencies and drags on innovation that have been attributed to an enlarged defense industry?

The Japanese political economy in the 1930s was not necessarily an in-

[35] For accounts of this period (1936-1940), see Arthur E. Tiedemann, "Big Business and Politics in Prewar Japan," in Morley (fn. 29), 302-9; Nakamura (fn. 31), chap. 10; Schumpeter, "Conclusion: Industrial Development and Government Policy, 1936-1940," in Schumpeter (fn. 34).

[36] Nakamura (fn. 31), 290-91; the slow growth of consumption as compared with investment was characteristic of the 1930s (and the 1950s): *ibid.*, 7. Jerome B. Cohen notes that during the Pacific War, consumers in Japan were hit harder than those of any other major belligerent; see his *Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1949), 56.

[37] At earlier times of military exertion, particularly 1893-1913, Japan had turned to the international capital markets to supplement its domestic savings. The collapse of the international capital markets during the Great Depression closed this option during the 1930s. On the question of foreign borrowing, see William W. Lockwood, *The Economic Development of Japan*, expanded ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), 253-58.

*creasingly cozy and collusive relationship between a monolithic, directive state intent on military build-up and a highly concentrated industry. Japanese politics in the 1930s and even the 1940s was reminiscent of pre-1914* Germany, displaying the same pattern of oligarchic competition in a setting of economic dynamism, military adventurism, and diplomatic ineptitude. The Japanese "state" remained a set of unstable coalitions, with each of the principal actors—the military, the civilian bureaucrats, and the *zaibatsu*—divided internally. Even in a wartime political setting after 1937, military cabinets were forced to govern as other cabinets had governed in the past—"by informal coalitions or working agreements with career civilian bureaucrats" and, it might be added, with the necessary cooperation of the *zaibatsu*.[38] By 1940, "the government, despite its numerous powers on the statute books, was not a cohesive, unifying directive force in the economic sphere"; at the outbreak of the Pacific War, after years of controls, there was "no centralized responsibility for planning and executive economic mobilization."[39]

State intervention in industry did expand over the decade, with 1937 marking a watershed here as it did in macroeconomic management. Since the Meiji Restoration, strategic industries had received special attention from the state. During the 1920s, however, and even during the years of recovery and initial armament before 1936, direct state involvement in industry was minimal: "there was no economic regimentation, no control of consumption and little or no restriction on the investment of capital in Japan." The principal instruments for influencing industrial structure were the Major Industries Control Law (1931), which encouraged the formation of cartels in order to restrict competition, and subsidies that favored the shipping and shipbuilding industries. These measures were generally ineffective: the cartels tended to be "weak and unstable"; the influence of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry was largely hortatory (through its Rationalization Bureau); and one instrument that was potentially useful in an industrial policy—import protection—was rendered largely superfluous by the devaluation of the yen. The government did encourage concentration in the steel industry, but protection of the industry was weakened at times to encourage imports of needed supplies from abroad. Apart from steel and shipbuilding, a clear-cut state design to encourage heavy industry selectively was hard to discern.[40]

[38] Robert M. Spaulding, "The Bureaucracy as a Political Force, 1920-1945," in Morley (fn 29), 76.

[39] Cohen (fn. 36); cf. the judgments cited in Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982), 153-54.

[40] See G. C. Allen's excellent contemporary account, "Japanese Industry: Its Organization and Development to 1937," in Schumpeter (fn. 34).

Among the military and the reform bureaucrats allied to them, an emphasis on state ownership, planning, and direction of the economy in the interests of national military power had been growing for some time. After the annexation of Manchuria, these programs found expression in a succession of plans produced before the outbreak of the war with China, most notably the Five-Year Plan for Key Industries. The plans were designed to extend state control and to develop militarily significant heavy industries—steel, coal, metals, armaments, machine tools, automobiles, and chemicals. Consumer-goods industries were given short shrift.[41]

The contribution of such government plans to the growth of heavy industry in the late 1930s was probably slight. As described above, a shift to heavy industrial production and exports had accelerated with only a modest military stimulus in the early 1930s: that sectoral development would have continued, as it had begun, without direct state intervention. Ironically, the overly ambitious investment plans introduced in 1937 were soon undercut by the demands of the war in China: the military could not have both its desired expansion of industrial capacity and the war. The plans subsumed in the system of wartime controls "were not so much plans as ex post facto responses to conditions. . . ."[42] The pressures of war did bring about an intensification of the shift to Japan's new industrial structure (soon to be destroyed by American bombing), but, because of the tight constraints imposed on imports, only at the expense of consumers and the industries that met their needs.

The structural effects of military expansion in the 1930s may not have produced a closely guided march toward a new industrial structure, but emphasis on external military goals certainly did not hinder the structural change. The Japanese military favored innovation and a shift toward the most advanced sectors of the world economy; whatever the impact of their formal plans, they did not want an out-dated arsenal. Certain sectors, such as automobiles and aircraft, did owe their existence directly to military influence and state nurturing.[43] The military provided additional demand for sectors that were the "cutting edge" of the time; much of their expansion was based on linkages (chemicals-electricity-metals) and on the existence of civilian demand for the same industrial products.

Military demands pushed Japan toward an industrial structure that it

[41] For accounts of the plans, see Nakamura (fn. 31), 276-85, 300-301; Johnson (fn. 39), 130-32; Mark R. Peattie, *Ishiwara Kanji and Japan's Confrontation with the West* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 185-216.

[42] Nakamura (fn. 31), 276, 300; Peattie (fn. 41), 216-19.

[43] It is hard to imagine a time when Japan did not produce automobiles, but here the military expansion of the 1930s was also a turning point: starting with 500 units in 1930, Japan reached a level of 48,000 units in 1941; aircraft went from 400 to 5,000. See Cohen (fn. 36), 2-3.

would finally achieve in the 1950s and 1960s. Paradoxically, the failure of its tightly designed plans for industry meant that an expanding military sector stimulated competition rather than fostering a group of favored inefficient firms. Military demands on heavy industry served to weaken the grip of the old *zaibatsu*, whose power had reached its peak in the 1920s and early 1930s, because they were relatively weak in that part of the economy.[44] Sectoral trends in the 1930s gave an important edge to "new *zaibatsu*," such as Japan Nitrogen or Nissan. More directly, military suspicion of the established leaders of business reinforced these trends, since officers turned to newer enterprises for partners in imperial economic development. In Manchuria, after the Kwantung Army failed to develop the territory through state control, the military discovered that rapid development was possible only through the hated capitalists. To achieve their development goals without rewarding the old combines, they turned to the new *zaibatsu* who were already deeply involved in the industries that satisfied military demand. In October 1937, they restricted the South Manchurian Railway Company, which had been the principal development agency, to transportation, and transferred industrial development to the Manchukuo Industries Development Company; one of the military's favored new groups, Nissan, held half of the capital, and the Manchukuo government the other half. The new *zaibatsu* tended to be led by "new men" more sympathetic to the aims of the military, such as the head of Nissan, Yoshisuke Ayukawa. These entrepreneurs were "largely from a technological background and psychologically in tune with the army economic planners, since they were production rather than finance oriented and had a technologist's interest in the manipulation of raw materials."[45]

## Japan's Colonial Empire: Protected Refuge or Source of Competition?

Japanese foreign economic policy in the 1930s was shaped by its colonial empire, which was contiguous to Japan and carved out in a threatening international environment—an important feature that would shape its economic development. Its core remained Taiwan, Korea, and finally Manchuria; its basis in strategic concerns was particularly clear-cut in northeast Asia.[46]

[44] Nakamura (fn. 31), 252.

[45] Tiedemann (fn. 35), 289; also see Peattie (fn. 41), 215-16. On Ayukawa and Nissan, see David Halberstam, *The Reckoning* (New York: William Morrow, 1986), 134-36.

[46] Mark Peattie, "Introduction," in Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie, eds., *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 15-18; on the importance of contiguity, see Bruce Cummings, "The Legacy of Japanese Colonialism in Korea," *ibid.*, 482.

The economic effects of empire were shaped by Japan's status as a relatively poor, late-industrializing society (though a highly successful one), which differentiated Japan from older imperial powers such as Britain and France. As Kublin has observed, "the tremendous stakes and her limited resources permitted Japan, a relatively backward and undeveloped country, only the barest margin for political, military, and economic error."[47] The empire had to pay, but Japan differed from other colonial powers in the way in which the empire was made to pay: not by penny-pinching financial orthodoxy, but by development. Colonies were regarded as investments. Samuel Ho notes that, among the colonial powers, "the Japanese were unusually development-oriented . . . both the colonial governments and Japanese capitalists reinvested in their colonies a substantial share of the surplus that they controlled."[48] Japan directed colonial development in its own interests, managing to capture most of the surplus produced and to shape the colonial economies into a pattern of complementarity with its own. Distortion resulted, but it existed within a relatively dynamic economic relationship. The colonies did not languish under imperial neglect; if anything, Japan paid excessive attention to these imperial assets.[49]

The economic role of the colonies was first of all that of a granary, relieving the balance-of-payments pressures of rice imports by creating imperial self-sufficiency in critical foodstuffs. Taiwan and Korea thus became "agricultural appendages of Japan."[50] This primitive colonial pact was shattered under the pressures of the 1930s, when Japan tightened economic integration within the empire, not simply by constructing a trade and currency bloc, but through forced industrialization in Korea and Manchuria. Japan was perhaps the only colonial power "to have located modern heavy industry in its colonies: steel, chemicals, hydroelectric facilities in Korea and Manchuria, and automobile production for a time in the latter."[51]

Heavy state involvement in colonial development could have produced stagnation caused by protection of less dynamic metropolitan sectors through a trading bloc or hostility to economic development in the colonies that threatened metropolitan economic interests. Japan escaped those costs of empire and the stagnation of a traditional colonial pact when it redefined development and complementarity in a way that permitted in-

[47] Hyman Kublin, "The Evolution of Japanese Colonialism," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 2 (October 1959), 82, 77-78.

[48] Samuel Pao-San Ho, "Colonialism and Development: Korea, Taiwan, and Kwantung," in Myers and Peattie (fn. 46), 385.

[49] Kublin (fn. 47), 80.

[50] Ho (fn. 48), 348-50.

[51] Bruce Cumings, "The Northeast Asian Political Economy," *International Organization* 38 (Winter 1984), 12-13.

dustrialization on the periphery. External ambition and the need to develop Japan's military-industrial base played a role in this shift, but so did the peculiar position of Japan as a late industrializer: both the military and the needs of colonial development promoted the "sunrise" sectors of the 1930s. The heavy and capital-goods industries developing in the 1930s found expanding markets in the empire; the traditional export industries, particularly textiles and raw silk, were oriented toward markets in Europe and the United States. Because it was new, Japan's empire also did not contain many vested interests that could obstruct rapid development: colonists were not an effective political force against the state.[52]

The empire thus became a source of competition and experimentation within the Japanese economy, not a refuge of declining sectors and ossified interests. Cheap imports of food from Taiwan and Korea accelerated the decline of Japan's agricultural sector, which, virtually alone among domestic economic sectors, did not recover during the 1930s.[53] Despite agitation by the Imperial Agricultural Society, the state, concerned with industrial wages and possible discontent in the colonies, refused to restrict colonial exports of food, choosing merely to stabilize prices and to slow agricultural production in the colonies.[54]

The potential for exit to the colonies and the beginnings of industrialization within the empire also upset efforts to cartelize Japanese industry in the 1930s: some cartel agreements extended only to Japan proper; aggressive firms could transfer production to the colonies and thus escape restrictions on production. In the case of steel, conflict between Japanese and Manchurian producers disrupted efforts to organize the steel sector.[55] And, as has been mentioned, Manchuria in the 1930s served as a magnet, not only for the new *zaibatsu*, but also for those military men and bureaucrats who were toying with state planning. Rather than favoring powerful domestic interests that might have hindered economic advance in both Japan and the empire, the Japanese government chose industrial development on the periphery. Japan's empire, in short, was not a backwater of the Japanese economy, but its frontier.

## Japan in the 1930s:
## The Benefits and Burdens of Aggressive Upward Mobility

A closer look at Japan's economy in the 1930s serves to revise the conventional image of an economy that moved rapidly toward autarchy, state

[52] Lewis H. Gann, "Western and Japanese Colonialism: Some Preliminary Comparisons," in Myers and Peattie (fn. 46), 498.

[53] Patrick (fn. 29), 215.

[54] Schumpeter (fn. 34), 144-47; Ho (fn. 48), 363-64.

control, and a militarized economic structure. Japan's foreign policy ambitions and the economic changes instituted to further these ambitions were far less important in the first half of the decade than in the later years; the turning point was the war against China in 1937. The fiscal stimulus instituted under Takahashi did include an increase in military spending (but was not limited to it); the devaluation of the yen, and the export boom and import substitution that it stimulated, were equally or more important. The structural effects of military spending were also limited at first: the shift in Japan's industrial structure before 1937 owed more to overall economic growth than to the specific effects of military expansion. Finally, while economic integration of the Japanese empire was tightened in the 1930s, it served the purposes of a distorted and accelerated industrialization in northeast Asia, imposed at the cost of certain domestic Japanese interests. Empire, in this case, was a prod to changes in Japan's industrial structure that were already underway.

Even after the move to a war footing, as some sectors were built up from nothing, much of the planned expansion of heavy industry foundered on the demands of the war in China. Expansion that did take place came about at the expense of private consumption and the consumer-goods industries. State direction of the economy toward military goals accelerated after 1936 as import constraints tightened, but Japan was never a smoothly running totalitarian machine, even after the outbreak of the Pacific War: business resistance and autonomy remained high, and the state harbored feuding factions. Imperial integration did not produce autarchy: the empire failed to provide Japan with adequate supplies of strategic products—metals and petroleum in particular—and the need for imports from outside the yen bloc was both a persistent barrier to military plans for investment and a spur to military expansion in the search for greater autonomy.[56]

All of the foregoing suggests that the *weight* of Japan's external strategy has been overstated in conventional accounts as an explanation of the country's economic performance in the 1930s. Of equal interest, however, are the *signs* of the fiscal, structural, and protectionist effects produced by external ambition (see Figure 1). Although the balance was mixed, it appears that Japan did enjoy positive benefits from its external strategy, and that the course of military expansion was not entirely a burden on the economy. The Takahashi strategy of 1932-1936 had the anticipated results and, in a deeply depressed economy, the new course worked brilliantly. A different mix of military and social expenditures might have

[56] On the lack of self-sufficiency in the empire, see Peattie (fn. 46), 35.

*produced more benefits for the Japanese population, but the economy' recovery in a bleak international context was striking.*

Although military spending did not dominate public spending before the middle of the 1930s, military pressure for more resources did have another positive effect: *policy innovation*. Japan's break with orthodoxy under Takahashi was due in part to military demands; later in the decade, Finance Minister Ikeda devised additional means to accommodate increased military spending while minimizing controls.[57] The later impetus to state direction of the economy—which had mixed results—came directly from reform bureaucrats and military officers. This was not the first time that military demands had brought about institutional innovation: the Bank of England was founded in part to finance British naval expansion; France's lack of a similar institution proved to be a major inhibition on naval competition with Britain in the 18th century.[58]

Countering these positive fiscal effects was the equally classic end of the experiment in 1936-37: investment and war demands collided in a balance-of-payments crisis and produced an economy of growing controls. The country did not escape the negative fiscal effects of its ambition: for institutional reasons, military spending proved to be uncontrollable. Japan's experience during the 1930s (and earlier) raises the difficult question of whether military claims on resources can reach a stable equilibrium, or whether increased expenditures lead to increased institutional power in a cycle that points toward fiscal excess.

The structural effects of military spending reinforced changes in the Japanese economy that had begun well before the 1930s. The convergence of military demands and the evolution of the Japanese economy toward more capital- and technology-intensive industries resulted from the peculiarities of Japan's position in the international economy and the bases of military power in the interwar years.

Astute observers at the time saw that this symbiosis was more than a spin-off effect—that Japan was not creating an industrial structure suited for war and nothing else: there was "no real distinction between peace and war industries."[59] The role of state intervention—apart from growing military procurement—has probably been exaggerated: direct intervention was late and imperfect; the grandiose plans of the mid-1930s perished on the plains of North China. Nevertheless, military preferences during this period were oriented toward technological change and the new industries. And, given the industrial organization of Japan, those

[57] Peter Gourevitch discusses the configurations that produced other "breaks with orthodoxy" in the 1930s in "Breaking with Orthodoxy: The Politics of Economic Policy Responses to the Depression of the 1930s," *International Organization* 38 (Winter 1984), 95-130.

[58] McNeill (fn. 13), 180.

[59] Schumpeter (fn. 34), 328.

preferences favored new entrepreneurs and new industrial combines over the old *zaibatsu*, fostering competition rather than stifling it.

The Japanese case demonstrates a variant of Alexander Gerschenkron's arguments concerning the importance of international position—late industrialization, "catching up" rather than being on top—for reaping the structural benefits of military expansion. In nations that see themselves as catching up in military technology and capability, the space for conservative military preferences is lessened. One would hardly find in the Japan of the 1930s the classic attitude of the dominant power expressed by the Royal Navy in 1828: "Their Lordships feel it is their bounden duty to discourage to the utmost of their ability the employment of steam vessels, as they consider that the introduction of steam is calculated to strike a fatal blow at the naval supremacy of the Empire."[60]

Similarly, *not* being on top influenced Japan's attitude toward its colonial empire and minimized the negative imperial effects on its economy: its cost-benefit calculations were more careful since its margin of maneuver was smaller. The empire, like all else, had to contribute directly—not just as a status symbol—to Japan's economic development and its leaders' goal of "a rich country and a strong army."

As an upwardly mobile, relatively poor power within the international hierarchy, Japan had always been more careful than most to weigh economic costs and benefits in its external advance. During the 1930s, however, such reckonings were increasingly pushed aside by many among the military and their allies within the bureaucracy. Hosoya has observed that values such as "expansionism, national prestige, and 'national mission' increasingly took precedence over economic values of foreign policy decision-making."[61] A reassertion of pre-industrial values (Schumpeter's explanation) could be advanced for this shift, but it could also be argued that Japan became a "premature" hegemonic power: its leaders perceived a wider margin of economic maneuver. Such incipient attitudes were confirmed when the Pacific War brought its stunning initial successes, and the Japanese elite telescoped decades of development to attain the smug outlook of a dominant power. After years of frenetic concern with building military potential, Japan enjoyed one year of hegemonic complacency. Then, after the setback at Guadalcanal in November 1942, its leaders began their first "really energetic attempt to raise over-all production sights."[62] But it was too late: the swift descent through blockades and bombing to economic ruin took less than three years.

[60] Cited in McNeill (fn. 13), 226.

[61] Chihiro Hosoya, "Retrogression in Japan's Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process," in Morley (fn. 28), 88.

[62] Cohen (fn. 36), 55.

Japan's economic development in the 1930s, and the importance of its situation in the international military and economic systems for determining the economic effects of an ambitious external strategy, can be compared to other countries characterized by such a strategy, by the prominent role of the military in the economy, or by both. The cases of Germany in the 1930s, of contemporary developing countries, and of the superpowers in the post-1945 international system permit a further inquiry into whether, and under what conditions, the effects observed in the Japanese case will be found.

## Economic Dynamism and External Strategy: Comparisons and Qualifications

### Hitler's Germany: Rearmament and Economic Recovery

The economics of rearmament in National Socialist Germany has inspired considerable scholarly controversy, in contrast to the relative lack of attention paid to prewar Japan. In large measure, such scrutiny of the German case was motivated by the belief that German rearmament offered evidence of Hitler's military plans; the debate over the latter was not concerned with the connection between the rearmament program and Germany's overall economic performance in the 1930s. In more recent examinations of the German economic record, however, the superficial similarities between Japan and Germany in the conventional accounts have given way to even more striking contrasts that suggest a partial explanation of Japan's superior economic record.

Germany's economic performance was hardly as stellar as Japan's during the 1930s, nor was its break with past policies as great. National Socialist economic policies increased public spending (in line with preceding governments); the novelty was that it was now financed through short-term bills or longer-term loans, which many viewed as dangerously unorthodox. Military spending, however, was not a significantly large budgetary element during the initial, and most marked, years of recovery before 1936. As in Japan, after 1936, "rearmament did assume a much greater significance, with a high level of expenditure, a general restructuring of the economy for waging war and the deliberate restraining of consumer expenditure."[63]

One contrast with Japan lay in the external dimension of Germany's new course. Unlike Japan, Germany did not pursue an export-oriented

[63] R. J. Overy, *The Nazi Economic Recovery, 1932-1938* (London: Macmillan, 1982), 47. On Nazi economic policies and their relationship to rearmament, see esp. chaps. 1 and 4.

recovery. The Nazi elite, and particularly Finance Minister Hjalmar Schacht, remained constrained by orthodox beliefs and by Germany's international economic position: the Deutschmark was overvalued to restrain inflation and to assist in repaying German debt (which prevented a radical break from the international economic order). In the early 1930s, Germany, unlike Japan, was too important an exporting power and too central to the world economy to hope for a devaluation that would not be countered by its trading partners.[64] The combination of an overvalued exchange rate and an economic recovery led to a familiar pattern: extension of controls over foreign transactions to ensure that foreign exchange would be conserved for "essential" purposes—rearmament among them.[65]

The policies pursued by Germany, then, were distinct from those chosen by Japan under Takahashi: Schacht's conservatism was reinforced by Germany's perceived international economic constraints. As in Japan, however, the fiscal impact of external strategy was relatively minor before 1936. When war preparations assumed first priority after 1936, however, Germany faced the same severe trade-offs in an economy at full employment; a further shift of resources toward the armaments sector reduced economic performance.[66]

In part, this overall reduction in economic performance resulted from the structural effects of military expansion, which appear to have been less positive in Germany than in Japan. Far more research is required on government-business relations in both Japan and Germany during this period; it appears, however, that certain aspects of these relations contributed to the relatively poor performance of the German economy and its arms sector before World War II. Although the shift toward new sectors of the economy—aircraft, chemicals, automobiles—was apparent in Germany, military spending also favored heavy industrial sectors which, unlike their counterparts in Japan, were already well established in Germany, and were hardly the most dynamic in the economy.[67] A plausible argument can be made that technical progress would have been greater had export and consumer industries been favored instead of being increasingly penalized by the demands of rearmament.

The inefficiency introduced by political intervention was equal in sig-

[64] *Ibid.*, 22-25.
[65] *Ibid.*, 51-52; William Carr, *Arms, Autarky and Aggression* (London: Edward Arnold, 1972), 39, 51-56.
[66] Overy (fn. 63), chap. 6.
[67] T. W. Mason, "Some Origins of the Second World War," in Esmonde M. Robertson, ed., *The Origins of the Second World War* (London: Macmillan, 1971), 120-21; Overy (fn. 63), 54-55.

nificance to the pattern of industrial sectors favored by rearmament. The tenuous state of government-business relations and a chaotic lack of co-ordination and planning paralleled those in Japan during the same period. All observers agree that the state itself was too disorganized to co-ordinate the rearmament efforts and that the military paid little attention to the economic implications of their programs.[68] Two features of National Socialist rearmament stood in sharp contrast to Japan's. One was the extension of state ownership and control in the armaments sector; inefficiencies in that sector (such as cost-plus contracts and tight control of the arms firms by the military) resulted in lowering the performance of private firms working for the military as well: "those commercial firms brought into war-work also became infected by the incompetence and inflexibility of the system."[69] The second feature was the additional layer of interference and corruption introduced by the Nazi Party itself, which had no analogue in prewar Japan.

For Germany, the protectionist effects of its expansionist policies can only be estimated since, unlike Japan, Germany began to construct a New Order in Europe only with the outbreak of war. Asymmetric economic relations with the Balkans had been strengthened in the 1930s (a process described by Albert Hirschman) but the importance of the Balkans as a trading partner was never great; in contrast to Japan's pattern of colonial development and industrialization, Germany sought to acquire raw materials and to freeze dependent relations. An even more overt exploitation was characteristic of German policies in occupied Europe: a pattern of plunder to avoid domestic conflict over wartime economic burdens.[70]

Despite the parallels that have been drawn between the economic records of Germany and Japan during the 1930s, the economic effects of Germany's expansionist strategy seem to have been more negative, for reasons of both the international situation and domestic politics. Germany's position in the international economy inhibited policy innovation and the choice of instruments such as devaluation. Because it was already a major industrial power, the structural effects of rearmament tended to favor established sectors, and there is little evidence that German rearmament favored new or more dynamic firms, as Japan's military did. The party regime added an inefficient and aggrandizing political layer to an increasingly overstretched economy.

[68] Mason (fn. 67), 123; Burton H. Klein, *Germany's Economic Preparations for War* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), 79; Overy (fn. 63), 63; Wilhelm Deist, *The Wehrmacht and German Rearmament* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), 91-96.

[69] R. J. Overy, "Hitler's War and the German Economy: A Reinterpretation," *Economic History Review*, 2nd Series, 35 (February 1982), 287.

[70] Klein (fn. 68), 60-61; Overy (fn. 63), 30.

THE NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZING COUNTRIES AND THE JAPANESE MODEL

One implication of independence for developing countries in the decades since 1945 has been the need to provide for their own defense. The potential competition between military expenditures and development goals has drawn attention and controversy. Much of both has centered around the findings of Emile Benoit, whose study of a large sample of developing countries between 1950 and 1965 revealed—to his own surprise—that "countries with a heavy defense burden generally had the most rapid rate of growth, and those with the lowest defense burdens tended to show the lowest growth rates." Benoit suggested some positive contributions of defense expenditures to economic growth—relaxation of restrictive fiscal and monetary policies (one of the fiscal effects noted above), development of infrastructure, support for research and development (with structural spin-off effects), and development of human capital—while admitting that evidence for these benefits "is imprecise, anecdotal, and difficult to evaluate."[71]

Benoit's study stimulated an outpouring of aggregate studies that have added more heat than light to the question of defense burdens and economic performance.[72] Most of Benoit's critics seem determined from the outset to disprove any positive relationship between defense spending and growth. They have chosen different samples from different historical periods, making comparison difficult; the quality of the data employed has been questioned.[73] They usually found very weak negative relationships, which is not surprising in view of the large samples analyzed. In certain cases, the data for a particular country are in direct contradiction with each other.[74]

One can conclude from these studies that the relationship between military spending and economic growth appears stronger when country

[71] Benoit, "Growth and Defense . . ." (fn. 11), 271, 276-77; for an earlier statement of Benoit's research, see *Defense and Economic Growth* (fn. 11).

[72] David Lim, "Another Look at Growth and Defense in Less Developed Countries," *Economic Development and Cultural Change [E.D. & C.C.]* 31 (January 1983), 377-84; Nicole Ball, "Defense and Development: A Critique of the Benoit Study," *E.D. & C.C.* 31 (April 1983), 507-24; Riccardo Faini, Patricia Annez, and Lance Taylor, "Defense Spending, Economic Structure, and Growth: Evidence Among Countries and Over Time," *E.D. & C.C.* 32 (April 1984), 487-98; Saadet Deger and Ron Smith, "Military Expenditure and Growth in Less Developed Countries," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 27 (June 1983), 335-53; Gavin Kennedy, *The Military in the Third World* (London: Duckworth, 1974), chap. 10; Saadet Deger, *Military Expenditure in Third World Countries: The Economic Effects* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986).

[73] Frank Blackaby, "Introduction," in Nicole Ball and Milton Leitenberg, eds., *The Structure of the Defense Industry: An International Survey* (London: Croom Helm, 1983), 16.

[74] See, for example, the findings on India by Faini et al. (fn. 72), 496, and Deger and Smith (fn. 72), 175; or those on military spending by military regimes by Benoit (fn. 11, 1978), 273, and Kennedy (fn. 72), 163.

*samples are broken down by region and level of development, and that aggregate studies tell us little about the processes by which military spending affects economic performance. The term "developing countries" conceals wide variations in economic structure (industrial base) and composition of military expenditure; one would therefore expect different countries to experience different relations between economic growth and military expenditure.*

One significant cluster, defined by level of industrialization, resembles the Japanese case described above. Most of the newly industrializing countries, which shared high economic performance during the 1960s and 1970s, also possess substantial defense industries. Trebilcock has noted the close relationship between the international transfer of military technology, the founding of defense industries, and the progress of industrialization among the "NICs" of Europe before World War I.[75] Military expenditures created additional demand for capital goods industries during a period when expenditure trade-offs were less severe: military spending was not an alternative to other forms of public spending in this era, nor did military research and development drain expertise from the private sector.

Certain similarities with interwar Japan are apparent in the few existing national studies of defense industries in contemporary NICs. While positive fiscal effects of military spending are reduced in a post-Keynesian era in which the state's role in the economy is extensive, structural effects of military spending remain significant. As early as the 1930s, the military in Brazil pressed for the development of the steel and petroleum industries.[76] In Taiwan and South Korea, intense security concerns, exacerbated by American policy in the 1970s, stimulated the development of more capital- and technology-intensive industrial sectors.[77] Moreover, the positive impact of defense spending on human capital formation seems to have been more significant than in earlier periods.[78]

Equally important, however, is the relationship of the incipient defense industry to overall economic strategy. The balance-of-payments effects of military expenditures, which could be negative under conditions of technological dependency, are offset in many NICs by export-oriented defense industries: Brazil, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore are all sub-

[75] Clive Trebilcock, "British Armaments and European Industrialization, 1890-1914," *Economic History Review*, 2nd series, 26 (May 1973), 254-72.

[76] John D. Wirth, *The Politics of Brazilian Development, 1930-1954* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1970), chaps. 4 and 5.

[77] Janne E. Nolan, *Military Industry in Taiwan and South Korea* (London: Macmillan, 1986), 12-13.

[78] *Ibid.*, 121.

ıtial arms exporters.[79] The need to compete in an international arms ·ket—even though influenced by state policies—undoubtedly reduces negative structural effects of military spending on the defense indus- In countries that have developed a defense industry within an overall ture of import substitution, the technological and other benefits of itary spending seem to have been reduced: India and Argentina are :s in point.

'he growth of arms industries and exports in the newly industrializ- countries—from Israel to South Korea to Brazil—offers some confir- .ion of the structural effects of military spending found in interwar an: economic benefits will be greatest in those countries whose current ustrial structure lags somewhat behind current military technology. ıtching up" would probably produce the maximum benefits, so long he gap is not too large (which would limit the spinoff effects). Inter- diate powers in the international hierarchy are also likely to escape er negative economic effects, since they, like Japan, may make more eful cost-benefit calculations. (These conclusions may not fully apply ın era of foreign borrowing and large-scale military aid.) The contrast ween interwar Japan and Nazi Germany as well as the experience of contemporary NICs suggest that it is countries in the middle of the :rnational division of labor that are likely to reap beneficial economic :cts from external ambition.

## External Ambition, Economic Decline, and System Stability

Γhe foregoing conclusions confirm Gilpin's formulations on heg- onic decline: there is no inevitability to the connection between eco- nic stagnation and an ambitious foreign policy, but the connection is :ly to be much closer in hegemonic or dominant powers than in pow- that view themselves as upwardly mobile. In a mature industrialized nomy, the opportunity costs of military spending are likely to be her and the fiscal effects negative. Particularly in a post-Keynesian era, need for military demands to increase total effective demand is re- :ed. Competing socially valuable demands on public spending will be her than in developing countries. Valuable alternative investment by private sector is likely to be crowded out by military expenditures.

Hegemonic powers—those at the top of both the economic and the wer hierarchy—have neither the economic nor the military incentives cept in wartime) that produce beneficial structural effects in powers

' On the relationship between arms production and strategies of import substitution and ort orientation, see Herbert Wulf in Ball and Leitenberg (fn. 73), chap. 10.

that are catching up within the international system. Nor do they su the tight external constraints of many upwardly mobile countries, co straints that necessitate careful attention to cost-benefit calculations an economic effects of external ambition. The signs of the feedback effect sketched earlier are therefore more likely to be negative in the case o dominant powers.

Quantitative studies of the relations between military spending and economic performance in industrialized countries have been less sophisticated than those analyzing developing countries. Simple associations between higher growth and lower military expenditures wash out if more countries (France in particular) are added. Although military expenditures seem to have a negative association with investment, the part played by military spending in explaining lower economic performance among the industrialized countries after 1973 seems small, since military spending increased at a slower rate than in previous decades.[80] As in the case of developing countries, more detailed examination of the processes by which military spending affects economic outcomes is necessary. In the case of the superpowers, those effects may have long-run implications for the international configuration of power.

The economic consequences of the Reagan administration's military build-up are likely to contrast sharply with those that flowed from the militarization of Japan's economy in the 1930s. The elements in the contemporary U.S. defense build-up represent a reverse image of that of Japan fifty years ago; America's different place in the international system is a major explanation of the probable negative effects. The early Reagan budgets did represent a variant of military Keynesianism, but the economic outcomes have been determined by the central rather than peripheral role of the United States in the world's financial and monetary systems. While Japan's reflation and rearmament were coupled with sharp devaluation, the deficits produced by the American tax cuts and defense build-up resulted in a stronger dollar. Until military demands grew beyond its full-employment resources, Japan squared the circle through classic multiplier effects that induced a high rate of growth. The Reagan administration managed the feat through foreign borrowing—an avenue closed to Japan in the 1930s. The sources of the fiscal stalemate that developed in the United States are different from those in Japan: conflicting demands between military build-up and a middle-class welfare state on the one hand, and between big business and the military on the other. In the event that the contribution of foreign savings declines, however, in-

[80] On investigations of these relationships, see DeGrasse (fn. 7), and Smith (fn. 9), 61-76. criticisms of these arguments are offered by Blackaby (fn. 73), 8, 15-16.

vestment in the U.S. is likely to suffer in the contest between guns and butter; authoritarian Japan was able to force a different trade-off.

Structurally, the results of devoting increased resources to defense remain controversial in the United States. Military spending contributed to Japan's economic expansion in prewar advanced sectors. What Robert Reich has called Reagan's disguised industrial policy has accelerated the decline of America's basic industry and agriculture (much like that of Japan's agriculture in the 1930s); whether it will produce new, export-oriented industries (and equivalent employment) is questionable. The structural effects of investment in the Strategic Defense Initiative (S.D.I.) and its technologies symbolize the difficulty of predicting economic costs and benefits of even a major military program.[81] Critics and skeptics point to two probable negative structural effects. First, given the pattern of S.D.I. expenditures so far, benefits are likely to flow to established defense contractors rather than to smaller, innovative firms.[82] Second, critics view the potential spin-off effects (like those of most recent defense expenditures on research and development) as low, and the opportunity costs for civilian research and development (public and private) as high. They argue that expenditures made in such a centralized manner, for specific system needs rather than basic research, are less likely to provide technologies that are transferable to commercial applications.[83] Supporters of the S.D.I. argue that if research and development funds were removed from the program, they would not be used for other research and development programs, and that beneficial gains in infrastructure, personnel, and commercial applications are likely.[84]

Finally, in connection with fiscal and structural consequences, one can begin to see protectionist effects in regional trade arrangements such as the Caribbean Basin Initiative and the free-trade agreement with Israel. Those initiatives, driven by foreign policy goals, are a vivid illustration of the client economies that the United States believes offer safe possibilities for economic integration; in the meantime, the demands grow for raising protectionist barriers against more dynamic foreign producers.

[81] See the analysis of the costs of alternative strategic defense systems and their fiscal impact by Barry M. Blechman and Victor A. Utgoff, *Fiscal and Economic Implications of Strategic Defenses* (Washington, DC: Westview Press/Foreign Policy Institute, 1986).

[82] William D. Hartung et al., *The Strategic Defense Initiative: Costs, Contractors & Consequences* (New York: Council on Economic Priorities, 1985), 24.

[83] Robert B. Reich, "High Technology, Defense and International Trade," in John Tirman, *The Militarization of High Technology* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1984), 33-43; Hartung (fn. 82), 6-10, 107-11; Harvey Brooks, "The Strategic Defense Initiative as Science Policy," *International Security* 11 (Fall 1986), 182-84.

[84] Gerold Yonas, "Research and the Strategic Defense Initiative," *International Security* 11 (Fall 1986), 185-89.

While the negative economic consequences that follow from military expansion by a dominant power fit well with Gilpin's assumptions, the effects of military competition on the challenger in the system, the Soviet Union, are of even greater significance for the evolution of the international order. The Soviet Union is the first socialist rival of a dominant power since the Industrial Revolution. Although the evidence is hardly conclusive, Moscow's international ambitions seem to have had clearly negative effects on its economic performance in recent decades. The principal fiscal effect of its military program has been a repeated choice for consumption and military spending over investment.[85] The structural effects of its military ambitions on Soviet economic growth also seem negative. On balance, although some observers have argued that increased military spending strengthens the most efficient sector of the Soviet economy and spawns technological spin-offs for civilian sectors, most specialists maintain that transfer of technology is limited, not only between the defense and the civilian sectors of the economy, but even within the defense sector.[86] This pattern of limited spin-offs has been reinforced by the priority that the defense industry enjoys within the economy and the secrecy in which it has been shrouded.[87] The beneficial economic effects of military expansion that may have characterized the planned economy of the 1930s seems to have disappeared:

> In the 1930s the planning system served both industrial and military policy equally well. But now a contradiction has emerged between the two, for while the system hinders progress in civilian industry, it allows the state to protect the defence sector and ensure that it is more successful in pursuing technological progress.[88]

The U.S.S.R. remains the only power with a formal imperial sphere, one directly linked to its external strategy. The protectionist effects on Soviet economic performance of its ties to Eastern Europe may have become negative: a heavily subsidized and inefficient regional economy confronts political unrest at a time when Soviet resources are stretched by renewed military competition with the United States.[89]

[85] See Rush (fn. 12).

[86] For the positive view of structural effects, see John W. Kiser, "How the Arms Race Really Helps Moscow," *Foreign Policy* 60 (Fall 1985), 40-51.

[87] David Holloway, *The Soviet Union and the Arms Race* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 146; Mikhail Agursky, *The Soviet Military-Industrial Complex* (Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems 31, Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, Hebrew University, 1980), 9-16, 25.

[88] Holloway (fn. 87), 171.

[89] The economic costs and benefits of the Soviet sphere are the subject of considerable controversy. On the question of whether and why the U.S.S.R. subsidizes Eastern Europe, see Michael Marrese, "CMEA: Effective but Cumbersome Political Economy," *International Organization* 40 (Spring 1986), 287-327; Josef C. Brada, "Soviet Subsidization of Eastern Eu-

The negative feedback effects of military competition on the economies of the United States and the Soviet Union in recent decades suggest an often overlooked reason for the relative stability within the international system since 1945. Robert Gilpin, Kenneth Waltz, and others argue that the clear bipolarity of the present system has played a principal role in lowering the risk of hegemonic war; others give credit to nuclear weapons.[90] Although power configuration and military technology both figure in explaining the restrained competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, the economic effects described—peculiar to the post-1945 system—provide a supplementary explanation. Before 1914 and again in the 1930s, external ambition and economic dynamism were linked: peculiar forms of late-industrializing capitalism in Germany and Japan provided the principal destabilizing force in the international system. Today, the dominant power as well as the challenger face the erosion of their economic edge; the other major industrial powers—Germany and Japan—no longer pursue external ambitions through military means. Thus, the ambitious pay an economic price that restrains their contest, while more dynamic economies (in contrast to the 1930s or the 1890s) are not ambitious. Until the elite of another ascendant power (China?) discovers the means to reinforce its military ambitions with economic success, the stability that has characterized the present system for more than four decades is likely to persist.

rope: The Primacy of Economics over Politics?" *Journal of Comparative Economics* 9 (March 1985), 80-92; Valerie Bunce, "The Empire Strikes Back: The Evolution of the Eastern Bloc from a Soviet Asset to a Soviet Liability," *International Organization* (Winter 1985), 13-28.

[90] For a review, see John Lewis Gaddis, "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System," *International Security* 10 (Spring 1986), 99-142.

# THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, AND THE POLITICS OF OPPOSITES

By MIROSLAV NINCIC

PROGRESS in coming to intellectual grips with the forces driving U.S.-Soviet relations has been slow. Historians, and a number of political scientists, have provided excellent interpretative chronologies of the onset of the cold war and of the vicissitudes of detente,[1] and a body of capable work has been produced on strategic competition and arms control,[2] as well as on matters of crisis prevention and management.[3] Nevertheless, there has not been much systematic work on the structure of the overall relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, or on the forces behind the rhythms and cycles that these relations display. Too often, inquiry into what drives the rivalry is relegated to a set of questions to which the answer seems to be so obvious as never to require explication. It is apparent, however, that the policies of the superpowers toward each other are shaped by the interplay of domestic and international circumstances, and that the former are probably no less important than the latter. This premise has been repeatedly confirmed with respect to the arms race[4] and may well be true of Soviet-American relations more generally.

[1] See, for example, John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982); Louis J. Halle, *The Cold War as History* (New York: Harper & Row, 1967); Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War: 1945-1975* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1976); and Bernard A. Weisberger, *Cold War, Cold Peace: The United States and Russia since 1945* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1984).

[2] The literature is vast. Representative items include Thomas R. Cusack and Michael D. Ward, "Military Spending in the United States, Soviet Union, and People's Republic of China," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 25 (September 1981), 429-70; Stephen J. Majeski and David L. Jones, "Arms Race Modeling: Causality, Analysis and Model Specification," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 25 (June 1981), 259-83; Michael Nacht, *The Age of Vulnerability* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1985); Miroslav Nincic, *The Arms Race* (New York: Praeger, 1982); and William K. Domke, Richard C. Eichenberg, and Catherine M. Kelleher, "The Illusion of Choice: Defense and Welfare in Advanced Industrial Democracies: 1948-1978," *American Political Science Review* 77 (March 1983), 19-35.

[3] See, for example, Arthur M. Cox, *Russian Roulette: The Superpower Game* (New York: Times Books, 1982); Alexander L. George, *Managing US-Soviet Rivalry: Problems of Crisis Prevention* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983); and William R. Uri, *Beyond the Hotline: How We Can Prevent the Crisis that Might Bring on a Nuclear War* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985).

[4] See, for example, Cusack and Ward (fn. 2); Nincic (fn. 2); and Miroslav Nincic, "Fluc

By examining the nature and impact of public preferences regarding U.S. Soviet policy, this article will treat a specific aspect of the policy's domestic context. Historically, official attitudes toward the Kremlin have interacted with public opinion in a variety of ways. At times, the government's policy has been manipulative, seeking to mold national opinion in a manner consistent with its preferences and programs. At other times, policy has been reactive, as an administration has let actual or anticipated public attitudes toward the U.S.S.R. shape its own attitudes and behavior.

President Truman's tough anti-Soviet rhetoric of 1947 and his emphasis on the communist danger were largely guided by the need to mobilize the nation around his major foreign policy and national security initiatives—most prominently the Truman Doctrine and an increasing reliance on nuclear weaponry as tools of external policy. In 1950, one State Department memorandum observed that it seemed "necessary" for the administration to oversimplify Soviet intentions in order to ensure congressional and popular support for its defense program[5]—a defense program that was largely rooted in the apocalyptic views contained in the famous NSC-68 secret memorandum. Similarly, some of the vehemence in President Reagan's early denunciations of the Soviet Union flowed from a desire to rouse the country's anxiety and distrust toward the Soviets, which had softened in the years of detente.

Although official attitudes on East-West matters are sometimes intended to mold public opinion, it is a matter of pragmatic politics, and especially electoral considerations, that these attitudes must also be responsive to existing national moods. As John Lewis Gaddis has convincingly argued, major shifts in U.S. containment strategies have been influenced at least as much by domestic electoral concerns as by the Kremlin's actions.[6] By the 1952 electoral campaign, the nation displayed signs of frustration with the costs and ineffectiveness of containment, and the Republican Party, guided largely by John Foster Dulles, reacted by urging a policy of "rollback" designed to reverse Soviet gains in Eastern Europe (rather than merely to contain Moscow's power). Despite its declared policy of "massive retaliation" with nuclear weapons in response to a Soviet foray outside of its sphere of influence, the Eisenhower administration's natural prudence and fiscal conservatism led it to be content with a combination of flamboyant rhetoric and considerable caution regarding the

tuations in Soviet Defense Spending," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 27 (December 1983), 648-60. But see also Charles Ostrom and Robin F. Marra, "US Defense Spending and the Soviet Estimate," *American Political Science Review* 80 (September 1986), 819-42.

[5] Quoted in Ernest R. May, "The Cold War," in Joseph S. Nye Jr., ed., *The Making of America's Soviet Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 226.

[6] Gaddis (fn. 1).

actual use of force. Some years later, John F. Kennedy's strong statements on missile gaps, and his call for a major defense build-up, seemed to stem from his perception of where the greatest electoral advantage lay. During Richard Nixon's quest for the Presidency, his conciliatory stance on U.S.-Soviet issues was also probably dictated by electoral concerns and a recognition of public weariness with confrontation and large defense budgets. Ronald Reagan's election in 1980 (and the campaign platforms of his principal opponents) reflected the fact that American public opinion was no longer in sympathy with the idea of detente, and that more votes were to be gained by hardline than by conciliatory policies.

Public attitudes have encouraged major shifts in Washington's Soviet policies even outside the specific context of electoral politics—simply in the normal play of influence between the public and the government. Although President Truman did seek to heighten public hostility toward the Soviet Union in order to gain support for his national security program, it appears that his initial decision to move away from cooperation was taken in response to increasing public irritation with Moscow's postwar behavior. Schlesinger points out that "[it was] the mass of ordinary people who first became angry over Soviet actions and then turned the Truman administration around."[7] Similarly, President Carter's increasing assertiveness toward the Kremlin at the end of his incumbency had much to do with the average American's growing anger with the U.S.S.R. in the late seventies. To some extent, then, public feelings have provided an independent drive behind U.S.-Soviet relations.

As George F. Kennan has observed,

> The motivations for American policy toward the Soviet Union from the start have been primarily subjective, not objective in origin. They have presented for the most part not reactions to the nature of an external phenomenon (the Soviet regime) but rather the reflections of emotional and political impulses making themselves felt on the American scene.[8]

Adam B. Ulam concurs, remarking that, with regard to the Soviet Union, "powerful gusts of popular emotion rather than factual data about the international situation determined the main lines of American foreign policy."[9]

Though the public may have made its influence felt at crucial junctures, the limits to the role it can expect to play are defined by its overall

[7] Arthur Schlesinger Jr., "The Cold War Revisited," *New York Review of Books*, October 25, 1979, p. 17.

[8] Kennan, *The Nuclear Delusion: Soviet-American Relations in the Atomic Age* (New York: Pantheon Books, 198[illegible]), 229.

[9] Ulam, *Dangerous Relations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 7.

apathy and patchy knowledge regarding the substance of foreign policy issues, including those involving the Soviet Union. For example, despite the centrality of NATO to America's security arrangements, in 1964 only 58 percent of those surveyed knew that the United States was a member of NATO, while 38 percent thought that the U.S.S.R. was a member.[10] In 1985, 28 percent of the public believed that the United States and the Soviet Union had fought as enemies during World War II, and 44 percent did not know that the two had been allies at the time.[11]

## Two Models of Opinion Formation

Because the public's levels of knowledge and understanding are quite low, its input into foreign policy cannot proceed from an informed assessment of needs and possibilities. Thus, if we assume that public opinion does bring itself to the attention of the makers of foreign policy, we must understand how it is formed and how it is expressed. Two possibilities suggest themselves.

Some observers assume that such opinion operates in the form of occasional bursts of emotion, interspersed with long stretches of apathy. This may be termed the *impulsive model* of attitude formation; it implies that the overall foreign policy mood of the nation, based on emotional whim rather than coherent thought and adequate information (Ulam's "gusts of popular emotion"), is likely to be volatile and unpredictable. This image is held by George Kennan who, referring to the American public, has observed that it is

> similar to one of those prehistoric monsters with a body as long as this room and the brain the size of a pin: he lies there in his primeval mud and pays little attention to his environment: he is slow to wrath—in fact, you practically have to whack his tail off to make him aware that his interests are being disturbed; but once he grasps this, he lays about him with such blind determination that he not only destroys his adversary but largely wrecks his native habitat.[12]

The prediction to be drawn from this assessment is that public moods will swing wildly, and often erratically, between extremes of indifference or complaisance on the one hand, and belligerence on the other. Such an expectation is consistent with the thinking of certain other political sci-

[10] Lloyd A. Free and Hadley Cantril, *The Political Beliefs of Americans* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1968), 60.

[11] Adam Clymer, "Polling Americans," *New York Times Magazine*, November 10, 1985, p. 48.

[12] Kennan, *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950* (New York: New American World Library, 1959), 59.

entists. In his study of mass belief systems, Philip Converse observed tha
the mass public (as opposed to elites) exhibits very little constraint amon
its various opinions, which are not mutually linked and anchored by
contextual grasp.[13] Accordingly, these opinions tend to be quite unstabl
James Rosenau, in a pioneering study of public opinion on foreign policy
maintained that the "mass public" (the vast majority of Americans
knows very little about its nation's external affairs and does not care t
know much more: its response to international events is "less one of in
tellect and more one of emotion, less one of opinion and more one o
mood." And, while the dominant mood "is, of course, indifference an
passivity," it sometimes "swings from one extreme to another."[14] Con
verse generally referred to the opinions of individuals; Rosenau appeare
to have in mind both the attitudes of individuals within the mass publi
and of the aggregate itself.

This image of the American public as moody and lurching betwee
attitudinal extremes may or may not apply to other areas of foreign af
fairs, but it does not adequately describe feelings toward the Sovie
Union.

The American people never could have been described as overly trust
ing or complaisant with regard to the Soviet challenge. As Figure 1 illus
trates, opinions of the Soviet Union have fluctuated within a band rang
ing from cool to frigid; the portion of the public expressing a favorabl
opinion of the U.S.S.R. has always been less than half.[15] In addition, over
all opinion cannot be described as particularly volatile. Rather, it ha
tended to track the general state of relations between the two countries
improving progressively during the fifties and sixties, registering new
highs during the period of detente, deteriorating during the collapse o
relations in the early eighties, and stabilizing thereafter.

Americans have always endorsed the need for military preparedness
For example, 80 percent of the respondents who were asked to list the
major factors in U.S. greatness in 1976 mentioned military strength.[16]
Normally, some 20 percent of the public wants larger defense budgets,
but in 1980, when Soviet-American relations had deteriorated and when

[13] Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in David Apter, ed., *Ideology and Discontent* (New York: Free Press, 1964), 206-61.

[14] Rosenau, *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy* (New York: Random House, 1961), chap. 4.

[15] In Gallup and N.O.R.C. surveys, respondents were asked to rank their approval of the U.S.S.R. on a ten-point scale, with +1 to +5 indicating some level of approval and −1 to −5 indicating some level of disapproval. The Gallup data are for 1953, 1954, 1956, 1966, 1967, 1973, 1976, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, and 1983. N.O.R.C. data are for 1972, 1974, 1975, 1977, 1985, and 1986.

[16] Roper Public Opinion Center, "Factors in America's Greatness," *Current Opinion* 6 (January 1976), 2.

FIGURE 1
U.S. PUBLIC APPROVAL OF THE SOVIET UNION

U.S. defense outlays had declined as a percentage of national income during the late seventies, 60 percent of respondents desired more military spending. After the dramatic increase in defense outlays under the Reagan administration in the early eighties, this figure declined to its traditional level of 20 percent.[17] The U.S. public has thus not been indifferent to the Soviet challenge, but it has not expressed rabid belligerence toward the U.S.S.R.

William Schneider reports that one-half of the public tends to agree with the view that "we should take a strong position with the Soviets now so they won't go any further, but at the same time we should try to reestablish good relations with them." By contrast, only about one-quarter of the respondents agree with each of the two more extreme positions that "we should do nothing that is likely to provoke an American-Soviet conflict, but instead should negotiate and reason out our differences," and that "it is clear the Soviets can't be trusted and we will have to rely on increased military strength to counter them."[18]

Despite the dramatic deterioration in superpower relations during the early years of the Reagan administration, and even though public approval of the Soviet Union had fallen to 21 percent, most Americans were

[17] Bruce M. Russett and Harvey Starr, *World Politics: The Menu for Choice*, 2d ed. (San Francisco: Freeman, 1985), chap. 10.

[18] Schneider, "Rambo and Reality: Having It Both Ways," in Kenneth A. Oye, Robert J. Lieber, and Donald Rothchild, eds., *Eagle Resurgent? The Reagan Era in American Foreign Policy* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1987), 49.

not really swept up in the wave of hostility. A majority of those questioned wanted arms control talks, cultural and educational exchanges and even joint efforts to solve energy problems.[19] In 1984, when relations were still icy, 90 percent of the public endorsed nuclear arms control negotiations, and over 80 percent wanted to expand academic and cultural exchanges with the Soviet Union.[20]

It is apparent that, despite proven support for a strong defense and overall distrust of the U.S.S.R., the U.S. public is not comfortable with unbridled hostility and saber-rattling—not at all Kennan's prehistoric monster wildly lashing out when jarred by events. If we assume that it has a somewhat more systematic approach to evaluating policy toward the U.S.S.R., two considerations must be kept in mind. On the one hand, Americans appear to have a reasonable standard of what desirable foreign policy should be; in all likelihood, they do measure governmental behavior against this standard. On the other hand, because of low levels of information and weak analytical tools for judging the conduct of foreign affairs, rather simple rules of evaluation must be thought to operate.

From what we have seen, it appears that the two values to which the public most consistently adheres regarding Soviet policy are those of strength and of peace. The first is reflected in support for adequate military power and in the conviction that the United States cannot deal with the Kremlin from a position of weakness or docility. The second is expressed in a desire for negotiated agreements between the superpowers and a dislike of pugnacious "high noon" postures and excessive militarism. Consequently, U.S. presidents have been led to promise both toughness toward the Soviet Union and efforts to avoid dangerous confrontation.[21] Beyond certain levels, however, these two values become increasingly incompatible, and choices must be made. We may suppose that, desiring both, the public will tend to reward behavior enhancing that value (either peace or strength) which appears currently most slighted in U.S. foreign policy.[22] We may also assume that the public evaluates both the symbolic and the tangible side of foreign policy—its tone and rhetoric as well as the concrete activities it produces.

Specifically, we hypothesize that, when current policies seem overly

[19] John E. Reilly, *American Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy* (Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1983), 15.

[20] *The Harris Survey*, May 28, 1984, p. 3.

[21] Alexander L. George and Robert O. Keohane, "The Concept of National Interests," in Alexander L. George, ed., *Presidential Decision Making in Foreign Policy* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980), 225.

[22] This, of course, is based on the usual assumption that the marginal utility of a value increases the less one has of it.

tilted toward military means and a confrontational tone, the public will prefer evidence of conciliatory behavior; when current policies seem excessively soft and accommodating toward the Soviets, evidence of resolute toughness will be preferred. This may be called the *politics of opposites* model of public opinion. While the impulsive model implies that public attitudes will amplify swings in U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union, the politics of opposites assumes that public influence is more likely to have a moderating role.

FIGURE 2
ATTITUDES PREDICTED BY THE POLITICS OF OPPOSITES

We can test the validity of the model with reference to recent history. If concern shifts toward the value that seems to be slighted by the U.S. government's Soviet policy, the public may be expected to approve of cooperative initiatives by hawkish administrations while frowning on similar behavior by administrations thought to be dovish toward the U.S.S.R. Of the nation's two most recent administrations, Ronald Reagan's has been unabashedly hawkish while Jimmy Carter's, except perhaps for its final phase, has been considered quite dovish. Ultimately, neither approach met with the public's wholehearted approval. In 1980, 60 percent of the respondents in a Gallup survey thought that President Carter was "not tough enough" in his dealing with the Soviet Union.[23] In 1983, on

[23] *The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1980* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1981), 52.

the other hand, 56 percent of the public, when asked about President Reagan's approach, agreed with the statement that "while it's good to have someone as president who is firm with the Soviets, I worry that he might get us into another war." An identical percentage concurred with the view that "he doesn't seem to realize that negotiations to make peace are more important than building up the armed might of the U.S."[24]

Although this information provides some preliminary support for the hypothesis, it would be more revealing to examine whether fluctuations in public support for Reagan's and Carter's Soviet policies were actually correlated with their respective dovishness and hawkishness—i.e., whether the public preferred conciliatory moves by President Reagan and wanted tougher initiatives from President Carter. To avoid an overly mechanical approach, and to get a direct sense of how public feelings and foreign policy have interacted, we will begin by reviewing the major phases of Reagan's and Carter's Soviet policy and the shifts in public approval that they evoked.

## Ronald Reagan, the U.S. Public, and the Soviet Union

Figure 3 displays the public's evaluation of Reagan's Soviet policy between 1981 and 1986, the policy of a president who is generally considered the most fervently anti-Communist and the most thoroughly distrustful of the Russians of any chief executive in the nation's recent history.[25]

Over the entire period, the portion of the public approving of the way President Reagan handled relations with the Soviet Union ranged from a low of 40 percent (October 1982) to a high of 65 percent (January 1986). Though this reflects a generally favorable evaluation, approval ratings have moved both up and down. The pattern of responses demonstrates that, with very few exceptions, Americans thought better of their president's policies when they moved away from confrontation than when they were pugnaciously hostile. Over the period of five and a-half years, and on the basis of the public opinion data at our disposal, we can distinguish thirteen shifts in approval ratings (A-M); all but two of these were in the direction anticipated by the hypothesis.

During the first period (A) the administration was busy sounding the tocsin on Soviet involvement with terrorism (an allegation later denied by

[24] *The Harris Survey*, May 9, 1983.

[25] The wording of the question was: "Tell me whether you approve or disapprove of the way President Reagan is handling this problem: relations with the Soviet Union." The figures are reported in *Gallup Report* No. 251 (Princeton, NJ: The Gallup Poll, 1986), 20.

FIGURE 3
PUBLIC APPROVAL OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SOVIET POLICY
1981-1986

the C.I.A.); declaring a new era of U.S. attitudes toward the Kremlin—an era of toughness where treaties would be no substitute for military strength; and describing the Soviets as an "evil force" bent on destroying the United States. During these months, public misgivings about Reagan's policy appeared to grow as approval dropped ten points (from 58 percent to 48 percent). This was followed (B) by a mild softening of rhetoric and a few, admittedly minor, conciliatory gestures.[26] Approval climbed back to 53 percent in late fall. In January 1982, however, relations took another turn for the worse. Martial law had been declared in Poland on December 13, 1981, and the administration proclaimed that arms talks would henceforth be linked to an improvement in the Polish situation. A meeting between Haig and Gromyko in Geneva on January 26 led to nothing but bitter recrimination.[27] Relations moved from cold to frigid, and approval dropped to 41 percent in March (C).

Though public support for the President's Soviet policies increased during the next few months (D), new dimensions of East-West tension emerged between mid-summer and mid-fall (E).[28] Relations were as icy

[26] In late September, for example, the President dispatched a letter to Secretary Brezhnev seeking a "framework of mutual respect"; this was followed, the next day, by a "frank" talk between Haig and Gromyko setting a date for arms talks in Geneva.

[27] Furthermore, the Soviet offer, in mid-March, to forgo further deployment of its nuclear weapons in the European U.S.S.R. if the United States installed no more medium-range missiles in Western Europe, was dismissed by President Reagan as "pure propaganda."

[28] The administration embarked on an all-out effort to stop its allies from providing the

as they have ever been during the Reagan administration, and a meeting between Shultz and Gromyko in September failed to produce a thaw. Between June and October 1982, public approval of policy toward Moscow slid from 49 percent to a low of 40%.

Nearly a year of ambiguous foreign policy signals followed (F). On the one hand, the President took his rhetoric to new extremes with a speech, delivered to a group of evangelicals in March 1983, denouncing the U.S.S.R. as an "evil empire" that acts as the "focus of evil in the modern world."[29] At the same time, however, there was a flurry of arms control initiatives and other marginally constructive moves. Grain sales to the Soviets were once again liberalized, the administration ended its ban on furnishing gas pipeline equipment, and the I.N.F. and START talks in Geneva showed a fair amount of activity. Public approval of the President's Soviet policy remained low during this period, but declined no further.

A short-lived upswing in public approval followed (G). On September 1, the Soviet Union shot down a Korean Air Lines passenger plane, killing all 269 people on board. Amid widespread public indignation, the administration condemned this action, but the tone of the response was measured. Reagan described the downing as an "act of barbarism" and announced the curtailment of cultural, scientific, and diplomatic exchanges. Still, these sanctions were comparatively gentle, and the President explained the restrained response by observing that "it would be easy to think in terms of vengeance, but that is not a proper answer." Rather, he stressed that "we must not give up our effort to bring [the Soviet Union] into the world community of nations," and "we cannot, we must not, give up our effort to reduce the arsenals of destructive weapons threatening the world."[30] By most standards, this was a mild response. In any case, the tragedy was not allowed to stand in the way of a number of constructive initiatives,[31] and approval ratings climbed five points during

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U.S.S.R. with pipeline equipment (causing considerable friction within the Alliance). In addition, Alexander Haig declared that trends in Soviet missile deployment belied conciliatory overtures, while the Soviets' proposal to cut their strategic weapons forces, if Washington would agree to shelve its medium-range missile plans, was dismissed as unacceptable. On July 19, Reagan announced an end to the U.S.-U.K.-U.S.S.R. negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban for nuclear weapons; two weeks later, each superpower expelled one of the other's leading journalists.

[29] He also undertook a renewed drive for MX deployment, launched his fateful "Star Wars" program, and accused "foreign" (read Soviet) agents of instigating the freeze movement within the United States.

[30] "Reagan Denouncing Soviet, Bars Series of Negotiations; Demand It Pay for Jet Losses," *New York Times*, September 16, 1983, p. 14.

[31] On September 26, 1983, Reagan announced a new set of positions on medium-range nuclear forces; soon after, he put forward a strategic arms proposal based on the build-down concept.

this period—from 41 percent in August to 46 percent in November—after which a brief reversal (H) was registered. When the Soviets walked out of the Geneva arms talks in protest against initial deployments of U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe, the level of mutual recrimination rose once again. The percentage of the public endorsing the President's Soviet policy slipped slightly, to 43 percent.

The next phase (I) lasted throughout 1984 and witnessed steadily increasing public approval of Reagan's Soviet policy. This was also a time of generally responsible and statesmanlike dealings with Moscow.[32] The year was somewhat marred by the Soviets' refusal to participate in the 1984 Olympic Games in Los Angeles, but a number of steps set relations on a healthier course. In July, the two sides initialed an agreement to modernize the Hot Line, and Washington lifted its ban on Soviet fishing in American waters. On September 9, Secretary Shultz offered talks on restricting space-based weapons. Later that month, the Secretary of State met with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, who, somewhat unexpectedly, was invited to the White House as well. On October 16, Soviet Party chief Chernenko expressed optimism regarding relations between the two sides. During this period, public approval consistently hovered above the 50 percent mark. On November 22, a new round of arms control meetings was announced and, in December, administration officials hinted that the U.S. might forsake advanced antimissile defenses in exchange for Soviet reductions in offensive arms. By January 1985, public approval of Reagan's policies reached 54 percent.

The new year began with mixed, but ultimately discouraging, indications on Soviet-American relations and slipping approval ratings (J).[33] In May, however, things were again in a constructive phase (K), and the tone got progressively warmer.[34] By fall, rumors of an impending first summit meeting between the President and the Soviet leader were confirmed and, on November 19, Reagan and Gorbachev met in Geneva. An aura of cordiality and optimism surrounded their talks; public approval of the President's Soviet policy soared to an all-time high of 65 percent.

The early part of 1986 (L) brought a warm exchange of televised New

[32] On January 16, 1983, the President softened his criticism of the U.S.S.R. and appealed for nuclear arms negotiations and a dialogue between the two countries. Although several days later Reagan submitted a report to Congress alleging Soviet violations of arms control obligations, he again called for improved relations in his State of the Union address on January 24.

[33] While there were useful bilateral contacts in Geneva, the talks did not seem to be leading anywhere; the President reiterated, with considerable fanfare, his charge that the Soviets had violated a number of arms treaty provisions.

[34] A trade agreement was signed, and President Reagan vowed to abide by the unratified SALT II Agreement.

Year greetings between the two leaders, but the tone of relations cooled rapidly in the face of Reagan's commitment to the Strategic Defense Initiative and the obstacle it placed on the path of a second Reagan-Gorbachev summit.[35] As a new chill fell on relations, approval dropped to 57 percent in April. By June, the President made a constructive speech on the future of relations between the two superpowers; predictably, public approval once again moved upward during the last of the periods covered here (M).

Most of the observed periods confirm the notion that conciliatory moves by President Reagan were rewarded with increasing public approval of his Soviet policy, while bellicose initiatives provoked the opposite reaction. There was one major exception: during the spring and early summer of 1982 (D), a period of vitriolic anti-Soviet rhetoric, the public expressed growing approval. Another period (F) was marked by mixed indications of U.S. policy toward Moscow and a fairly flat, though gently rising, level of public approval. Because of the ambiguity, and for purposes of the following statistical analysis, this period will be treated as a disconfirmation of the hypothesis. Despite the one exception and the one ambiguous case, the evidence appears strong that, given Reagan's anti-Soviet credentials and tendency to rely on tough talk and military strength, the public's dominant concern was that relations might be allowed to deteriorate beyond safe levels. Consequently, nonconfrontational initiatives were considered especially necessary and welcome. During the Carter administration, public response had been very different.

## Approval of Carter's Soviet Policy

Unlike his successor, President Carter was generally regarded as a conciliatory president on East-West matters. He had came to office on a pro-detente platform, arguing against an "inordinate fear of communism." Although he did display occasional periods of firm rhetoric and increasing sympathy for expanding military budgets, he was not, nor was he ever perceived to be, one of the more hawkish presidents of the United States. We have less information on the public's responses to his Soviet policy than we have on Reagan's; what we do have allows us to identify four distinct periods.[36] The data indicate that approval for Carter's policies vis-

[35] In addition, in an unusually provocative move, two U.S. warships sailed into Soviet waters in the Black Sea in March.

[36] Gallup seems to have started surveying public approval of presidential Soviet policies at the beginning of the Reagan Presidency. Data for Jimmy Carter's approval ratings are from various issues of the *Harris Survey*. Respondents were asked whether or not they approved of "Carter's handling relations with Russia."

FIGURE 4
PUBLIC APPROVAL OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S SOVIET POLICY
1977-1979

à-vis the U.S.S.R. fluctuated between 28 and 43 percent; in contrast to the Reagan period, support increased when Carter became more assertive, and tended to decline when he was conciliatory.

Our scores begin in June 1977, six months after Carter's inauguration. In the first phase (A), the President's attitude toward the Soviet Union was one of benign optimism that detente could be saved; it included several initiatives to maintain the momentum of cooperation carried over from the early seventies. SALT and Comprehensive Test Ban talks started in Geneva, and there was even serious mention (to the dismay of many of the President's supporters) of bringing Moscow into the Middle East peace process. Despite the President's insistence on needling the Soviets on their human rights record and his willingness to warn the Kremlin against foreign military involvements, he eschewed inflammatory rhetoric, believing that most problems could be resolved in a nonconfrontational manner. The public, however, was less convinced of the merits of a conciliatory approach. By June 1978, approval of Carter's Soviet policy slipped to 28 percent (the lowest point during his administration).

At approximately this time, the President's approach began to change. The new attitude was presaged by a speech delivered at Annapolis on June 7, in which he warned the Soviets that they must choose between cooperation and confrontation. The speech was more assertive and criti-

cal of Soviet conduct than any that Carter had previously delivered.[37] In a new display of toughness, the President also decided to tighten controls on transfers of oil technology to the Soviets. As his stance became more confrontational, public approval of his Soviet policy experienced a significant upswing (B). Toward the end of the year, 43 percent of Americans thought Carter was doing a good job of handling the U.S.S.R.—up 15 points from the June level.

The third period (C), though marked by the President's growing disillusionment with Moscow, nevertheless saw him pushing hard for acceptance of the SALT II treaty, negotiations for which were entering their final phase. He went so far as to indicate that he wanted the United States to abide by the treaty provisions even if the Senate refused to ratify it. This must have been viewed as too much of a concession toward detente and to the Kremlin, and the public judgment of his policy took another nosedive, dropping to 31 percent by March of 1979. The length and data of the fourth period (D) are restricted because most questions referred to President Carter's handling of the hostage crisis rather than to the U.S.S.R. That period witnessed the conclusion of this phase of the strategic arms talks; in mid-June, President Carter and Secretary Brezhnev met in Vienna to sign the SALT II Agreement. The public rewarded this achievement with a somewhat higher approval score. Nevertheless, the difference between Carter's 37 percent at the time of Vienna and Reagan's 65 percent when he met Gorbachev in Geneva is significant.

## The Politics of Opposites and America's Soviet Policy

Although the data are not suited to structural equation techniques, other statistical tools will provide an intuitively meaningful test of the hypotheses flowing from the politics of opposites model of opinion formation. Part A of Table 1 shows the number of increases ($\Delta+$) and decreases ($\Delta-$) in public approval of presidential Soviet policies on occasions when these policies were consistent with their perceived stance toward the Soviet Union (confrontational for Reagan, conciliatory for Carter) or opposite to that which this stance might have led one to expect; part B displays the probabilities associated with these numbers.

From these figures we can draw statements, cast in terms of conditional probabilities ($p$), that shed light on the model. We have assumed that, if the President is perceived as too much of either a dove or a hawk,

[37] Following the trials of dissidents Aleksandr Ginzburg and Anatoli Scharantsky, Carter announced a review of existing exchange programs. As part of the same overall policy, he also cancelled a sale of Sperry-Univac computer equipment to Russia.

TABLE 1
PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD THE PRESIDENT'S SOVIET POLICY*

| *Relation of Policy to President's General Stance* | *Movement in Public Approval* | | *Total* |
|---|---|---|---|
| | **A. Number of Instances** | | |
| | $\Delta+$ | $\Delta-$ | |
| Consonant | 2 | 8 | 10 |
| Opposite | 6 | 1 | 7 |
| Total | 8 | 9 | 17 |
| | **B. Probability** | | |
| | $\Delta+$ | $\Delta-$ | |
| Consonant | 0.12 | 0.47 | 0.59 |
| Opposite | 0.35 | 0.06 | 0.41 |
| Total | 0.47 | 0.53 | 1.00 |

* This table includes the following periods from Figures 3 and 4:
Consonant $\Delta+$ : D, F (Reagan)
Consonant $\Delta-$ : A, C, E, H, J, L (Reagan)
A, C (Carter)
Opposite $\Delta+$ : B, G, I, K, M (Reagan)
B (Carter)
Opposite $\Delta-$ : D (Carter)

the public will register increased approval of behavior contrary to the perceived stance or decreased approval of policies consistent with it. Let us begin with the assumption that approval will surge when policies are opposite to general predisposition. The conditional probability is:

$$p(\Delta + | \text{opposite}) = 0.35/0.41 = 0.85.$$

In other words, the data suggest that there is an 85 percent chance that approval will increase if the President acts in a way contrary to that which his general stance toward the Soviets would have led the public to expect; there is only a 15 percent chance that the public will disapprove of such contrary behavior. By extension, the odds that an increase rather than a decrease will occur in the presence of opposite presidential behavior are:

$$\overline{\Omega}_1 = p(\Delta + | \text{opposite})/p(\Delta - | \text{opposite}) = 5.7.$$

Thus, if the President acts contrary to expected stance, the public is 5.7 times more likely to respond with increased rather than decreased ap-

proval of presidential Soviet policies: a strong endorsement of the hypothesis. How do these probabilities present themselves in the case of behavior that is consistent with public expectation? We can repeat the exercise as follows:

$$p(\Delta - |\text{consistent}) = 0.47/0.59 = 0.80.$$

Accordingly,

$$\bar{\Omega}_2 = p(\Delta - |\text{consistent})/p(\Delta + |\text{consistent}) = 4.0.$$

In other words, if a president's policy is consistent with his overall attitude toward the Soviet Union, the odds are 4 to 1 that public approval will decline rather than rise.

### Possible Alternative Explanations

Though the evidence is certainly suggestive, we should address a rival hypothesis. As a competing explanation for the findings, one might argue that the different responses to Reagan's and Carter's Soviet policies were caused by the public's different feelings toward the Soviet Union rather than by presidential dovishness or hawkishness. Though intuitively compelling, the hypothesis does not seem to fit the evidence. Over the period covered by our data on the Carter and Reagan years, an average of 22 percent of the public expressed some level of approval regarding the U.S.S.R. During each of the four periods charted in the Carter administration, the public's opinion of the Soviets was above this average; yet during three of these periods, the President was either punished for an overly conciliatory policy (A,C) or rewarded for adopting a harder line toward Moscow (B). Similarly, during the Reagan years we examined, every survey but one (D) registered a lower than average public evaluation of the U.S.S.R.; yet, in all but one of the periods covered (the exception again is D), the public preferred nonconfrontational behavior. It would seem that the politics of opposites eclipsed overall feelings toward the Soviet Union in determining the public's policy evaluations.

Another competing hypothesis should also be addressed—one that leads to similar conclusions via a different, though less plausible, path. We have assumed that the politics of opposites is a product of the public's tendency to seek a balance between the objectives of peace and strength. Another mechanism, producing similar results, would start with the President's attempt to maximize his domestic support rather than with the public's desire to optimize its values. Here we would assume that the President's existing supporters are unlikely to shift their endorsement no

ıat turn his Soviet policy might take, but that a significant num-
›ple would support him only if he adopted an opposite behavior
he Kremlin. His movement away from what his supporters ex-
·ms of Soviet policy would thus be designed to capture that extra
support, and the higher public approval scores would indicate
tratagem worked. The notion cannot be rejected out of hand,
s rest on a set of suppositions that are, on the whole, unconvinc-
umes that established supporters will not defect despite the shift
policy, while newly courted supporters are supposedly willing
e the President because of his Soviet policy, no matter how they
ıerwise feel about him. Even if we allow that the President seeks
.ize support, not for his overall performance but merely for his
licy, we are still forced to believe that his old support will not
spite his shift of policy, while new support will nevertheless be
In both cases, the more likely result is that gains would be ap-
ely matched by losses—a net wash from the perspective of the

.

e the assumptions behind this explanation are rather implausi-
riginal hypothesis seems to be more valid as an explanation for
s of the study: the public (consisting of some overall supporters
esident and some nonsupporters) shifts its preference between
d conciliatory policies depending on which seems generally
lected—a tendency we have labeled the politics of opposites. It
stressing, however, that both mechanisms would produce the
ılts.

**IPLICATIONS**

ct that, other things being equal, the public will tend to prefer
ıess in dovish presidents while seeking a more conciliatory
ıawkish chief executives has two major implications for the way
d States may interact with the Soviet Union.

'st is that there are limits on how far policies will be allowed to
n either a conciliatory or a confrontational direction, from a
foreign policy that combines peace and strength. If a President
depart too far from either of these two values, the public will
hat the neglected value be given greater prominence in national
ıe public's attitude is of course affected, and often amplified, by
nce of the media, the preferences of interest groups, and the in-
f the political leadership itself. Still, its malleability is limited
emocratic politics, it is the final arbiter of political incumbency.
· can assume that U.S. public opinion will normally limit the

range of feasible policy toward the U.S.S.R. by making extremes politi cally costly. Contrary to what is sometimes assumed, therefore, the publi may act as a moderating influence on the administration's Soviet policy.

The second (and related) implication is that the politics of opposites al lows presidents to preempt the opposition by adopting, once in office, pol icies contrary to those that earlier rhetoric or action would have led th nation to expect. If an apparently dovish president wishes to becom more assertive toward the Soviets, he may do so—not only with impu nity, but even with the prospect of increased public support. The invers is true as well. This tendency thus provides leaders with considerabl flexibility to move in the opposite policy direction—though only reason ably pragmatic presidents would choose to benefit from this liberty.

## A Possible Extension of the Model

A phenomenon that is in some ways parallel may also operate. Publi evaluation of an administration's Soviet policy may clash with the man date that a political leader may have inferred from the public's ideologica inclination. Though we will not provide a comprehensive test of this hy pothesis, and though it is no more than an interesting possibility, certair suggestions and statistical indications are worth considering.

To illustrate: a pronounced conservative mood in the country may no only increase the likelihood that the elected political leadership will be of a similar cast, but also give leaders of all ideological orientations the feel ing that they must respond to this mood with appropriate policies. In the case of relations with the Soviet Union, this mood would presumably be interpreted as a mandate for a hard-line policy. At the same time, the electorate, perceiving a confrontational political bent in the administra tion, may reward predominantly conciliatory policies. Thus, the leaders' interpretation of their mandate may collide with the actual pattern of po litical rewards.

The core beliefs that define political ideology in the United States are usually associated with domestic policy, and, even more so, with issues of morality and lifestyle; but foreign policy beliefs to some extent also flow from overall ideological identification. For example, most Americans who characterize themselves conservatives also generally take more hawkish positions on external affairs than those who consider themselves liberals. The former tend to believe more strongly that too little is spent on defense, have a deeper conviction that communism is the worst form of government, and harbor a more pronounced coldness toward the Soviet Union.[38] The suggestion that a predominantly conservative public

[38] John Robinson, "The Ups and Downs and Ins and Outs of Ideology," *Public Opinion* 7

ɔit a greater dislike for the Soviet Union is particularly signifi-
ɔur hypothesis—sufficiently so to warrant independent confir-
ere.

ıestion of their attitude toward the U.S.S.R., expressed in terms
ɔoint approval scale, has frequently been asked of the American
both the Gallup Organization and N.O.R.C.[39] These surveys
ıı separate data points, each representing the percentage of re-
s who expressed some level of approval of the Soviet Union. On
ɔns since 1968, the Harris Survey has reported the proportion of
nts identifying themselves as either conservative or liberal.[40] It is
possible to establish how closely political ideology predicted
bout the Soviet Union during the 13 years when data were avail-
ɔoth variables.

behavior is also likely to have affected public approval ratings.
e American perspective, the most alarming sort of activity is
the direct external use of Soviet military force, which has oc-
ɔur times since the onset of the cold war: Hungary in 1956,
ovakia in 1968, Afghanistan in 1979, and the destruction of the
ivilian airliner in 1983. The latter two incidents are covered by

ıllowing regression equation incorporates the two hypothesized
s on public attitudes toward the Soviet Union:

$$approv\% = k - \beta_1 |cons\%| - \beta_2 |armed| + u$$

*prov%* = the percentage of respondents expressing some level of
of the Soviet Union; *cons%* = the percentage of respondents
ıg themselves as political conservatives; and *armed* = a variable
whether or not one of the four instances of use of military force
during the twelve months preceding the survey that produced
sponding value of *approv%*. The estimation of this equation, by
od of ordinary least squares, yielded the following results:

TABLE 2
COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES AND RELATED STATISTICS

| t | *Standard Error* | *t value* |
|---|---|---|
| 1.43 | 0.68 | 2.11 |
| 6.96 | 6.10 | 2.78 |
| 8.800 | | |

Durbin-Watson 1.58; N = 13

15.
ıestion of ideological identification was asked by the Harris pollsters in 1968, and
quent occasions.

Both coefficients are in the predicted directions, and both are more than twice their standard errors. As the value of the Durbin-Watson statistic indicates (DW = 1.58), first-order serial correlation does not appear to be a problem. For $\hat{\beta}$, the 90 percent confidence interval (the interval of numbers within which the true coefficient lies by a 90-percent probability) is bounded by the values −0.02 and −2.66. This allows us to predict, both in terms of a specific estimate and of a range of values, the decreases in public approval of the Soviet Union associated with a growth (of 1 percent, 3 percent, 5 percent, 10 percent) in the number of American conservatives. (See Table 3.)

TABLE 3
CONSERVATISM AND APPROVAL OF THE SOVIET UNION

| *Growth in Conservatism* | *Predicted Drop in Approval of U.S.S.R.* | *Bounds of Prediction (based on 90% confidence interval)* |
|---|---|---|
| 1% | 1.43% | −0.2% to − 2.66% |
| 3% | 4.29% | −0.6% to − 7.98% |
| 5% | 7.15% | −1.0% to −13.30% |
| 10% | 14.30% | −2.0% to −26.60% |

For example, if the number of conservatives were to increase by three percent, there is an assumed 90-percent probability that public approval of the Soviet Union would fall by between .6 percent and roughly 8 percent; our best estimate would be a decline of 4.3 percent.

There is consequently a significant relationship between ideological inclinations and attitudes toward the U.S.S.R. If national leaders take the dominant ideological mood as a cue on how to behave toward Moscow (for example, to the extent of adopting a pronounced hard-line stance in a conservative national climate), the politics of opposites might come into play. Thus, a President who is elected by a large conservative vote, and possibly any President who senses a predominantly conservative national mood, may interpret this as a mandate for toughness vis-à-vis the Soviet Union—and the public may initially have intended it as such. But if the President, acting accordingly, conveys the image of a confrontational leader, the public may come to approve of behavior that is contrary to the perceived mandate while opposing activities that are consistent with it.

## THE CASE OF A MODERATE PRESIDENT

The mechanism of the politics of opposites assumes that the President is considered somewhat extreme—i.e., too much of either a hawk or a dove on matters regarding the Soviet Union. But none of Carter's and Reagan's predecessors would have qualified, in the public's mind, as

either excessively confrontational or conciliatory toward the U.S.S.R. This is not astonishing for at least two reasons. First, the postwar bipartisan consensus on East-West matters provided a rather clear set of guidelines along which presidents could direct their external behavior, making it less likely that they would veer away from mainstream preferences. This consensus had collapsed by the late sixties, and the substance of public preferences became less simple. Second, the shifting fortunes of detente in the early seventies furnished an unusually volatile set of standards for any leader trying to gauge the hawkishness or dovishness of his own Soviet policy. Thus, the politics of opposites would not have had an obvious application to administrations that preceded President Carter's, and a different set of rules must have guided the public's reaction to U.S. Soviet policy. In an article devoted to the politics of opposites, we cannot explore the situation of a President who is generally considered moderate, but will offer a few tentative suggestions.

For the years preceding the mid-seventies, the data on public approval of presidential Soviet policy are scant, but they do cover the Presidency of Gerald Ford adequately. In one way, his Presidency was well-suited for our examination, in another way it was not. Ford was not a statesman whom most people would unambiguously have qualified as either a hawk or a dove. His congressional record was generally pro-defense and anti-communist; yet he did not disapprove of Nixon's detente policies and, upon stepping into the White House, made no strong pronouncements regarding the Soviet Union and East-West relations. A president without a clear foreign policy stance provides us with an example of what happens when the politics of opposites has no foundation upon which to operate. On the negative side, the two and a-half years of the Ford administration were too brief for an adequate range of policy initiatives and public reactions to have manifested themselves. Consequently, our data on the Ford Presidency can provide no more than very preliminary suggestions.

Upon assuming the Presidency, Ford experienced the initial surge of public support that is usually given to a new Chief Executive. Shortly after he stepped into office in August 1974, 59 percent of the public approved of his Soviet policy; but this support decreased rapidly and, by March 1975, only 39 percent endorsed his handling of the Soviet Union.[41] The period during which this decline occurred was one marked by an indecisive, but on balance supportive, attitude toward detente. Although a White House official characterized relations as in "pretty good shape," no major new initiatives were undertaken during these months, and the Vladivostok Accord signed in November satisfied neither the partisans of

[41] *The Harris Survey*, May 1, 1975, and November 3, 1975.

arms control nor its conservative critics. In January 1975, the U.S.-So\
trade agreement was annulled by the Kremlin in response to congr
sional efforts to link it to increased emigration of Soviet Jews; yet
President assured the nation, somewhat implausibly, that relations wo
be unaffected. Nothing characterized Gerald Ford's Soviet policy duri
this time as much as its apparent lack of direction.

By the middle of 1975, public opinion exhibited a modest rally arou
Ford's policy, reaching levels of support that remained at the low 40 p
cent mark throughout the summer,[42] possibly because of two events tl
occurred during this period. In May, the United States staged the su
cessful armed rescue of the *Mayaguez*, the U.S. vessel captured by Ca
bodian naval units. The operation was not directed against the Sov
Union, but it nevertheless had an East-West flavor about it. In late Ju
the President traveled to Helsinki for the concluding stages of the Co
ference on European Security and Cooperation; he witnessed the signi
of its Final Act, frequently viewed as an endorsement of Europe's poli
cal division. Although the separate effects of these two activities are r
easily disentangled, both showed a measure of decisiveness that had r
previously been apparent. By fall and winter of 1975, however, supp
dropped back down to 34 percent.[43] This period was again one of hesita
policy, with no dramatic moves in any direction—a period of very halti
movement toward arms control combined with an effort not to provi
the increasingly visible opponents of detente with an issue that could
used against the administration.

The foregoing chronology tentatively suggests that, where the polit
of opposites has no foundation upon which to operate, the public will r
ward the President for *any* display of decisive (though not necessarily e
treme) initiative, whether of a conciliatory or confrontational sort. T
evidence regarding the Ford Presidency is far too sketchy to confirm t
proposition, but it offers information that allows us, at a minimum,
propose the hypothesis. Subsequent studies may wish to incorporate th
suggestion into a more complete model of the relationship between publ
opinion and U.S. Soviet policy.

## Conclusions on the Politics of Opposites

The implications of the politics of opposites are, on the whole, we
come. The mechanism allows leaders some degree of flexibility, bu

[42] In May, 42% approved of his handling of relations with Moscow (*The Harris Survey*, M
27, 1975). In August and September, the figures were, respectively, 43% and 42% (*The Har
Survey*, September 25, 1975).
[43] *The Harris Survey*, February 23, 1976.

within a band of fairly moderate policy. While discouraging extremism, t helps to avoid swings in policy even greater than those that we have actually witnessed. At the same time, a President whose interpretation of he public's initial mandate is overly rigid may experience an unexpected pattern of national disaffection with the policy he thought the public expected.

Finally, the politics of opposites seems to be applicable to areas other than the one we have examined. It is, for example, reflected in the feelings of many Europeans toward the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. Their tendency to vacillate between a fear of insufficient U.S. commitment to the nuclear defense of Western Europe and a fear that the United States may be willing to tolerate nuclear war on European soil has been unmistakable, especially with regard to the issue of theater nuclear forces. Public opinion always seems to stress the concern that is least emphasized in current (American) policy. Macroeconomic issues provide another example of the politics of opposites. The fact that there is usually a trade-off between unemployment and inflation has been recognized for some time, and is embodied in the Phillips curve of economic theory. In the view of the public, that of the two values (employment or price stability) which is most neglected in current economic policy is usually the one that elicits the greatest concern. Thus, although the concept should not be made to carry an overly heavy burden, its explanatory potential is probably not limited to U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union.

# *Research Note*

# ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL EXPLANATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

By NEIL J. MITCHELL and JAMES M. McCORMICK*

GOVERNMENTS organize police forces and armies to protect thei *citizens, build schools and hospitals to educate and care for them and provide financial assistance for the old and unemployed. But governments also kill, torture, and imprison their citizens.* This dark side of *government knows no geographic, economic, ideological, or political boundary. In the Middle East, for example, Iraq has morbidly placed a "welcome" doormat at the entrance to its torture chamber—a place where prisoners are burned with cigarettes and electric hot plates, where* electric shocks are administered to them, and where they are hanged from the ceiling. In Central America, the government of Guatemala tolerates the torture and killing of three church workers who were assisting refugees. In Africa, the Cameroons allows eight prisoners to die of malnutrition; South Africa, through its policy of apartheid, systematically violates the rights of its nonwhite citizens. In Asia, Burmese army units operating in Karen state use local civilians as minesweepers. In Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union confines dissenters to psychiatric hospitals. In Western Europe, the residents of Northern Ireland are subjected to trials that fail to conform to international standards, and civilians are shot by the security forces.[1] The list goes on.

Unfortunately, this type of governmental behavior is—even in the late 20th century—a dismal characteristic of contemporary politics. Most of the world's countries hold some "prisoners of conscience" or detain po-

* The order of the authors' names was randomly selected to reflect equal contributions tc the research effort. An earlier version of this research was presented at the 1987 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. We would like to thank Professors Hank Jenkins-Smith and Philip Roeder of the University of New Mexico and Professor Ke Koehler of Iowa State University for their helpful comments and suggestions on this research Thanks are also due to the Faculty Leave Program at Iowa State for supporting a portion of this research.

[1] These illustrations are taken from *Amnesty International Report 1985*, describing human rights conditions in 1984.

ical prisoners without a fair trial. There is, however, a substantial varia-
on between nations in the degree of these human rights violations.
While some treat their citizens ruthlessly, others—though by no means
nocent in their conduct—treat them better. Despite the fact that varia-
ons in the level of human rights violations across the world have been
ecognized, relatively little empirical research has been done to account
or these differences.

Instead, most of the empirical research in this area has tended to con-
entrate on the influence of a country's human rights record on U.S.
oreign policy, primarily on decisions concerning American aid. Un-
loubtedly stimulated by new congressional statutes and the Carter
dministration's emphasis on human rights, a number of studies emerged
n the late 1970s and early 1980s on the relationship (or lack of it) between
uman rights and American assistance. This trend has continued into the
nid-1980s, probably fueled in part by the Reagan administration's appar-
nt reversal of this emphasis. Beyond these analyses—and a considerable
dialogue on what exactly constitutes human rights—little work has pro-
ceeded to the next important step: the characteristics of countries that are
most likely to violate human rights.

In our research, we intend to undertake just such an analysis. Specifi-
cally, two principal tasks guide our work. First, we seek to develop a new
measure with which to compare human rights conditions on a much
wider basis than has been done previously and to specify more fully the
degree of human rights violations throughout the world. Second, we de-
velop and test several alternate hypotheses that might account for this
variation in global human rights conditions. By eliminating, or specify-
ing, popular explanations of human rights violations, we can begin to un-
derstand the conditions that precipitate those violations.

## Explaining Human Rights Violations

Although human rights issues are of immediate public concern and
great political importance, the theoretical contribution of political science
to explaining these violations has been modest at best. In view of the cen-
trality of the state in affecting the rights of its citizens, this theoretical
weakness is particularly surprising. After all, the liberal tradition has
held, since Hobbes, that life under government is preferable to life with-
out it. Thus, while government may be "evil," human beings on their
own are worse. In Thomas Paine's words:

> Society is produced by our wants, and government by our wickedness. . . .
> Society in every state is a blessing, but government even in its best state is

*but a necessary evil. . . . Government, like dress, is the badge of lost innocence. . . .*[2]

*The question of what kinds of governments will be most evil would appear to be a natural priority for research; what we have instead are efforts* to understand repression in the Soviet Union or in the southern cone of Latin America. Only a few efforts have been made to theorize on a global level about the kinds of governments that are likely to engage in human rights violations.

Where, then, do we look for some theoretical guidance? Our point of departure, some writing on democracy and political instability, does not always address human rights violations directly; it does, however, carry important implications for the relative propensity of states to violate the rights of their citizens. Moreover, it allows us to develop several plausible economic and political hypotheses about states and human rights violations that can be tested empirically.

### Economic Conditions and Human Rights Violations

Economic modernization, it is sometimes argued, leads to political stability and, in turn, to increased respect for human rights. The poorest countries, with substantial social and political tensions created by economic scarcity, would be most unstable and thus most apt to use repression in order to maintain control. Robert McNamara has succinctly summarized this view: "There can . . . be no question but that there is an irrefutable relationship between violence and economic backwardness."[3] The implication of McNamara's analysis is that the poorer the country, the greater the probability of human rights violations as the government seeks to maintain some semblance of order. Empirically, then, a first proposition for testing would be a simple one: an inverse relationship would exist between the wealth of a society and its human rights violations.

Samuel Huntington, in his classic investigation of political stability in *Political Order in Changing Societies*, has sought to refute this "simple poverty thesis." Although human rights violations are not the focus of his work, he does suggest some likely correlates: he argues that it is not the poorest countries that will be the most unstable "because people who are really poor are too poor for politics and too poor for protest."[4]

Evidence, nonetheless, did exist to suggest that causes of violence in such nations lay with the modernization process rather than with the backward-

[2] Thomas Paine, *Common Sense* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1976), 65.

[3] Quoted in Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 41.

[4] *Ibid.*, 52.

ness itself. *Wealthier nations tend to be more stable than those less wealthy, but the poorest nations, those at the bottom of the international economic ladder, tend to be less prone to violence and instability than those countries just above them.*[5]

As social and economic change broadens, political participation increases, and the demands on government are greater. According to Huntington, traditional sources of political authority are thus challenged, and new political institutions (particularly political parties) are necessary to moderate and channel the demands of the newly mobilized citizenry. If such institutions are not developed, instability and disorder will result. Such a situation is ripe for political repression. The inference from Huntington's analysis, unlike that from McNamara's, is that the "modernizing" states would be most susceptible to a high level of human rights violations. Put differently, a curvilinear relationship should exist between the relative wealth of a nation and human rights violations: the very poor and the very rich countries would be less likely to have substantial levels of human rights violations, while those who are in the process of modernization would be more likely to exhibit such a pattern.

A third economic explanation is largely Marxist in orientation and has less to do with poverty *per se* and more with the external economic relationships of a country. Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, for example, argue that "the balance of terror [in human rights violations] appears to have shifted to the West and its clients, with the United States setting the pace as sponsor and supplier."[6] This shift is systematically linked to the economic interests of the United States and other advanced capitalist countries, and to their efforts to maintain favorable conditions for investment in the third world. Such efforts include the containment of reform (e.g., the formation of trade unions) and the prevention of revolution. Consequently, there is an increase in human rights violations by countries that are more involved with external capitalist interests. In other words, the greater the economic association with the United States or other advanced capitalist countries, the greater the degree of human rights violations.

## Political Conditions and Human Rights Violations

While poverty, levels of development, and dependence represent the principal economic conditions that may be associated with human rights violations, political culture and regime type seem to be the principal political conditions. The dominant attitudes and beliefs of a society are con-

[5] *Ibid.*, 41.

[6] Chomsky and Herman, *The Political Economy of Human Rights: The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism* (Boston: South End Press, 1979), 8.

sidered to be of great importance in the choice of methods of political co
trol and the relative propensity of governments to violate human righ
A key question, for example, is: To what extent does the political cultu
tolerate political repression as a means of maintaining order?

One important factor that is thought to have shaped political cultur
for most states in the world is the colonial experience. Since most are re
atively new (over 90 newly independent states have been created sinc
1945), the political culture derived from the colonial experience may be
useful starting point for understanding variations in respect for humar
rights. British colonial rule, for instance, is commonly thought to be
strongly associated with the postcolonial development of democracy. The
British legacy may be a relatively greater respect for human rights. By
contrast, other colonial experiences (Spanish, for instance) are generally
assumed to have introduced a greater degree of hierarchy and authori-
tarianism. The legacy here may well involve higher levels of human
rights violations.[7]

The thesis based upon political culture may be affected by the length of colonial rule and, alternatively, by the "newness" of the state. For example, 18th-century British colonies such as India are thought to have a better record in terms of democracy than 19th-century British colonies such as those in Africa.[8] Presumably, "democratic" culture—insofar as any colonizing culture can be democratic—is more or less influential depending on the time it has had to permeate the colonized society. It is also possible that politics in countries that achieved independence relatively recently, regardless of colonial rule, may be more unsettled than in those that have had a considerable time to unify their states. Because ethnic and religious divisions may be more important than the sense of belonging to one nation, human rights violations may be particularly pronounced in the newest states as they attempt to "build" a new nation.

Other political explanations of differences in human rights focus on the kind of political regime in power. One variant is offered by former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick, who employs

[7] See Samuel Huntington, "Will More Countries Become Democratic?" *Political Science Quarterly* 99 (Summer 1984), 193-218. Wiarda and Kline contrast the British and Iberian influences as follows:

> The Spanish and Portuguese colonies were founded on a set of institutions that were absolutist, authoritarian, hierarchical, Catholic, feudal or semifeudal, two-class, corporatist, patrimonialist, orthodox, and scholastic to their core. By contrast, the British colonies . . . derived from a set of institutions and practices that were fundamentally different. . . ."

Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline, eds., *Latin American Politics and Development* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1979), 21-22.

[8] Huntington (fn. 7), 206.

distinction between totalitarian and authoritarian regimes as her organizing theme.[9] Rhoda Howard and Jack Donnelly focus on another variant, the differences between liberal and "communitarian" regimes.[10] With each variant, predictions are made about the magnitude of human rights violations in the kinds of societies examined.

Kirkpatrick maintains that, of all forms of government engaged in repression, left-wing, totalitarian regimes are the greatest offenders against human rights. These regimes render the individual virtually defenseless in relation to the state and offer little prospect of evolutionary or revolutionary change. Authoritarian regimes, though hardly innocent of human rights violations, are based upon traditional social patterns with less complete control; in time, they are thus subject to evolutionary change. Because governmental control in authoritarian regimes is less complete and more subject to change than in totalitarian regimes, human rights violations in the former are likely to be less extensive than in the latter. Kirkpatrick summarizes her position and its implication for American foreign policy as follows:

> Only intellectual fashion and the tyranny of Right/Left thinking prevent intelligent men of good will from perceiving the facts that traditional authoritarian governments are less repressive than revolutionary autocracies, that they are more susceptible of liberalization, and that they are more compatible with U.S. interests.[11]

Since the "susceptibility of liberalization" argument requires data over time, it will not be investigated here. We shall focus, instead, on the assertion that totalitarian regimes are most repressive. To our knowledge, this regime explanation for human rights violations has not been systematically tested.

Howard and Donnelly cast a wider net than Kirkpatrick by grouping regimes into two general categories: liberal or communitarian. They maintain that only governments that operate within the liberal tradition are likely to observe their citizens' human rights: "We contend that internationally recognized human rights require a liberal regime."[12] Their contention is based on the premise that only "liberal" regimes have the

[9] Kirkpatrick, "Dictatorships and Double Standards," *Commentary* 68 (November 1979), 34-45.

[10] Howard and Donnelly, "Human Dignity, Human Rights, and Political Regimes," *American Political Science Review* 80 (September 1986), 801-18.

[11] Kirkpatrick (fn. 9), 44. We should note that the use of regime type in an analysis of human rights violations risks tautology because concern for human rights is an element of regime definition. In our research, however, classifications of regime types are independent of our data on human rights.

[12] Howard and Donnelly (fn. 10), 802.

requisite "substantive conception of human dignity" to make the observance of internationally recognized human rights possible. "Communitarian" societies, by contrast, in which the community or the state has priority over the individual, will not be receptive to the observance of human rights. Howard and Donnelly do not extend their argument to the identification of regimes that are to be considered liberal; our database, however, permits a rough comparison, suggested by their work, of presumed liberal states—that is, first-world nations—with the rest of the world.

The various theoretical positions can be summarized in a number of questions for research:

—Are the worst violators the poorest nations?

—Are the worst violators economically associated with capitalist countries?

—Are the worst violators tied to a particular colonial background?

—Are the worst violators the newest nations?

—Are the worst violators regimes of a certain political type?

Before pursuing these questions, we need to address the difficulties involved both in collecting adequate data on human rights violations and in the problem of developing comparative measures.

## Defining and Measuring Human Rights Violations

In evaluating human rights violations in any society, we immediately encounter several questions: What are human rights? How do you monitor nonadherence to human rights across a great number of countries? How do you measure these violations in a way suitable for comparative purposes?

The initial problem, of course, involves the definition of human rights (and hence, their violation). We do not wish to get involved in the philosophical debate on the nature, origins, or existence of human rights.[13] Our concern here is with governments' propensities for torture, killing, and arbitrarily imprisoning their citizens. We simply follow contemporary convention by identifying these activities as violations of human rights. In addition to philosophical traditions that have given rise to this convention, there is now a legal basis—the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). This United Nations resolution, in addition to condemning torture, killing, and imprisonment, enumerates various eco-

[13] See the discussion in David Carleton and Michael Stohl, "The Foreign Policy of Human Rights: Rhetoric and Reality from Jimmy Carter to Ronald Reagan," *Human Rights Quarterly* 7 (May 1985), 205-29. Our discussion of the methodology draws upon their imaginative research and follows their lead.

nomic and social rights. Although these latter rights are clearly very important, they represent a distinct category and are beyond the scope of the present research.

Acts of the U.S. Congress have added to the legal basis of this convention with their focus on aspects of human rights that have to do with "the integrity of the person." For example, section 116 of the International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975 and section 502B of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 both emphasize "the integrity of the person." Section 116 states that

> no assistance may be provided under this part to the government of any country which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, including torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without charges, or other flagrant denial of the right of life, liberty, and the security of the person. . . .[14]

Section 502B repeats only a portion of this passage: "No security assistance may be provided to any country the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights."[15] In essence, then, while we acknowledge that we are examining only part of human rights across national societies, we are evaluating a crucial segment of them.

How, then, do we measure whether states respect "the integrity of the person" within their societies? The primary problem, as in all human rights analyses, is simply the inadequacy of information on such violations, since governments are understandably reluctant to publicize their use of arbitrary imprisonment, torture, or killing. Second, even in the case of sources that monitor human rights conditions on a regular basis, questions about comprehensiveness and political fairness inevitably arise. Of three standard sources of such human rights monitoring—Amnesty International, Freedom House, and the U.S. State Department—only *Amnesty International Report* can make a reasonable claim to being politically uncommitted. Freedom House does not focus solely on "the integrity of the person" and has been described as a "partisan group within the domestic context of American politics." The U.S. State Department can hardly claim to be a disinterested investigator.[16] Further, *Amnesty Inter-*

[14] See the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended, in *Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 1985*, Committee on Foreign Relations (Washington, DC: G.P.O., 1986), 86, for a more recent statement of this section, in which the phrase "causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction and clandestine detention of those persons" has been added after the passage on "prolonged detention without charges."

[15] *Ibid.*, 125.

[16] See Harry M. Scoble and Laurie S. Wiseberg, "Problems of Comparative Research on

*national Report* concentrates specifically on human rights conceptualized as concerned with "the integrity of the person"; it does not introduce what is sometimes called respect for civil and political liberties.

Our analysis is based on the latest available human rights survey (at the time) by Amnesty International (*Amnesty International Report 1985*); we developed a two-dimensional scale of human rights violations for each of the countries included in the 1985 *Report*. A detailed description of how the scale was constructed will show how it differs from earlier efforts and how it will be used in our subsequent analyses.

First, one of the authors surveyed the *Report* to identify the categories of human rights violations recorded in order to develop a coding format that is comparable across all nations. The coding categories ranged from the holding of "prisoners of conscience" (those imprisoned for their beliefs, color, religion, and so forth, and who are nonviolent) and other political prisoners detained without a trial conforming to internationally recognized standards, to disappearances, executions, and the torture of prisoners. The format thus developed allowed the coders to evaluate the presence or absence of these dimensions in 1984, the intensity of the different activities (that is, the number of violations), and the presence or absence of these activities in earlier years. Coding space was also available for any investigation or conviction of officials who were accused or suspected of human rights violations in that year. (*Amnesty International Report* sometimes includes information on efforts to handle human rights violations.) Each of the authors then read and coded all 123 countries listed in the *Report*.

The next task was to construct a summary measure for comparing countries. A two-dimensional measure of human rights violations was developed—one dimension based upon the degree of arbitrary imprisonment, the other based upon the systematic use of killings and torture of prisoners. The conceptual justification for this dichotomy was based upon the view that, although arbitrary imprisonment was certainly reprehensible, resort to torture and killing was a distinct, and qualitatively worse, activity. Previous measures had tended to incorporate different levels of imprisonment and killings into a single dimension; we believe, however, that that approach inadequately captures the substantive difference. Furthermore, we noted that, empirically, states were quite distinct on these measures. While the preponderance of states had political prisoners, there is a considerable gulf between states with political prisoners

Human Rights," in Ved R. Nanda, James R. Scarritt, and George W. Sheppard, Jr., *Global Human Rights: Public Policies, Comparative Measures, and NGO Strategies* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981), 162-64, for a discussion of the Freedom House and State Department reports.

and those that use torture and killing. These differences should be noted in any evaluation. Finally, in order to provide greater sensitivity to these dimensions, a five-point ordinal scale was developed for each. A country could be scored as (0) never having such violations, (1) rarely, (2) sometimes, (3) often, or (4) very often.

With the coding information collected and the scale dimensions with their subcategories developed, each author separately proceeded to classify each country on the imprisonment and torture dimensions. We then compared our rank orderings, discussed differences that arose, and came to a joint resolution.[17] The result was a summary measure along each dimension for all of the countries included in the *Amnesty International Report*. In a few cases—for example, North Korea and Albania—Amnesty International reported particular difficulties in obtaining information. Our strategy was to assume the worst and score those cases in the "very often" categories on both dimensions.

In a further effort to verify our rankings, we compared them with an earlier attempt at crossnational human rights measurement. We put our 1984 combined political prisoner and torture rankings beside those in Carleton and Stohl's analysis for 1983,[18] and found that they differed only slightly. Fifty-four percent (25 of 46 comparisons) had similar rank or-

[17] The rank-ordering of a country into one of the five categories for the two scales was difficult. While identifying the most and least serious offenders on either dimension was a relatively straightforward procedure, the task was considerably more challenging for the majority of countries in our study. In order to produce meaningful measures for analysis, the scaling of each country involved an iterative process of categorization. First, using the information on each country from our coding sheet, both of us separately rank-ordered all countries on both scales. Next, we compared our rankings, did an initial intercoder reliability check, and tried to make explicit the calculations that we went through to arrive at a particular rank order for a country. To resolve our differences, we agreed upon the following quantitative distinctions: "rarely" referred to countries in which one to ten cases of political prisoners or incidents of torture or killing were reported by Amnesty International; "sometimes" referred to countries with 20 to 90 cases; "often" to 100 or above, and "very often" to 1000 or more. Because our coding sheet has more than one entry to capture information on political prisoners and their treatment, we also agreed that if a given country had a number of entries on these dimensions, the numerical threshold required for an assigned scale would be lower. Finally, we made adjustments in our rank-ordering for several countries to reflect these decisions. Namibia, while given its own country entry in the *Report*, was not included in our analysis because of the general lack of other data.

Although these procedural efforts cannot ultimately remove the necessarily qualitative judgment for the two scales, we are generally quite confident that our effort helped us to construct a meaningful and empirically useful measure.

Finally, in a decision that may well be controversial, we departed from Amnesty International's definition by not counting judicial executions or capital punishment on our torture-and-killing scale. For the sake of consistency, we also excluded judicial amputations—as found, for example, in some Moslem countries—from our analysis.

[18] The comparison between our aggregate human-rights scale score (the sum of the ranks on the political prisoner and torture scales) for 1984 and Carleton and Stohl's rank-ordering of countries for 1983 is based upon their assessment from Amnesty International for that year (fn. 13, 227-28). The range of our scale scores was 0 to 8; it was 1 to 5 for Carleton and Stohl. In all, comparable information between the two datasets was available for 46 countries.

derings even though different scale categories were used. In comparing 1983 and 1984, some of the differences were to be expected. For instance, the 1984 human rights score for Argentina improved after it changed from a military to a civilian regime in late 1983. By contrast, Nigeria's record worsened, perhaps as a result of the military coup of December 31, 1983. We also scored India and Chile higher in terms of violations; the rankings correspond in India to Indira Gandhi's assassination and the events surrounding it, and in Chile to Pinochet's crackdown on growing antigovernment unrest. Even where the comparisons did not match, the differences in most cases were not greater than one category in rank. In short, our political prisoner/torture scale is comparable to another measure of human rights violations.

## Findings

Table 1 shows that, although virtually all countries of the world held some political prisoners in 1984, countries vary widely. Part A of the table shows the aggregate level of human rights violations (the political prisoner scale and the torture scale combined). There is a relatively even distribution of countries across the nine categories. Fourteen countries score 0 or 1 on this summary measure, 28 countries score 7 or 8, and the rest are fairly evenly distributed across the other values. The aggregate measure, of course, assumes equality between the two dimensions. Without minimizing the significance of either, it can reasonably be asserted that the torture-and-killing dimension is generally the harsher method of political control; this is the argument that encourages the separate analysis of each dimension. When we separate the aggregate scale into the two components, we begin to see considerable variations in human rights violations.

Part B of Table 1 shows the number of countries for each of the five points on our political-prisoner scale. While only 8 states did not hold any political prisoners in 1984, over half (65) of the states in our analysis held citizens as political prisoners "often" or "very often" in that year. Between these two extremes, 49 states "rarely" or "sometimes" used detention of political prisoners as an instrument of policy.

Some of the states with the greatest number of political prisoners are readily recognizable from recent popular accounts: Ethiopia, South Africa, Kampuchea, Iran, and Sri Lanka, for example. The countries with the best records are not wholly unexpected either: the United States, Switzerland, Ireland, Japan, and Finland, for instance. These results demonstrate, however, that the bulk of the states of the world still practice this kind of human rights violation.

TABLE 1
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS RANKED ALONG THREE DIMENSIONS
(1984)

| *Scale Values* | | *Number of Countries* | *%* |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | A. AGGREGATE SCALE | |
| No Violations | 0 | 6 | 4.9 |
| | 1 | 8 | 6.6 |
| | 2 | 13 | 10.7 |
| | 3 | 13 | 10.7 |
| | 4 | 19 | 15.6 |
| | 5 | 19 | 15.6 |
| | 6 | 16 | 13.1 |
| | 7 | 18 | 14.8 |
| Most Violations | 8 | 10 | 8.2 |
| Total | | 122 | 100.2* |
| | | B. POLITICAL PRISONERS TAKEN | |
| Never | | 8 | 6.6 |
| Rarely | | 9 | 7.4 |
| Sometimes | | 40 | 32.8 |
| Often | | 39 | 32.0 |
| Very Often | | 26 | 21.3 |
| Total | | 122 | 100.1* |
| | | C. USE OF TORTURE | |
| Never | | 29 | 23.8 |
| Rarely | | 15 | 12.3 |
| Sometimes | | 32 | 26.2 |
| Often | | 27 | 22.1 |
| Very Often | | 19 | 15.6 |
| Total | | 122 | 100.0 |

* Percentage does not total to 100 due to rounding.

Part C of Table 1 shows that, although still substantial, governmental use of torture and killing is somewhat less pervasive than is the holding of political prisoners. To be sure, 44 states never or rarely employed such harsh treatment, but 46 states (or 38 percent of our dataset) frequently tortured their citizens. Once again, many countries in this category are no surprise: El Salvador, Guatemala, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Uganda, for example.

We should emphasize again that the two dimensions are related. The Spearman rank-order correlation is significant and relatively large (.62), but it is not perfect—indicating, as do the frequencies, that holding prisoners, and torturing and killing them, are distinct activities in a substantial number of countries.

### Economic Conditions as Explanations

Economic conditions can help us understand and begin to account for variations in human rights violations, but their impact is less potent than might be expected. Table 2 contains cross-tabular breakdowns of countries on three levels of per capita income (under $500 per year, $501 to $3000, and over $3000).[19] For the political prisoner analysis, McNamara's "simple poverty thesis" seems to have more support than Huntington's curvilinear explanation. That is, the wealthier the country, the less likely it is to hold a large number of political prisoners.

Yet even this assertion should not be pushed too far, for at least two reasons. First, the relationship is modest at best. Although the cross-tabulation implies support, and the $tau_c$ coefficient for this relationship is significant and in the right direction, it is relatively small (−.19). Second, close examination of the tabular results suggests that only in countries that never or rarely hold political prisoners do we approach a linear relationship with the level of economic development (and direct support for the McNamara thesis). When we look at countries that hold political prisoners sometimes or often, the pattern changes. The differences on the political prisoner dimension between the countries in the two lowest income categories are small, but the difference between these two categories and the highest income category is substantial. In effect, there is a threshold effect in the relationship between relative wealth and the holding of political prisoners.

On the torture dimension, the simple poverty thesis receives some support as well. Once again, those countries that have a relatively low per capita income are more likely to have higher levels of torture. But caution is in order to an even greater degree than in the case of the political prisoner scale. While the $tau_c$ coefficient for this relationship is somewhat stronger (−.21) than for the political prisoner analysis, the tabular results plainly show the threshold effect. Only 3 of the high-income countries

[19] For the purposes of the statistical analyses, we collapsed categories one and two on both the political prisoner and torture scales. The income data are from *World Development Report, 1986* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). Where there were reporting gaps, which was most often the case with second-world countries, we used *The World Almanac and Book of Facts, 1986* (New York: Newspaper Enterprise Association, Inc., 1985). In the case of Brunei, we used *The CIA Factbook* (Washington, DC: C.I.A., 1986).

TABLE 2
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BY LEVEL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1984)

| | *Per Capita Income* | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | *$0-$500* | *$501-$3000* | *>$3000* |
| **A. Political Prisoners Taken** | | | |
| Rarely or Never | 2.4% | 11.3% | 35.7% |
| Sometimes | 41.5 | 26.4 | 32.1 |
| Often | 34.1 | 35.8 | 21.4 |
| Very Often | 22.0 | 26.4 | 10.7 |
| Total | 100.0 | 99.9* | 99.9* |
| | (N=41) | (N=53) | (N=28) |
| Chi Square = 18.70, $p<.005$ | | | |
| **B. Use of Torture** | | | |
| Rarely or Never | 29.3% | 28.3% | 60.7% |
| Sometimes | 29.3 | 22.6 | 28.6 |
| Often | 22.0 | 30.2 | 7.1 |
| Very Often | 19.5 | 18.9 | 3.6 |
| Total | 100.1* | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| | (N=41) | (N=53) | (N=28) |
| Chi Square = 14.36, $p<.03$ | | | |

* Percentage does not total to 100 due to rounding.

(those above $3000 per capita per year) have torture records in the "often" or "very often" categories, while 25 have torture records that place them in the "rarely" or "sometimes" rankings. The low- and middle-income countries in our dataset do not have that great a gap between those with relatively good records ("rarely" or "sometimes") and those with bad records ("often" and "very often"). Thus, in this case too, only countries with very high incomes do well on this dimension of human rights.[20]

[20] Although our human rights measures are not per capita measures, there is a small positive association between the size of population and the frequency of violations on both human rights measures: the larger the population, the larger the potential pool of victims, and the larger the reports of violations. Nevertheless, when we controlled for size of population (small, medium, or large) using an analysis of variance technique and a hierarchical log linear technique (controls that we use throughout these analyses) the association between income and human rights violations remained. See Marija J. Norusis, *SPSS^x Advanced Statistics Guide* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1985), 195-254, 297-325. The population estimates for 1984 are from *The World Almanac* (fn. 19). For Albania, Gambia, U.S.S.R., and Zaire, population estimates were available only for 1983.

*Our third economic hypothesis—capitalist involvement—is more dif*ficult to test; it requires some discussion of how best to measure economic involvement with the United States and capitalist countries generally. As the hypothesis is essentially directed at third-world nations, first- and second-world countries were excluded from our analysis. We decided to operationalize capitalist involvement in two ways: first, by measuring the amount of trade between capitalist and third-world countries; and second, by measuring the total investment tie between capitalist and other countries. The first measure involves the 1984 volume of trade flows (exports plus imports) between an individual country and capitalist countries (defined as "industrial countries" by the International Monetary Fund [I.M.F.]).[21] The second measure involves the private-sector net flows plus public-sector export credits and investments to the individual country from capitalist countries for 1984.[22] Although it is now conventional to operationalize the trade measure as a function of trade's relative weight in a domestic economy, and thus as a ratio of GNP, we have used the absolute amounts of trade and investment. Our hypothesis is that the greater the economic involvement with the capitalist countries, the greater the human rights violations, rather than the greater the relative weight of capitalist economic involvement in the domestic economy, the greater the human rights violations. Irrespective of the size of a country's GNP, it is assumed that two plants or factories will be twice as likely to prompt efforts to unionize as would one plant, and twice as likely to prompt government countermeasures as well. We are therefore not theoretically interested in the ratio measure itself.[23]

[21] The I.M.F. lists the following as "industrial countries": United States, Canada, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom. I.M.F., *Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 1986* (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 1986). The classification of nations into first-, and second-, and third-world nations was based upon Gary K. Bertsch, Robert P. Clark, and David M. Wood, *Comparing Political Systems: Power and Policy in Three Worlds* (New York: Wiley, 1986), xiii-xv, and their categorization of 170 nations for 1983. The first-world nations excluded from our dataset for this analysis were: Canada, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States. The second-world nations excluded were: Albania, Bulgaria, People's Republic of China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Kampuchea, North Korea, Laos, Poland, Romania, Soviet Union, Vietnam, and Yugoslavia. The rest of the nations in our dataset were classified as third-world countries for this analysis, including five nations (Barbados, Cyprus, Djibouti, Grenada, and the Seychelles) that were classified as "mixed systems, status uncertain, or otherwise unclassified" by Bertsch et al. Because of missing data for some nations, the total number of nations in the trade and investment analyses was 90 and 85, respectively.

[22] The investment measure is the sum of "Total Other Official Flows plus Private Sector Net" from the member countries of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (which corresponds to the I.M.F.'s list of industrial countries except Luxembourg, Iceland, and Spain). OECD, *Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries* (Paris: OECD, 1986).

[23] See Glenn Firebaugh and Jack P. Gibbs, "User's Guide to Ratio Variables," *American*

TABLE 3
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
BY TRADE WITH AND INVESTMENT BY CAPITALIST COUNTRIES (1984)

| | *Trade* | | | *Investment* | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *Low* | *Medium* | *High* | *Negative* | *Low* | *Medium* |
| **A. Political Prisoners Taken** | | | | | | |
| Rarely or Never | 17.2% | 6.3% | 3.4% | 11.5% | 13.6% | 10.0% |
| Sometimes | 44.8 | 40.6 | 31.0 | 50.0 | 45.5 | 20.0 |
| Often | 31.0 | 28.1 | 37.9 | 26.9 | 27.3 | 30.0 |
| Very Often | 6.9 | 25.0 | 27.6 | 11.5 | 13.6 | 40.0 |
| Total | 99.9* | 100.0 | 99.9* | 99.9* | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| | (N=29) | (N=32) | (N=29) | (N=26) | (N=22) | (N=20) |
| Chi Square = 8.44 (not significant) | | | | Chi Square = 12.83 (not significant) | | |
| **B. Use of Torture** | | | | | | |
| Rarely or Never | 48.3% | 18.8% | 27.6% | 30.8% | 40.9% | 15.0% |
| Sometimes | 24.1 | 31.3 | 17.2 | 34.6 | 22.7 | 25.0 |
| Often | 20.7 | 25.0 | 31.0 | 7.7 | 27.3 | 40.0 |
| ery Often | 6.9 | 25.0 | 24.1 | 26.9 | 9.1 | 20.0 |
| Total | 100.0 | 100.1* | 99.9* | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| | (N=29) | (N=32) | (N=29) | (N=26) | (N=22) | (N=20) |
| hi Square = 9.53 (not significant) | | | | Chi Square = 10.42 (not significant) | | |

* Percentage does not total to 100 due to rounding.

Countries in the high trade category are, as expected, more likely to be in the "often" and "very often" imprisonment categories. Table 3 shows a total of 65 percent in these categories, as compared to 38 percent in low trade countries. The chi square is not significant, but the $tau_c$ coefficient (.24) is; it indicates an association between imprisonment and trade in the direction expected. Using the direct measure of investment, the high investment category again has the largest share of countries that imprison citizens often or very often; the low is 38 percent in the negative investment category, in which the investment flow is reversed and away from the country. Investment is significantly associated with imprisonment (the $tau_b$ coefficient is .18). When we control for size of population, however, any significant associations between trade and imprisonment and investment and imprisonment disappear.

*Sociological Review* 50 (October 1985), 713-22, and Eric Uslaner, "The Pitfalls of Per Capita," *American Journal of Political Science* 20 (February 1976), 125-33, for a methodological discussion of the use of ratio variables.

Those countries that use torture often or very often tend to fall in the medium and high trade categories; the low trade category has the largest share of countries that make infrequent or no use of torture. These observations are supported by a significant $tau_c$ coefficient (.22). The medium and high investment categories also contain most of the countries that use torture often or very often. But the $tau_b$ coefficient for the relationship between investment and torture is not significant, and the trade/torture association disappears when population is held constant. So, while a substantial number of countries that have very bad human rights records are economically heavily involved with advanced capitalist countries, a third factor—population—appears to account for some of the observed association.

### Political Conditions as Explanations

The political culture hypothesis seems to provide some useful insight into human rights violations. The classic assertion that British colonial experience is associated with the development of democracy and, by extension, with greater respect for human rights, finds some support in our data.[24] As Table 4 shows, countries that were British colonies are less likely to imprison political dissidents than countries that had other colonial experiences. (The $tau_c$ of .25 is statistically significant.) About 58 percent of the countries that were British colonies are classified as "rarely" or "sometimes" holding political prisoners. By contrast, 55 percent of the countries with other colonial experiences fall into the "often" or "very often" categories.

When we control for both population and income, however, using an analysis of variance and a log linear technique, the association between former British colonies and lower levels of imprisonment is no longer statistically significant. A closer examination of the data suggests that the original relationship between these two variables was largely attributable to some small former British colonies with medium (and, to some extent, high) per capita incomes and good human rights records, as compared to similar states with other colonial experiences and poor human rights records. Put differently, and generally consistent with our earlier results, low- and high-income countries—with or without British colonial experience—do not have significantly different human rights records. Some caution is still warranted in intepreting these results, however, because of the limited cases in our data cells when these controls are built in.

[24] The information on colonial powers is from Waldemar A. Nielsen, *The Great Powers and Africa* (New York: Praeger, 1969), inside front cover; *The World Almanac* (fn. 19); and Arthur S. Banks, ed., *Political Handbook of the World, 1986* (Binghamton, NY: CSA Publications, 1986).

Colonial background is even less important in differentiating nations on the torture scale, although the results are in the predicted direction. While most countries with any colonial experience are classified as torturing "rarely" or "sometimes," those with a British colonial background are less likely to be in the "often" or "very often" category than those with a non-British colonial background. The statistical analysis indicates that the propensity to torture or kill is not significantly associated with a British colonial experience. When we control for population and income through log linear techniques, we find that both factors significantly specified any possible relationship between torture and British or other colonial background. Close inspection revealed that, again, any relationship that does exist is based on medium-income former British colonies that have considerably better records on the torture dimensions than do medium-income countries with other colonial experiences.

Taking our colonial analysis one step further, we found few differences in human rights performance, both on our political prisoner scale and on our torture scale, between the 21 countries in our dataset that had been British colonies for less than a hundred years and the 19 countries that had been British colonies for more than a hundred years. Thus, the sheer fact of British colonization seems to have somewhat more impact on human rights performance than length of colonization.[25]

A second way to examine political conditions and human rights violations is to look at the relationship between the length of a state's independence and the treatment of its citizens. Are older nations more respectful of human rights than newer ones? To answer this question, we divided the states in our dataset into two categories: those that had gained independence before 1944, and those that had gained independence after that year. On our two dimensions of human rights violations, we found virtually no difference between these two classifications. The newness of the state appears to be unrelated to the observance of human rights.

Yet another way to inquire into the relationship between human rights violations and the political environment is to test the hypothesis advanced by Jeane Kirkpatrick. According to her thesis (and using her vocabulary), totalitarian regimes—operationalized here as second-world, Marxist nations—are more repressive in the treatment of their citizens than are authoritarian regimes—operationalized here as military regimes and traditional monarchies; the former are also less susceptible to change.[26] In

[25] Data for years of independence are from Appendix B in Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr, *World Politics: The Menu for Choice* (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1981 and 1985), original and 2d eds., 577-83 and 589-96.

[26] To identify authoritarian regimes, we used the regime typology presented in W. Phillips Shively, *Power and Choice* (New York: Random House, 1986), 248-49. From this typology, the

TABLE 4
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BY COLONIAL EXPERIENCE
(1984)

| | *Colonial Experience* | |
|---|---|---|
| | *Former British Colony* | *Other Colonial Background** |
| **A. Political Prisoners Taken** | | |
| Rarely or Never | 25.0% | 3.9% |
| Sometimes | 32.5 | 41.2 |
| Often | 30.0 | 29.4 |
| Very Often | 12.5 | 25.5 |
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| | (N=40) | (N=51) |
| Chi Square = 9.92, $p<.02$ | | |
| **B. Use of Torture** | | |
| Rarely or Never | 42.5% | 31.4% |
| Sometimes | 25.0 | 23.5 |
| Often | 12.5 | 29.4 |
| Very Often | 20.0 | 15.7 |
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| | (N=40) | (N=51) |
| Chi Square = 3.94 (not significant) | | |

* Spanish, Portuguese, French, Dutch, Belgian, or Italian.

one sense, Kirkpatrick's argument is confirmed by our data. All second-world nations fall into the "often" or "very often" political prisoner categories (see Table 5). The strong and statistically significant relationship ($tau_c$ = $-.47$) between imprisonment and the second world survives our controlling for population differences and levels of income. On the torture dimension, however, we found no significant difference between the two types of regimes. Contrary to Kirkpatrick's argument, more author-

classification of "Military Government" and "Monarchy" formed the bulk of our authoritarian category. Like most such efforts, the regime typology from Shively has some questionable classifications. For example, Uruguay, South Korea, and Honduras were listed under "Democracy," with the qualification "heavy military involvement." We placed those countries in the authoritarian category. Finally, to identify totalitarian regimes, we used the classification of Marxist nations by Bertsch et al. (fn. 21).

TABLE 5
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
BY TOTALITARIAN AND AUTHORITARIAN STATES (1984)

| | *Type of State* | |
|---|---|---|
| | *Totalitarian* | *Authoritarian* |
| **A. Political Prisoners Taken** | | |
| Rarely or Never | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Sometimes | 0.0 | 41.9 |
| Often | 53.3 | 41.9 |
| Very Often | 46.7 | 16.1 |
| Total | 100.0 | 99.9* |
| | (N=15) | (N=31) |
| Chi Square = 10.19, $p<.01$ | | |
| **B. Use of Torture** | | |
| Rarely or Never | 33.3% | 19.4% |
| Sometimes | 26.7 | 29.0 |
| Often | 26.7 | 32.3 |
| Very Often | 13.3 | 19.4 |
| Total | 100.0 | 100.1* |
| | (N=15) | (N=31) |
| Chi Square = 1.16 (not significant) | | |

* Percentage does not add to 100 due to rounding.

itarian regimes (52 percent) than totalitarian regimes (40 percent) are in the "often" or "very often" category on the torture dimension.

For second-world governments, imprisonment is the preferred method of political control. Thus, only if "repression" is restricted to imprisonment is there evidence that confirms Kirkpatrick's thesis. If repression is defined as torture and killing, then the results, though not statistically significant, are contrary to her expectation: authoritarian regimes show a greater inclination toward torturing and killing the opposition. And if repression is defined as both imprisonment *and* torturing and killing, our aggregate human rights measure, there is no statistically significant difference between the two types of regimes.[27]

[27] South Africa was also classified as a democracy in the Shively listing, and the following were termed countries "difficult to classify": Philippines, El Salvador, Haiti, Nepal, Chad, and Iran. When these seven countries are added to the authoritarian category, the number of

A reformulated and weaker version of Howard and Donnelly's argument—that liberal regimes are more attentive to human rights than are communitarian regimes—is borne out by our analysis. Although Howard and Donnelly do not provide a usable operational definition of a liberal regime, we operationalized their thesis by comparing the degree of violations in first-world nations (advanced capitalist democracies) with that of the rest of the world. Whereas the first-world nations would do well on respecting "the integrity of the person," we assume that these other nations would all do equally poorly on this dimension of human rights.

In the course of our analysis, we found, not unexpectedly, that the "liberal" regimes have a superior human rights record on both the political prisoner and the torture dimensions. Almost all of the liberal states fall into either the "rarely" or "sometimes" categories on both dimensions; the lowest-scale category ("rarely") is the most prominent one. By contrast, the rest of the nations are spread across the scale, with over half in the "often" and "very often" ranks on the political prisoner dimension, and just under half in the same categories for the torture dimension.

Howard and Donnelly advance a precise and interesting proposition: that human rights observance *requires* liberalism while "communitarian regimes necessarily violate the full range of human rights."[28] It is supported by our analysis only if Barbados, Botswana, Mauritius, and Jamaica—which, along with Japan and the United States, are the only countries to score 0 on both of our measures of human rights violations—are considered to have liberal regimes. Several additional second- and third-world countries score 0 on the torture scale and thus cannot be said to violate "the full range of human rights."

## Conclusion

Our analysis demonstrates, first, that human rights violations are indeed a common feature of contemporary governments. At the same time, however, substantial differences exist between governments in terms of the types and numbers of violations that occur. Moreover, these differences are sufficiently marked so that the division of the violations into two categories—imprisonment and torture—is an appropriate conceptualization, especially in terms of violations of "the integrity of the person." Further, these two categories may serve as important guideposts in

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authoritarian regimes in the two high-torture dimensions increases from 52% to 61%, but this does not significantly change the results.

[28] Howard and Donnelly (fn. 10), 814.

seeking to reduce such violations on a global scale. Arbitrary imprisonment seriously diminishes the integrity of any individual, but systematic torture deserves even more immediate normative attention and action.

Although we tested several plausible explanations that might account for variations in human rights violations throughout the world, our results indicate that none of them is complete. Support for various hypotheses was generally weak-to-modest and not always consistent, especially when various controls for the size of a nation's population and its level of income were introduced into the analysis. In that sense, this study has begun to specify, and possibly to eliminate, several explanations for differences in human rights compliance around the world, but it has not found a wholly satisfactory one. Further work will need to be undertaken to complete the picture that we have begun to outline.

Nonetheless, the major themes of our results are worth emphasizing. We generally found that the economic hypotheses were better supported than the political ones. For instance, countries that enjoyed higher levels of economic well-being had somewhat consistently—albeit modestly so—better human rights records than those that did not. Extensive ties with capitalist states did not in themselves detract from or contribute to the level of human rights violations in the nations of our dataset; the actual level of development—as measured by domestic income levels—seems to be a more important factor.

For the political explanations, the results are more mixed. While former British colonies are somewhat less likely to imprison their citizens than are countries with other colonial backgrounds, both were about equally likely to torture their citizens. The relative "newness" of a state turned out to be unrelated to both dimensions of human rights violations, and support was mixed for Kirkpatrick's thesis on authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. A weak version of Howard and Donnelly's thesis on liberal and communitarian regimes was generally borne out by our data, but their stronger version was not.

Where do we go from here? First, we need to introduce other political and social conditions within these nations that may help us sort out the relationships. Two factors immediately come to mind: the amount of warfare (both internal and foreign), and the magnitude of ethnic divisions within a state. Both of these factors can be expected to influence human rights violations; they should be incorporated into future analyses. Second, where possible, we need to move to greater precision in our data, and to more multivariate analyses of various alternate explanations. Our examination thus far has relied primarily on, at best, ordinal-level data with only a few limited controls. More sophisticated analyses are neces-

*sary, even though we are constrained by the limitations of our d*
*of human rights data in general). Third, we should search for a*
*amine additional explanations for human rights violations. By movi*
*all these directions, we may come closer to a position in which we*
*understand and work for change in human rights conditions.*

*Some of our "explanations" of human rights violations do not seem*
*have immediate policy implications. The level of development or a co*
*nial heritage, for example, are conditions within which policy make*
must operate rather than something they can do much about.[39] Our ana
ysis does indicate variations in violations *within* as well as *between* diffe
ent types of conditions, however: poor countries do not necessarily violat
their citizens' human rights; among those that do, the extent varies. Thu
while some global redistribution of material well-being may be the ob
vious overall recommendation, government policy makers in poor coun
tries do have alternatives when coping with the problem of political con
trol. It may be possible for the international community, or even fo
individual nations, to raise the costs—perhaps through aid decisions—c
violations of human rights.

We began this article with some examples of violations of huma
rights in particular countries. In the course of our analysis, and with th
unavoidable abstractions that accompany statistical discussion and th
necessary attention given to methodological issues, we lose some sensitiv
ity toward the phenomenon that we are trying to understand. It is im
portant to end by reminding ourselves of the real terror and sufferin
contained in our concepts and percentages.

[39] See Charles W. Anderson, "System and Strategy in Comparative Policy Analysis," i
William B. Gwyn and George C. Edwards, eds., *Perspectives on Public Policy Making* (Ne
Orleans: Tulane University Press, 1975), for a theoretical discussion of policy conditions.

# *Review Articles*

# LESSONS FROM HISTORY, OR THE PERFIDY OF ENGLISH EXCEPTIONALISM AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HISTORICAL FRANCE

By ROBERT H. BATES*

'. H. Aston and C.H.E. Philpin, *The Brenner Debate: Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 339 pp.
teven L. Kaplan, *Bread, Politics, and Political Economy in the Age of Louis XVI*, 2 vols. (The Hague: Martin Nijhoff, 1976), 797 pp.
teven L. Kaplan, *Provisioning Paris: Merchants and Millers in the Grain and Flour Trade During the Eighteenth Century* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), 666 pp.
lilton L. Root, *Peasants and King in Burgundy: Agrarian Foundations of French Absolutism* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987), 277 pp.
harles Tilly, *The Contentious French: Four Centuries of Popular Struggle* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1986), 456 pp.

## INTRODUCTION

THE field of development lacks a core body of deductive theory; it proceeds inductively instead. To account for development, scholars ften draw lessons from history: they extrapolate from what is "known" › have happened in the past. As a consequence, the field belongs as much › historians as it does to social scientists.

In a field without theory, precedents assume the status of laws. In the evelopment field, it is the historians who process the case materials from 'hich law-like statements are drawn. Historians infer the lessons that be- ›me the new orthodoxies. Equally as important, they challenge old ones.

* I wish to acknowledge the impact of Philip Hoffman, Kathryn Norberg, Hilton Root, obert Brenner, Douglas North, Roger Schofield, Eleanor Searle, Peter Lange, Michael Gil- spie, John Aldrich, William Bianco, and Margaret Levi on my thinking. I hasten to add that one are responsible for the viewpoints in this article.

*For the development theorist, the implication is clear: keep a vigilant eye on the work of historians.*

If specialists in the field were asked to appraise competing definitions of development, one of the most popular surely would be: development is the process by which town replaces country and industry replaces agriculture. Key works at theorizing in the development field focus on this transition.

In the contemporary literature, many scholars proceed cross-sectionally: the development field remains a branch of comparative politics, and scholars arrive at theories by contrasting behavior in present-day agrarian and industrial societies. But the grand theorists of development—Max Weber, Adam Smith, Karl Marx, and others—proceeded longitudinally. The theories they bequeathed the field evolved from studying how, in societies that had developed successfully, town had emerged from country, industry from agriculture, and mature capitalism from its agrarian antecedents.

This essay examines some recent works that focus on this transition. Recognizing that in this field history stands as parent to theory, we shall conduct a critical inquiry into several of the key lessons that have been drawn. We shall see that resistance to the market was not led by rural communities, but by the agents of capitalism; that peasants (particularly wealthy ones) often sought to champion private rights in property, whereas elites promoted collective ones; and that the historical shifting of the terms of trade against agriculture, which heralded the ascendancy of the commercial classes, has been deeply misunderstood.

Above all, I shall argue that, by focusing on the case of England, classical and Marxian theorists have based development studies on data that are profoundly misleading. Differing in critical respects both from its historical contemporaries and from the developing nations today, the English case supports invalid inferences. Rather, it is the French case from which the lessons of history should be drawn.

## Communal Resistance to the Rise of Capitalism

Influential 19th-century theorists held that pre-industrial societies were founded on principles that contrasted with those of market-based societies: in the words of Toennies, *Gemeinschaft* as opposed to *Gesellschaft*, or, in the words of Durkheim, "mechanical" as opposed to "organic" solidarity.[1] Marx contrasted natural societies, where value was

[1] Ferdinand Toennies, *Community and Society*, trans. and ed. by Charles B. Loomis (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1937); Emile Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society* (New York: Free Press, 1956).

onferred by use, with market societies, where value was determined by xchange.[2] The distinction also figures in the work of such influential on-Marxian theorists as Polanyi and Parsons.[3]

Contemporary scholars remain convinced that the principles which nderlie agrarian societies contrast with the principles which govern narket-based societies. Some have used this "lesson of history" to create theory of political violence. Wolf, Migdal, and Scott, for example, have ocated the origin of agrarian rebellion in efforts to resist the impact of ne market.[4] The market, they hold, threatens the very foundations of ru-al community. It promotes self-interest and violates basic notions of hu-nan welfare in agrarian societies, such as the guarantee of subsistence. Thus, its spread is resisted by peasant communities.

These scholars maintain that, in part, the triumph of the market is as-ured by its possession of an active ally: the nation-state. In the contem-orary period, for example, the spread of market forces has been pro-noted by imperialism. In the reigning orthodoxy of peasant studies, easant rebellions thus become communalistic rebellions, representing orms of protest against the market. And while they are profoundly anti-apitalist, they are clothed in the rhetoric of nationalism, as they also en-ail resistance against foreign political domination.

In *The Contentious French*, Charles Tilly—a historian and sociologist who has made well-known contributions to the development field[5]—per-etuates important strands of the contemporary orthodoxy. But, by lov-ngly exploring a rich tableau of historical data, he opens the door to re-isionists. For the lessons that he reaffirms appear to be contested by the acts that he uncovers.

Tilly's mission, he states, is to address the question, "How did the de-elopment of capitalism and the concentration of power in the national tate affect the ways that ordinary people contended—or failed to con-end—for their interests?" (p. 5). His answer is that the intrusion of cap-alism and the nation-state led to protests in early modern France that epresented the reassertion of community. This lesson, he argues, is most

[2] Karl Marx, *Capital* (New York: Clark A. Kerr, 1906), and esp. *Grundrisse* [Outlines] Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1973).

[3] Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957); Talcott Parsons, *The Social System* (New York: Free Press, 1964).

[4] Eric R. Wolf, *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 969); James C. Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant. Peasant Rebellion and Subsistence in outheast Asia* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1973); Joel S. Migdal, *Peas-nts, Politics, and Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974). For more recent orks, see Eric R. Wolf, *Europe and the People Without History* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1982), and James C. Scott, *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday orms of Peasant Resistance* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985).

[5] See, for example, Charles Tilly, ed., *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).

vividly conveyed by a characteristic form of political protest, the grain riot: "Blockage of grain expressed the demand of ordinary people that needs of the community take priority over the requirements of the market" (pp. 21-22).

As Tilly's own work—and the work of others—has confirmed, political demands for subsistence were indeed characteristic of European society in the early modern period. Local communities faced with shortages of food and rising prices used political power to prevent the shipment of the grain that could meet their needs for subsistence.[6]

The key questions, however, are: Did these protests represent revolts against the market? Did they represent revolts against the market's putative ally, the state? In short, did they represent a revolt by precapitalist political communities?

For the conventional interpretation to hold, two things must be true. One is that those who entered the rural community to procure grain must have been agents of the market. The other is that the state officials who backed them must be champions of the market.

Tilly's data, and the data of others, show that it was often the levies of the armed forces that precipitated the grain riots; the military had little incentive to pay high prices for food (Tilly, 83ff.).[7] Other levies were made to provision Paris. Like Tilly, Robert Brenner ("Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe," chap. 1, pp. 10-63, in Aston and Philpin) relates that the French monarchy frequently mounted wars against the regional nobility. Its power base usually rested narrowly on Paris. The bureaucracy, the armed forces, and the aristocracy also were concentrated in Paris. And the residents of Paris demanded cheap food.

Kaplan (1976) recounts that, in order to feed Paris, the government developed an elaborate bureaucracy for securing food from the countryside.[8] Its purpose was not only to feed Paris, but to do so at low prices—in other words, to counter market forces. It sought to purchase the grain at prices cheaper than those offered by consumers living in regional markets—or abroad.

[6] See, for example, the materials in Tilly (fn. 5); Louise A. Tilly, "The Food Riot as a Form of Political Conflict in France," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 2 (1971), 23-57, and J. Stevenson, "Food Riots in England, 1792-1818" in R. Quinault and J. Stevenson, eds., *Popular Protest and Public Order: Six Studies in British History* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1974). Critical to the interpretation of these riots is Edward P. Thompson, "The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century," *Past and Present* 52 (1971), 76-136, and George Rude, "La taxation populaire de mai 1775 à Paris et dans la region Parisienne" [The common taxation of May 1775 in Paris and in the Paris region], *Annales Historiques de la Revolution Française* 28 (1956), 1[illegible]9-79.

[7] See also the materials in Louise Tilly (fn. 6), and Stevenson (fn. 6).

[8] For the correlation between unrest and the price of food, see George Rude, *Paris and London in the Eighteenth Century* (London: Collins, 1970).

The image that Tilly conveys is that of the state actively promoting the formation of markets and thereby provoking communal unrest in the agrarian hinterland. In keeping with the orthodox strain of contemporary peasant studies, he therefore interprets grain riots as a form of communal protest against the rise of capitalism, with the latter being championed by the market and the state. But the principal demanders of food were not agencies of the market; they were agencies of the state—the military or the bureaucracy who sought to override the operations of the market, rather than to promote them. They wanted food at cheaper prices than the unregulated market would provide.

The composition of the groups who resisted the export of grain constitutes a further challenge to the orthodox view. Tilly's language, and that of his colleagues in the field of peasant studies, suggests that it was agrarian communities who resisted the intrusion of the market and thus, implicitly, the rise of capitalism. But neither logic nor evidence bears out such an interpretation. Rather, both suggest that the enemies of the grain trade would be the creatures of capitalism—the nascent bourgeoisie and the proletariat—rather than the relics of the pre-capitalist past, the agrarian producers.[9]

Logic suggests that the consumers rather than the producers would resist the export of grain, for exports would lead to a rise in local prices. Although in times of drought or crop failure, the grain producers themselves became net consumers and then had reason to resist food exports, most often they were suppliers. If they could obtain higher prices by exporting grain from the local community, they would presumably favor grain exports.

It is relevant, therefore, that historians have found that food riots took place long after the end of subsistence crises in both England and France.[10] Moreover, these riots were led by consumers, not producers: members of the new urban populations that had grown up in the regional centers of England and France. Thus, Stevenson writes that food riots in England tended to take place in towns, communication centers, and ports. They usually occurred in areas of mining and quarrying; in areas where workers and builders were constructing canals, dykes, and roads;

[9] The picture is further complicated by the fact that members of the aristocracy who lived in Paris also owned land in the grain-growing areas. In their capacity as local elites, they often ruled *against* the right of grain "exports" to Paris and in favor of the paramountcy of local markets. The political interests of the aristocracy thus conflicted with their economic interests in shipping grain to high-priced markets; and their interests as producers, which were enhanced by high prices, conflicted with their interests as urban consumers, which were enhanced by low prices. These complexities should make the analyst suspicious of any simplistic rendering of the class interests of the aristocracy.

[10] For France, see Louise Tilly (fn. 6), 25. Stevenson too stresses that food riots occurred even after subsistence crises had ended in England (fn. 6, pp. 40ff.).

*and among the rural workers. Louise Tilly finds that in 18th-century Burgundy, "within the province, which was quickly tapped by the large military and urban consumers, smaller cities sought food and the countryside armed to prevent loss of vital supplies. 'There was open war with the peasants to get their grain,' wrote a canon of Beaune."*[11]

Too often, the lesson that is drawn seems to indicate that rural, agrarian interests fight against the penetration of the market, particularly when the market threatens basic food supplies and creates crises of subsistence. Historically, there have indeed been political struggles over food supplies. But those who imperiled local subsistence most often were not agents of the market; rather, they were agents of interests that sought to override market forces. Often, those who resisted the export of food supplies were not the members of the agrarian community; the resistance tended to come from the local consumers rather than the producers of food.[12] And food riots continued even after subsistence crises subsided.

The agents of the new capitalism—the workers, artisans, burghers, as well as those who governed them—cloaked their demands for cheap food in the myth of the precapitalist community. Kaplan shows that agrarian interests—the producers of grain—trumpeted the virtues of "liberty and the market" and called for the end of irrational "feudal fetters" on the market's operations (Kaplan, 1976, I, pp. 114ff.). Clearly, key lessons of history must be unlearned.

## Peasants as Communitarians

Another so-called lesson of history is that, with the transition from an agrarian to an industrial society, peasants tend to experience a loss in welfare. It is held that capitalism promotes the formation of private rights in property; and that, with the privatization of common rights, poor people lose their institutional defenses against the risks of the market. For this reason too, the rural poor are said to rebel and resist the rise of capitalism.

This interpretation has been put forward for peasant rebellions in France.[13] It has been applied to the study of rural violence in England,

[11] Louise Tilly (fn. 6), 52.

[12] As noted above, members of the agrarian community would on occasion be net purchasers of food, and therefore would resist higher prices for it. This was particularly true of cottagers and farm laborers, who at times of subsistence crises faced both a lowering of the wage rate and higher food prices; they would therefore be particularly motivated to resist the "exportation" of food. For a brilliant analysis, see Amartya Sen, *Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981).

[13] Marc Bloch, *French Rural History*, trans. by Janet Sondheimer (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1970); Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, *Histoire de la France Rurale* [History of rural France], ed. by Georges Duby and Armand Wallon, 4 vols. (Paris: Seuil, 1976); Albert Soboul, "Problèmes paysannes de la communauté rurale (xviiie-xixe)"

especially at the time of the Parliamentary enclosures.[14] And, as a "lesson of history," it has been applied to the study of peasant rebellions in the modern world.[15]

Again, Tilly perpetuates this orthodoxy. He argues that:

> The second common form of anti-capitalist action was ... local resistance to landlords' consolidation of lands and of rights in the land (p. 23).
>
> Popular opposition did not aim specifically at the landed nobility. It aimed at the landlords of any order who chewed up the rural community's collective rights (p. 24).

But who actually promoted the preservation of collective rights? In some cases, to be sure, it was the peasants. But the more we learn, the more we come to realize that the defenders of common rights were often drawn from the ranks of others.

Some came from the elites who dominated village institutions and thereby captured the benefits of common property.[16] Important work by Philip Hoffman shows that, in Northern and Eastern France, herders constituted the primary opponents of private enclosure. Landlords, wealthy peasants, and local seigneurs usually owned these herds. They also tended to hold the right to stint on common lands, and to exercise it because they feared the loss of grazing privileges.[17] Kathryn Norberg argues in a study of a village in southwestern France:

> The commons ... profited mainly the elite who jealously guarded its benefits.... they were the principal beneficiaries of most traditional practices, be they open fields or communal woods. No wonder then that they were among traditions' strongest defenders. ... historians have mistaken the elite's views for those of the whole community.[18]

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[Peasant problems of the rural community, 18th-19th century], in *Problèmes paysannes de la Revolution 1778-1848* (Paris: Maspero, 1975).

[14] J. L. and Barbara Hammond, *The Village Laborer 1760-1832* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1970); Edward P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (New York: Vintage Books, 1962).

[15] See, for example, Scott (fn. 4, 1974).

[16] This line of historical interpretation was provided by Alfred Cobban in *The Social History of the French Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968). In addition to the recent work of Norberg and Hoffman (fns. 17, 18, and 19), see Root's discussion in *Peasants and King*, pp. 16, 95-97, 125, 153ff, and 216-17.

[17] Philip T. Hoffman, "Institutions and Agriculture in Old-Regime France," paper prepared for the Caltech-All University of California Group in Economic History Conference on Pre-Industrial Developments in Peasant Economies (Huntington Library, Pasadena, CA), May 22-24, 1987.

[18] Kathryn Norberg, "The Struggle Over the Commons: Antiseigneurialism and Social Tension in the Peasant Community," pp. 26-27. The work of Hoffman (fn. 17) and Norberg (fns. 18 and 19) is to be featured in a special edition of the journal *Politics and Society*, edited by Margaret Levi and Robert H. Bates. Also see Samuel L. Popkin, *The Rational Peasant* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1979), which makes a comparable argument based on data from contemporary Vietnam.

*In France, the local elites had an important ally: the central a-*
*trators. Under a law passed in 1439, the monarchy could tax the peas*
*directly and without convoking the Estates General. Locked in comb*
*with the nobility and distrustful of other elites, the king was afraid to ne-*
*gotiate for revenues with privileged orders. Instead, he sought to secure*
*his tax base by preventing encroachments upon peasant property. This*
*ability to tap the streams of income generated by the peasant communities*
*played another critical role in the state's finances: it underwrote the mon-*
*arch's capacity to repay—and thus to attract—foreign loans. This argu-*
*ment forms the central thesis of Hilton Root's Peasants and King in Bur-*
*gundy. Root draws the important implication:*

> *Communal rights and properties and collective responsibility for tax col-*
> *lection were not spontaneous expressions of peasant culture. Both were*
> *measures imposed from above to ensure political dominance of the agrar-*
> *ian population and to facilitate resource extraction (pp. 232-33).*

Perhaps we have gone too far. What, after all, do we know of the preferences of the peasants? Do we have any insight into what they themselves would have preferred? We do, at least to a modest degree. Norberg has gained access to the response of 431 peasant communities to a law passed after the French Revolution, which allowed peasants to divide common land into private holdings. She concludes that, when given the chance to break up the commons, peasant villages elected to do so.[19] In response to an investigation of the implementation of this law, the government learned that even prior to the new policy, 240 villages had decided to divide up the commons; 118 voted to partition; and only 46 had declined to do so.[20] Most of the villages that elected not to divide did so because their commons were too wet, too dry, or too hilly to cultivate. Norberg concludes, "If the commons had not been encroached upon, they were, most likely, virtually worthless and therefore not worth partitioning. Here lay, it appears, the main reason peasants chose to leave the commons as collective property."[21]

Too often, people in the development field seem to have drawn the lesson that local communities struggle against the privatization of interests brought on by capitalism, and do so in order to safeguard the interests of the poor. Instead, there is ample historical evidence to suggest that collective property is championed by elites and that it affords a way of privatiz-

[19] Kathryn Norberg, "Dividing up the Commons: The Political Economy of Eighteenth-Century French Agriculture," paper prepared for the Caltech-All University of California Conference (fn. 17).
[20] Twenty-seven had no knowledge of the law.
[21] Norberg (fn. 19), 7.

[ben]efits to be extracted from agrarian society while spreading the [wi]dely among its members. It appears that champions of collective [proper]ty possess private interests themselves, and use the corporate inter[ests] of the rural community to legitimate their claims.[22]

## Peasant Farming as a Retardant to Development

Anyone who works in present-day developing areas knows that, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, significant elites and especially intellectuals remain convinced that peasant farming provides an inadequate foundation for development. In post-independence Africa, for example, the governments of Somalia, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Zambia, Tanzania, and Ghana have invested heavily in state farms; alternatively, through "villagization" or other means, they have sought to promote large-scale farming.[23] In the pre-independence period, the governments of Kenya and Rhodesia determined, as a matter of policy, not to rely on the output of peasant farmers. It was held that, in view of their commitment to subsistence, peasant farmers produced a highly variable level of marketable surplus, thus imposing risks upon consumers and the state.[24] Policy makers therefore chose to rely instead upon the large-scale farmers who, they believed, produced a more reliable flow of marketable output.

The superiority of the large-scale farmer is a lesson of history drawn chiefly, it would appear, from commentaries on the 18th-century rivalry between the superpowers of that era: England and France. Influential observers attributed England's military superiority in large part to her economic prosperity; her superior wealth, in turn, was thought to be due to the greater productivity of her agriculture; and the last was believed to be based on the greater technical and economic efficiency of England's large-scale farmers.[25] The retarded state of the French economy was as-

[22] Also see the discussion in Robert H. Bates, "Some Conventional Orthodoxies in the Study of Agrarian Change," *World Politics* 36 (January 1984), 234-54. This is not to deny that there were cases where the poor depended upon common rights, for pasture, for forest products, or for gleaning, and where they allied themselves with those who resisted the break-up of common lands. In general, however, it appears to have been the local elites who dominated the commons.

[23] See, for example, the discussion in Robert H. Bates, *Markets and States in Tropical Africa* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1981).

[24] See the discussion and review of this debate in William O. Jones, *Marketing Stable Food Crops in Tropical Africa* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1972). William Allan, *The African Husbandman* (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1965) remains the classic argument of this position.

[25] The intellectual background is brilliantly presented in Kaplan (1976). See also the thoughtful review in Michael Lipton, *Why Poor People Stay Poor: Urban Bias in World Development* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977).

cribed to France's lagging rural sector, where productivity remained low, technical progress insufficient, and farm size diminutive. England had seized the capitalist road to development; France remained backward, mired in peasant production.

This analysis was championed in a series of influential works by Arthur Young, published in the 18th century.[26] It was endorsed by the leading economists of the time,[27] and exercised a powerful influence upon policy makers—especially in France, where the government sought to reform its rural economy the better to finance its military ventures.[28] Karl Marx helped to inject this analysis into contemporary development studies. While condemning the stagnation of peasant production,[29] Marx attributed the initial surge toward industrialization to the rise of capitalist farming.[30]

This lesson of history—that peasant production is inefficient and incapable of generating an agricultural surplus adequate for the promotion of development—continues to influence the writings of contemporary historians. Among the works reviewed here, its power is perhaps most strikingly underscored by Brenner's compelling re-analysis of the decline of feudal society. The triumph of modern capitalism, he argues, was marked by the rise of commercial farming: large, capital-intensive farms, employing wage labor. States in which development was retarded were marked instead by the capacity of the bureaucracy and others to ally with an organized peasantry and to block the rise of commercially minded agrarian classes:

> In England we find the landlords consolidating holdings and leasing them out to large capitalist tenants who would in turn farm them on the basis of wage labor and agricultural improvement. But in France we find comparatively little consolidation. Even the land controlled directly by the landlords—that is by demesnes farmed out on terminable contract leases—was

[26] See Arthur Young, *Six Weeks Tour Through the Southern Counties of England and Wales* (London: W. Strahan, 1768); *A Six Months Tour Through the North of England*, 2nd ed. (London: W. Strahan, 1771); and *A Farmer's Tour Through the East of England* (London: W. Strahan, 1771).

[27] See Ronald L. Meek, *The Economics of Physiocracy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963).

[28] Kaplan's work, esp. 1976, provides valuable insights into the influence of economic technocrats upon policy making in 18th-century France. Also see Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Old Regime and the French Revolution*, trans. by Stuart Gilbert (New York: Anchor Books, 1955)

[29] See the materials gathered in Norire Ter-Akopyan, ed., *Marx, Engels: Pre-Capitalist Socio-economic Formations* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1979).

[30] Marx, *Capital* (fn. 2), part VIII. Subsequent Marxian theorists attributed the relative stagnation of Eastern and Central Europe to the prevalence of peasant agriculture; they located in large-scale farming the motor force for the rise of capitalism. A useful review is contained in David Mitrany, *Marx Against the Peasant* (New York: Collier Books, 1961). See also V. I. Lenin, *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1956).

> generally let in small parcels and cultivated by small peasant tenants. At the same time, of course, fragmentation dominated the sector of peasant proprietorship. These different class structures determined substantially different results in terms of agricultural productivity and, indeed, wholly disparate overall patterns of economic development (Brenner in Aston and Philpin, 46).

Students of contemporary agriculture, particularly in Asia—Schultz, Hayami, Ruttan, Sen and others—have largely discredited this "lesson of history."[31] More important for this essay, the thesis is strongly disputed by contemporary historians of agricultural development in Europe. As phrased most dramatically by Goldstone, "There is a persistent belief... that much of the magic in English farming was due to its 'larger' farms, with their land lord/capitalist tenant/wage laborer, compared with the proliferation of tiny plots in France. This is, to be polite, poppycock."[32]

As the work of Robert C. Allen and others has shown, there was a steady growth of productivity on all British farms, be they enclosed or open-field, large or small, from the time of the middle ages through the 18th century;[33] because of the dominance of open-field farming throughout much of this period,[34] enclosed, large-scale farmers contributed relatively little to the differences in productivity that distinguished British from French agriculture.[35] According to Allen,

> Corn yields in the English midlands approximately doubled between the middle ages and the nineteenth century. Wheat, for instance, which had yielded about ten bushels per acre in the fifteenth century, provided about 20-22 bushels c. 1800. Compared to that increase, the difference between open and enclosed yields at the end of the eighteenth century was small, i.e. open field farmers (like enclosed farmers) had accomplished almost all of the advance.[36]

[31] Theodore W. Schultz, *Transforming Traditional Agriculture* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1964); Yujiro Hayami and Vernon W. Ruttan, *Agricultural Development: An International Perspective* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971); Amartya K. Sen, "Size of Holding and Productivity," *The Economic Weekly* 16 (1964), 323-26.

[32] Jack Goldstone, "Regional Ecology and Agrarian Change in England and France, 1500-1700," paper presented at the Caltech-All University of California Conference (fn. 17), 24. A revised version of this paper is scheduled to appear in a special edition of *Politics and Society* (see fn. 18).

[33] Allen, "Enclosure and Productivity Growth, 1459-1850," typescript (Department of Economics, University of British Columbia, 1984). Allen's data remain controversial.

[34] For data on the rate of enclosure, see J. R. Wordie, "The Chronology of English Enclosure 1500-1914," *Economic History Review* 36 (November 1983), 483-505.

[35] For data on these differences, see Anthony Wrigley, "Urban Growth and Agricultural Change: England and the Continent in the Early Modern Period," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 15 (1985), 716-21.

[36] Robert C. Allen, "Enclosure, Farming Methods, and the Growth of Productivity in the South Midlands," Discussion Paper No. 86-44 (rev.) (Department of Economics, University of British Columbia, January 1987), 16. See also J. A. Yelling, *Common Field and Enclosure in*

*To what, then, is the greater English productivity to be attributec len suggests biological improvements: seed selection and the use o proved plant species. Others suggest the growth of the market. In l land, to a much greater degree than in France, a national market* formed. Some areas produced wool for export. *Areas immediately a*c cent to towns specialized in truck farming and the production of peri ables.[37] Farms near the coast produced meat and grains, which they tl shipped by water to urban centers. And those who worked the heav soils of the interior shifted out of arable production into the producti of livestock. Studies of subsistence crises also suggest the relatively grea integration of the English market; Appleby and others indicate that th was a far greater mobility of grain between regions of abundant harve and those of dearth in England than there was in France, and thu greater capacity to blunt the consequences of food shortages.[38]

Major investigations of present-day agriculture refute the position tl peasant agriculture retards development. So do important reassessme of the historical data.

## THE SQUEEZE ON AGRICULTURE

Viewed in historical perspective, development is a process of structu change. It results from the movement of resources—land, labor, and ca ital—out of agriculture and into other sectors, such as industry, wh these resources can be used more productively. In summary notation:

$$\frac{d\,GNP}{dt} > 0 \quad \Longrightarrow \quad \frac{d\,Ag./GNP}{dt} < 0,$$

where $d$ stands for change, $t$ for time, *GNP* for gross national produ and *Ag./GNP* for agriculture as a portion of the gross national product

One way in which this shift of resources takes place is through pı ductivity increases in agriculture. Technical change in agriculture lea to increased supplies of agricultural products; because the demand 1

*England 1450-1850* (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1977), and M. Turner, "Agricultural P ductivity in England in the Eighteenth Century: Evidence from Crop Yields," *Economic H tory Review*, 2nd series, 35 (1982), 489-510.

[37] See Marjorie Mackintosh, "Economic Change in Southeast England, 1350-1600," pa presented at the Caltech-All University of California Conference (fn. 17).

[38] See Andrew Appleby, "Grain Prices and Subsistence Crises in England and Fran 1590-1740," *Journal of Economic History* 39 (December 1979), 865-87; E. A. Wrigley and Ro Schofield, *The Population History of England 1541-1871* (Cambridge: Harvard Univers Press, 1981); David Weir, "Markets and Mortality in France," 1600-1789," manuscript, n n.d.; Joan Thirsk, ed., *Agrarian History of England and Wales* (Cambridge: Cambridge U versity Press, 1984).

such products is inelastic, prices fall, and the resources of land, labor, and capital employed by marginal producers fail to earn revenues equivalent to their opportunity costs, and so seek productive employment elsewhere. Through the Mills-Marshall treadmill, dynamic transformations in agriculture lead to the structural transformation of the greater economy.[39]

Structural transformation can also be achieved by policy-induced shifts in relative prices. Here, another lesson of history is brought to bear: that industrialization was achieved by shifting the terms of trade against agriculture.[40]

Central to this inference is the history of the Corn Laws, and in particular their repeal. Classical economists, especially Ricardo, had attacked the Corn Laws and stressed the way in which they privileged the interests of the landed classes. Manufacturers and workers had combined in demanding their repeal; according to Marshall, "the Victory of the Anti-Corn Law League signalized the extension of the interests of industrial capitalists and of . . . their rule over England."[41] From the history of the Corn Laws, many therefore concluded that the shift from an agrarian to an industrial society could be achieved by altering the terms of trade between town and country.[42]

This way of promoting industrialization strongly appealed to ambitious elites. In the Soviet Union, for example, some, like Bukharin, favored offering positive incentives to farmers; their response in terms of increased supply would then induce the dynamic adjustments leading to the release of resources to industry. Others, like Preobrazhensky, distrusted the willingness and ability of peasants to respond to price incentives; citing the lessons from the history of industrialization in Britain, they felt that forceful state intervention to shift the terms of trade against

[39] See the excellent discussion in Alain de Janvry, *The Agrarian Question and Reformism in Latin America* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981). The central issue of whether industrialization resulted from the transfer of resources from agriculture is addressed in François Crouzet, *Capital Formation in the Industrial Revolution* (London: Methuen, 1972), and Roderick Flood and Donald McClosky, eds., *The Economic History of Britain since 1700*, I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

[40] The history of these ideas is ably reviewed in Lipton (fn. 25). See also E. Preobrazhensky, *The New Economics*, trans. by Brian Pearce (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966); Alexander Erlich, *The Soviet Industrialization Debates, 1924-1928* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960).

[41] Leon S. Marshall, "The Emergence of the First Industrial City: Manchester 1780-1850," in Caroline F. Ware, ed., *The Cultural Approach to History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1940), 158. A sophisticated treatment is provided by Timothy J. McKeown in "The Politics of Corn Law Repeal Reconsidered," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 3-6, 1987. In this paper, McKeown reanalyzes the famous Aydelotte data set. See William Aydelotte, "The Country Gentlemen and the Repeal of the Corn Laws," *English Historical Review* 82 (1967), 47-60.

[42] See in particular Ashok Mitra, *Terms of Trade and Class Relations: An Essay in Political Economy* (London: Frank Cass, 1977).

agriculture represented the best policy. The advocates of political intervention won out; by shifting the structure of relative prices against rural producers, they taxed the rural sector in favor of industry.[43] This policy was subsequently followed by others.[44]

Although it is now widely recognized that turning the terms of trade against agriculture is far more likely to lead to stagnation than to growth, this lesson of history was used for decades to advocate and to justify the imposition of negative pricing policies on farmers.

Because reasoning from precedent will remain an important guide to policy in the development field, we are motivated to reassess the historical record. When we do so, we learn three *new* lessons. The first is that the repeal of the Corn Laws represented the repeal of a subsidy rather than the imposition of a tax; structural transformation had thus been achieved where agriculture was subsidized rather than squeezed. The second is that the development field has drawn historical lessons from a highly anomalous case; it therefore rests upon unfirm data. The third is the centrality of politics to the economics of development.

Lesson One

When re-assessing the historical precedents that proved to be misleading guides to policy, one quickly recognizes that the repeal of the Corn Laws did *not* represent the imposition of a tax on agriculture. The policy of the British government can be summarized as choosing that price for farm products which represents the

$$max\ (P_d, P_w)$$

where $P_d$ is the price on the domestic market and $P_w$ the price on the world market. Under the terms of the Corn Laws, when the world price was higher than the domestic price, farmers could export grain; when it was lower than the domestic price, imports were prohibited. The policy thus represented a high-price policy, which favored farmers at the expense of consumer interests.

It is ironic that, *rather than justifying the policy prescription of shifting the terms of trade against farming, the English case justifies the opposite*. The structural transformation of English agriculture took place in the context of policies that protected high agricultural prices.

[43] See Erlich (fn. 40), as well as Maurice Dobb, *Soviet Economic Development Since 1917* (New York: International Publishers, 1948).

[44] See the discussion in Theodore W. Schultz, ed., *Distortions of Agricultural Incentives* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978).

LESSON TWO

As Heckscher and others point out, England's commitment to policies favoring farmers made that nation unique in its time. A key element of "mercantilist policies," Heckscher suggests, was "provisioning": supplying cheap grain to urban centers. Other governments intervened to defend low domestic prices by banning the export of grain when world prices were higher than the domestic price, and by allowing the import of grain when domestic prices were high. They acted, in other words, to implement policies which selected the

$$min\ (P_d, P_w).$$[45]

*The policies everywhere else in Europe were exactly the opposite of those followed in England.*

It is important to stress the level of English exceptionalism. Economists, Marxist and otherwise, have long taken the English case as prototypical of early industrialization. Many of the lessons inferred about the origins of successful capitalist development derive from this case. And yet, as we have seen, England proves to have been anomalous.

French policies toward agriculture were more characteristic of those of her historical contemporaries; they were also more typical of those that characterize the developing nations today. French agriculture was peasant-based; productivity was relatively low; the government adhered to a low-price policy; and it maintained a bureaucracy to secure cheap grain to feed its civil servants, its armed forces, and its capital city. The French case—not the English, with its large farms, subsidized rural sector, and relatively free internal trade—better approximates the world of the contemporary developing nations. Thus, it follows that too much theorizing about development has been based on the case of England, and too little on that of France.

Development specialists would do well to put aside their Marx, Smith, Ricardo, and Mill and instead consult the writings on France, such as those produced by Tilly, Brenner, Root, and Kaplan.

LESSON THREE

The third lesson leads to a renewed respect for the centrality of politics to the economics of development.

England, like every other developing country, originally intervened in agricultural markets in an effort to defend consumer interests. Gras,

[45] Eli F. Heckscher, *Merchantilism*, II (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1931), 80ff.

*Ponko, Outhwaite, and others have examined the process by which the government sought to regulate the grain trade so as to preserve low prices.*[46] *The frequency of such interventions declined in the 17th century, however, and policy was reversed in 1688, with the adoption of* the Corn Laws.[47] As Kaplan, Tilly, and others show, the government in France, by contrast, continued to intervene in grain markets in order to preserve lower, not higher, grain prices.

One reason for the disparate behavior of the two governments may have been the relative security of food supplies. The data suggest that, by the 17th century, food shortages were less frequent in England than in France; there were fewer subsistence crises. Just as government policy affected the performance of the agrarian economy, so the performance of the economy may have affected the incentives for governments to assure the supply of low-cost food.[48] There is a strong case to be made for the significance of this reciprocal causation.

The books reviewed in this essay also suggest, however, that there may have been important *political* reasons for the contrast in public policies. Root, Brenner, Tilly, and Kaplan argue that agricultural policy in France was driven in part by the need for revenues to finance foreign wars and in part by the need to achieve internal security. The English monarchy, too, needed money for its foreign wars; but, in the 17th century, the domestic threat to it came not so much from the capital city as from parliament.

Viewed from this vantage point, the date of the Corn Laws—the hallmark of English exceptionalism—is instructive. The laws were passed in 1688 as part of the terms negotiated between parliament and the king who had been chosen by parliament: William of Orange.[49] Parliament had overthrown the monarchy; it had ruled England for decades; and by turning to William and Mary, it had imported a new royal family. The landowners who dominated parliament sought the commitment of the monarch to policies that would raise the price of grain; the monarch

[46] N.S.B. Gras, *The Evolution of the English Corn Market* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1915); V. Ponko, "N.S.B. Gras and Elizabethan Corn Policy: A Re-examination of the Problem," *Economic History Review*, 2nd series, 17 (1964), 24-42; R. B. Outhwaite, "Dearth and Government Intervention in English Grain Markets, 1590-1700," *Economic History Review*, 2nd series, 34 (1981), 380-406, and "Food Crises in Early Modern England: Patterns of Public Response," in *Proceedings of the Seventeenth International History Conference*, ed. Michael Flinn (Edinburgh: The University Press, 1978).

[47] See the discussion in Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), Book I, pp. 219ff.

[48] See, for example, Weir (fn. 38); the contributions in Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, *Hunger and History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); and Appleby (fn. 38).

[49] See Smith (fn. 47), Book I, pp. 219ff.

sought higher taxes. The result was a political compromise. The king exchanged protection of the economic interests of grain producers for parliament's agreement to a land tax. The landed elites and the monarch adopted a program of agrarian protection and split the economic benefits between them.

Why, then, did not London rebel, as Paris did?[50] Brenner's new research shows that the governing elites in London differed significantly from those in Paris.[51] London was a port city, and its government was dominated not by civil servants and lawyers, but by merchants and traders. The elites of Paris were consumers of grain; those of London were traders. Unlike their Parisian counterparts, those who dominated the government of London could benefit from the exportation of grain; free trade in grain therefore was less of a threat to the powerful in the capital city.

Kaplan's study of the politics of agricultural policy in France demonstrates that the coastal cities joined the landed classes in demanding the liberalization of the grain trade. London was a coastal city. Had the capital of France been Marseille rather than Paris, the monarchy of France in the 18th century might well have shifted to market principles in the making of agricultural policy.

## Conclusion

In this essay, we have examined five recent works that cast light upon the foundations of the development field. To a great extent, those foundations are based on lessons of history that have not been properly interpreted.

Several of the central theses about the transition from agrarianism rest on debatable grounds. For example, the nation-state did *not* champion the extension of competitive markets; rather, public officials sought to limit and regulate them. It was the workers and burghers—the new classes that emerged with capitalism—who used the language of community to resist the market; often, it was agricultural producers who preferred unfettered trade. Peasants often sought to break up commons; elites often sought to preserve them. Small-scale farmers accounted for much of the productivity gains in the period preceding the Industrial Revolution; peasant agriculture was not stagnant. Moreover, deep mis-

[50] As Rude has shown, the rebellions by the London mob correlated with the price of bread. See Rude (fn. 8).

[51] Robert Brenner, forthcoming.

understandings surround the history of the terms of trade and the ro
they played in "the great transformation."

Among the most significant of the new lessons learned, however, is th
intellectual tyranny of the English case—and the significance of that o
France.

# JAPANESE FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY FORMATION: Explaining the Reactive State

By KENT E. CALDER*

Takashi Inoguchi, *Kokusai Kankei no Seiji Keizai Gaku: Nihon no Yakuwari to Sentaku* [The political economy of international relations: Japan's role and choice]. Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppan Kai, 1985, 253 pp.
Yōichi Funabashi, *Nichibei Keizai Masatsu* [Japan-U.S. economic conflict]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho, 1987, 232 pp.
Atsushi Kusano, *Nichibei Orange Kōshō* [Japan-U.S. orange negotiations]. Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbun Sha, 1983, 237 pp.
Thomas McCraw, ed., *America versus Japan*. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1986, 463 pp.
Kenneth B. Pyle, ed., *The Trade Crisis: How Will Japan Respond?* Seattle: Society for Japanese Studies, 1987, 251 pp.
Michèle Schmiegelow, ed., *Japan's Response to Crisis and Change in the World Economy*. New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1986, 309 pp.

As trade frictions between Japan and its Western economic partners have escalated, both Western and Japanese analysts, particularly at the popular level, have developed increasingly divergent and strongly held conceptions of what Japanese foreign economic policies currently are, and how they got to be that way. Some see Japanese policies as remarkably liberal in view of Japan's pervasive resource vulnerabilities; others regard these same policies as rapaciously mercantilist. Yet despite this broad divergence of views—as well as the rising importance of Japan's behavior—for the international system, for comparative political analysis, and for international relations theory, there has been remarkably little serious international dialogue about the character of the Japanese state in its complex relationship with the global economic system. Scholarly Western-language publications in the international relations field in particular have all too frequently given short shrift to or ignored Japanese

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*interpretations of Japan's own policy processes, institutions, and obje tives.*

For an understanding of the complex mixture of strategy, hesitanc and pragmatism that characterizes Japanese foreign economic policy be havior, particularly in the late 1980s, this essay employs the concept of th "reactive state." This concept denies neither the strategic intent of muc Japanese policy making nor its successful implementation in many in stances. It is also broadly consistent with arguments stressing the impor tance of international considerations, particularly the U.S.-Japan allianc in influencing Japanese foreign economic behavior. The reactive stat interpretation merely maintains that the impetus to policy change is typ ically supplied by outside pressure, and that reaction prevails over strat egy in the relatively narrow range of cases where the two come into con flict. Thus, ambiguous foreign demands may serve, through deft strategi redefinition within Japan itself, as a stimulus for enhancing Japanes competitive capabilities; this occurred during the capital and import lib eralization controversies of the late 1960s after Japan joined the OECD But institutional difficulties in initiating pro-active policies handicap Ja pan in pursuing strategic interests in multilateral settings, a reality be coming more important to both Japan and the international economi system with the decline of American pre-eminence.

The essay begins by exploring the concept of the reactive state withi the broader context of analysis in international political economy. It pro ceeds to an empirical investigation of postwar Japanese foreign economi policy behavior, with particular emphasis on the post-1971 period, an explains Japanese passivity in international affairs when activism woul have been both possible and beneficial for Japan. This tension betwee reactive behavior and strategic imperatives became particularly pro nounced during 1971-1973, after the stable trade, financial, and energ regimes within which Japan prospered during the 1950s and 1960s bega to dissolve abruptly with the Nixon Shocks, flexible exchange rates, an the first oil shock.

Although the concept of the reactive state as presented here is a general notion, broadly applicable to nonhegemonic powers in highly interdependent international systems, it has particular relevance to contemporary Japan. The reactive aspects of Japanese foreign economic behavior are remarkably pronounced, considering the country's economic strength, the strategic inclinations of its technocracy, and the turbulence of the international economic system; the economic basis for a more pro-active Japanese global role is gradually being established, however. The article concludes with an assessment of implications of Japan's character

as a reactive state for the broader global political economy and for future research.

## JAPAN AS A REACTIVE STATE

The essential characteristics of the "reactive state" in this analysis are two-fold: (1) the state fails to undertake major independent foreign economic policy initiatives when it has the power and national incentives to do so; and (2) it responds to outside pressures for change, albeit erratically, unsystematically, and often incompletely. In a four-fold typology of nation-states in terms of these two characteristics, the reactive state can thus be distinguished from pro-active hegemonic and middle-range powers such as the United States, France, and many of the other large European powers during the 1950s and 1960s. It can also be distinguished from inflexible, autistic states incapable of responding to outside stimuli even under pressure. Contemporary Japan is sometimes accused of being such a state. Small, advanced European nations such as Austria and Norway, with foreign economic strategies that are highly responsive to developments in a broader global political economy whose parameters they do not attempt to shape, could be considered reactive states under the definition adopted here;[1] so could the newly industrializing nations of East Asia, such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, although their internal social and state structures are obviously very different from those of the small European democratic corporatist states.[2] Ample natural resource endowments, large internal markets, relatively centralized domestic policy-making structures, defense incentives for autarkic development, and a tradition of North-South confrontation have made the larger Latin American NICs (as well as India) somewhat more pro-active but less pragmatically flexible than their East Asian counterparts; Brazilian and Indian informatics policies during the late 1970s and the early 1980s are cases in point.[3]

From the perspective of international relations theory, Japan is an es-

[1] On the industrial adjustment and foreign economic strategies of the smaller European industrial states, see Peter J. Katzenstein, *Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985).

[2] On the foreign economic policies of the East Asian NICs, see Roy Hofheinz, Jr., and Kent E. Calder, *The Eastasia Edge* (New York: Basic Books, 1982), 171-91; David Yoffie, *Power and Protectionism: Strategies of the Newly Industrializing Countries* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983); and Frederic C. Deyo, ed., *The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).

[3] On Brazilian informatics policies and the constraints they placed on U.S. multinationals, see Peter B. Evans, "State, Capital and the Transformation of Dependence: The Brazilian Computer Case," *World Development* 14 (July 1986), 791-808.

On the Indian case, see Joseph Grieco, "Between Dependency and Autonomy: India's Ex-

*pecially interesting reactive state because of its enormous economic size, its substantial population (more than France and West Germany combined),*[4] *and its pre-1945 history of pro-activism in the international system. In all these respects, it is more similar to the pro-active middle-range* European economic powers (such as West Germany, Britain, and France) than to other reactive states (such as Austria and Norway), which are typically smaller in size and influence. Japan has, in addition, a far larger domestic market, and is less dependent on international trade than any of these states, including the major European powers. It has carefully controlled Western multinational corporations and banks in order to prevent them from compromising state authority; few other governments have done this successfully. Moreover, since 1985 Japan has been the largest creditor in the world; its capital outflows in 1986 were more than twice those of all OPEC nations combined at the height of their wealth.[5]

Despite its manifest economic and geostrategic resources and its demonstrated ability to operate strategically within its national boundaries, the Japanese state has been consistently more cautious in taking international initiatives than most major European governments. It has also typically been more deferential to pressure from the United States—and at times even from the European Community—than these middle-range powers. These differences raise fundamental issues regarding the relationship of national economic capabilities to foreign economic policy. The Japanese case also raises basic issues regarding the relationship of domestic structure to international economic behavior, particularly concerning domestic political constraints on pro-active foreign economic policy.

Considering the importance of the subject to the functioning of the global economic system and to theoretical analyses in international political economy, competent book-length empirical studies of Japanese foreign economic policy behavior are still remarkably scarce. Those that are available, such as the 1986 Harvard Business School's comparative study of business-government relations, *America versus Japan*, edited by Thomas K. McCraw (reviewed here), and the various collaborative projects of I. M. Destler, Hideo Sato, and Haruhiro Fukui,[6] focus predominantly on U.S.-Japan relations.

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perience with the International Computer Industry," *International Organization* 36 (Summer 1982), 609-32.

[4] In 1986, Japan's population was an estimated 121.5 million, compared with 61.1 million for West Germany, 57.2 million for Italy, 56.6 million for the United Kingdom, and 55.4 million for France. See Keizai Kōhō Center, *Japan 1988: An International Comparison* (Tokyo: Keizai Kōhō Center, 1987), 6.

[5] Japanese long-term capital outflows in 1986 totaled $132 billion; OPEC annual capital outflows in the mid-1970s averaged under $65 billion. See *Nomura Investment Review*, July 1987, p. 11; *New York Times*, August 31, 1986.

[6] I. M. Destler, Hideo Sato, and Haruhiro Fukui, *Managing an Alliance* (Washington, DC:

Because of the explosive recent intensification of U.S.-Japan economic interdependence[7] and the far-reaching implications of that interdependence for the global political economy as a whole,[8] U.S.-Japan comparisons are of crucial importance for policy purposes. But in securing a deepened theoretical understanding of the reactive postwar Japanese state, U.S.-Japan analysis must be supplemented with comparisons between Japan and European states, comparisons between Japan before 1970 and the current newly industrializing countries (NICs), comparisons between recent Japanese behavior and that of earlier emergent economic superpowers, and comparisons between pre-World War II and post-World War II Japan itself. The important question is why Japanese foreign economic policy has been so much more reactive than that of other middle-range economic powers, even as Japan moves toward economic superpower status. In this respect, comparisons with the United States are especially useful when they are lagged to compare recent Japanese realities with American economic policy making between World Wars I and II, before the American global hegemonic role had been clearly established.[9]

During the 1950s and 1960s, both Japan and Western Europe were subordinate elements of the U.S.-dominated Western hegemonic system. Evidence from one of the few studies that has yet undertaken a systematic comparative analysis of Japan and Europe—Michèle Schmiegelow's edited volume under review here—affirms that the early post-World War II foreign economic policies of the middle-range European powers were significantly more pro-active, and on important occasions significantly *less* deferential to the United States, than those of Japan. In a fascinating comparative essay, Henrik Schmiegelow points out, for example, that several of the European nations, particularly France, pursued openly neo-mercantilist exchange-rate policies during the 1950s and the 1960s, involving pragmatic competitive devaluations broadly counter to the Bretton Woods structure of fixed exchange rates (p. 31). In sharp contrast to this practice, and to Japan's own mercantilist strategy of competitive devaluation during the 1930s, postwar Japan adhered rigidly to a fixed exchange rate of ¥360 to the dollar, consistently avoiding devaluations despite recurrent balance-of-payments deficits and a strong sense of

Brookings Institution, 1976); I. M. Destler and Hideo Sato, *The Textile Wrangle* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1979); I. M. Destler and Hideo Sato, eds., *Coping with U.S.-Japan Economic Relations* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1982).

[7] See Kent E. Calder, "The Emerging Politics of the Trans-Pacific Economy," *World Policy Journal* 2 (Fall 1985), 593-623.

[8] See Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 328-40.

[9] On such prehegemonic American foreign economic policy making, see, for example, David A. Lake, "International Economic Structures and American Foreign Economic Policy, 1887-1934," *World Politics* 35 (July 1983), 517-43.

*external vulnerability. Only in 1969-1971, as Japan reached full employment and a structural balance-of-payments surplus was emerging, did Japanese exchange-rate policies benefit Japanese exports at clear cost to others because Japan persistently refused to consider realignment of a demonstrably undervalued yen. Throughout the period of formal dollar* gold convertibility up to August 1971, *Japan refrained from active* accumulation of gold reserves, which might have antagonized the United States. With regard to exchange-rate policy, Japan was significantly more deferential to the U.S. in its slowness to accumulate gold than the major middle-range European powers, particularly France.

Inoguchi's *Kokusai Kankei no Seiji Keizai Gaku* (The Political Economy of International Relations), is one of the few Japanese scholarly works that consider both Japan's role in the international economic system and its domestic politics bearing on foreign economic policy. Evidence from the volumes by Schmiegelow, Pyle, and McCraw, as well as from Inoguchi's work, suggests that the foreign economic policies of the reactive Japanese state remain less pro-active and confrontational than those of the major middle-range European powers, although the direct comparative data continue to be highly fragmentary. In the postwar period, Western Europe's economic ties to the United States were much closer than those of Japan. Europe has consistently had private-sector institutional structures that were relatively conducive to expanded imports and foreign investment; this pattern does not prevail in Japan, as Okimoto points out in his useful analysis of private-institutional barriers to rapid foreign economic penetration (Okimoto in Pyle, 85-116). But when confronted with explicit foreign political pressure—often the crucial catalyst for policy decisions by the reactive state—Japan has been more forthcoming with specific, formal policy changes than is generally realized. David Yoffie points out, for example, that in 1960 one-quarter of the Japanese government's special taxation measures for enterprises were devoted to promoting exports; by 1975, in the wake of widespread criticism of Japanese trade policies, all incentives had been shifted to favor domestic projects (Yoffie in McCraw, 47). Michèle Schmiegelow notes that Japan's average tariff levels for manufactures in the mid-1980s were lower than those of the United States and the European Community; indeed, Japan had reached West Germany's level of actual import liberalization as early as April 1971, even though West Germany had started from a substantially more liberal early postwar base (Schmiegelow, 5).

As Chalmers Johnson points out, Japan has eliminated virtually all the formal tariff and nontariff barriers to trade that were specifically criticized by its trading partners as being contrary to GATT rules (Johnson in Pyle, 75). To Schmiegelow, Japan's 1980 Foreign Exchange and For-

eign Trade Control Law appears to be no less liberal than that of West Germany (Schmiegelow, 2); one might add that, since the Yen-Dollar Agreement of May 1984, Japanese foreign-exchange control policies have been significantly more liberal than those of West Germany. Schmiegelow also points out that since the mid-1960s, Japan has been unusually liberal, for a nation at its stage of development, in its treatment of capital outflows (p. 13). These measures did not emerge unilaterally; Yoffie maintains with only modest overstatement that Japan has been willing to alter its prevailing policies only under external pressures, such as those epitomized in the Nixon Shocks of 1971 (Yoffie in McCraw, 67).

Despite some self-interested nuances, Japanese foreign-aid policies also appear reactive to foreign pressure as well as broadly supportive of U.S. strategic purposes in the global political economy (Inoguchi, 201-4). Beginning with reparations policies in the 1950s (undertaken at the behest of the United States), Japan has played a key role in supporting Southeast Asian economies, thereby neutralizing the appeal of China in that region.[10] Since the 1970s, Japan has also provided increasing assistance to South Asian, Middle Eastern, and Latin American nations of strategic interest to the United States, complementing America's own security assistance (Inoguchi, 201-2).

Japanese behavior at major multilateral financial conferences of the past two decades has also been that of a reactive state. It has been passive, yet unusually cooperative with U.S. hegemonic demands, despite divergent Japanese interests and, particularly since 1985, despite Japan's substantial presence in the international monetary system. At the Smithsonian Conference of December 1971, for example, Japan accepted under pressure a nominal change of 16.88 percent in the parity value of the yen—the largest realignment imposed on any state, and the first revaluation of the yen since 1949. West Germany, by contrast, had unilaterally revalued in 1962, 1969, and in May 1971; consequently, its revaluation of the Deutschmark at the Smithsonian Conference was much smaller than Japan's. Similarly, Japan agreed at the Plaza Conference of September 1985, also under pressure, to cooperate actively in the effort of the Group of Five (G-5) major industrialized nations to drive down the dollar. The Nakasone administration only began its active intervention to stabilize exchange rates some months later, as the yen's surging strength started to threaten the domestic Japanese economy with a deep recession.

Japan's approach to macroeconomic coordination with other major in-

[10] On the details, see Akio Watanabe, "Sengo Shoki no Nichibei Kankei to Tōnan Azia" [Early postwar Japan-U.S. relations and Southeast Asia], in Chihiro Hosoda and Sadamu Ariga, eds., *Kokusai Kankyō no Henyō to Nichibei Kankei* [Change in the international environment and Japan-U.S. relations] (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppan Kai, 1987), 27-54.

*dustrialized nations is also that of the passive (but often pragmatically flexible) reactive state, far less disposed to either pro-activism or dogmatic* rigidity than either West Germany or France. Although initially hesitant, Japan fell into harmony with the Carter administration's "locomotive strategy" following the Bonn Summit of 1978, in sharp contrast to the recalcitrant West Germans. Similarly, in response to U.S. pressures during 1986-1987, Japan began to reflate, beginning with off-budget credit programs;[11] West Germany refused to do so until after the global stock market crash of October 1987. Japan's reflation, however, occurred only after six years (1980-1986) during which conservative Japanese fiscal policies seriously exacerbated international trade frictions by intensifying Japanese current account surpluses and capital flows (Edward Lincoln in Schmiegelow, 154). Reflation came about not through autonomous Japanese decisions, but as a result of strong foreign pressure for fiscal expansion.

The Japanese state is clearly more systematic than most states in defining national industrial policy objectives, in redefining ambiguous foreign demands to suit domestic purposes, and in handling its relations with domestic and foreign firms within Japan. It can also be highly calculating in specific bilateral trade transactions (Yoffie in McCraw, 36-37). On the other hand, Japan is more hesitant in pursuing strategic trade and industrial interests in cases that require pro-active multilateral initiatives, especially in the face of clear foreign opposition.

Japanese policies toward telecommunications and data processing, for example, bear the hallmark of the diffident reactive state, in contrast to more rigid and statist continental European approaches. This has been true despite the long-term industrial significance of telematics to the Japanese economy. There were, to be sure, active mercantilist overtones to nascent Japanese software policies of the early 1980s, when draft legislation prepared by MITI in 1984 raised the possibility of compulsory licensing and relatively loose patent-law protection of software, as well as other provisions to which Japan's trading partners objected strongly. Following strong multilateral foreign pressure against Japan during 1985, however, these MITI proposals were retracted. In the case of value-added networks and other telecommunications activities made possible under the Telecommunications Business Law of 1985, initial Japanese proposals to restrict foreign involvement were also sharply modified under foreign

[11] The Fiscal Investment and Loans Program, for example, expanded by 6.2% in 1986, and by 22.2% in 1987. See Junichi Yonezawa, Takuo Noguchi, and Katsuhiro Kubota, *Zusetsu. Zaisei Tōyūshi* [The fiscal investment and loans program: A graphic description], 1987 ed. (Tokyo: Tōyō Keizai Shinpōsha, 1987), 254-55.

pressure; the result was a considerably more liberal telecommunications and data-processing environment for foreign firms by the mid-1980s than prevailed in either France or West Germany.[12] In both of the latter countries, the telecommunications industry remained in public hands during the late 1980s, with only a gradual and grudging recognition of the role of market forces in stimulating innovation, and with much stronger and more rigid rejection of U.S. proposals for reform than was the case in Japan.

Reactive Japanese foreign policies have persisted throughout the 1980s, not only in the face of massive and rising Japanese economic capabilities, but also—as Kenneth Pyle notes in his edited volume under review—despite determined efforts by Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone (1982-1987) to fashion a more decisive, pro-active international role for Japan (pp. 5-32). Pyle points out that, on the eve of assuming office in November 1982, Nakasone wrote that "the first necessity is a change in our thinking. Having 'caught up,' we must now expect others to try to catch up with us. We must seek out a new path for ourselves and open it up ourselves."[13] Throughout his long term as Prime Minister, Nakasone continued to stress the importance of an active international role for Japan; some tentative steps toward an expanded diplomatic role included his abortive efforts in 1983-1984 to mediate the Iran-Iraq war. In the economic arena, however, Nakasone's expressed intentions did not produce much actual change in policy. He did press strongly and successfully for Japanese concessions in the case of the Yen-Dollar Agreement of 1984. In this instance, intervention had few domestic political complications, since Nakasone's personal ties with the Ministry of Finance bureaucrats whom he was forced to override were relatively weak, and market forces had in any case created strong support for financial liberalization within Japan. But in several other cases, such as the U.S.-Japan telecommunications negotiations of 1984-85, domestic political vulnerability—particularly Nakasone's lack of a strong factional power base within the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)—prevented him from intervening decisively to generate a clear, activist policy stance. Instead, he temporized and waited for foreign pressure to determine the outline of an appropriate Japanese response.[14]

Even the so-called Maekawa Report on structural transformation of

[12] See Kent E. Calder, *Dealing with Emerging Japanese Information Industries in the 1980s: The Cases of VAN and Software* (Center of International Studies, Princeton University, forthcoming 1988).

[13] Yasuhiro Nakasone, "Takumashii Bunka to Fukushi no Kuni o" [Toward a nation of welfare and vigorous culture], *Seiron*, January 1983, 26-37; quoted in Pyle, 16.

[14] Calder (fn. 12).

the Japanese economy toward a more import-oriented profile, inspired by Nakasone, was brought forward in reactive fashion, appearing just prior to the 1986 Tokyo summit, when foreign pressures for decisive Japanese initiatives in trade policy were growing intense.[15] The report stresses quite clearly and boldly the importance of a fundamental change in national direction, away from the strong export orientation that had been traditional in Japan since the mid-19th century. It outlines a number of broad alternative national goals, such as expanding domestic demand, changes in fiscal and monetary policy, and increased imports of manufactured goods. But it provides few specifics on how such a transformation away from exports might be realized. There is only one statistic in the entire eleven-page report—the 3.6 percent figure representing Japan's trade surplus as a share of GNP in 1986. At an early stage, the advisory group that prepared the report apparently considered various prospective policy initiatives, such as setting a target date for Japan to bring its trade surplus to zero, or boosting government spending to stimulate the economy. But the final document included no quantified targets at all, reportedly due to various bureaucratic counterpressures.[16]

## Why Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Tends to Be Reactive

In order to understand why states have reactive foreign economic policies, we must answer two parallel questions: why those policies are not pro-active, and why they are not simply rigid. Possible answers to both questions lie in one of three areas: considerations of state strategy, the character of the international system, and the internal structure of individual states that jointly make up the system. None of these possibilities are mutually exclusive as explanations for reactive state behavior; in the Japanese case, all were concurrent between the end of World War II and roughly the end of the 1960s. Japanese national strategy dictated avoiding broad international commitments or a pro-active global role, so as to devote maximum attention to economic growth; the pre-eminence of the United States—with whom Japan shared an interest in multilateral free trade and stable exchange-rate regimes—obviated the need for independent Japanese initiatives. Conversely, heavy dependence on the United States for capital, markets, and diplomatic support—rendered es-

[15] The report was informally named after the former governor of the Bank of Japan, Haruo Maekawa, the chairman of the advisory group. The formal name is Advisory Group on Economic Structural Adjustment for International Harmony; the committee was charged with recommending ways of "more fully internationalizing the Japanese economy."

[16] *Japan Times*, April 8, 1986.

pecially acute by Japan's resource vulnerabilities, diplomatic isolation, and highly geared corporate strategies that mandated stable, steady cash flows—also made Japan unusually deferential to strongly expressed U.S. demands. Like some smaller U.S. allies, Japan could try to deflect or redirect those demands, but it could not totally forestall them.[17]

When the United States indicated a strong interest in concessions by Japan (as on the mutual security treaty, the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, the Airline Treaty, and the Fisheries Treaty of the 1950s; and on adoption of I.M.F. Article 9 status and trade with the Soviet Union and China during the 1960s), Tokyo grudgingly but pragmatically accommodated U.S. concerns—indeed, more so than Americans usually recognize in hindsight. During the first two postwar decades, the United States simply did not press Japan very hard, due to the marginal attractiveness of the Japanese market, Washington's failure to foresee Japan's resurgent competitive potential, and the U.S. preoccupation with security considerations. The United States was obsessed with the need to retain Japanese diplomatic support against the Soviet Union and China; it also feared that severe pressure regarding economic issues would exacerbate Japan's seemingly fragile economic circumstances and lead either to political instability or to a counterproductive surge of anti-American sentiment within Japan.

While international systems explanations focusing on the U.S.-Japan relationship provide important insights into both Japanese passivity and Japanese responsiveness vis-à-vis the United States during the 1950s and 1960s, it is harder to explain the reactivity of Japanese foreign economic policy making since the Nixon Shocks of 1971—particularly since 1985. Japan has grown much larger in economic, technological, and even military terms than most of the other reactive states.

Unlike South Korea and most other reactive states, Japan has no net external debt; indeed, it is by far the world's largest creditor, with well over $200 billion in net external assets at the end of 1987. Compared to most reactive states or other middle-range powers, foreign investment in Japan is minimal relative to the overall scale of the national economy and has little domestic political influence; moreover, Japan has a much larger domestic market than the others. Supplying close to $100 billion annually in capital exports to cover the U.S. fiscal deficit, Japan has developed considerable leverage over the United States in their bilateral trans-Pacific relationship. Yet Japan has declined to use this international leverage

[17] See Robert O. Keohane, "The Big Influence of Small Allies," *Foreign Policy* No. 2 (Spring 1971), 161-82, on the methods smaller states use to influence the foreign policies of larger powers upon whom they are dependent.

overtly in support of its interests, even to the extent of taking strong initiatives to secure exchange-rate stabilization that might limit multi-billion dollar portfolio losses for Japanese overseas investors.[18]

### Domestic Constraints on International Initiatives

Despite the importance of the international environment and considerations of state strategy, particularly during the early postwar period, Japan's reactive behavior in the international political economy of the late 1980s cannot be explained without reference to Japanese domestic social and political structure. In contrast to the situation of the 1950s and 1960s, the international economic order of the 1980s clearly allows for and encourages Japanese activism, especially in view of the declining hegemonic capabilities of the United States, economic stagnation in Western Europe, and Japan's own broad-based economic, technological, and, increasingly, geostrategic leverage on the global scene.[19] Considerations of national strategy not only permit but mandate Japanese activism, particularly in international monetary affairs; with external financial assets upward of $200 billion, most of them dollar-denominated, Japan is sharply and adversely affected by the depreciation of the dollar and other major currencies against the yen, such as occurred steadily during the two years after the Plaza Accord of September 1985. With the international system allowing Japanese activism beyond the continuing strategic assistance to domestic firms within Japan, and conditions of national strategy seeming to dictate such activism, the reactive character of Japanese foreign economic policy in the late 1980s would clearly appear to have important roots in the Japanese domestic structure.

Japanese domestic political structure discourages pro-active foreign policy behavior in several respects. Perhaps most importantly, the fragmented character of state authority in Japan makes decisive action more difficult than in countries with strong chief executives, such as the United States or Fifth-Republic France. The problem of domestic coordination is compounded in Japan by the lack of both a functionally oriented ad-

[18] In fiscal 1986, for example, Japan's 24 insurance companies incurred a ¥2.2 trillion (over $15 billion) foreign exchange loss on their ¥10 trillion in foreign securities holdings, 50% of which were in U.S. Treasury offerings. Results for 1987 were reportedly comparable. See *Japan Times*, January 5, 1988.

[19] By 1988, Japan had, at prevailing exchange rates, by various definitions either the third-largest or the seventh-largest defense budget in the world, with rising defense technology capabilities and a central role in funding both U.S. defense budgets and economic assistance programs supportive of U.S. basing rights in states such as the Philippines. The Japanese defense budget for fiscal 1988 by Japanese definition was ¥3.67 trillion (around $30.4 billion at December 1987 exchange rates). By the NATO definition, including military pensions that Japan treats as welfare spending, Japan's defense budget was around $45 billion—significantly larger than the 1987 totals for France ($34.5 billion), West Germany ($34.2 billion), and Britain ($31.8 billion). See *The Economist*, January 23, 1988, pp. 27-28.

ministrative corps and authoritative codification of ministerial responsibilities to dampen bureaucratic disputes over jurisdiction. Japan has, as Karel van Wolferen puts it, "a hierarchy, or complex of overlapping hierarchies, without a top,"[20] the intermittent attempts of figures such as former Prime Minister Nakasone to play transcendent leadership roles notwithstanding.

To be sure, Japan has powerful national ministries such as MITI and the Ministry of Finance, which lend an aspect of decisiveness to policy on narrow technical issues within their clear individual areas of technical expertise and established professional concern (*nawabari*), such as technical standards for the consumer electronics industry or the establishment of research cartels in integrated circuits.[21] But on broad, complex questions of global economic management, or on issues created by emerging technology or economic transformation where bureaucratic responsibilities have yet to be defined, ministerial jurisdiction is often unclear, and internal conflict over how to proceed is often strong. In such cases, of which multilateral financial and telecommunications issues in the 1980s are typical, Japanese policies can hardly avoid being reactive.

Fragmentation of decision-making authority, leading to reactive policy making, is not a new characteristic of Japanese diplomacy. Bureaucratic divisions and lack of a strong central executive led to indecisive and reactive policy making at the Washington and London Naval Conferences of the interwar period,[22] although decisive military actions were also typical of that era. Cleavages within the machinery of state also seriously undermined Japanese diplomacy and military effectiveness during World War II.[23] Similar dynamics appear to have been at work in drafting the Maekawa Report of 1986. In that case, a range of relatively bold proposals for policy change, such as setting a target date for Japan to bring its trade surplus to zero, was apparently defeated by complex bureaucratic counterpressures flowing from the lack of decisive central authority.

Domestic interest-group pressures and the Japanese state's unusual

[20] Van Wolferen, "The Japan Problem," *Foreign Affairs* 65 (Winter 1986-87), 289.

[21] On the details of Japanese semiconductor industry development, including the relatively coherent and strategic role of public policy, see Daniel I. Okimoto, ed., *The Competitive Edge* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1983).

[22] See the studies by Sadao Asada of the 1922 Washington and the 1930 London Naval Conferences, in Chihiro Hosoya and Jōji Watanuki, eds., *Taigai Seisaku Kettei no Nichibei Hikaku* [A comparison of U.S. and Japanese foreign policy processes] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1977); and Chihiro Hosoya and Makoto Saitō, eds., *Washington Taisei to Nichibei Kankei* [The Washington system and U.S.-Japan relations] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1978).

[23] See Ryōichi Tobe, Yoshiya Teramoto, Shinichi Kamata, Yoshio Suginō, and Ikujirō Murai, *Shippai no Honshitsu: Nihongun no Soshikiteki Kenkyū* [The essence of failure: Organizational research on the Japanese military] (Tokyo: Diamondo Sha, 1984).

sensitivity to them also intensify the reactive character of current Japanese foreign economic policy making, particularly in the area of trade policy. In contrast to the United States, France, Britain, and even West Germany, Japan has a relatively weak defense lobby, few emigrés with irredentist concerns, and relatively few powerful indigenous multinational enterprises with far-flung, global geostrategic interests. The most powerful interest groups (aside from large umbrella business federations such as Keidanren, which has 600 corporate members and is too unwieldy to direct an activist foreign policy), are agricultural federations and small-business dominated regional chambers of commerce. These parochial groups have virtually no international interests other than to resist foreign encroachments into Japanese domestic markets. During the 1970s and 1980s, domestic interest groups have been entering into increasingly intimate "iron triangle"-style clientelistic relationships with bureaucrats and politicians, forming "policy tribes" (*zoku*) that impede decisive policy initiatives even further.[24]

Although the evidence is mixed, many knowledgeable analysts suggest that the role of individual conservative politicians and of the Liberal Democratic Party itself in policy making has increased during the 1980s.[25] Improved expertise, information, and staff support, together with the growing ability to control bureaucratic promotions (the result of over thirty years of continuous power) have enhanced the LDP's policy-making influence. So have internal divisions within the bureaucracy, particularly in sectors such as telecommunications and postal finance, where technology and the contours of markets are changing rapidly and spheres of bureaucratic responsibility are poorly defined. Within the LDP itself, career party politicians appear to be gaining influence in policy making at the expense of ex-bureaucrats; since 1968, no former bureaucrat has become chairman of the Policy Affairs Research Council, the LDP's increasingly important policy-making arm (Inoguchi, 56).

Within a Liberal Democratic Party increasingly important in foreign policy formation, there are few incentives to propose clear, independent foreign policy initiatives. Japan's system of medium-size electoral districts forces as many as five members of the largest political parties (especially the ruling LDP) to run against one another in the same electoral district; thus, extremely small shifts in the total vote become crucial to a

[24] On the phenomenon of "policy tribes," see Takashi Inoguchi and Tomoaki Iwai, *Zoku Giin no Kenkyū* [Research on tribal dietmen] (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbun Sha, 1987).

[25] See, for example, Seizaburō Satō and Tetsuhisa Matsuzaki, *Jimintō Seiken* [The LDP administration] (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1986), and Nihon Keizai Shimbun Seiji Bu, ed., *Jimintō Seichō Kai* [The LDP policy affairs research council] (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbun Sha, 1983).

candidate's election prospects. As a result, LDP legislators tend to be highly sensitive to constituency pressure, especially from relatively well-organized grassroots pressure groups such as agriculture and small business. Most of them have no clear ideology or maxims for conducting international relations other than a pragmatic response to foreign pressure (Funabashi, 33). Empirical analysis shows that politicians specializing in foreign affairs and defense matters tend to do rather poorly at the polls in Japan; the most secure Dietmen—those most likely to advance to the higher ranks of a seniority-oriented conservative political world—devote themselves to service to their constituents, especially in the agricultural and construction areas (Inoguchi, 43). Because these Dietmen often have broad expertise but little personal vision, they are disposed to reactive policy making, in which the impetus to change necessarily comes from outside (Funabashi, 41).

Candidates for prime minister, of course, must have views on the key foreign policy questions of the day; some demonstrated foreign policy expertise is an asset—especially during turbulent periods in the international economy, such as the late 1980s. There have been a few documented cases of LDP initiatives in the process of trade liberalization, mainly by aspirants to the office of prime minister or by foreign affairs specialists.[26] But Japan's numerous "action programs," as well as the LDP's Special Committee for Economic Counter-Measures (Esaki Committee), have achieved little success at dismantling domestic trade barriers in the absence of strong, directed foreign pressure, as the history of Japanese agricultural trade policy in the 1980s demonstrates (Funabashi, 61-62). The common pattern has been for the LDP's complex factional structure, grassroots constituency-sensitive orientation, and strong domestic interest-group ties to inhibit the party from undertaking decisive, independent foreign policy initiatives. The party's welfare-oriented biases also tend to erode the mercantilist cast of Japanese policy making. The LDP thus gains influence at the expense of a more strategically oriented bureaucracy; trade policy is biased in favor of inefficient domestic agriculture and labor-intensive manufacturing.

The prospects for future LDP influence with the bureaucracy are uneven. In areas where the responsible ministries have little international expertise and where the interests of the constituency are strong, such as air transport agreements, the LDP already appears dominant. The ruling party also often plays a decisive mediating role in sectors such as telematics, where bureaucratic jurisdictions are ambiguous and interministerial

[26] Some see the LDP's mediation of the import liberalization controversy of metal baseball bats in the early 1980s as one such case. See *ibid.*, 40-43.

conflicts correspondingly severe. This role is frequently indirect, however, and not easily visible to outsiders. The area of finance provides a mixed picture. The LDP is deeply involved in mediating the future of the massive postal savings system and in brokering tax reform, but it avoids many controversial issues, such as banking and securities-industry liberalization, that lie within the clear jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finance.

Bureaucracy and big business are still powerful in the policy process—perhaps more than Inoguchi's analysis implies—where their responsibilities are clear and their interests deeply engaged. But the net effect of the party's rising influence in Japanese policy making has generally been to intensify the reactive bias of the Japanese state. This has been especially true on delicate trade-policy questions, where pro-active initiatives directed toward liberalization of existing barriers are often politically controversial within Japan.

Reactive states, as has been mentioned, have their flexible dimensions. Despite the existence of clientelistic "policy tribes" in such areas as agriculture, Japan has totally liberalized imports of lemons (to the point where an industry that was significant until 1962 has almost disappeared) as well as most non-citrus fruits; it currently takes over three-quarters of U.S. global beef and veal exports.[27] During the 1980s, Japan has also made important concessions to its foreign trading partners on telecommunications equipment procurements, copyright protection for software, technical standards for consumer appliances, underwriting opportunities in yen-denominated securities for foreign financial institutions, and access to government credit for foreign subsidiaries operating in Japan. But these concessions, it must be stressed, have always been in response to foreign pressure—usually focused and rendered relevant to business and political realities in Japan by local subsidiaries of Western multinationals, which typically maintain ties to both Japanese and foreign governments. As Daniel Okimoto points out, a strong physical presence in Japan will be crucial for foreign firms as they become more seriously involved in the Japanese market (Okimoto in Pyle, 116). Apart from the business reasons he cites (pp. 101-3), one of the most important reasons for this is the significant role of local subsidiaries of foreign companies, especially well-established entities like IBM-Japan, in helping to mediate relations with the reactive Japanese state while benefiting from its pragmatic, if often subtle and obscure, concessions to outside pressure.

[27] In 1986, 77.7% of global U.S. beef and veal exports went to Japan. So did 86.5%, 73.2%, 55.2%, and 29.2% of U.S. lemon/lime, pork, grapefruit, and orange/tangerine exports, respectively. See Keizai Kōhō Center (fn. 4), 18.

THE SOURCES OF INTERMITTENT JAPANESE FLEXIBILITY

Why is the Japanese state reactive but nevertheless intermittently flexible in the face of foreign pressure? Keenly sensed international vulnerabilities, including a dearth of raw materials, frequent lack of state-of-the-art technology, and a pervasive sense of diplomatic isolation are obvious factors. Dependence on the United States for security and markets is also relevant. But, taken together, these considerations are still underpredictive; an understanding of domestic structure is also important to a full explanation.

Funabashi's *Nichibei Keizai Masatsu* [Japan-U.S. Economic Conflict] and Kusano's *Nichibei Orange Kōshō* [Japan-U.S. Orange Negotiations] illustrate the political dynamics of, as well as the limits to, the Japanese reactive state's flexibility in international economic affairs. They depict the Japanese political system as one that, like its trading partner across the Pacific, is divided internally. That system is in the throes of perpetual domestic conflict, driven by political cycles, interest-group pressures, and bureaucratic machinations in complex interrelationships with one another (Funabashi, 10-11). In the case of the orange negotiations, Japanese consumers, the Japanese Foreign Ministry, and longtime orange-cartel boss Kazuo Fujii all had differing interests with respect to expanded U.S. orange imports into Japan. At the same time, many of these interested Japanese parties to the orange-import controversy had implicit allies in the United States, either because of parallel economic interests or direct political connections. The transnational "managed trade" coalition of Sunkist in California and orange-cartel boss Fujii in Japan were arrayed against Japanese consumers and the Florida citrus interests championed by Florida senator Richard Stone. Similar transnational dynamics were at work in the automobile, rice, and financial negotiations examined by Funabashi (pp. 120-230).

Because of the widening U.S.-Japan trade deficit, the American government was under pressure to take action in the orange case, which is broadly typical of the trade cases presented in the volumes under review. Washington was well-equipped to act, due to the centralization of political power on the American side in the hands of the executive branch and its trade negotiator, Robert Strauss. The Japanese government, faced with conflicting pressures from various ministries and interest groups, and without a centralized forum for resolution, had more trouble in coming to a coherent position. But one point on which both rival interest-group coalitions and the U.S. government agreed was the need for some marginal increase in U.S. orange exports to Japan. Under pressure from

Strauss, the Japanese negotiators became more flexible regarding an increase in the import quota for oranges; they used this concession effectively to sidestep the issue of full-scale import liberalization, which, due to internal divisions, the U.S. side could not press very strongly (Kusano, 11).

The orange negotiations thus are a case in which the flexibility of the reactive Japanese state—like the demands of the pro-active American state—were both real and limited. While the Japanese political system was not prepared to fully liberalize, it was prepared to *compensate*. Virtually all relevant actors in the orange negotiations, in both the United States and Japan, were given a lucrative piece of what they wanted (Kusano, 205). Although quotas were not dismantled, they were expanded so gradually that both the American exporters and the import cartel increased total revenues. Only the Japanese consumer, unrepresented in the negotiations, failed to reap major benefits—a particularly ironic outcome given basic Ricardian precepts of comparative advantage in international trade.

One major reason for flexibility (albeit often limited flexibility) in Japan's reactive policies is rooted in domestic political structure: the existence of crosscutting communities of interest between Japanese and foreign interest groups. Both U.S. exporters and the Japanese import cartel benefited from a marginal increase in Japanese orange import quotas, for example, as long as that increase was quite limited. As the Japanese economy becomes more and more deeply integrated with those of foreign trading partners—particularly that of the United States—crossnational interest-group coalitions that have the leverage within Japan to induce some flexibility in the Japanese government will grow in number and political influence. The strong yen of the late 1980s, for example, is promoting further coalitions between large Japanese distributors and foreign exporters on behalf of Japanese import expansion. T. J. Pempel points out that Japanese policy making is becoming very much a transnational process on many issues of foreign economic policy as well as on security matters (Pempel in Pyle, 149-50).

Among the strongest forces for reactive foreign economic policy making in Japan is the unusual structure of the Japanese mass media and their relationship to broader policy processes: they encourage some policy flexibility while also inhibiting pro-active Japanese initiatives. Japan has the most powerful mass media in the non-Communist world, with each of the three major national newspapers listing circulations of more than four times that of *The New York Times*. All these national dailies also have powerful television and other mass-media affiliates with whom they co-

operate closely. The major media organizations operate through a common press-club system that standardizes both access to and timing of release of information from major political and bureaucratic sources. By Western (especially Anglo-American) standards, these are highly unusual characteristics; the integration and power of the media since the advent of television in the late 1950s is unprecedented in Japanese history as well.[28] The size and coordination capabilities of the Japanese media, operating within a homogeneous and relatively conformist society, give them an extraordinary ability to sway grassroots opinion, and to create a plausible pretext for action by the political authorities—probably the strongest such capacity in the world. Politicians and bureaucrats who watch cautiously to see how foreign overtures or domestic trial balloons are received by the media and the grassroots can use the power of the media to advantage; more assertive tactics would probably not be effective. Thus, in the absence of outside pressures for action, the media structure in Japan creates strong incentives toward hesitant initial behavior. However, the media also facilitate policy change once a consensus on the need for it has been reached.

## Reactive Japanese Foreign Economic Policy: Implications for Japan and the World

Even in the 1980s, Japan's approach to the international economy, like that of the United States and most other major industrial nations, is in many respects still deeply rooted in the economic crises of the early post-World War II period.[29] During the era of economic and political uncertainty, whose perils were compounded by resource shortages and the effects of wartime destruction, the framework was forged for Japanese participation in the broader global economy. Japan succeeded brilliantly in achieving its objectives as long as the parameters of the global trade system remained stable. The very success of Japanese trade strategies, however, together with that of other newly industrializing nations, had begun to undermine the viability of the prevailing global trade and mon-

[28] On the influence of the Japanese mass media since the late 1950s, see, for example, Mataichi Kido, ed., *Gendai Jyanarisumu: Shimbun* [Modern journalism: Newspapers] (Tokyo: Jiji Tsushin Sha, 1973); Mataichi Kido, ed., *Gendai Jyanarisumu: Hōsō* [Modern journalism: Broadcasting] (Tokyo: Jiji Tsushin Sha, 1973); Ichirō Miyake, Jōji Watanuki, and Ikuo Kabashima, *Byōdō o meguru Elito to Taikō Elito* [Elites and counter-elites who bring about equality] (Tokyo: Sōbun Sha, 1985); and Ikuo Kabashima and Jeffrey Broadbent, "Referent Pluralism: Mass Media and Politics in Japan," *Journal of Japanese Studies* 12 (Summer 1986), 329-61.

[29] Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982); also see McCraw, ed., *America versus Japan*, esp. p. 37.

etary regimes by the mid-1980s, despite periodic *ad hoc* adjustments since the Nixon Shocks and the Smithsonian Accord of 1971.

As Thomas McCraw and his colleagues point out in the study under review, the growing international economic crisis of the late 1980s, centering on the U.S.-Japan relationship, has deep structural origins and cannot readily be solved by macroeconomic nostrums (McCraw, throughout). Exchange-rate adjustments, such as the greater than 50 percent revaluation of the yen against the dollar during 1985-1987, can exert pressure for change, but cannot themselves produce it. Fundamental structural adjustments within the major trading nations (analogous to those that gradually gave birth to the current status quo of a relatively open America and a more closed and strategically oriented Japan) or thorough changes in international trade and financial arrangements are ultimately required.

The urgency of change is clear from even a cursory examination of emerging global balance-of-payments disequilibria. In 1986, the trade deficit of the United States reached $144 billion. Japan's trade surplus per year, by contrast, was running almost $100 billion.[30] Foreign capital inflows were financing the U.S. current account deficit at an annual rate of around $140 billion, turning the United States into the largest debtor in the world.[31] The bulk of these capital inflows came from Japan.

By mid-1987, the substantial exchange-rate shifts of the previous two years were beginning to have a marginal impact on Japan's trade balance in yen-denominated terms. But Japanese investment earnings—a major share of which represented the converse American debt-service burden—were growing even more rapidly. By the early 1990s, Japan is likely to be a net creditor of at least $500 billion, with annual investment earnings between $25 and $50 billion.[32] The United States, on the other hand, stands to become a massive debtor; I.M.F. estimates suggest a magnitude of around $800 billion by 1990 alone, with debt service payments of approximately $60 billion,[33] or roughly the size of the 1987 U.S.-Japan trade deficit.

Japan will be facing strong economic and political pressures to alter its export-oriented behavior and to assume a major role in reordering the international monetary and trade systems. Japanese self-interest—not to mention the viability of the international economic order—will require

[30] According to Ministry of Finance statistics, Japan's 1986 trade surplus was $92.8 billion. See *Nomura Investment Review*, January 1988, p. 10.

[31] Martin Feldstein, "Correcting the Trade Deficit," *Foreign Affairs* (Spring 1987), 795-96.

[32] C. Fred Bergsten, "Economic Imbalances and World Politics," *Foreign Affairs* 65 (Spring 1987), 770-71.

[33] Feldstein (fn. 31), 801.

much greater activism on the international economic scene than Japan has manifested at any time over the four postwar decades. What implication does the reactive-state interpretation of Japanese foreign economic policy have for Japan's ability to assume these new roles?

It is essential to recall the dual character of Japan's reactive state. On the one hand, it finds independent initiatives difficult. Yet, on the other hand, it is often pragmatically flexible under outside pressure, particularly in sectors such as finance and high technology where market forces are strong, bureaucratic strength is waning, and domestic interest groups are relatively weak. Even in agriculture, long-run structural changes in the Japanese domestic political economy are laying the basis for growing import dependence in case strategically focused—and strategically limited—foreign pressures should demand it.

Several times during the late 1970s and the early 1980s, foreign pressure induced policy changes in Japan on such matters as restraints on automobile exports to the United States (1981), access to the Japanese market for beef and oranges (1978), macroeconomic stimulation (1978), and market access for American telecommunications equipment (1980). The G-5 Plaza Accord of September 1985 may also have generated pressures for policy change in Japan, together with subsequent but related short-term interest rate increases by the Bank of Japan.[34] The massive imbalances of the international trade and monetary system in the late 1980s, combined with Japan's character as a reactive state, suggest that the importance of *gaiatsu* (foreign pressure) in Japanese foreign economic policy formation will further intensify.

In the short run, the reactive character of the Japanese state in foreign economic policy, particularly in dealings with the United States, helps to prolong a period of U.S. global hegemony in which American commitments have come to exceed American economic power.[35] For example, with the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law of 1980, the Yen-Dollar Agreement of 1984, and other related measures, Japan has responded positively to U.S. pressures for liberalization of outward capital flows;[36] the resulting unprecedented trans-Pacific capital flows played a central role in the ability of the United States to sustain the defense buildup of the 1981-1986 period. Consistent Japanese support for the U.S.

[34] *Ibid.*, 799-800.

[35] See Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 328-36.

[36] For further details on the process of Japanese financial liberalization and its implications for long-term U.S.-Japan capital flows, see Kent E. Calder, "Japanese Capital Outflows: Origins and Implications for the Global Political Economy," testimony before the Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, December 11, 1986.

at summit conferences of the advanced industrial nations, G-5 financial negotiations, the I.M.F., and the preliminary Uruguay Round of trade negotiations has also allowed Washington's positions to prevail more frequently than American economic power alone would justify.

Yet reactive Japanese economic diplomacy, and the intensifying foreign pressures that motivate it, have potentially fateful long-run consequences within Japan. Most importantly, they are stimulating Japanese nationalism, as the Japanese people become increasingly aware of their country's relatively high economic efficiency and global prominence just as the barrage of global criticism against Japan intensifies.[37] Many see foreign criticism as unjustified. Although the Japanese government continues to respond, at least formally, to most demands from the major Western nations, popular support for such action is growing thinner.

Nationalist forces within Japan have also been stimulated by the sharp exchange-rate realignments of 1985-1987. These pushed weaker export sectors of the Japanese domestic economy, such as shipbuilding and textiles, into deep recession even as they intensified market pressures for enhanced import dependence. If severe exchange-rate induced deflationary pressures persist throughout an extended period of structural transition to a less export-dependent economy, and if they generate serious unemployment in the process, they may ultimately undermine the one-party dominance that has persisted in Japan for well over thirty years.

Perhaps the sharpest potential stimulus to anti-internationalist sentiment in Japan would be determined foreign efforts to force liberalization of labor-intensive import sectors such as wood products, food processing, and metal fabrication, in combination with forced rationalization of the Japanese distribution system. Together, these four sectors employ roughly one-third of Japan's entire work force. Relatively inefficient labor-intensive manufacturing, which had totally lost international competitiveness by the 1980s, employs as many workers as the major export sectors. For example, over twice as many workers are employed in predominantly small-scale metal fabrication as in the entire steel and nonferrous metal production sectors combined.[38] Under the impact of the

[37] Among the growing literature combatively justifying Japanese economic management and blaming others for global imbalances, see Osamu Shimomura, "Ijōna Amerika Keizai, Rifujin na Amerika" [A distorted American economy, and an unfair America], *Next* (July 1985), 90-95; Kenichi Ohmae, "Nichibei ni 'Fukinkō' wa nai" [Between Japan and the U.S. there is no imbalance], *Bungei Shunjū* (April 1986), 94-109; and Osamu Shimomura, "Nihon Mondai kara 'Amerikan Puroburemu' e" [From the Japan problem to the American problem] *Seiron* (July 1987), 40-49.

[38] In 1985 the metal fabrication industry employed 1,278,000 workers, compared to 427,000 for the steel industry, and 202,000 for the nonferrous metals production sector. See Management and Coordination Agency Statistics Bureau, *Japan Statistical Yearbook*, 1987 ed. (Tokyo: Management and Coordination Agency Statistics Bureau, 1987), 74.

sharp yen revaluation that began in late 1985, unemployment is already rising steadily. Foreign efforts to force rationalization of distribution and labor-intensive manufacturing would exacerbate this problem, and could possibly trigger a sharp antiforeign reaction, particularly within the LDP.

Indefinite continuation of the recent cyclical pattern of unfocused, often insensitive foreign pressure and reactive Japanese policy making could have dangerous consequences in the long run. At an extreme, it could place an unstable, uncertain, but nationalistic Japan in a central position within the global monetary system, inviting disastrous worldwide repercussions. It is therefore necessary to think more systematically about how foreign demands on Japan can be more focused and qualified so as to avoid inflaming Japanese nationalism still further. It is also important to consider means of encouraging Japan to engage in moderate, proactive diplomacy in the interest of the world system as a whole. Japan's economic partners should give particular thought to coordinating trade and monetary policy claims on Japan, so that the two types of policy do not work at cross-purposes.

Economic changes of the past two decades, spawned in the interaction between Japan's reactive foreign economic policy and the international system, are providing some groundwork for a more decisive Japanese global role. Direct foreign investment outward from Japan, like portfolio investment, has been massive, driven by relative costs of production as well as by Japanese fears of Western protectionism. Both these motivations for direct overseas investment are a function of the sharp shifts in exchange rates and the intermittent protectionist measures that followed the demise of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s. In 1986, Japanese direct foreign investment surged to $22.3 billion, nearly twice the level of the previous year; it was less than $1 billion in 1971, when Bretton Woods broke down.[39] Although in 1980 only 2 percent of the production of Japanese corporations took place offshore, compared to 10 percent for U.S. firms, this ratio between U.S. and Japanese offshore production was moving rapidly toward equality by the late 1980s.

Japan has also been developing major new stakes in the profile of the international monetary system, as a result of foreign-currency denominated securities holdings that totaled almost $102 billion at the end of 1986.[40] International pressures appear to have given Japanese manufacturing firms, particularly those investing massively in new plants and equipment abroad, a growing interest in a more active Japanese economic diplomacy, including a diplomacy more occupied with national security

[39] Keizai Kōhō Center (fn. 4), 56.

[40] *Nomura Investment Review*, April 1987, p. 11.

concerns. The growing role of Japan in the international financial system, as the world's largest exporter of capital, has brought about sharply increased prosperity and influence for Japanese financiers domestically; it has also given these financiers an expanded stake in a stable international monetary regime.[41] If the exchange-rate turbulence of the mid-1980s persists as Japanese financial surpluses continue to rise, Japan will have powerful incentives to become more active in global regime formation—through insisting on stronger multilateral foreign investment guarantees or on yen-dominated U.S. Treasury debt, for instance. By the spring of 1986, calls for measures of this sort were already beginning to surface within Japan,[42] although the Japanese government, in classically reactive fashion, was slow to assert its clear national interests in the absence of external pressure to do so.

The economic basis for a gradual revision of Japan's reactive-state approach to economic diplomacy and for the emergence of a more positive Japanese leadership role in the international political economy is now beginning to emerge, just as its analogue did during the 1840s in Britain and during the 1890s in the United States. Do we have, in the rising financial houses, automobile producers, and electronics firms of Japan—newly wealthy as a consequence of Japan's changing role in the world economy—the functional equivalent of the merchants of Bristol and Wall Street who gave the stimulus to the assertive hegemonic roles played in the past by Britain and the United States? The issue is complex, but our analysis provides the basis for some guarded generalizations.

First of all, it seems unlikely that Japan could or would become an overarching hegemon in the international system comparable to the Anglo-Saxon powers in their heyday, even if strong economic reasons for activism gradually transformed the reactive Japanese state. Because of its relatively weak armed forces and the strong domestic constraints on their expansion, Japan could not easily play a hegemonic role in strategic and military affairs. Aside from imports to correct resource shortages, trade is much less fundamental to Japanese economic growth or to the maintenance of domestic employment than is often supposed; less than 20 per cent of Japan's work force is employed in sectors generating over 80 per-

[41] After the sweeping reforms of the foreign exchange law in 1980, operating profits of the top four securities houses rose between 29% and 51% in one year. By the end of 1985, they stood at roughly triple the levels of 1979-1980, while those of the major banks quadrupled during the same period. By 1986, all four of the largest banks in the world, and six of the ten largest, were Japanese. See The Oriental Economist, *Japan Company Handbook*, First Half 1986 (Tokyo: Tōyō Keizai Shinpō Sha, 1986), 1010-1113; and Nihon Shimbun Sha, ed., *Nikkei Sōgō Charts* [Nikkei composite charts] (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbun Sha, 1985), 425-30.

[42] See, for example, Yoshihide Ishiyama, "Utage no ato no Kokusai Tsuka Kaikaku" [International currency reform after the banquet], *Chūō Kōron*, April 1986, pp. 176-87.

cent of total exports, while total exports comprise only around 15 percent of GNP.[43]

Domestic structural constraints—particularly the lack of a strong central executive, coupled with the presence of strong elite ministries with specialized and at times divergent concerns—will probably combine with national interest to produce a Japanese leadership role that will be technical and sector-specific rather than broadly political. The strongest prospects for Japanese activism will most likely appear in energy and finance, where sharp global price fluctuations and Japan's dependence on world markets create an overwhelming interest in shaping future international regimes. In the short run, Japan may be expected to exert influence in these areas either through multilateral mechanisms or through informal G-2 arrangements with the United States, such as those pioneered in the Baker-Miyazawa Agreement of October 1986.[44] Only an extended period of turbulence in the global economy with discernible, threatening contours would elicit strong movement away from the continuing tradition of the reactive Japanese state.

[43] Bank of Japan Research and Statistics Department, *Keizai Tōkei Nenpō* [Economic statistics annual], 1985 ed. (Tokyo: Nihon Ginkō, 1986), 249-52.

[44] On the G-2 concept, see Funabashi, 194-230 and Bergsten (fn. 32), 789-93.

# IMPLEMENTING THE FINAL SOLUTION:
## The Ordinary Regulating of the Extraordinary

By HENRY L. MASON

Hans Günther Adler, *Der Verwaltete Mensch: Studien zur Deportation der Juden aus Deutschland* [Bureaucratized man: Studies on the deportation of the Jews from Germany]. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1974, 1076 pp.
Eberhard Jäckel and Jürgen Rohwer, eds., *Der Mord an den Juden im Zweiten Weltkrieg: Entschlussbildung und Verwirklichung* [The murder of the Jews in World War II: Decision making and implementation]. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1985, 252 pp.
Helmut Krausnick and Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm, *Die Truppe des Weltanschauungskrieges* [Troops for ideological warfare]. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1981, 688 pp.
Robert Jay Lifton, *The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide*. New York: Basic Books, 1986, 561 pp.

HUMAN failure of all kinds looms large in the annihilation of the Jews during World War II. Many of the facts relating to the "actions" of the Einsatzgruppen—the killing commandos of the SS—in Soviet territories, the treatment of the sealed-off ghettos in Poland and Lithuania, the deportation process in Germany and elsewhere, and even the ultimate horror of the extermination camps could well have been known to many of the bystanders within and without the Nazi realm and should have provoked fervent reactions from them. Instead, they pretended not to know, and they did nothing; the Jews were abandoned virtually on all sides.[1] Equally shocking is how all kinds of bureaucratic apparatuses—German and non-German, military and civilian, including many professional ranks—allowed themselves to be used as organizers, agents, and legitimators of heinous acts that were crassly in violation of their traditional ethic and professional standards. These bureaucratic implementors of the Final Solution are the principal concern of the present article.

The massive volume by Krausnick and Wilhelm provides the most

[1] There is ample literature on this subject, including David S. Wyman, *The Abandonment of the Jews* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984); Bernard Wasserstein, *Britain and the Jews of Europe 1939-1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979).

penetrating insight into the "work" of the Einsatzgruppen, particularly how this work was perceived—and accepted—not only by them, but also by the dominant actor on the Einsatzgruppen's turf, the German army.[2] Adler's even more voluminous study provides an equally penetrating insight into the relationships that a host of German bureaucracies had with the process of deportation of the Jews from Germany—the intricate series of "administrative" actions that preceded the arrival at the ramp in the East.[3] Lifton's book, another in his unmatched studies of "holocaustic" subjects, exposes the surprising and shocking impact of a professional class, the physicians. His concept of medicalization, through which the physicians were intricately involved with the killings, permits analysis of crucial turning points on the road toward the Final Solution. This road is also studied by several German, Israeli, and American scholars in the volume edited by Jäckel and Rohwer, which emphasizes decision making and implementation.

In the first section of the present article, the implementation of the Final Solution is discussed in terms of the conceptual themes characteristic of the Jäckel-Rohwer volume, reflecting the divergence between the so-called functionalists and intentionalists. The second section treats the routines—"what they saw to be their job"—of two sets of implementors of the Holocaust: the mass liquidations perpetrated by the Einsatzgruppen and the "barbaric-civil orderliness" of the bureaucrats carrying out the deportation of the German Jews (as depicted, respectively, by Krausnick-Wilhelm and Adler). Lifton's concept of medicalization is the subject of the third section, which also pays attention to his thoughts on "doubling" and the extention of his concerns "beyond Auschwitz" to the sphere of nuclear catastrophe. The debate between the functionalists and the intentionalists is a continuing theme throughout the article.

## I. Functionalists versus Intentionalists

Eberhard Jäckel maintains that decision making and implementation have become the most debated scholarly topics in Holocaust studies. The volume edited by him and Jürgen Rohwer presents the papers and discussion from a symposium on these topics held in Stuttgart in May 1984.

[2] The best coverage in English is Raul Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews*, particularly the three-volume edition of 1985 (New York: Holmes & Meier).

[3] Adler's magnum opus, with its emphasis on bureaucratic behavior in the deportation process, has not received sufficient attention since its publication in 1974. Uwe Adam's worthwhile but very differently focused analysis has been seen as the standard general coverage of the policies against the German Jews. See Adam, *Judenpolitik im Dritten Reich* [Policy on Jews in the Third Reich] (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1979).

The deliberations crystallized around two positions, the "functionalists" and the "intentionalists." According to Jäckel and Rohwer (pp. 10-11) this debate began with an article by Martin Broszat, which questioned whether Hitler had formally planned and formally decreed the annihilation of the Jews. Broszat's entirely negative conclusions were challenged by Christopher Browning, writing in the same journal in 1981.[4]

Documentation on issues of decision making and implementation in the Holocaust is hard to find. The Final Solution was supposed to be kept at the very highest level of secrecy; therefore, written decrees and related materials were tabu and, where existing, destroyed before the end of the war. After the war, Allied and German investigators were for many years not much interested in decision making and implementation as such, and therefore failed to ask pertinent questions of the surviving witnesses. Moreover, different sets of German officials had participated in the killing of Jews—e.g., the Einsatzgruppen in the areas from which the Soviet army was driven; the SS leader Odilo Globocnik, who was in charge of the "Aktion Reinhard" (the extermination camps at Treblinka, Belzec, and Sobibor); and the Auschwitz commandant Rudolf Hösz, who worked for the economic branch of the SS. Although there was some coordination by Himmler and Eichmann, the killing agents remained separate and jealous of each other throughout their functioning. Finally, analysis is difficult because the sequence of events is difficult to trace. The first Jews to be killed were those in the regions the Germans conquered from the Soviet army immediately after the invasion of June 1941; the first massive extermination of deported German Jews occurred at Kowno on November 25, 1941, and of ghettoized Polish Jews at Chelmno on December 8, 1941. The slaughter of the other Jews in the German realm began in spring 1942. Each of these actions involved its own kind of decision making, lead time, and style of implementation (Jäckel and Rohwer, 11-14).

The debate between the intentionalists and functionalists concerns the question whether the annihilation of the Jews was based on specific, formal planning by Hitler or whether it followed incrementally—bureaucratically, so to speak—from the accumulation of anti-Jewish and other measures. In the functionalist view, the impression of planned policies and planned implementation reflects the hindsight of the researcher. The intentionalists tend to present the Final Solution as reflecting Hitler's

[4] Broszat, "Hitler und die Genesis der 'Endlösung'" [Hitler and the genesis of the "Final Solution"] *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 25 (October 1977), 746-56; Browning, "Zur Genesis der Endlösung. Eine Antwort an Martin Broszat" [On the genesis of the Final Solution, an answer to Martin Broszat], *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 29 (January 1981), 99-109.

precisely expressed wishes, while the functionalists see it as part of the "anarchial polycracy" so typical of the Nazi state (Jäckel and Rohwer, 11, 27, 53).

Although the term functionalism has been used as a convenient label for a variety of concepts in the study of politics and other societal phenomena, it is appropriate "as a rough form of shorthand" reflecting a much-needed emphasis on machinery and structures of government and their effect upon Nazi decision making, particularly with respect to the Final Solution.[5] A leading German functionalist, Hans Mommsen, has emphasized that an understanding of the complex road to Auschwitz must include analysis of the process of *Umsetzung* (transformation) of long-range ideological aims into actual political strategy. All kinds of interim steps were needed for this transformation. These steps have been interpreted as having been based on coherent and consistent dictatorial will; actually, they flowed from a variety of initiatives on the part of a variety of interest groups among the political power brokers and lower-level implementors in the Third Reich. Hitler's "idea" of killing the Jews was not sufficient to start, let alone regularize, the annihilation process. What was required for the realization of the idea was the involvement of several of the German elites—for purposes of their own—and the "servile eagerness" of all kinds of lower-level bureaucrats—basically not ideologically inspired.[6] According to Gerhard Schreiber's summation of the functionalist position, the implementation of the Final Solution must be seen as the consequence of, and reaction to, a set of conditions, particularly inner German ones, "which affected Hitler more profoundly than he affected them." The responsibility did not lie only with Hitler, Himmler, Heydrich, the SS, and the Foreign Office activists, or with ideology, anti-Semitic propaganda, and traditions of German authoritarianism; the ultimately chaotic structures of the Nazi political system and its dependence on jealously competing bureaucratic apparatuses were also to blame.[7]

Intentionalism is the name given by the functionalists to the position of those who regard "the consistent dictatorial will" as the essence of Nazi policy, particularly with respect to the Holocaust. In the intentionalists'

[5] See Tim Mason, "Interaction and Explanation: A Current Controversy about the Interpretation of National Socialism," in Gerhard Hirschfeld and Lothar Kettenacker, eds., *Der "Führerstaat": Mythos und Realität* [The "Führer-state": Myth and reality] (Stuttgart: Ernst Klett, 1981), 24, 27.

[6] Mommsen, "Hitlers Stellung im nationalsozialistischen Herrschaftssystem" [Hitler's position in the national-socialist ruling system], *ibid.*, 62-63, 65, 70. Translations are by the present author.

[7] Schreiber, *Hitler Interpretationen 1923-1983* [Interpretations of Hitler 1923-1983] (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1984), 298-99.

view, the Jews were killed because Hitler wanted to kill them. Such issues as the decision-making process or the dynamics of organizational rivalries and bureaucratic structures were secondary, at best. Hitler's ideas about the annihilation of the Jews were "primary and causative."[8] Joseph Michman points out that Hitler had not only been the supreme commander of the armed forces, but had also attended "to small details of battle"; similarly, according to Michman, Hitler was in full command of the implementation of the Final Solution and "attended to the smallest details of the Jewish question."[9] Sarah Gordon and Gerald Fleming emphatically agree with this position.[10]

Intentionalists argue that the emphasis on the issues raised by the functionalists has tended to trivialize the real subject, "the distinctive murderous will" of the dictator. Mommsen's reply is that, because they see in Hitler alone the determinator and originator of the killings, intentionalists have failed to understand the real causal processes. This flaw is most serious because such killings might be undertaken again—along analogous lines, even if under different political auspices.[11] In any case, maintains Tim Mason, however morally responsible and evil-intentioned Hitler was, "his will cannot carry the main burden of explanation"; "Hitler *cannot* be a full or adequate explanation, not even of himself."[12]

A number of case studies, as presented in the Jäckel and Rohwer volume, contribute important points to the debate, including those on deci-

[8] Mason (fn. 5), 27-28; Mommsen (fn. 6), 87.

[9] Michman, "Planning for the Final Solution against the Background of Developments in Holland in 1941." *Yad Vashem Studies*, Vol. XVII (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1986), 179.

[10] Sarah Gordon, *Hitler, Germans, and the "Jewish Question"* (Princeton University Press, 1984), 300, 312; Gerald Fleming, *Hitler und die Endlösung* [Hitler and the Final Solution] (Wiesbaden: Limes Verlag, 1982), 62-68, 76-77, 123.

[11] Mason (fn. 5), 29; Mommsen (fn. 6), 70.

[12] Mason (fn. 5), 30. Browning, the initiator of the debate, describes his own position as "moderate functionalist," as opposed to Broszat's more extreme stand. (See Jäckel and Rohwer, 185.) An elaboration of Browning's position appears in his *Fateful Months: Essays on the Emergence of the Final Solution* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1985), 3-38. An excellent analysis of this debate is contained also in Ian Kershaw, *The Nazi Dictatorship; Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation* (London: Edward Arnold, 1985), esp. 110-14. In a volume edited by Gerhard Hirschfeld, *The Politics of Genocide* (Winchester, MA: Allen & Unwin, 1986), Lothar Kettenacker and Hans Mommsen contributed articles that focus on the debate between intentionalists and functionalists (73-96; 97-144, respectively). Both these authors, as well as Kershaw and Browning, recognize the danger of reducing the analysis of origins and implementation of the Final Solution to a debate between two contrasting positions; still, all of them find themselves considerably closer to the functionalist pole. So does Christian Streit, whose article in Hirschfeld's volume (pp. 1-14) describes the German army's relationship with the policies of genocide.

Tim Mason considers the functionalist position vulnerable in one respect: no full-length study along functionalist lines had as yet been undertaken. Such a study would require language capable of "conveying the complexity of its findings." He finds the intentionalists' position easy to summarize because they have been "less explicit about their methods." See Mason (fn. 5), 28, 35.

sion making on "euthanasia" (by Karl Schleunes), on the implementation of the Aktion Reinhard (by Raul Hilberg), and on Heydrich's need of a legitimization for the Wannsee Conference (by Jäckel).

At the end of October 1939, shortly after the victory over Poland, Hitler instructed the head of his chancellery, Philipp Bouhler, and his personal physician, Karl Brandt, to set up a system through which a panel of physicians, as selected by Hitler himself, would be empowered to grant the "*Gnadentod*" (mercy death) to mentally impaired patients considered incurable "according to the best available human judgment." Hitler issued this order on his private stationery, back-dating it to September 1, 1939, the day of the attack on Poland. Two crucial "euthanasia" decisions by the Führer are known to us: one decreeing the start of the program in 1939 and one terminating it in 1941. In contrast to the lack of documentation on the Final Solution, there is the authenticated paper with Hitler's signature for the former and, equally authenticated, an oral command by Hitler of August 24, 1941, which stopped at least part of the euthanasia program. However, and very much along the lines of the functionalist interpretation (as also seen in the Final Solution), the euthanasia killings were characterized by jurisdictional conflicts among various agencies of the Nazi state—Bouhler, Brandt, and Viktor Brack of the chancellery on one side, and various party and state officials on the other. Equally functionalist was the phenomenon of the "cumulative radicalization" of the killings—again, typical also of the Final Solution. The role of Hitler's chancellery in both the euthanasia program and the Final Solution is characteristic of the bizarre bureaucratic chaos of the Nazi state. The euthanasia personnel—the doctors and the lower-level medical personnel on actual killing duty—who had been employed by the chancellery were later transferred *as a group* to the killing centers of the Aktion Reinhard in the East. A weekly courier continued to deliver salary, food, and scarce luxuries, as well as the mail directly from the chancellery in Berlin to the transferred personnel (Jäckel and Rohwer, 70, 77-81, 85).

Hilberg's depiction of the implementation of the Aktion Reinhard has strong functionalist overtones. In the summer of 1941, Himmler, claiming to transmit a command by the Führer, charged Odilo Globocnik (the SS leader in the Lublin district) with the establishment of three killing centers for Jews. These camps—Treblinka, Sobibor, and Belzec—were built in Poland under the most primitive conditions with minimal expenditure. The construction workers for Treblinka were taken from the Warsaw ghetto, and the building materials also came from there—the very ghetto whose inhabitants were to be gassed there by the hundred thousands. The three camps were quite small, some two- to three-

hundred square meters in circumference. The trains delivering the victims had to enter backwards so that several of the box cars could be emptied at the same time on the minuscule ramp. There were only a few structures: a barracks for the guards (mostly Ukrainians), the shack where the victims had to shed their clothes (and hair), the room for the gassing, and the "funnel" through which the victims were driven to the gas. There were no crematoria; the corpses were burned in the open. The gas was produced by a diesel motor, usually from a captured Soviet vehicle.

In Hilberg's words, the set-up of the Aktion Reinhard establishments was "frightfully primitive." He suspects that their designers and builders did not know about the nature and scope of their ultimate usage. The bureaucratic preparations for the Aktion Reinhard had to be rudimentary because the Final Solution—typically, the functionalists would argue—had no central bureaucratic "home" in Nazi Germany and no budgetary allotments of its own. What moneys became available for the building of the camps, the payment of the guards and other staff, and the cost of the transports and the killings, had to be "organized" in irregular ways. Because Auschwitz had other purposes in addition to the killing of Jews, various budget designations could be used there to cover the killings. Treblinka, Sobibor, and Belzec were "pure" killing centers, however, and no official budget line was available for them. Their cost had to be kept minimal and "financially inconspicuous." The killing personnel had to remain dependent on funds from Hitler's chancellery and the guards had to be mostly Ukrainians—ex-prisoners of war who came virtually free of charge (Jäckel and Rohwer, 126, 129-31). No matter how primitive and underfinanced, the three camps of the Aktion Reinhard were responsible for killing more than 1.5 million Jews, most of them originating in the nearby Polish ghettos. There were virtually no survivors: 60 to 70 at Treblinka, fewer than 50 at Sobibor, 2 at Belzec. Aktion Reinhard took care of much of the implementation of the Final Solution during 1942. During 1943 and 1944, the more sophisticated facilities at Auschwitz were used.[13]

Göring's desk calendar for July 31, 1941, showed the following entry,

[13] Chelmno, where the very first gassings of Jews took place, was even more primitive than the establishments of the Aktion Reinhard. As Wolfgang Scheffler put it, it was not a camp but merely a "station for gas trucks," a transfer point. At the famed Chelmno castle, the victims were loaded into one of three available gas trucks, which then drove to a point in the nearby woods—the so-called forest camp—where the victims, gassed during the ride, were unloaded and burned. Chelmno preceded the killing centers; it was the link, in Browning's view, between the Einsatzgruppen and Treblinka (Jäckel and Rohwer, 148, 152). The designing and building of the gas trucks is described by Browning (fn. 12), 57-67.

"18:15-19:15 Uhr Heydrich." Jäckel is convinced that this entry does not refer to an order from Göring to Heydrich, but rather—again in confirmation of the functionalist view of lower-level personnel as initiators of action in the sphere of the Final Solution—an eager Heydrich making an appointment with Göring to obtain a signature from him. What Heydrich really needed from Göring was "a legitimization for third persons." The ongoing early phases of the annihilation of the Jews had reached a point at which third persons had to be involved, persons who might not be ready to string along without some kind of written authorization seemingly from the very top leaders of the Third Reich. These "third persons" included the future participants at the Wannsee Conference who represented all sectors of the Nazi state. The Wannsee Conference made official the plans for the total annihilation of all Jews in the Nazi realm and even outside it, and the legitimacy of these plans could be seen as confirmed, however adequately, by Göring's signature. This signature was appended to a letter not even written on Göring's own stationery (Jäckel and Rohwer, 15-16).

Several of the participants in the Stuttgart symposium maintained that a synthesis between intentionalists and functionalists was quite feasible. According to Saul Friedländer, the functionalists correctly emphasize the chaotic nature of the Nazi governance system, while the intentionalists -re right in stressing Hitler's obsession with *Lebensraum* and with the ews, as well as his concern with the implementation of his aims in these pheres. Friedländer points to the unique emergence of a messianic and pocalyptic vision of history *within* the political, bureaucratic, and techiological system of a highly developed industrial society. What took place vithin Nazi Germany were interactions between totally heterogeneous ›henomena: messianic fanaticism *and* bureaucratic structure, pathologial ideology *and* routinized administrative decrees, archaic modes of hinking *and* a highly complex modern society. Otto Dov Kulka also ıotes a convergence between the two schools, with the intentionalists tressing the ideological and the functionalists the structural aspects of the Nazi system. Jäckel sees no basic contradiction: Hitler could govern only n a polycratic milieu (Jäckel and Rohwer, 33-35, 48-49, 67-68, 234).

In the debate, members of the two schools could not arrive at consensus vith respect to the role of Hitler. Friedländer does not comprehend how, ıs the functionalists insist, a pathological hater like Hitler would hesitate o give the order to kill the Jews, leaving this issue to the gradual, increnental, and even accidental, steps of underlings. He points to the discrepıncy between this alleged hesitation and Hitler's known recklessness vith respect to ordering the war in the West, the euthanasia killings, and

the abrupt action against the Soviet Union. Hitler was not a fanatic dreamer who left the fanatic deeds to others (Jäckel and Rohwer, 36-37). In response, Jäckel argues that Hitler could undertake the Jewish annihilation only *stück- und schubweise* (incrementally) because he anticipated opposition. He did not dare to expect blind obedience in this sphere where no justification, or even rationalization, had been provided for the killing of defenseless men, women, and children. Even Göring, Himmler, and Goebbels had seemed dubious. Hans Mommsen also sees Hitler as having initially been ambivalent with respect to the Final Solution, simply because he was aware that it could not be carried out without the congruence of certain political, social, and psychological factors within German society that he could not manipulate at will. Hilberg is convinced that Hitler was essential to the "success" of the Final Solution, and cites Himmler and Göring as admitting that it could not have been carried off without him. Broszat agrees that Hitler was essential—but only as the indispensable legitimator (Jäckel and Rohwer, 189-90, 196-97, 211).

There is much consensus on the phenomenon of "cumulative radicalization." The internal bureaucratic struggle for the control of "Jewish affairs"—concerning which jurisdictions had never been clearly assigned among the various state and party structures—led to the growing radicalization of anti-Jewish measures. Political jurisdictions in general had not been rationally delimited in the governance system of the Nazi state. With respect to Jewish matters, it was considered good politics to meddle as fervently and violently as possible. Whenever Hitler *talked* about the Jews—as he did in all of his speeches—party and state agencies felt that they might as well *do* something about them. There was constant competition to exert oneself *in der Judenpolitik*: to suggest a "solution" of Jewish affairs brought prestige and power. The cumulative radicalization that resulted from this competition contributed its share to the outcome of the Final Solution (pp. 23, 80-81).

As early as 1961, in the first edition of *The Destruction of the European Jews*, Raul Hilberg emphasized that the implementation model used by him for analyzing the destruction process was but a heuristic device: he did not presume the existence of a plan, a preconceived system, nor even a progression of steps thought out ahead of time by the Nazi leaders. According to Hilberg, the Holocaust developed "blow by blow," without a "master plan."[14] Hitler's fanaticism and his charisma were preconditions for accomplishing the Final Solution. Yet, its implementation was determined ultimately by Hitler's sense of the politically feasible in the pecul-

[14] Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1961), 640.

iar political structures of the Nazi state and particularly by the fortuitous interactions of bureaucracies and lower-level decision makers whose relationship to the killing of the Jews was more complex and more indirect—in other words, functionalist—than follows from the interpretation favored by the intentionalists.

## II. What They Saw to Be Their Job

### Mass Liquidations as Routines under Army Auspices

Krausnick and Wilhelm's definitive investigation into the operations of the Einsatzgruppen of the SS points to a crucial factor: their ability to kill some 1.5 million Jews was dependent on an attitude of toleration, if not cooperation, on the part of the German army vis-à-vis these operations.

"It is not really the task of German men and soldiers to kill defenseless human beings, particularly not in territories under the German army's civil administration." Although such reflections by army personnel had surfaced during the Russian campaign, they did not impede the killers. During the earlier campaign in Poland, as relatively lesser misdeeds by the Einsatzgruppen became known, the high command of the army had had a real chance to present a unified stand against such criminal occupation policies. The chance was missed. Supreme commander von Brauchitsch did receive evidence of the crimes from all kinds of horrified army sources; yet, he saw his task only as keeping at bay the indignation expressed by army personnel. With respect to the anti-Jewish (and anti-Polish) actions, the army remained at best "ambivalent" during the Polish campaign and throughout 1939, even though numerous army protests were on record (Krausnick and Wilhelm, 15, 77-81, 102-6).

Hitler's triumph in the French campaign (during which, at the army's insistence, no Einsatzgruppen had been used) contributed to the complete surrender of the army with respect to the Einsatzgruppen in any future military action. The astounding victory against France turned out to be the "pacemaker for moral indifference": Hitler was able to convince the army, in early 1941, that the East War would require the most brutal methods—no mere military struggle as against the French, but a fight for survival between two eternally and inevitably opposed philosophies. Such a fight made necessary the carrying out of "special tasks" of such sensitivity and difficulty that one could not expect the army to handle them. In Krausnick's view, the ties between the army and the Nazi regime became tighter than ever in the period between the French victory and the begin-

ning of the war against the Soviet Union. The description of the propose task of the Einsatzgruppen—"to combat all elements hostile to the Reic or to 'German-ness' in enemy territory in the rear of the troops engage in combat"—lent itself to being interpreted as broadly as needed for th occasion. What really was to take place was the ever-escalating extensio and perversion, of supposedly preemptive tasks in the security spher Very soon, the jurisdiction of the Einsatzgruppen extended beyond an previous limits and collided in all kinds of ways with traditional jurisdic tions of the army (pp. 111-15).

The original orders from Himmler and Heydrich to the Einsatzgrup pen had mentioned the "cleansing" of "undesirable" elements. Th cleansing, or for that matter the annihilation, of the Jews in the Easter areas was not singled out as a task the Einsatzgruppen would engage in However, the army had received "signals" about some killings: Heydric had issued a written order on July 2, 1941 (after the start of the invasion that all Jews holding *party* or *state* positions in the Soviet Union were t be shot. Krausnick speculates that Heydrich did not want to say more a that moment, at least not in a written order. Possibly, the original orde to kill "selected" Jews was formally (if not in writing) enlarged in scop later in July to include all Jews, including women and children. Accord ing to the report of one Einsatzgruppe, the killing of all Jews had alread become "routine (*sich eingespielt*)" by July 13, 1941. Mass killings of Jew were treated as well-known and "regular" happenings in minutes of top level meetings of August 1941 (pp. 164-65, 250, 515).

The army's own "Rules of Behavior for the Conduct of the Troops in the Soviet Union," distributed before the invasion, had specified "ruthless measures" against Bolshevik *Hetzer* (hatemongers), partisans, sabo teurs—and Jews. Only the Jews were listed without specifying the com mitment of punishable acts on their part. Krausnick thinks, nevertheless that most army leaders did not realize how total the annihilation of the Jews was to be, not even after the first large-scale "actions" were under- taken by the Einsatzgruppen in towns and villages near their headquar- ters. After a while, numerous army reports did suggest a growing aware- ness of the crimes of the Einsatzgruppen. Krausnick cites one staff officer who traveled extensively over the entire eastern front in December 1941. His report shows that the killings of the Jews were then known to many officers at the front, that they talked about them frequently, and that some, at least, were quite upset. Many of the "actions," however, drew crowds of spectators from neighboring army units. In one case reported by Krausnick, navy personnel in a Baltic port were given special leave to watch the Jewish "events" (pp. 124-25).

Krausnick was able to find considerable evidence for the actual participation of army units in the killings of Jews. Even where participation was avoided, Krausnick discovered a widespread, thorough adaptation of army routines and general outlook to the annihilation program. Not only were the army leaders in basic agreement with Hitler's assumptions about the exceptional nature of the East War, but they also seemed ready to believe the "security" motives for the shootings: that "Jewry" was the treacherous middleman between the Red Army and the Soviet units acting as guerrillas behind the German lines. Army leaders declared themselves grateful that the "delicate political" tasks could be left to the Einsatzgruppen and that the army did not have to interfere in "political" or "philosophical" disputes—typical ways of referring to matters affecting the Jews. In getting the army used to killing practices, the concept of "the Kommissar" played a crucial role. This official in the Red Army had been singled out as a special enemy even before the attack on the Soviet Union, to be "taken care of" by the army itself. He became the convenient first scapegoat, one the army could readily see as evil. The Kommissar was pictured as the symbol of Bolshevik-Jewish conspiring and also as a political functionary meddling with the troop commander's authority, a person who would be despicable even if he were not a Bolshevist or a Jew (pp. 226, 251-58, 541).

The members of the Einsatzgruppen had not been selected by rigid standards. There was no real political screening, although old-time party members were preferred. Many of the Einsatzgruppen had not belonged to the SS, particularly those coming from the police. They did agree with the aims of the regime in the East War, but the feeling for their "work," according to Krausnick, came from small-group consensus and team spirit, from "comradeship." Their training did not include preparation for killing, not even antipartisan activities—tasks that appear to have been revealed to the lower ranks only after the invasion of Russia. Even then, the briefings were superficial; they were equally superficial with respect to the geography and demography of the Russian regions where they were to operate (pp. 142-49).

The Einsatzgruppen boasted of having developed a "system" for the killings that was superior to the "premature" and "unplanned" excesses perpetrated by native populations or foreign auxiliaries. "It was primarily a question of organization": there had to be a suitable locality for the collection of the Jews; a number of pits had to be prepared that would be sufficient for the number of intended victims; there had to be an approach road of some four or five kilometers to the place of "execution" on which the Jews could be marched in groups of 500, separated by at

least two kilometers. Because of the number of victims and the expanse of occupied Russia, the small core of Einsatzgruppen had to rely increasingly on non-German auxiliaries. Almost all the killings were by shooting; gas trucks were available, but their use was seen as "unmanly" and "cowardly." Although killing in gas trucks was less "noisy" than shooting, it took much longer and the "burial" work was more difficult and "dirty." However, since the shooting of children and women was considered especially hard on "family men" among the Einsatzgruppen, five gas trucks were in constant use (pp. 546-51).

The language used by the men of the Einsatzgruppen reveals something about their own view of their "work," especially in the original German. For example, at one of the larger "actions," only Jews with families were "used (*verwandt*)." The Einsatzgruppen had counted on the "participation (*Beteiligung*)" of five to six thousand Jews, but actually more than 30,000 "turned up (*fanden sich ein*)." After the first wave of actions at the time of the military advance, the Einsatzgruppen engaged in the "stationary implementation (*stationäre Bearbeitung*)" of their "security tasks." Sometimes there was the "involvement (*Einbeziehung*)" of Gypsies in the "fate" of the Jews, and then their "elimination (*Ausmerzung*)" took place together with the "real (*eigentlichen*)" Jews. A sergeant of an Einsatzkommando reported that he had been "attending to (*betreuen*)" a transport of Jews by "handing them over to the earth (*der Erde übergeben*)" (pp. 189-91, 198, 271, 595).

Christian Streit, in his masterful analysis of the German army's direct involvement in the "second Holocaust," the murder by means of shooting, starvation, freezing, and other "natural" means of some three and one-half million Soviet prisoners of war, provides a largely functionalist explanation. The German army had not planned the commitment of such a crime before the invasion of the Soviet Union—except perhaps indirectly, by not undertaking the proper anticipatory logistic measures that would have been needed to feed, house, and transport huge masses of Soviet prisoners. When these masses of prisoners appeared (in much greater numbers than could have been expected), "one thing led to another." Of course, this did occur within the ideological framework of Hitler's East War, which for opportunistic, political, and ideological reasons, the army had seen fit to swallow. Similarly, with respect to the army's attitude concerning the killing of the Jews by the Einsatzgruppen, Streit is convinced that the army's toleration and sometime participation were unplanned. Hitler decided to proceed with the wanton killing of all the Jews in his domain, argues Streit, only after he was assured that the army was putting up with the "actions" of the Einsatzgruppen; he had

dared to be certain of this attitude on the part of the army before the nmer of 1941.[15]

'What they saw to be their job"—that is, the killing of all the Jews in territories conquered from the Soviet army—had not been perceived :he job by most of the members of the Einsatzgruppen before the at- k on Russia. That it could become their job required all kinds of im- ›visations, particularly because the reaction of the army was unfore- able. In this sense, one must understand the behavior of the ısatzgruppen in a largely functionalist framework. But again, the ide- gy of the East War has to be included in the calculation—and that ide- gy, whatever "actions" were to be possible under its aegis, had been ›pagated by Hitler.

ᴀʀʙᴀʀɪᴄ-Cɪᴠɪʟ Oʀᴅᴇʀʟɪɴᴇss":
Bᴜʀᴇᴀᴜᴄʀᴀᴛɪᴄ Asᴘᴇᴄᴛs ᴏғ ᴛʜᴇ Dᴇᴘᴏʀᴛᴀᴛɪᴏɴ ᴏғ ᴛʜᴇ Gᴇʀᴍᴀɴ Jᴇᴡs

Adler describes the events in Germany leading up to the act of depor- on. In this sphere, intentionalism did play a large role. There were de- ed laws and a profusion of administrative decrees, all planned by the zi top echelon to provide for graduated but ever more severe steps to- rd the ultimate deprivation of all rights from the Jewish population— "stripping," as Helen Fein calls it.[16] Since so many lower-level offi- s from all kinds of agencies were involved, however, the functionalist ment was present too. The way the anti-Jewish measures were imple- nted often depended on interpretation, misinterpretation, or perhaps t the mood of these officials. To Adler, the most shocking aspect was t the Jewish deportations took place "in a barbaric-civil orderliness" xxi).

Before and during the deportation process, the victims were subjected what Adler calls several kinds of administrative deaths. "Legal death" ;an to be implemented after the *Kristallnacht* of November 10, 1938; it minated in the legislation of July 1, 1943, on which date the courts re, in effect, closed to Jewish claimants for civil as well as criminal es. This legal death was followed by "civil death." As each victim was epared" for deportation, he was entered into the population register ıaving moved "to an unknown address," or simply "migrated away

Christian Streit, *Keine Kameraden* [Not comrades] (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 3), 28, 126-27. Alfred Streim, the other analyst of this "second Holocaust," estimated that *'east*" 2,530,000 Soviet prisoners of war in German hands died through "natural death" or ution. See Streim, *Die Behandlung sowjetischer Kriegsgefangener im "Fall Barbarossa"* [The tment of Soviet prisoners of war in "Case Barbarossa"] (Heidelberg-Karlsruhe: C. F. ler, 1981).

Helen Fein, *Accounting for Genocide* (New York: Free Press, 1979), 60.

*(abgewandert).*" Just before being loaded onto the train, the following items were taken from each deportee: birth certificate, marriage certificate, any emigration documents, passport photos, records of military service, certificates testifying to decorations or other honors, occupational records and testimonials, and even listings of addresses of relatives and friends and all private photographs. Thus, the deportees were deprived of the wherewithal of a civil existence. With the surrender of their documents and papers—in times of excessive demand for these—the possibility was closed, seemingly, for any future reentry into normal life.

"Financial death" accompanied the other types of deprivation. The German Ministry of Finance probably did not reveal to its lower officials what fate awaited the Jews in the East, but all of these officials worked diligently to achieve the total expropriation of the deportees. All German Jews were automatically deprived of their citizenship at the moment the deportation train crossed the frontiers of Germany. With this act of denationalization, they were also "legally" stripped of all their property, which had to be surrendered to "the German people." The stated justification for the expropriations was simple enough: all Jewish properties were held to have been acquired either through theft, trading in stolen goods, or violation of rationing decrees (Adler, 41, 183, 405-08, 521, 569, 832-34).

A variety of German civil servants of all ranks were involved in these forms of administrative death. They included mayors, county heads (*Landräte*), city and county police, finance ministry officials, and railroad employees. One of the most significant, and depressing, facts of the Final Solution is the extent to which large numbers of ordinary Germans were involved with or aware of the measures leading to the deportation of the Jews. These included the officials themselves, but also many others in their bureaucratic or social surroundings, in addition to those close to the deportees in their place of work or residence.[17] By the winter of 1941-42,

[17] An analysis of wartime German public opinion toward the deportation and other crimes committed against the Jews has been provided by Ian Kershaw, "German Popular Opinion and the 'Jewish Question,' 1939-1943: Some Further Reflections," in Arnold Paucker, ed., *Die Juden im nationalsozialistischen Deutschland: The Jews in Nazi Germany 1933-1943* (Tübingen J.C.B. Mohr, 1986), 366-86. He grants that the evidence was far from plentiful and that German attitudes toward the gradual radicalization of anti-Jewish measures "were far from uniform." He also grants that "amid the general atmosphere of alienation and hostility there were pockets of sympathy. . . ." Nevertheless, Kershaw is convinced that the prevailing attitude on the "Jewish question" was apathy combined with "a deliberate turning away" from any feelings of personal responsibility, let alone concern, for the fate of the Jews. Kershaw concludes that "it is plain that so far in history no other advanced society has experienced a collapse of collective moral consciousness and individual civil morality approximating the steepness of the decline in Germany after 1933." Similarly, Rainer Baum found the German elites "capable of a level of moral indifference to the suffering of concrete human beings that

t latest, all these persons must have been aware of the *gruesomeness of* ie various acts relating to the "preparation" for deportation. Despite whatever they may have thought about it, Adler concludes, they collab-rated with utter efficiency. In the large cities it was the Gestapo who did nuch of the *Abfertigung* (dispatching) of the Jews and their ejection from ivil life. In the smaller towns and villages, these ultimate tasks were per-formed by ordinary officials. Particularly intensive was the cooperation between Himmler's officials and the Finance Ministry. Adler notes the introduction of all kinds of new bureaucratic duties of a seemingly rou-tine character intended to cloak the basic outrage, the act of deportation.

Many of the participating officials apparently were convinced of the appropriateness of at least a number of Hitler's anti-Jewish measures. In addition to being dependable Nazis and anti-Semites, they displayed a frightening degree of "conscience-killing coldness of heart," which was cultivated by the SS, but, according to Adler, came naturally to many others, especially the younger generation. Adler cites from a letter of one of the officials involved with a shipment of Jews, who reflected on the "cozy" spirit among the Würzburg Gestapo as they worked together on the *Behandlung* (servicing) of the transport. It was hard yet satisfactory work, he wrote, and he particularly enjoyed the "nice," "harmonious," and "comradely" social gatherings afterwards. Also typical were the jokes and laughter coming from the young Gestapo secretaries amid the utter grimness of the deportation scenes. Amateur and professional pho-tographers wandered about, taking pictures of "typical" Jews. Very few of the officials of the Würzburg Gestapo were members of the SS; none were members of the SA and none had been party members before 1933. Most of them had transferred to the Gestapo from the Bavarian political police for opportunistic reasons.

Adler regards the Jewish victims of Nazi Germany as extreme exam-ples of contemporary mass-man, totally "administered" as well as totally dehumanized. The method for this total administration of human beings

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has scarcely its equal in human history generally." See Baum, *The Holocaust and the German Elite* (London: Croom Helm, 1981), 301.

The writer Jochen Klepper, an "Aryan" with a "non-Aryan" wife and stepdaughters, has left a moving account of the humiliations experienced by "starred" individuals. Klepper, a fervent "Prussian" and old-style nationalist, found the indifference of the German public to the fate of the Jews his most unbearable burden among the many horrors of the Nazi period. Officials, his colleagues at the publishing house where he worked (and later was dismissed), and many of his friends refused to acknowledge what was happening to the Jews, let alone worry about it—although very few seemed to consider themselves Nazis. Virtually none showed even the slightest spark of human kindness toward the Jews. The Kleppers commit-ted suicide in December 1942. See Klepper, *Unter dem Schatten Deiner Flügel; Aus den Tage-büchern der Jahre 1932-1942* [Beneath the shadow of your wings; from the diaries of the years 1932-1942] (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1956).

was ordained in a manual that described the "collection" of Jews for deportation. Adler considers this manual to be the most blatant ex-sion of the pedantic, "precisionistic" treatment imposed on the Jews. process began with the victim receiving the so-called *Eröffnung* (i notification) concerning his imminent deportation, delivered to his h by one or two officials of the Gestapo or the local police. It had to signed on receipt, in two copies. The *Eröffnung* was followed within a fe hours by the "police-imposed pick-up" and the transport, usually in truck, to the local "collection" point. From there followed the *Durchschleusung der angelieferten Juden* (transmission of the supplied Jews) t railroad sidings where the train to the East (or Theresienstadt) awaited them.

As specified in the manual, the deportation process consisted of a set of administrative routines carried out by "professionals." Not based on any law or decree that authorized or ordered it, the deportation was conducted as a "purely administrative measure." This measure was sufficient to tear hundreds of thousands of victims from their homes to transport them somewhere where even bureaucracy ceased and the plain act of murder was committed. The act of deportation was the final decree for its victims: "they simply disappeared." Once a person had been loaded onto the train to the East, there was no way to get him off or to know his further whereabouts—as even Eichmann had to admit in a case where highest-level support had been voiced for an individual after his being loaded. At the ramp in the East, no names were permitted to be kept for that great majority of arrivals who were sent directly to the gas chamber (Adler, 331, 362-65, 483-86, 506, 566, 868-69).

Before the beginning of the large-scale deportations from Germany in late 1941, the Nazis undertook "exercises" in the deportation of Jews. These (largely mishandled) experimental projects reveal much about the motives and methods of what ultimately became an efficient administrative routine. The Madagascar Plan seems to have been taken quite seriously by Eichmann. It provided for the "unlimited surrender" of the Jews everywhere in the world to the Germans. The aim was their deportation to the tropical island off the African coast, where they would dwell in total isolation from the rest of the world. The victims were to be seized by three "resettlement" staffs (West, Middle, East) who would have 120 ships at their disposal. Two ships per day would arrive in Madagascar, each with three thousand Jews on board—which would make for some two million arrivals per year.[18]

[18] Joseph Michman maintains that the Nazi concept of the Final Solution had always included forced emigration from Europe as an acceptable alternative to extermination. Hitler's

The "re-education camp" Nisko, in the Lublin region of Poland, was ore than a plan. It was Eichmann's first real effort at deportation, cared out in September 1939. Some five thousand Jewish "volunteers," iostly from Vienna, were involved. Although the Nisko camp turned ut to be a total failure, Adler thinks that it enabled Eichmann to gain aluable experience in the handling of Jewish officials who recruited the volunteers." The Jewish authorities were assured that the Nisko group vould be happy and thankful; there would be "regular conditions of vork" and plentiful food. The workers would be treated "humanely," ınd foreign officials and the press would be invited for inspections. There vould be Jewish self-administration. When the "volunteers" arrived in what turned out to be swampy fields near Nisko, they found total chaos; the "experiment" remained a complete fiasco, and the operation was soon terminated by Himmler. By April 1940, all the "volunteers" had returned to their homes.

The Stettin experiment differed drastically from the Nisko affair: the twelve hundred Jews who "participated" were not sent home after it failed; they were killed, or died a "natural" death, under the most horrible conditions. On February 12, 1940, the Jewish inhabitants of the Pomeranian city of Stettin were suddenly "collected," without any warning, and shipped to Lublin in occupied Poland. On arrival there, they were distributed among three neighboring villages, to which they had to march in subfreezing temperatures and deep snow. Many froze to death during the march. The survivors were told to seek shelter in the Jewish homes in the villages, inhabited by very poor Jews who did not speak German. Virtually all the deportees from Stettin were dead before the "real" Final Solution could affect them.

Another deportation experiment took place in October 1940. Affected were some sixty-five hundred to seven thousand Jews from the states of Baden and Saarpfalz in western Germany. These victims were shipped to Vichy-France, apparently on the private initiative of the governors (*Gauleiter*) of the two states. The Vichy-French, who had not been notified, were outraged when the deportees arrived; they dumped them into camps formerly used for Spanish refugees. A few of the victims managed to leave the French camps and succeeded in escaping to freedom via Spain. The great majority were handed over to the Gestapo in summer

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aim was to "disinfect" Europe of Jews, by killing *or* removal to other continents. The stop to emigration that Heydrich announced in January 1942 reflected disappointment with the outcome of emigration policies as well as anticipation of "great advances" in methods of mass killing. Michman cites evidence, however, that emigration to Palestine and elsewhere overseas was considered acceptable by the Nazi leadership until the end of the war (fn. 9, pp. 145-80).

1942, for direct shipment to Auschwitz. This experiment, accor
Adler, reveals the extent of bureaucratic discretion in the treatmen
Jews. Most likely, there had been no prior authorization for this
yet the two Gauleiter had all the cooperation they needed from t
stapo and other German officials. These deportations, as well as
from Stettin, were undertaken without the involvement of Jewis
cials.

Adler considers one other deportation action as "irregular," or e
imental. In October 1941, just before the main process began, s
twenty thousand Jews, mostly from Berlin, were suddenly "collect
and transported to the Lodz ghetto, apparently in response to a whim
Hitler's to render Berlin *judenrein* (clean of Jews). The German autho
ties in Lodz had not been warned about their arrival and immediate
voiced strong protests about the overcrowded conditions in the ghett
Significantly, the first use of a killing center, at nearby Chelmno, o
curred soon after these deportees arrived; the gassing at Chelmno of Po
ish Jews from Lodz apparently was seen as necessary to relieve the ove
crowding of that city (Adler, 73-79, 127-46, 156-61, 172-74).

It is this last experiment, resulting in the transports from Lodz t
Chelmno, that gave impetus to the functionalist concept. In his article o
1977, Martin Broszat argues that the first extermination camp,
Chelmno, was opened on December 8, 1941, in order to provide "breath
ing space (*Luft machen*)" in the Lodz ghetto after the twenty thousan
Jews from Berlin had been dumped there. Thus, as the functionalists se
it, Chelmno resulted from improvisation on a local problem—excessiv
shipments to a ghetto. What had started as improvisation gradual
turned into the practice of annihilation with the introduction of sever
killing centers. As more and more trains arrived from Germany, *Lu
machen* in more and more ghettos was seen as convenient, and what ha
started as an experiment became the regular solution to ghetto over
crowding. Thus, the Final Solution was routinized.[19]

Adler's main conclusion about the various experiments is that the de
portation of Jews became an efficient process only during the summer o
1942, and that much of the efficiency was achieved by the automatic kil
ing of those deported, immediately upon their arrival in the East. Th
Jews were destroyed through both physical violence and bureaucratic sys
tems. The cloak of legality, or legalisms, was given up only at the exter
mination camp; all other phases of the Final Solution were built into
seemingly regular bureaucratic process and systematized. The utter raw

[19] Broszat (fn. 4). Cf. the analysis of this issue in Henry L. Mason, "Imponderables of th
Holocaust," *World Politics* 34 (October 1981), 90-113, at 97-100.

s of the anti-Jewish measures was being manipulated and gradualized
bureaucratic channeling (pp. 35-38, 245, 519-20, 560).

The killings perpetrated by the Einsatzgruppen and the measures eading to deportation fit into the framework of the debate between functionalists and intentionalists, thereby suggesting the need for synthesis between the two concepts. The extent of the "actions" by the Einsatzgruppen had not been delimited before the invasion of the Soviet Union; whatever was intended at the highest Nazi level could be implemented only if the army seemed inclined to tolerate extreme brutalities. The elaborate schemes resulting in the "stripping" of the German Jews and their "preparation" for the transport to the East depended on the cooperation, the initiatives, and even the inventiveness of all kinds of layers of officials. Without their eager and coordinated cooperation, the deportation process could not have taken place—and had not taken place efficiently during the earlier "experiments." (Nor did it take place later in such locales as Denmark, Italy, and Belgium, where the officials were not eager.) While functionalist elements played an important role, intentionalist factors were also present. The ideological predisposition of the Einsatzgruppen and the army reflected the East War mentality propagated by Hitler; various kinds of anti-Semitic postures, promoted assiduously by the regime, had made their impact on German officialdom.

## III. Crossing the Boundary in the Medicalized Setting

### The Role of the Doctors

Robert Lifton's book deals with the participation of German physicians in the "euthanasia" program and at the various extermination camps. The concept of medicalization is introduced by Lifton in his analysis of the process of adaptation to evil on the part of a professional elite, a process that proceeded in important respects along functionalist lines. Lifton uses a further concept, "doubling," in an attempt to provide a second level of explanation that reflects a more intentionalist mode.

In the Holocaust, a crucial boundary was crossed: between "violent imagery and periodic killing of victims (as of Jews in pogroms)" and "systematic genocide in Auschwitz and elsewhere." Lifton posits that what he calls the medicalization of killing made feasible the crossing of that boundary (p. 14). A series of mass killings in the Nazi state, from 1936 to 1941, had already been medically-related. In several centers for "euthanasia," killings had been undertaken for allegedly "therapeutic genetic" reasons, but the depiction of the various "euthanasia" programs as med-

ical operations was ludicrous. Typically, in the program known as T
physician had to complete 2,109 "evaluations" during a seventeen-day
riod, on the basis of a two-page questionnaire, without access to a med
history or other medical records or a medical examination of the vict
Not surprisingly, the definition of "the life considered medically unw
thy for life" developed slippage. The killing net was widened constan
For example, in the children's program the age limit moved upwarc
affect older children, adolescents, and "even at times overlapped with
adult killing project." Grounds for killing were expanded and came
include mongolism (not listed at first) as well as "various borderline
limited impairments in children . . . , culminating in the killing of th
designated as juvenile delinquents" (Lifton, 56, 66-67).

The link between "euthanasia" and the Final Solution was a close c
The head of one of the main T4 killing facilities, Dr. Irmfried Eberl,
came the first commandant (not just chief medical officer) of a major k
ing center for Jews, Treblinka. It is reported that he wore his white p
sician's coat as he supervised the proceedings at Treblinka. The ter
*Sonderbehandlung* (special treatment) and *sonderbehandelt* (speci
treated) were introduced during one of the "euthanasia" programs a
transferred for use in the Final Solution. These euphemisms were l
terms in what Lifton calls the "healing-killing" reversal inherent in m
icalization, implying not only some sort of medical therapy but als
medically determined imperative in the killing of the Jews (pp. 124, 1
150-51).

The physicians had the major responsibility "for the murderous ec
ogy of Auschwitz." Lifton distinguishes as many as twelve "medic
tasks that related directly to the killings. (1) When the victims arrived
the ramp, the doctors performed the initial large-scale selections throu
which the great majority were sent immediately to the gas chamb
(2) A doctor was in charge of the team implementing the killing proc
(mostly SS medical technicians) and supervised the administration of t
gas. (3) At the end of the killing process, a doctor had to signal when th
inside the gas chamber were to be considered dead. (4) Doctors p
formed the secondary selections, at various locales in the camp, so as
make room for "healthier" replacements from new transports. (5) Do
tors performed selections in the medical blocks, dispatching to the g
chambers those diagnosed as significantly ill or debilitated (the so-call
reverse triage). (6) Doctors conducted a "murderous form of epidemi
ogy," routinely condemning to death not only those suffering from su
diseases as typhus, scarlet fever, or diarrhea, but also the other inmates
the block who were still free of disease. (7) Doctors ordered, supervise

and often administered the direct killing of "hopeless" patients in the medical blocks by means of phenol injections. (8) Doctors signed fake death certificates, which attributed the death of each inmate to a "regular" illness—except for the great majority of the victims assigned to immediate death upon arrival, who were considered as never having entered the camp, and therefore required no death certificate. (9) In the case of "official" (as opposed to "wild") corporal punishment, typically whipping, a doctor had to certify in writing the inmate's capacity to absorb such punishment and had to be in attendance during the administration of the punishment. (10) Doctors were consulted regularly on how to keep the selections running smoothly, making recommendations, for example, "whether women and children should be separated or allowed to proceed along the line [to the gas chamber] together." (11) Doctors also advised on "policies" concerning numbers of people permitted to stay alive, balancing the need for Jewish workers against the "need" for Jews to be killed. (12) Finally, the doctors' "technical knowledge" was called upon with regard to the problem of the burning of the corpses, particularly during the summer of 1944 with the arrival (and immediate gassing) of hundreds of thousands of Hungarian Jews (pp. 147-49).

The Auschwitz doctors performed their tasks in a milieu where "medical metaphor blended with concrete biomedical ideology." The ideology proclaimed the doctrine of a deadly "racial" disease among the Aryans; the cure was the killing of all the Jews. The diagnosis determined that the Jews were "the gangrenous appendix in the body of mankind," the agents of "racial pollution" and "racial tuberculosis," and the "parasites and bacteria" causing sickness, deterioration, and death to the Aryan people whom they infected as they lived among them. Spouting Darwinian language, the Nazis boasted of assuming "the functions of nature (natural selection) and God . . . in orchestrating their own 'selections,' their own version of human evolution." Zyklon-B became the preferred "medicine," to be handled only by medical personnel and stored in the Auschwitz pharmacy. The "disinfectors" who applied this ultimate prescription were selected from an elite of SS medical corpsmen, of course under the supervision of a doctor (pp. 16-17, 161).

Lifton characterizes "selections" as "the quintessential Auschwitz ritual" which epitomized and maintained "the healing-killing paradox." Upon his arrival at Auschwitz, each doctor had to attend to ramp selection as "his ritual of initiation, his transition from ordinary life to the Auschwitz universe. . . ." Although virtually any person could have performed the selections, they had to be presented as a "public health" measure. Only doctors were authorized to perform this all-important ritual;

even during the arrival of the Hungarian transports, when the incoming victims were too numerous for the available physicians, their ranks were augmented only by dentists and pharmacists. Ramp duty and the later selections were said to require "precise medical judgment," even if that meant that one doctor had to examine five hundred persons in ten minutes (pp. 150, 172-73, 181-82).

Before the appearance of Lifton's book, the role of the Nazi physicians had been epitomized in the literature (and at some of the postwar trials) by Dr. Joseph Mengele's experiments, particularly with twins. Lifton pays relatively little attention to these bizarre, incredibly sadistic, pseudo-scientific practices that victimized people whose dispatch to the gas chamber was merely delayed while the experiments were conducted (if they survived them). It is Lifton's achievement that he pinpoints an even more ominous contribution of the physicians to the Final Solution. As members of the most respected elite in matters of life and death, they provided a sort of legitimization to the gas chamber proceedings, proceedings that even today, after some forty years of more than ample documentation, remain unimaginable—even more so than the "actions" of the Einsatzgruppen. Legitimization came from the doctors' handling of the "medical" procedures listed above, the medicalized routines which seem to fit the functionalist mode. The intentionalist mode also applied, through the metaphors of biomedical ideology: the Jews as parasites and the doctors as "Darwinian" selectors of the unfit. The emphasis is on the functionalist interpretation, with the selections as the ultimate Auschwitz routine.

### "Doubling"

The psychological pattern that Lifton calls "doubling" is described as "the division of the self into two functioning wholes, so that a part-self acts as an entire self." Doubling is seen as the psychological device through which the doctors could accept a "Faustian bargain": becoming "the theorists and implementers of a cosmic scheme of racial cure by means of ... mass murder." Doubling solved the tension between two selves: the doctor needed his "Auschwitz-self" to be able to function in an Auschwitz environment that was totally antithetical to the standards of his "medical self." The Auschwitz-self managed to render the Auschwitz milieu coherent to the individual doctor; it was a device for psychological survival in a "death-dominated environment." The major function of doubling was the avoidance of feelings of guilt; it produced "a significant change in moral consciousness" (pp. 418-19).

Lifton finds that some of the most notorious participants in the medicalization process displayed clear evidence of the doubling phenomenon.

For example, Dr. Karl Brandt, the Führer's choice for initiating the "euthanasia" program (and its ultimate medical authority), came from a distinguished medical family. He professed to have had two heroes in his life, Hitler and Albert Schweitzer. He was seen by many as a "highly ethical person" and "one of the most idealistic physicians." Lifton depicts Brandt as the prototype of the "decent Nazi," whose "religious-romantic" involvement with "euthanasia" was quite indispensable to the Third Reich. Another such doubler, Dr. Edward Wirths, the highest medical authority in Auschwitz, had the reputation of being a most dedicated physician and was described by Auschwitz inmates as kind, decent, polite, and honest. Yet it was he who set up the camp's system of medicalized selections and medicalized killings and supervised these processes during the two years of the most extensive mass murders at Auschwitz. Wirths provides "the specter of a 'good man' becoming a leading figure in a project of unprecedented evil." He presents the ultimate example of doubling: on the one hand, his Auschwitz-self with fervent attachment to such themes as racial purification and national revitalization; on the other, his "human medical self," which gave him a reputation of decency and integrity. Doctors Brandt and Wirths, insists Lifton, revealed themselves as men rather than demons—men "whose multifaceted harmony with Auschwitz can give us insight into . . . the human capacity to convert healing into killing" (pp. 114, 117, 383-86, 413, 446-47).[20]

Lifton introduces the phenomenon of doubling to provide a clue to the doctors' willingness to participate in medicalization at the extermination camps—that is, the legitimization of the killings. Whatever its validity as a concept of psycho-politics, as a heuristic device doubling does provide insight into one of the most puzzling aspects of the Final Solution. It was beyond Lifton's scope to estimate how representative the Nazi doctors he studied were of the German medical profession. He establishes that a good number of the doctors who were active in "euthanasia" and at the extermination camps were well-reputed professionally, even in academic circles. In spite of his painstaking research and intensive interviewing, Lifton does not profess to know to what extent these doctors were typical of German doctors under the Third Reich. He does speculate that German psychiatry was more directly involved with Nazi policies than the medical profession in general.[21]

[20] In a recent article, Zdenek Zofka concludes that Dr. Joseph Mengele was "neither a sadist nor fanatical National Socialist"—which, Zofka thinks, made his crimes at Auschwitz even more serious. See Zofka, "Der KZ-Arzt Joseph Mengele; zur Typologie eines NS-Verbrechers" [The concentration camp physician Joseph Mengele; aspects of the typology of a Nazi criminal], *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 34 (April 1986), 243-67, at 266-67.

[21] In a volume depicting the relations of the German medical profession with all kinds of

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Lifton views the behavior of the Nazi doctors as "an overall key to human evil." Through his analysis he hopes to have derived principles "that apply more widely—principles that speak to the extraordinary threat and potential for [nuclear] self-annihilation that now haunt mankind." A nuclear physicist may have experienced a form of doubling from which emerged his "nuclear-weapons self," causing him to become a proponent of nuclear weapons and nuclear strategies (pp. 424, 464).

The Nazi Holocaust "can help us avoid the next one." Our predicament with respect to nuclear weapons has resulted in doubling on all sides as "genocidal principles" have developed around us. These principles include, on the one hand, the fear of "contagious illness" such as Soviet communism (or American capitalism), which threatens the life of the nation; and, on the other hand, the promise of a "revitalizing cure via an absolutized vision ... that justifies 'killing them all'. ..." This kind of vision ("of American virtues and Soviet evil, or reverse") leads, once again, to the planning of mass killing in the name of healing (p. 503).

Like the Nazi doctors, the "killing professionals" are a part of society—the physicians, scientists, engineers, military leaders, lawyers, clergy, academics "who combine to create not only the technology of [nuclear] genocide *but much of its ideological rationale, moral climate, and organizational process*" (emphasis added). Also among us are the professional killers, the less knowledgeable hit men on the frontline of the killings. In the Holocaust, they did the shooting or inserted the gas pellets; in the case of nuclear annihilation, they will be ready and trained to carry out the tasks and scenarios formulated by the "killing professionals." No individual is inherently evil, murderous, or genocidal; but "under certain conditions virtually any self is capable of becoming all of these." It is not a problem of individual psychology, but of "collective currents" that press large numbers of people in the wrong direction (pp. 489-91, 497).

It comes as no surprise that Lifton extends his analysis of the Nazi doctors "beyond Auschwitz." Much of his work has been concerned with "nuclearism," a concept reflecting his fears of man's fatal relationship with nuclear weapons.[22] If one concludes from Robert Tucker's recent ac-

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aspects of the Nazi state, Fridolf Kudlieu concludes that it is impossible to determine the percentage of "real" Nazis among the physicians or the intensity of their commitment to Nazi doctrine. See Kudlieu, ed., *Ärzte im Nationalsozialismus* [Physicians under National Socialism] (Köln: Kiepenhauer & Witsch, 1985).

[22] Lifton, *Death in Life: Survivors of Hiroshima* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1967); *The Broken Connection* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1979); *Indefensible Weapons: The Political and Psychological Case Against Nuclearism*, with Richard Falk (New York: Basic Books, 1982);

count, *The Nuclear Debate*, that there are two basic positions with respect to man's view of his nuclear predicament—relying on "existential deterrence" or fearing "existential disaster"—Lifton clearly takes the latter.[23] He is close to such writers as Günther Anders, Jonathan Schell, Louis Beres, and George Kennan.[24]

Lifton's approach to nuclearism fits the functionalist view of the Final Solution in several ways. While acknowledging the role of perhaps more intentionalist factors such as relying on "genocidal principles" or fearing "contagious ideological illness," he is mainly concerned with the habits, the ambitions, and especially the organizational rationales and processes of the nuclear "killing professionals." These professionals, in turn, determine the routines of the implementors, the obedient "professional killers" who push the buttons.

This approach places Lifton fairly close to observers of the nuclear scene who are not necessarily believers in "existential disaster." Lord Zuckerman, for example, has denounced the scientists and technologists who "saw it to be their job" to propel the nuclear arms race and to preempt strategic decisions.[25] Similar charges have been voiced by Lawrence Freedman, Freeman Dyson, and Fred Kaplan, among others.[26] Paul Bracken has in truly functionalist terms worried about man's probable failure in attempting to command and control nuclear forces in times of crisis.[27]

Lifton's step beyond Auschwitz in the discussion of "killing professionals" is much more than a display of his antinuclearist stance dragged in at the end of a book on Nazi doctors. Lifton is convinced that there is an important connection between the Holocaust and the threatening nuclear catastrophe. More than any other writer, he has insisted that the les-

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*In a Dark Time*, with Nicholas Humphrey (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984); *The Future of Immortality* (New York: Basic Books, 1987).

[23] Those on the side of "existential deterrence" proclaim their trust in the stability of nuclear deterrence because of our very knowledge of the inordinate, uncontrollable destructiveness of nuclear weapons; the "deterrence faithful" believe in the strategic status quo and are hostile to what they term apocalyptic visions. Those fearing "existential disaster" argue that the very existence of nuclear weapons renders disaster inevitable; no "social contrivance" of man, such as nuclear deterrence, can go on indefinitely without a breakdown—a breakdown likely to have apocalyptic dimensions. See Robert W. Tucker, *The Nuclear Debate* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1985), 8-10.

[24] Anders, *Die atomare Drohung* [The nuclear threat] (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1981); Schell, *The Fate of the Earth* (New York: Avon Books, 1982); Beres, *Apocalypse* (University of Chicago Press, 1980); Kennan, *The Nuclear Delusion* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1983).

[25] Lord Solly Zuckerman, *Nuclear Illusion and Reality* (New York: Viking, 1982), 103-8.

[26] Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), xv, 214, 392-400; Dyson, *Weapons and Hope* (New York: Harper & Row, 1984), throughout; Kaplan, *The Wizards of Armageddon* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), throughout.

[27] Bracken, *The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces* (Yale University Press, 1983).

sons of the Jewish catastrophe must be applied to a develo
one—a connectedness that he demonstrated in his book o
shima survivors as early as 1967. It is the kind of connecte
many a student of the Final Solution. To those who have occ
selves with such total human and societal failure as affected
comes natural to draw parallels, to be fearful of a similar fail
spect to the nuclear predicament in its impact on man's moral
capabilities.

The functionalist mode of analyzing the Holocaust syst
links to the analysis of the nuclear milieu. In his current b
merely suggests such links. A work devoted to "nuclear doc
certainly be an appropriate sequel to *The Nazi Doctors*.

The extraordinary was handled during the Final Solutio
volved ordinary routines. The mighty and old-fashionedly
army did appear to be disturbed by the early misdeeds of
gruppen in Poland, but it was eager to tolerate and to adapt
killing of the entire Jewish population in the territories conc
the Russians after June 1941. Within Germany, the complex
state and party bureaucracies, many of them also proud of
sian" ethic, fitted readily into the outrageous procedures in
the Jews, which culminated in the act of deportation. Medic
implemented and legitimatized by the physicians, helped to
ble the crossing of the boundary toward the crassly unthi
events on the ramp and elsewhere at Treblinka, Auschwitz, a
extermination centers.

The Einsatzgruppen and their tolerant army bystanders
Krausnick and Wilhelm, the officials analyzed by Adler, and
studied by Lifton were undoubtedly influenced by the ideol
ings of their milieu and the long-range plans of the Nazi lead
the lines suggested by the intentionalist interpretation. But
into unprecedented brutality against their fellow men may
marily a consequence of factors stressed by the functionalists:
acceptance into their ordinary bureaucratic or professional un
most extraordinary steps, the kind that would ultimately lead
Solution.[28] In any case, a comprehension of the process of tr

[28] The debate between the functionalists and the intentionalists was oversh
hemence by the so-called *Historiker-Streit* (Historians' feud) of 1986. The k
were Jürgen Habermas and Ernst Nolte, but a wide array of historians and o
entered the fray. The feud was carried out at several academic conferences a
host of letters to the editors of such publications as the *Frankfurter Allgemei*
*Spiegel*, and *Die Zeit*. An article by Nolte in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*

the implementation of the "extraordinary" into the "ordinary, routine, and bureaucratic" should help us to understand genocidal acts other than the Holocaust, as well as sharpen our awareness of the probability of such acts' occurring in the future—in nuclear as well as non-nuclear ways.

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followed by a vehement response by Habermas in *Die Zeit* of July 11, 1986, set the stage. Habermas accused Nolte and some others of attempting to "trivialize" and "regularize" the Nazi period, particularly the Holocaust. Functionalists like Martin Broszat and Hans Mommsen and intentionalists like Klaus Hildebrand joined in the battle even though it did not really directly concern their disagreements.

An excellent coverage of the controversy, reflecting the intense concern of the West German academic world with the *Bewältigung* (overcoming) of the Nazi past, is provided in *Historiker-"Streit"* (Munich: R. Piper, 1987) (no editor listed). Cf. also Reinhard Kühnl, ed., *Vergangenheit, die nicht vergeht* [The past that does not pass away] (Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1987); also Hilmar Hoffmann, ed., *Gegen den Versuch, Vergangenheit zu verbiegen* [Against the attempt to distort the past] (Frankfurt am Main: Athenäum Verlag, 1987). Gordon Craig has described the feud in "The Battle of the German Historians," *New York Review of Books*, January 15, 1987.

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